Entrepreneurship Policy and its Discourse of Difference, Distinction and Domination

by
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Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of the West of Scotland for the award of Doctor of Philosophy

20th August 2021
Abstract

Commonly, entrepreneurship, or more specifically the formation of tech startups, has been attributed with economic growth and job creation by many policy makers in recent years due to their innovative and high-growth potential. Yet, in scientific literature this link remains widely debated, a fact that does not necessarily seem to inform public policy. Therefore, policy agendas targeting entrepreneurship and the process of policy articulation need to be subject to in-depth analysis. On the backdrop of foundational literature and current academic debate, this thesis critically interrogates how entrepreneurship policy stakeholders in Hamburg (Germany) feed a self-sustaining ecosystem based on sociotechnical imaginaries that are disconnected from reality. These imaginaries function as fictional expectations of the future and explain the disconnect between academic findings and policy practice and are uncovered as false motivators.

The author presents his critical discourse analysis and ethnographic methodology approach to uncover and identify the sociotechnical imaginaries inherent in the stakeholders’ discourse that serve the policy representatives within a network of actors to maintain or advance position and privilege. Through an analytical framework building on theories by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, the author reveals the discourse’s power relations, its institutional arrangements, and practices to unmask mechanisms of differentiation, distinction and domination that fuel the creation of misguided or even counterproductive public policy towards innovation and high-growth entrepreneurship. The study reveals a discourse that is so self-perpetuating that its rationality appears irrational as leaders find themselves in a locked logic that, as we also see with climate change, fails to take account of the evidence even when it appears irrefutable.

The study makes several contributes to knowledge. First, the evident disconnect between academic research on entrepreneurship policy and policy practice is investigated beyond analysing policy effectiveness and implementation failure and reveals underlying dynamics that shape the regional policy agenda. To make this debate more accessible to international audiences, the regional and German discourse is translated to English. Second, the study uses a unique methodological approach that combines document analysis with ethnographic covert observation, which has not been used within the context of entrepreneurship policy research. Third, the author provides a novel conceptualisation of an analytical framework suited to investigate socially constructed ecosystems by combining the social theories of Foucault and Bourdieu. Given that this study is applying theories by Foucault and Bourdieu to constitute its analytical framework, limitations are self-evident and make it inappropriate to generalise any findings. Still, further research could explore other socially constructed ecosystems and networks to gain additional and complementary insights to further triangulate findings.

Keywords: sociotechnical imaginaries, entrepreneurship, metrification, entrepreneurship policy, policy discourse, critical discourse analysis
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Finally, I emphasize that this work would not have been possible without the unconditional support of my partner, who supported me on both intellectual and personal levels, despite the considerable hardship and personal neglect this research entailed. I am sincerely grateful and offer thanks in love and admiration.
Author Declaration

The undersigned hereby certifies that this thesis is an original piece of work and an outcome of research conducted by the undersigned with all reference materials listed and acknowledged. The document is compliant with guidelines and requirements of the University of the West of Scotland’s Doctoral College and the British Library’s Standards Office.

Signed: Moritz Philip Recke

Dated: 20/08/2021
List of Publications

The author lists the following publications in direct correspondence with the presented study. In addition to prior research conducted in the field (Recke 2016; Recke & Bliemel 2017, 2018), these publications constitute the aim of the study, the methodological approach as well as initial findings.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACERE</strong></td>
<td>Australian Entrepreneurship Research Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BFHH</strong></td>
<td>Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg (City Parliament of Hamburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIS</strong></td>
<td>Behörde für Inneres und Sport Hamburg (Ministry of Interior and Sport Hamburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BKM</strong></td>
<td>Behörde für Kultur und Medien Hamburg, zuvor Behörde für Kultur (Ministry of Culture and Media Hamburg, formerly Ministry of Culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BSU</strong></td>
<td>Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt Hamburg (Ministry of Urban Development and Environment Hamburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BSW</strong></td>
<td>Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen Hamburg (Ministry of Urban Development and Living Hamburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BUE</strong></td>
<td>Behörde für Umwelt und Energie Hamburg (Ministry of Environment and Energy Hamburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BWFG</strong></td>
<td>Behörde für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Gleichstellung Hamburg (Ministry of Science, Research and Equality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BWVI</strong></td>
<td>Behörde für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Innovation Hamburg (Ministry of Economy, Transport and Innovation Hamburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CDU</strong></td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DESY</strong></td>
<td>Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (German Electron Synchrotron)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DPA</strong></td>
<td>Deutsche Presse-Agentur (German News Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DSM</strong></td>
<td>Deutscher Startup Monitor (German Startup Monitor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECCE</strong></td>
<td>European Center for Creative Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EFRE</strong></td>
<td>Europäische Fonds für regionale Entwicklung (European Regional Development Fund (ERDF))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUR</strong></td>
<td>Euro</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GDP</strong></td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td><strong>GEM</strong></td>
<td>Global Entrepreneurship Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;T</td>
<td>Science &amp; Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAANZ</td>
<td>Small Enterprise Association of Australia and New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKHH</td>
<td>Senatskanzlei Hamburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKHH</td>
<td>Senate Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Junior Achievement Young Enterprise Student Mini-Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEAM</td>
<td>Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts and Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Science and Technology Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUHH</td>
<td>Technische Universität Hamburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUHH</td>
<td>Hamburg University of Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHH</td>
<td>Universität Hamburg</td>
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<td>UHH</td>
<td>University of Hamburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKE</td>
<td>Universitätsklinikum Hamburg Eppendorf</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKE</td>
<td>University Medical Center Hamburg Eppendorf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Venture Capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDE</td>
<td>Verband der Elektrotechnik Elektronik Informationstechnik e.V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDE</td>
<td>Association of Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDI</td>
<td>Verein Deutscher Ingenieure e.V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDI</td>
<td>Association of German Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WK</td>
<td>Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt (WK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WK</td>
<td>Hamburg’s Real Estate Development Bank</td>
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1. Introduction:
Dynamics of Entrepreneurship Policy Discourse

This thesis examines the complex interrelations within the discourse of public policy towards entrepreneurship in Hamburg (Germany). Its primary purpose is to gain deeper insights into the policy formation process and unmask the inner workings of the public policy discourse that is operated as a closed network and creates a policy agenda that is disconnected from reality. The study builds upon previous research done by the author. The author analysed the public policy towards entrepreneurship in Sydney, Australia, in a 2016 case study of the City of Sydney's Tech Startups Action Plan. The study was first published as a peer-reviewed article at the ACERE conference in Melbourne in February 2017 (Recke & Bliemel 2017) and issued as an updated version as a book chapter in 2018 as part of the SEAANZ Research Book Series (Recke & Bliemel 2018). In his master thesis, the author furthermore analysed the setup of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Hamburg and evaluated the regional and national policy agenda towards entrepreneurship (Recke 2016). In both cases the author showcased how implemented policies neglect to account for issues raised by scholars such as Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen (2007), Shane (2008, 2009), Mason & Brown (2013, 2014), Brown & Mawson (2013, 2015), Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko (2015), Morris et al. (2016), Autio & Rannikko (2016), among others and seemed ignorant of empirical evidence contradicting the policy alignment.

Noticing the gap between policy research and practice and identifying recurring patterns of wishful thinking and overenthusiastic views on innovation and entrepreneurship, the author aims to explore the regional entrepreneurship policy agenda beyond misalignment or implementation failure. Since empirical evidence is well established and various policy orientations have been ideated and investigated by scholars, the lack of consideration in policy formulation sparked critical interest to investigate what mechanisms and narratives govern the regional discourse on entrepreneurship policy and motivate actors within entrepreneurship policy ecosystems in the city of Hamburg to align under certain phrase regimes, institutional arrangements, and power dynamics.

The following introductory sections will present the overall context of the study, the thesis’ aim, and objectives as well as the general roadmap of the manuscript to navigate the research process and knowledge formation presented by the author.

1.1 Entrepreneurship Policy Discourse

For many years, entrepreneurship, more specifically the formation of tech startups, has often been attributed with economic growth and job creation due to their high-growth potential by many policy makers in the world. Still, this link is widely debated in scientific literature, which does
not necessarily seem to inform public policy. The debate can be traced back to Birch (1979), who published paradigm-shifting evidence (Coad et al. 2014; Landström 2005; Ács & Mueller 2008) in 1979 that small firms in the U.S. were more relevant to job creation than large firms, a notion that remained highly controversial over the years. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) provided empirical evidence on the link between entrepreneurial activity and economic growth at the country level in 2000 (Reynolds et al. 2000). Kane (2010) established from U.S. employment data that job growth is in fact solely driven by organically growing startup firms and went so far as to claim all other firms to be de-facto job destroyers. He argued that an average of 3 million new jobs are created by startups each year, while 1 million jobs per year are lost by all other firms combined. Consequently, he argues that any effective public policy must entail an essential consideration for startup firms. Many researchers have substantiated in their research however that high-growth entrepreneurship does indeed disproportionately impact innovative change and economic growth (Autio 2005; Stam 2007; Stam et al. 2007; Shane 2008; Henrekson & Johansson 2010) while other types of entrepreneurship do not. As the vast majority of small firms do not grow (or only grow very slowly), only few high-growth ventures drive job creation and economic contribution (Ács, Parsons & Tracy 2008; Ács & Mueller 2008; G. Mason, Bishop & Robinson 2009; Coad 2009; Coad et al. 2014). Even though the critical relevance of high-growth ventures for economic growth is well established in empirical studies and the general orientation towards supporting high-growth ventures being common among policy makers, there are only very few public policy agendas that target high-growth firms explicitly or exclusively (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007; Kösters 2010).

As public policies towards entrepreneurship are often not very effective (Massa & Testa 2008; Arshed, Carter & Mason 2014, 2016) regarding firm-growth and job creation within entrepreneurial ecosystems, it seems prudent to analyse the creation of these policy agendas in greater detail to understand what drives the policy formation process. As Cox (1993) points out, city governments are more and more driven by global rather than regional conditions. Considering activities in other regions, cities need to be more competitive to secure capital flow, economic growth, and job creation. Hall & Hubbert (1996) have shown that public entities in fact take forms of a more entrepreneurial government, focusing on risk-taking and inventiveness, to encourage regional development and innovation.

As Borup et al. (2006) point out, innovation in science and technology is future-oriented and therefore based on expectations and visions that are essential to mobilising resources at macro (e.g. national politics), meso (e.g. industry sectors) and micro (e.g. engineering groups or single engineers) levels. Beckert (2013a, 2013b) calls the capacity to imagine future states of the world the central cornerstone of macroeconomic dynamics. In his view, imaginaries of the future are used as a basis for strategic decisions although the outcomes are impossible to calculate in the present. Imaginaries subsequently serve as motivation for actors in narrative forms such as stories, theories or discourses and can be understood as a source for economic dynamics and growth. This
approach is not limited to technoscientific imaginaries, it is always linked to visions of the social world as well, essentially articulating what is good and bad, which is why Jasanoff, Kim & Sperling (2007) call them sociotechnical imaginaries.

As Armstrong (2005) points out, entrepreneurship is considered as the answer of choice in neo-liberal policy discourses, reflected in policy agendas such as the European Union Lisbon Agenda 2000, aiming to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” (European Council 2000). This in itself might be considered as an imaginary. Weiskopf and Steyaert (2009) show that recent academic research targeted to uncover entrepreneurial success leads to this optimistic policy orientation. These policies tend to articulate common goals & expectations for the future while neglecting to implement formal measures to track the effectiveness of such programs, subsequently leaving negative outcomes of entrepreneurship as unintended and agentless (Jasanoff, Kim & Sperling 2007). Considering the pressure on many regional policy makers regarding economic development, the effects might be even worse. Legitimation pressure can in fact lead to decisions based on wishful thinking despite contradicting indications as Piotti (2009) found out.

Tangents of debate and findings from empirical investigation of entrepreneurship policy agendas indicate a gap between academic findings and policy practice. They also indicate that while intentions and goals between policy makers and researchers may be aligned on fostering economic growth and job creation, different factors seem to drive the policy formulation process itself. If imaginaries, that may not be grounded on reality but rather are fictions of desirable future states, serve as motivators for actors or as exploitable narratives to base policy on, a more in-depth investigation of the policy formation process and the inherent discourse reveals more insights than diagnosing policy misalignment and analysing implementation failures. Therefore, the author presents his investigation into the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg that is driven by a self-sustaining network of actors that repetitively articulates and replicates the discourse along a policy trajectory that serves the involved stakeholders to secure, maintain and advance position and privilege through mechanisms of distinction and domination.

1.2 Why Entrepreneurship Policy Discourse in Hamburg?

The study spawned out of more than ten years of professional experience, both on operational and managerial levels in media and digital industries. In various roles the author was involved in aspects of the entrepreneurial economy, e.g. as co-founder of a startup firm, as a manager tasked with integrating acquired companies within corporate structures or as a supervisory manager in portfolio firms, providing guidance and oversight from a shareholder perspective. In these functions he was involved in aspects such as product development, market introductions, marketing, sales as well as investing in companies, raising money from investors, accessing public subsidy funds, participating in pitches, competitions, or awards among others. This extensive
experience allows for an in-depth understanding of organisational, operational, and cultural processes within entrepreneurial ecosystems as well as investment and growth cycles of firms from newly created to growth and mature states.

Due to his previous academic and professional experience, the author has unique access to government, industry, and university stakeholders in Hamburg in terms of the triple helix approach or its derivatives (Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013; Carayannis & Campbell 2010). Also, in respect to quadruple-helix configurations in terms of Carayannis & Campbell (2009), the author gained experience in the society domain as he participated in various political public participation projects or citizen research initiatives and was involved in setting up technical infrastructure for high-profile innovation projects of local universities with public participation components. Not only does the author have substantial experience in the media/IT industry both as a professional and as an executive manager, but he can also build upon his access to regional networks of entities providing technological foundation for the location of technology startups in the region as well as additional access provided by his academic supervisors. The unique opportunity for insights allows an in-depth qualitative analysis of the factors at play that shape the setup and future development of entrepreneurship policy agenda towards high-growth entrepreneurship in Hamburg. The author built on his professional and entrepreneurial background in the regional ecosystem to embed his research approach in a strong theoretical foundation as well as perspectives gained in professional practice.

Various empirical studies substantiate that high-growth firms are relevant for job creation and economic growth, while it has also been shown that the vast majority of all new firms have very little economic impact since they neither grow nor innovate (Autio 2005; Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007; Stam et al. 2007; Henrekson & Johansson 2010). This calls into question public policy agendas all over the western world that promote entrepreneurship (Gilbert et al. 2004), since most do not target high-growth firms explicitly or exclusively (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007) but rather take a general approach to foster general entrepreneurial activity. In this respect, Hamburg is no exception. Public policy measures in Hamburg do mention the relevance of high-growth ventures for economic growth but still focus on generally increasing the number of startups, while remaining vague about the entailed definitions for terms like startup and innovation and providing very limited (if any) metrics to practically measure the impact of the policy (Recke 2016; 2020b). Arshed, Carter & Mason (2016) acknowledge that evaluation is vital to good policy implementation but point out that public policy evaluations often only consider short-term or unsuitable indicators to measure policy effectiveness, thus rendering hope of systematic learning from previous policy measures unlikely. This is in line with the author’s previous findings. However, the policy effectiveness and potential implementation failures are not the primary focus of the outlined research.

Public measures to foster entrepreneurship in Hamburg are to a large degree symbolic policy based on sociotechnical imaginaries that are not checked for practicability and real-world
effect but rather feed a self-sustaining policy ecosystem. The regional public policy agenda towards entrepreneurship is not guided by previous success but rather actionable narratives of the past. To understand the underlying mechanics and hidden imaginaries that inform the policy discourse is of high relevance, as most entrepreneurship policy studies largely focus only on effectiveness of policy itself or implementation failure, while little is known about the formulation phase of public policy, a key factor according to Arshed, Carter & Mason (2014) and arguably a very complex and messy process (Lundstrom & Stevenson 2005). Unmasking the discourse among policy stakeholders in Hamburg provides a major contribution towards a better understanding of entrepreneurship policy formulation and reveals new insights into reasons for entrepreneurship policy ineffectiveness.

1.3 Research Aim and Objectives

If academic research on public policy effectiveness does not inform public policy makers, it calls into question what presumptions the formulated policy agendas are based on and whether they can be effective or even relevant. Building on the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff, Kim & Sperling 2007; Jasanoff et al. 2015) as motivational drivers that are commonly shared among involved stakeholders in the closed networks within the policy formation process, the thesis aims to critically interrogate how entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg reflects a policy paradox that fosters symbolic rather than practical “real world” economic growth while perpetuating a self-sustaining discourse and capitals of sociotechnical imaginaries and the policy ecosystem itself. As such, stakeholders involved in the policy formation utilise exploitable narratives in form of fictional expectations of a better world to come to align and legitimise their agenda, articulate easy to please metrics and establish a phrase regime that governs the discourse. The resulting policy agenda is disconnected from reality and rather serves stakeholders to maintain or advance position, power, and privilege through mechanisms of differentiation, distinction, and domination.

The investigation takes advantage of an analytical coupling of theories by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu to deconstruct the discourse dynamics and power structures as they present themselves in public archives of policy documents and abstract levels of policy analysis as well as in embodied practices within the field of entrepreneurship policy. This analytical lens serves to reveal the self-sustaining nature of the discourse and its core field of power.

To achieve the aim of the thesis, a series of objectives have been identified. These are:

1. Discuss foundational literature on entrepreneurship and its practice;
2. Outline primary western entrepreneurship policy agendas and institutional arrangements relevant to their formation;
3. Contextualise regional innovation theory and imaginaries with entrepreneurship policy;
4. Articulate the research perspective underpinning the study and the coupling of theories by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu as an analytical framework;
5. Map the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem in Hamburg (Germany);
6. Methodologically situate the study through an empirical investigation of institutional structures, strategic processes, practices and primary stakeholders of Hamburg’s entrepreneurship policy;
7. Develop and critically interrogate findings of the study through the analytical framework drawing upon theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu.

The outlined objectives serve to analyse the historical development of the public policy agenda towards entrepreneurship in Hamburg, identify the discourse phrase regime and power relations and uncover how entrepreneurship policy stakeholders in Hamburg feed a self-sustaining ecosystem based on sociotechnical imaginaries that are disconnected from reality and fuel the creation of misguided or even counterproductive public policy towards innovation and high-growth entrepreneurship.

The following segment will introduce a roadmap of the thesis, how the research process was organised and how knowledge was generated by addressing the objectives stated above.

1.4 Research Process & Knowledge Formation

The study is structured along the sequence of objectives outlined in the above segment and follows a conceptual funnel from the abstract to the specific and from the global to the local. Contextualised on the backdrop of foundational literature and current state of academic debate, the local specificities of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg are explored. The overall process and knowledge formation can be described along the following roadmap of the thesis (see figure 1.1).

![Figure 1.1: Overall structure of the author’s thesis and its six chapters.](image-url)
Objectives 1 - 3 are addressed in chapter 2 through an in-depth review of the literature of entrepreneurship, its theoretical origin and connection to innovation, entrepreneurial practice, the role of the entrepreneur, new firm formation and entrepreneurialism as a phenomenon. The professionalisation of entrepreneurship in policy and education is reviewed and the gap between policy research and practice is discussed. Additionally, regional innovation theories, such as industry clusters, the triple helix approach and entrepreneurial ecosystems, and concepts of imaginaries are reviewed and contextualised for their relevance to entrepreneurship policy formulation and the discourse under investigation.

Objective 4 is addressed in chapter 3 by articulating the theoretical perspective informing the study and presenting ontological and epistemological assumptions, the research strategy and methodological approach, research methods as well as research execution. The author presents his approach of combining a critical discourse analysis with a complementary component of ethnographic observations to interrogate how entrepreneurship policy is shaped in Hamburg. The approach is embedded in the author’s analytical framework presented in chapter 4, introducing the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, and arguing for an analytical coupling to establish the analytical framework for the empirical investigation of the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg.

Objectives 5-7 are addressed in chapter 5, which presents the empirical investigation, the collected data and analysis. First, the city of Hamburg is contextualised, and the current state of its entrepreneurship policy agenda is presented on the backdrop of foundational literature discussed in chapter 2. Then, entities and stakeholders in the entrepreneurship policy terrain are presented to map the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem, its network of actors and the core field of power in the discourse under investigation. The institutional structures and their interrelations are presented and geographically allocated and classified using the conceptual backdrop of innovation theories discussed in chapter 2. Along themes of local discursivity, the entrepreneurship policy discourse, its processes, practices, and phrase regimes are presented through narrative themes commonly adopted by stakeholders and entities that articulate aspirations and goals. These themes evolved over time and are presented in the form of a history to establish the trajectory of the discourse and develop and discuss findings through the author’s analytical framework, drawing upon Foucault and Bourdieu, presented in chapter 4.

Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary of critical findings and establishes how the study contributed to both academia and practice with relevant and novel insights from a perspective of implications as well as methodology. Reflections on areas for further research contextualise the study.

Following this structure, the thesis systematically approaches the overall concepts of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship policy as well as the global and ubiquitous phenomenon of entrepreneurialism and fictional expectations of the future, to drill down to the locally contingent incarnation of regional policy formation and the discursive approach towards
innovation and entrepreneurship in Hamburg to reveal how the backdrop provides means to establish discourse practices, phrase regimes and power structures that serve a self-sustaining network of actors rather than what the backdrop would suggest. Despite claiming to be inclusive as well as fostering welfare and economic development, the discourse is unmasked as self-serving above all.

The study presented in this study is conducted on the premise to avoid rehearsing old grounds. While replicative studies investigating policy effectiveness on both quantitative and qualitative levels would also have been possible to gain additional insights specific to entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg, the authors aims to provide deeper insights and valuable contribution to knowledge with the investigation of underlying dynamics in the entrepreneurship policy formation process in the city of Hamburg. The study hence goes beyond effectiveness, policy metrics and implementation failure but accentuates the motivational side of policy creation as socially constructed process. In addition to unmasking the self-perpetuating nature of the political process as a contribution of knowledge, the study also provided a unique and previously unattempted methodological approach through the combination of document analysis and ethnographic observations to constitute the critical discourse analysis. Coined an entrepreneurial ethnography by the authors, the approach provides insights for research methodologists and provided a novel perspective on investigating network of actors in condensed discourse communities. Also the analytical framework building on theories by Foucault and Bourdieu is an unusual coupling and a contribution to knowledge and a novel way to analyse socially constructed ecosystems, such as the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. Lastly, the study also translates elements of regional German political discourse into the English language. As the author translated relevant textual document, the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg becomes more accessible to wider audience of interested academics and practitioners, allowing more comparative analysis in further studies.
2. The Era of Entrepreneurialism and Visions of the Future

For a better understanding of the conceptual context for the study, the most relevant notions of discourse around entrepreneurship and the related academic fields will be highlighted in this chapter. The proposed research is interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary (Wickson, Carew & Russel 2006; Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008; Nicolescu & Ertas 2013) in nature and transcends beyond typical boundaries of singular fields of research such as economic, social or policy studies. Within the general discourse of entrepreneurship policy, the areas of highest importance are:

1. entrepreneurship policy studies, which focus on configuration, implementation and effectiveness of public policy agendas towards innovation and entrepreneurship;
2. entrepreneurship education, which relates to measures in education to foster entrepreneurship and teach entrepreneurial skills;
3. the triple helix approach and its derivatives, which analyse dependencies between industry, government and university and their complex relations in the process of generating knowledge spill over (economically exploitable innovation);
4. the entrepreneurial ecosystem approach, which focuses on the structural setup of regional entrepreneurial ecosystems and the complex interrelations of its various entities and individual stakeholders; and lastly
5. the concept of imaginaries, which describes shared motivational (or even performative) visions of the future.

All these fields can be seen in the context of more general entrepreneurship studies that focus on the role of the individual entrepreneur and the (increasingly critical) perception of entrepreneurship in general. They highlight the overall nature of current entrepreneurship discourse that could be seen as a premise for an era of entrepreneurialism, the ubiquitous penetration of entrepreneurship in all areas of social life.

In the following sections, the most relevant aspects of the listed fields will be introduced to create context for the study. By no means is this introduction meant to be a complete discussion of the specific academic fields, it rather points out the salient aspects to be considered for the outlined investigation as they entail recursively applied discursive elements that appear in the discourse under investigation by the author, namely the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg.
2.1 Entrepreneurship and the Era of Entrepreneurialism

Notions of entrepreneurship are ubiquitous these days and seem synonymous with innovation, progress, and creation of new firms, or rather startups, as en vogue pursuits of happiness. This is evidenced not just by extensive media coverage but also popular movies, e.g. Pirates of Silicon Valley (1999), August (2008), The Social Network (2010), or tv drama series evolving around startups, e.g. HBO’s Silicon Valley (US) or Sony Crackle’s Startup (US), as well as reality tv shows with aspiring entrepreneurs pitching their ideas to investors, e.g. ABC’s Shark Tank (US), BBC’s Dragon’s Den (UK), Apple’s Planet of the Apps (US) or VOX’s Die Höhle der Löwen (Germany) or documentaries, e.g. Startup.com (2001) or The Startup Kids (2013). The entrepreneurial culture seems no longer limited to founders, business owners or investors but is open to anyone “confronting ignorance born of not knowing the answers to the difficult questions posed by the digital revolution” (Formica 2020a, p.100). As such, traditional and elite institutions, policymakers, and their dominant discourse is open to challenge and resistance as revealed with the author’s study. Without attempting to provide a conclusive genealogy of the field of entrepreneurship, it seems appropriate to elaborate on the genesis of entrepreneurship as a phenomenon and define the main vocabulary to contextualise the study at hand.

2.1.1 The Origins of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research

Even though it is safe to say, that mankind was always involved in the process of creating, discovering and exploiting opportunities, the notion of entrepreneurship as a theoretical concept can be traced back at least to the eighteenth century, with the first commonly accepted important publication on entrepreneurship by French national Richard Cantillon, Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général (1730), positioning the entrepreneur as a person accepting risks in light of an opportunity in an uncertain future (Carlsson et al. 2013). Another early publication, Traité d’Économie Politique (1803), by fellow French national Jean-Baptise Say described the entrepreneur as the coordinator in the goods production and distribution process (Masurel 2019a). As such, it is no surprise that the term entrepreneur is of French origin and relates to the French verb “entreprendre” which translates as “to undertake”, “to set about” or “to go to work on” in the Cambridge Dictionary (dictionary.cambridge.org). The same dictionary translates entrepreneur as “a person who starts or organizes a business company, especially one involving risk”, very much in line with even the earliest notions of entrepreneurship from Cantillon, as well as to “contractor” as “a person or firm that promises to do work or supply goods at a fixed rate”. Even though this may seem a bit contradictory, it might in fact accurately describe many modern forms of entrepreneurial activities, for example freelance workers or other forms of self-employment. Another most critical contribution to our understanding of entrepreneurship (Carlsson et al. 2013) was made by Austrian political economist Joseph Alois Schumpeter with his works The Theory of Economic Development (1934) or Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1943) among others. He accentuated the relationship between entrepreneurship and innovation
which drives change and generates economic growth (Shane, Locke & Collins 2003), as in going from something less to something more (Masurel 2019a). Schumpeter also highlights that entrepreneurship is not just discovery of opportunity, but even more so the will and the provision of leadership to take advantage of such opportunities, and therefore considers the entrepreneur a leader in the economic field (Choi 2003), a notion later critiqued and better developed by Kirzner (1973; 1979; Carlsson et al. 2013). As such entrepreneurship can be understood, along Schumpeter's work, as a process that equilibrates supply and demand (Kirzner 1997) and converts knowledge into products and services (Shane & Venkataraman 2000).

All in all, entrepreneurship can be seen as a young academic field, with its emergence in the 1930s and major publications arising in the 1970s and 1980s (Gupta et al. 2017), following rapid extension since the 1990s (Davidsson, Delmar & Wiklund 2006). Even though an extensive body of research and publications has been accumulated over the decades, no consensus on a definition of entrepreneurship has been reached, an obstacle to creating a coherent conceptual framework for the entrepreneurship field in academia (Shane & Venkataraman 2000). To contextualize the general notions of entrepreneurship for the study at hand, the author is adopting the recent definition provided by Masurel that positions entrepreneurship as “the creation, discovery and exploitation of value-adding opportunities” (Masurel 2019a, p.16). He traces this definition back to work by Shane & Venataraman, who coined entrepreneurship as “concerned with the discovery and exploitation of profitable opportunities” (Shane & Venkataraman 2000, p.217) and Avarez & Barney (2007), who accentuated implications from theories of discovery and creation on entrepreneurial action, and acknowledges his own extension through integrating notions of sustainable entrepreneurship, notions also supported by Chell (2007), calling for consideration of both economic and social value in entrepreneurship concepts. Creation is certainly linked to different types of innovation that can be distinguished based on work by Schumpeter and involves “competitive imperfections in markets [...] created by the actions of entrepreneurs” (Alvarez & Barney 2007, p.12), also considered in Butos’ notion (2003) of entrepreneurs not just discovering existing knowledge but also generating new knowledge. Discovery then rather accentuates application of something already existing in a new context, a notion descending from Kirzer’s thoughts (1997) of equilibrating supply and demand through entrepreneurial discovery. Exploitation refers to the extraction of value from an entrepreneurial idea, value-adding can be seen as worth or usefulness, such as economic value, social value, and ecological value, and lastly opportunities are favourable circumstances (Masurel 2019a), that “represent potentialities for profit making” (Shane, Locke & Collins 2003, p.260).

As it seems evident that this definition is strongly linked to innovation, the author adopts the definition of innovation as “successful market introduction of something new” (Masurel 2019a, p.19). According to Masurel, the successful introduction caters to actual adoption of whatever new is introduced in the market, as in a willingness to buy and use the innovation. New is more complex to elaborate but may be seen as either new to the firm (internally new) or to
local, regional, national, or international context (externally new) or radically, as in disruptive and not comparable to anything before, or incrementally new, as in related to preceding innovation and not completely new, according to Masurel (2019a). Building on Schumpeter and many scholars in his lineage, Masurel points towards six different types of innovation that incorporate some extension to include more recent economic developments, namely new products, or services; new production processes; new markets; new inputs; new organisations; and new brands. The notion of innovation is also often linked to the triple helix concept and ideas for open innovation and ecosystems, which will be elaborated on later in section 2.3. However, now the notion of new firm formation and the role of the entrepreneur as a practitioner will be reviewed.

2.1.2 New Firms and the Entrepreneur as a Practitioner

Any entrepreneurial activity is a phenomenon that extends in spatial, as in local, regional, national, or international environments; as well as social, as in micro-level of family, friends, and all kinds of networks of different sizes; and time dimensions (Kuckertz, Berger & Prochotta 2020). As such, entrepreneurship deals with starting new firms, which are primarily characterized as “non-large businesses” (Welsh & White 1981) and differ from large business not just in quantitative measures (size) but also qualitative dimensions (Masurel 2019a). Different quantitative classifications exist, depending on region and context. In Europe, the small business is used to describe small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with medium-sized firms having less than 250 employees and an annual turnover of less than 50 million euros, small firms having less than 50 employees and an annual turnover of less than 10 million euros and micro firms having less than 10 employees and an annual turnover of less than 2 million euros (European Commission 2006a). In total, 99% of all businesses in the EU are SMEs (Eurostat 2020). In a qualitative dimension, various special conditions of small businesses exist, such as the dimensions of resource poverty described by Welsh and White (1981). Other relevant dimensions may be the strong regional focus of small firms, accentuation of short term over long term business planning and of course the role of the entrepreneur in his role as owner and manager of the firm, contrasting management boards, shareholders etc. in large firms (Masurel 2019a). In comparison to larger businesses, also performance measuring is more complicated for small firms and notwithstanding an extensive debate, it seems that firm growth in general is used as the most prominent metric to measure performance of small businesses (Masurel 2019a). Following Masurel, the dynamic development of a firm over time may be described with a conceptual four stage life cycle:

1. startup stage, characterised by small size and young age;
2. growth stage, characterised by employing more people and some years of existence;
3. maturity stage, characterised by a stabilised number of employees; and
4. decline stage, characterised by shrinking number of employees, nearing the end of its existence.
Notions of the life cycle can be traced back to Greiner’s *Evolution and Revolution as Organizations Grow* (1972), who accentuated a “revolutionary stage” between any “evolutionary stage”, pointing towards progress through crisis in the firm, and other scholars, such as Churchill & Lewis (1983) or Scott & Bruce (1987). To measure a firm's progression over its lifetime, the dimensions of time and growth are mostly used (Masurel 2019a), in which context Shepherd & Wiklund (2009) point out that the level of sales is the most prominent indicator for growth, ahead of number of employees profits or other indicators. Special consideration must be given to the specific kind of rapid growth, as firms classified by this characteristic - often called “gazelles” in the literature - have strong impact in economic development (Ács & Mueller 2008; Henrekson & Johansson 2010). Most relevantly, the life cycle stage is linked to assumed levels of investment risks according to Jones, Macpherson & Jayawarna (2014) who point out that risk is lower the more mature a company becomes. As such, it makes sense that firms have to attract different types of investment in each stage, from personal finance, family and friends or bootstrapping to seed capital, public/grant funding, business angels, formal venture capitalists, commercial banks and IPO or initial public offering (Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko 2015; Masurel 2019a).

Obviously, the entrepreneur itself is critical to any entrepreneurial activity and despite the general notion that he is engaging in entrepreneurial practice, there is a widespread body of research exploring the different types of entrepreneurs, their motivation, and dispositions. Yet, there are attempts to establish typologies of entrepreneurs, for which the author is drawing on Masurel’s approach (2019a). Notwithstanding that lines may be blurry and any entrepreneur may be appurtenant to multiple types, he distinguishes seven main types that are prominent in recent literature, which are:

1. nascent entrepreneur, as in a person seriously considering starting his own firm;
2. new entrepreneur, as in someone recently starting a firm without prior entrepreneurial experience;
3. serial entrepreneur, as in someone who left his won firm and later starts another firm;
4. portfolio entrepreneur, as in someone who starts another firm while maintaining the old firm;
5. former entrepreneur, as in someone once had a firm but now doesn’t;
6. gazelle entrepreneur, as in someone who runs a rapidly growing firm;
7. stable entrepreneur, as in someone maintaining a more or less stable firm;

Masurel then adds an additional typology of 11 types:

1. accidental entrepreneur, as in someone who did not consider starting a firm but in the end did it;
2. hybrid entrepreneur, as in someone operating his own firm while being otherwise employed;
3. *lifestyle entrepreneur*, as in someone who make their firm depend on their life circumstance;
4. criminal entrepreneur, as in someone operating outside the law;
5. sustainable entrepreneur, as in someone working according to principles of sustainability;
6. social entrepreneur, as in someone contributing to a better world;
7. student entrepreneur, as in someone operating his firm while studying;

and also employees claiming entrepreneurial roles within their employer’s environments as

8. corporate entrepreneur;
9. academic entrepreneur;
10. pulicpreneur; *and*
11. governpreneur.

The literature also points out that the entrepreneur has different roles within his firm that shift with different development stages of the firm: 1. the role of the professional, most prominent in the startup stage where the entrepreneur may often be the only person or one of few deeply involved in the daily work; 2. the role of the leader, most prominent in the growth stage where the entrepreneur makes important choices about the future of the firm; and 3. the role of the manager, most relevant in the maturity stage where the entrepreneur has a number of employees to be managed (Masurel 2019a). Beyond his role, the entrepreneur needs specific competencies, of which most prominently a list presented by Shane, Locke & Collins (2003) in the context of accentuating human agency within the entrepreneurial phenomenon can be considered. It consists of need for achievement; risk-taking propensity; tolerance for ambiguity; internal locus of control; self-efficacy; goal setting; independence; drive; and egoistic passion. To this, Masurel adds few more (2019a), notwithstanding that there could be many others: empathy; social commitment; team spirit; patience; perseverance; imagination; and emotional stability.

In regard to motivation for starting entrepreneurial activity as well as for the majority of decision by entrepreneurs, the literature distinguishes between pull factors, as in positive motivation that attract individuals to freely choose to behave in specific ways in light of available alternatives because of recognised opportunities, and push factors, as in negative motivation that pressures individuals to behave in a certain way towards an alternative situation that is more attractive than the current one, which help to distinguish between opportunity-driven and necessity-driven entrepreneurs (Kirkwood 2009; Dawson & Henley 2012; Masurel 2019a).

The next section will introduce the phenomenon of entrepreneurialism, and the increasingly ubiquitous notion of entrepreneurship in all areas of social life.
2.1.3 Entrepreneurialism and the Ubiquitousness of Entrepreneurship

In the literature there is another term of relevance, that is to be mentioned, namely entrepreneurialism. Without providing a unified definition or conceptual context, it is identified with qualities essential to compete and create successful businesses and used increasingly to associate entrepreneurial attributes to sometimes closely, sometimes only loosely connected contexts, resulting in some considering the concept of entrepreneurialism as void (Woods & Nelson 2013). However, Woods (2011) associates three factors with entrepreneurialism, namely energy, creative visualisation of change and mobilising resources and their interrelations that as such embody cultural change through generic skills and predispositions such as creativity, a solution-oriented attitude, willingness to take on risks, ability to work in teams and having a mindset to seize opportunities, which are relevant beyond business (Woods & Nelson 2013). He also highlights the mentality to see the world as changeable as an integral component to entrepreneurialism (Woods 2011). As such, this concept seems to be closely linked to entrepreneurial leadership, commonly attributed with passionate motivation and commitment to action, tolerance of risk and opportunity awareness, which are linked to the previously described role of the entrepreneur as a leader or various of the entrepreneurial competencies, like need for achievement, risk-taking propensity, tolerance for ambiguity or drive (Shane, Locke & Collins 2003). Woods & Nelson (2013) then argue to see the concept of entrepreneurialism not just related to characteristics of individuals but rather extended towards structural features of context, such as organisational and cultural environments, values, and ideas, and describe entrepreneurialism as a product of ongoing interactions in a wider discourse. To that extent Woods & Nelson provide a typology, highlighting that different visions of entrepreneurialism are based on different values, for example accentuating social or sustainability dimensions:

1. business entrepreneurialism;
2. cultural entrepreneurialism, as in entrepreneurial activity addressing particular ideas such as ecology or specific philosophical or even religious beliefs;
3. social entrepreneurialism, as in entrepreneurial activity aimed at addressing specific social problems;
4. public entrepreneurialism, as in entrepreneurial activity aimed at operationalizing, advancing and sustaining of public aims; or even
5. democratic entrepreneurialism, as in entrepreneurial activity incorporating holistic growth and meaning and participation of people in co-creating their world around.

This overall phenomenon of entrepreneurialism is closely linked to the study at hand, as will be presented throughout the thesis. The notion of entrepreneurialism entered the public policy discourse in Hamburg not just through promoting entrepreneurial activity, but rather to accentuate entrepreneurial notions on various aspects of public life. This tendency can also be substantiated
with academic literature. One example can be seen in urban entrepreneurialism, as in the transformation of urban governance (Harvey 1989) from a logic of managerialism to one of entrepreneurialism (Steyaert in Germain & Jacquemin 2017). Harvey reports how at a colloquium in Orleans in 1985, academics, businessmen and policy-makers from eight large cities in advanced capitalist countries reached the consensus that urban governments need to be more innovative and entrepreneurial to overcome their distressed conditions and unmasked the notions of “public-private partnerships” - its activities being entrepreneurial with the public sector taking the risk and the private sectors taking the benefits - as well as the focus on the political economy of place rather than territory (Harvey 1989). He outlines four strategies to enact urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989; Steyaert & Beyes 2009), namely 1. counter international competition with local advantages (e.g. regional resources) and interventions (e.g. in form of public aids or private investment); 2. create consumerism- and service-oriented economy; 3. provide supportive services in high finance, government, information gathering and processing (including media); and 4. provide access to central resources (e.g. from state governments) locally by exploiting redistributive mechanisms.

“'Above all, the city has to appear as an innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place to live or to visit, to play and consume in”' (Harvey 1989, p.9)

In light of this development, cities engineered new narratives of urban policy, centring around ideas of the “entrepreneurial city” or the “creative city” (Steyaert & Beyes 2009), which is also closely linked to Landry’s The Creative City (2008) and its notion of making cities vibrant hubs for creativity and potential, through harnessing people’s imagination and talent, as well as to Florida’s The Creative Class (2002) and its notion of creativity as a fundamental economic driver and the subsequent rise of new social class being essential to an “entrepreneurial society” (Florida 2002; Lichtenstein, Lyons & Kutchanova 2004), to which accounts like those of Harvey (Harvey 1989) may be seen as counter narrative (Steyaert & Beyes 2009; Germain & Jacquemin 2017).

The case of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg is no exception in this regard. As the study presents, notions of urban entrepreneurialism and narrative motives of the creative city are deeply integrated in the web of local discursivity. The author shows with his interrogation of the local entrepreneurship policy discourse where these motives originated and how they are used in the discourse to align its phrase regime and discursive trajectory.

Social entrepreneurship may serve as another good example in this context, where traditional public sector values are substituted with private motivations, consequently shifting the narrative of social entrepreneurship towards an “utopian rhetoric with emphasis on newness” (Dey & Steyaert 2010, p.85) with heroic claims that social entrepreneurship can achieve what policy initiatives cannot (Parkinson & Howorth 2008) and as such presents an optimistic script.
for social change (Steyaert & Hjorth 2006). Dey and Steyaert (2010) trace this back to Leadbeater’s description of the “rise” of the social entrepreneur (Leadbeater 1997) and describe the generally positive and affirmative grand narrative of social entrepreneurship as utterly complex yet feeding a simplistic imagery that social change is depoliticised (Parkinson & Howorth 2008) and can be achieved without debate, tension or social disharmony and as such stabilises social entrepreneurship as societal actor confirming established order and control (Dey & Steyaert 2010).

Beyond any angle of potential critique, this highlights how the “everydayness” of entrepreneurship (Hjorth & Steyaert 2004) extended the realms of business and is increasingly visible in all areas of modern life (Gibb 2002), in business, social, culture and public domains, permeating everyday practices, a realisation substantiated by Steyaert (in Germain & Jacquemin 2017) and his account of a wider “entrepreneurial shift” since the 1980s (Steyaert & Beyes 2009). This may very well be tied to the self-perpetuating persistence of the heroic entrepreneurial metaphor (Anderson 2005) in “collective memory” presented by Nicholson and Anderson, with embodied in cultural beliefs, popular literature or journalism and other media coverage can be understood as re-asserting individualism (Nicolson & Anderson 2005). As such, it seems that entrepreneurship is “to surrender itself to floating around in the flux of becoming” (Hjorth & Steyaert 2004, p.19) and as such could be seen as “a creative performance and deserves to be ‘appreciated’ as an art form.” (Anderson 2005 p.602). For Formica (2020b), entrepreneurialism invests in creative autonomy, dynamism of co-creation and even embodies a new “renaissance humanism”, empowering entrepreneurs to shape their lifestyle while maintaining their freedom to explore, create, fail, and iterate. Building on the notion of creating economic growth with well-being and happiness, he describes entrepreneurialism as a cultural movement that when properly incubated contributes to the formation of an entrepreneurial class, comparing it to artistic avant-garde of the twentieth century (Formica 2020b).

In the following section the author will present notions of critique in the field of entrepreneurship research. While the author does not intend to provide a comprehensive historical genealogy of the field, it seems relevant to position the current state of academic debate to connect potential academic insights to policy formulation and the entrepreneurship policy discourse.

2.1.4 Critique in the Field of Entrepreneurship Research
Over the last years the academic focus in research on entrepreneurship has shifted, both on the perceptions of entrepreneurship as well as on its side effects. Tedmanson et al. (2012) point out that most of the literature positions entrepreneurship as a positive economic activity, with the normative assumption that it is a “good thing” (Weiskopf & Steyaert 2009). Various studies reproduce idealised views of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurial activity (Parkinson & Howorth 2008) that ultimately self-perpetuate the inherent discourse, as shown by Cohen & Musson (2000) regarding entrepreneurship culture in general or by Fletcher (2005) in
respect to opportunity discovery as part of the entrepreneurial process. Weiskopf & Steyaert (2009) describe a metamorphosis in entrepreneurship studies, arguing that the mainly enthusiastically positive research orientation is moving more and more towards a critical and differentiated direction, considering social and ethical implications among others. This opens new opportunities for a more critical debate about entrepreneurship and then subsequently about public policy measures to foster entrepreneurial activity.

In his work *Critique of Entrepreneurship* (2005), Armstrong revealed both the ideological nature and the political manipulation of entrepreneurship rhetoric, later substantiated by Jones and Spicer’s *Unmasking the Entrepreneur* (2009), in which the authors expose interconnections between conceptual and political representations of entrepreneurship (C. Jones & Spicer 2009). Among various other scholars aiming to grow the critical voice (Tedmanson et al. 2012), there is a call by Rindova, Barry & Ketchen (2009) to abandon wealth creation as the dominant motive for entrepreneurial activity and start addressing the dark sides of entrepreneurship. In general terms, the gap between public perception, mostly fed by the media and empiric reality, is increasingly recognised. For example, it is highlighted by Nicolson & Anderson (2005), in their investigation into newspaper coverage of entrepreneurship, that larger than life descriptions of entrepreneurs as heroics in media coverage bear little resemblance to reality. Dey & Steyaert (2010) identified a critical counter narrative in analysing the discourse of social entrepreneurship that is sceptical about over-optimistic utopia portrait in the grand narrative of social entrepreneurship, even if any reference to clearly identified negative effects are mostly omitted from optimistic representations of the field. Tedmanson et al. (2012) point out that entrepreneurship functions as a political ideology used to reproduce conservative political and economic agendas, public policy and perception and call for “critical humility” in openly challenging research findings. In this respect Steyaert points towards a general lack of interest in meta-theoretical discussions in entrepreneurship studies and highlights that critique has to engage with specific version of reality construction, such as the denaturalising the concept of opportunity which he considers either taken for granted or limited to the challenge of “finding” or “constructing” it in entrepreneurship literature, which involved working against a massively reproduced concept (Germain & Jacquemin 2017). Dey & Steyaert (2012) highlighted various ways to engage in critical studies for the field of social entrepreneurship and distinguished them by 1. myth-busting through empirical facts; 2. critique of power effects through de-normalising discourse; 3. normative critique through moral reflection; and 4. critique of transgression through practitioner’s counter-conduct.

The author does not attempt to provide a conclusive picture of ongoing academic debates in the field on entrepreneurship research, but rather wants to point out that in general the shift from largely affirmative perspectives on entrepreneurship towards more critical discussions yields promising potential for the development of the field. To which extent this changing discourse in academia is informing practitioners, most critically policy makers, is unclear. In the genesis of
this study, the author realized in his own research into regional entrepreneurship policy agendas in both Sydney (Recke & Bliemel 2017; 2018) and Hamburg (Recke 2016; 2020b) that the level of insights gained from academia in the policy formation is limited at best, which prompted the investigation of the entrepreneurship policy discourse for the study at hand, to better understand the process of knowledge formation within the policy agenda.

In the following section, the professionalisation within the field of entrepreneurship will be discussed along the tangents of entrepreneurship policy and entrepreneurship education.

2.2 Professionalisation of Entrepreneurship: Policy and Education

As evidenced in the previous section, the growing body of research on entrepreneurship over the last decades (Davidsson, Delmar & Wiklund 2006; Frank & Landström 2015) certainly portrays a process of professionalisation within the field of entrepreneurship research. As academia seems to inform policy makers at least on some level, also the field of public policy has evolved alongside the rise of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurialism. Beyond regional politics and governance adopting a more entrepreneurial perspective, as highlighted by Harvey in his account of urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989), also national policy agendas are subject to integration of entrepreneurialism. As fostering entrepreneurship is a generally adopted policy agenda, also education systems have undergone a process of integrating entrepreneurship studies to train the entrepreneurs of the future. Following section will highlight the most critical points of relevance considering the study at hand.

2.2.1 The Emergence of Entrepreneurship Policy

Most relevantly, the perspective of economic growth is under investigation by many academics with very divergent results. In 1979 Birch published paradigm-shifting evidence (Landström 2005; Ács & Mueller 2008; Coad et al. 2014) that small firms in the U.S. were more relevant to job creation than large firms (Birch 1979). While his findings remained highly controversial in academia over the years (Henrekson & Johansson 2010; Moreno & Coad 2015) it has also been shown that almost all small firms do not grow, or just grow very slowly (Davidsson & Henrekson 2002; Autio 2005, Stam 2007; Stam et al. 2007; Ács, Parsons & Tracy 2008; Ács & Mueller 2008; G. Mason, Bishop & Robinson 2009; Coad 2009; Coad et al. 2014; Henrekson & Johansson 2010; Bornhäll, Daunfeldt & Rudholm 2015; Audretsch et al. 2020), shifting attention towards neither large or small but high-growth firms, often also called “gazelles”, a term also coined by Birch (Landström 2005). This shift can also be seen as a tendency to accentuate age rather than size, or in Birch terms “mice”, “gazelles” and “elephants”, in entrepreneurship dynamics (Ács, Parsons & Tracy 2008; Ács & Mueller 2008; Moreno & Coad 2015). The measurement of entrepreneurial activity however is a considerable challenge, especially since any country-level entrepreneurship
indicators are rather simple aggregates of individual-level activities, that can be classified according to Ács, Szerb & Autio (2014) as:

1. output measures, as in tracking new firm formation within the population (e.g. in form of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor GEM, Deutscher Startup Monitor DSM or KfW Gründungsmonitor);
2. attitude measures, as in opinion and value surveys relevant to entrepreneurial climate but without association to actual entrepreneurial activity (e.g. the Euro-barometer survey);
3. framework measures, as in benchmarks of the institutional and regulatory conditions in the economy with association to actual entrepreneurial activity (e.g. the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor's National Expert Survey, the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” database or the OECD’s Entrepreneurship Indicators Program).

Yet, in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2000, Reynolds et al. (2000) provided empirical evidence of entrepreneurial activity being linked to economic growth. This was also confirmed in van Stel, Carree & Thurik (2005) investigation of entrepreneurial activity influencing GDP growth in 36 countries based on data also provided by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, but they also revealed a negative impact in developing countries. Later, also Wennekers et al. (2010) provide more empirical evidence to support the positive relationship between entrepreneurial activity and economic development, also in the context of innovation-driven entrepreneurship along development of the service industry sectors, and information technology advancements.

Academic findings had impact on western policy formation (Coad et al. 2014), as is evidenced by the listing support for high-growth SMEs in the European Commission's Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission 2010; Bornhäll, Daunfeldt & Rudholm 2015), the OECDs promotion of high-growth enterprises (OECD 2010) and various regional and national policy agendas (Gibb 2002; Gilbert et al. 2004; Rasmussen & Sørheim 2006; Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007; Stam et al. 2007; G. Mason, Bishop & Robinson 2009; Wennekers et al. 2010; Henrekson & Stenkula 2010; Isenberg 2010; C. Mason & Brown 2013; Audretsch, Siegel, & Terjesen 2020; Arenal et al. 2021) and the conventional thinking that entrepreneurial activity is good and should be encouraged (Lundstrom & Stevenson 2005; Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko 2015; Audretsch 2021; Bradley et al. 2021). Without going into the details of policies that may affect entrepreneurship, such policies have long term rather than short term impact and can be approximated as (Ács & Szerb 2007) easing business formation; ensuring access to finance; protecting intellectual property; and adjusting tax policy.

In Germany for instance, the federal Ministry of Economics and Technology connected high rates of unemployment and lack of economic growth with insufficient entrepreneurial activity, which resulted in several instruments to stimulate new firm formation as part of the policy agenda and can be coined as entrepreneurship policy (Gilbert et al. 2004; Lundstrom &
targeting not just quantity but also quality of new ventures since the 2010s in the EU (Arenal et al. 2021).

More relevant to the overall context of the study is the general orientation of public policy towards entrepreneurship, which is highly controversial, despite partial consensus.

### 2.2.2 Divergence in Entrepreneurship Policy

Shane (Shane 2008, 2009) for instance prominently propagates a "picking winners" strategy and recommends supporting high-growth ventures only. He argues that since most startups do not contribute to economic growth, a notion generally accepted in entrepreneurship research (Stam et al. 2007; C. Mason & Brown 2013; Brown et al. 2017), general encouragement of entrepreneurship is flawed (Shane 2008). Shane contests the common misbeliefs among policymakers that he calls “the economic growth” and “the job creation myth” and argues that 1. productivity increases with firm age, rendering the average new firm less productive than the average existing firm; and that 2. the vast majority of job growth happens in companies that are ten or more years old and that new firms have net job destruction after their first year (Shane 2009). High growth firms can be attributed with job creation, above-average productivity growth, strong export-orientation, a high level of internationalisation and beneficial spill-over effects contributing to regional other firm growth (Davidsson & Henrekson 2002; G. Mason, Bishop & Robinson 2009) as well as high levels of innovation (Coad 2009). In line with these findings, "picking winners" seems the solution of choice. Yet, as Autio & Rannikko (2016) point out, "picking winners" is difficult and not likely something that governments are equipped to do well (Coad et al. 2014), an emphasis on retention over selection - as in “retaining winners” over “picking winners” - was proposed to side-step the issue and is aimed at relatively loosely selecting firms to be supported and increase aid as the firm grows, while supporting them with capacity boosting activities (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007). This perspective was also substantiated by Buffart et al. who found that treatment design is more crucial than selection for achieving firm growths (2020) In an evaluation of Finnish public investment and policy measures, which are recognised as leading in the domain of high-growth entrepreneurship policy (C. Mason & Brown 2013), research findings indicate the validity of the approach to accentuate high-growth firms and suggest considerable return on policy investments (Autio & Rannikko 2016).

However, there are also considerable challenges in this approach. Despite clear indication of high growth firms’ economic performance, corresponding public policies may still be counterproductive (Coad et al. 2014), as high-growth is rarely persistent and is not a characteristic but rather a state firms can experience (C. Brown & Mawson 2013). To this extend, the focus on tech startups and technology-driven ventures seems to be common among policy agendas (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007; C. Mason & Brown 2013), although studies confirmed high-growth ventures not being disproportionately high-tech firms (Ács & Mueller 2008; G. Mason, Bishop & Robinson 2009; Henrekson & Johansson 2010; Moreno & Coad 2015), considering
public policy to target such ventures specifically as ineffective (Brown & Mason 2015). There are also indications that common focus on research & development at universities may not yield promising perspectives, as evidence suggests that most high-growth entrepreneurs are between 35-44 years old and already have job experience (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007). C. Mason & Brown (2013) recommend supporting firms with high-growth potential but highlight that policymakers are looking in the wrong places for such firms as empirical evidence does not support that high-growth firms are typically technology-driven or startups but rather older firms (Ács, Parsons & Tracy 2008) and question the link between growth and innovation (C. Mason & Brown 2013), that is only of crucial importance for a small number of high-growth firms (Coad 2009). Similarly, Brown et al. (2017) also point towards a number of pervasive and persistent myths within the policy community that shape commonly accepted thinking about how high-growth firms look, what their benefits are or how to foster them, without any or even contrasting empirical evidence. Beyond aforementioned misconceptions about high-growth firms being young and small or predominantly high-tech and universities being a major source for high-growth firms, they also point towards the common wrong assumption that high-growth firms are mostly venture capital financed ventures, that they are irrespective of their location or that they undertake a steady linear growth trajectory or grow organically (Brown et al. 2017). Especially regarding firm growth, Brown & Mawson (2013) point towards growth triggers that play a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of high-growth firms, systemically changing their structure and organisation to affect the growth trajectory, similar to Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” that creates both winners and losers as an essential fact about capitalism (Schumpeter 1943).

Among the debates in academia, there are also contrasting perspectives that challenge the “picking winner” strategy proclaimed by Shane (2008, 2009). For example, Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko (2015) point out threats to long term economic development if the creation of non high-growth firms is not also encouraged. They argue for a so-called “portfolio approach” to entrepreneurship policy to distinguish between different kinds of new firms and their distinct roles within the economy and their subsequently different requirements for support, to guarantee healthy economic development. To this effect, the authors call upon a typology of ventures, realising that these firms differ in fundamental ways as they have diametrically different requirements for support (Morris et al. 2016):

1. survival ventures, which provide basic personal finance for the entrepreneur, often motivated by “push factors”;
2. lifestyle ventures, providing stable income with a maintenance approach to management;
3. managed growth ventures, seeking for stable growth with workable business models and ongoing reinvestment in business development; and
4. aggressive growth ventures, referred to as gazelles and seeking exponential growth and funding through equity capital.
Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko (2015) consider all types of firms as fundamental to different roles in the economy, as survival ventures may help people move out of poverty, lifestyle ventures may serve to stabilize local economies, managed growth ventures may entail potential for larger market reach and job creation and aggressive growth ventures produce innovation, create large numbers of jobs and enhance competitiveness. As evidence provided by van Stel, Carree & Thurik (2005) suggests, entrepreneurship is increasingly relevant for economic growth, which indicates that relative costs of entry and exit are lower than in the past (Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko 2015). Simultaneously, regulatory barriers and initial investment requirements result in smaller windows of opportunity for high-growth firms than in the past, indicating that an economy has “less to lose and more to gain from efforts to encourage survival, lifestyle, and managed growth ventures.” (Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko 2015, p.716). Also, the entrepreneurial ecosystem is mentioned in this context as a conglomerate of regionally interconnected individuals, entities and regulatory bodies (Isenberg 2010). For Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko it highlights how entrepreneurial firms are embedded in community and serve to stabilise the local economy which warrants support for all types of ventures through public policy, which should be aligned to the distinctive needs of the venture typology in dimensions of financial investment, non-financial support programs, taxations incentives, regulation and business failure to differentiate the approach from generic encouragement of entrepreneurial activity or exclusive support for high-growth firms (Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko 2015). Comparable notions can also be found in Henrekson & Stenkula’s “targeted approach’ (2010) and draws attention to balanced public policy towards entrepreneurial activity or in Audretsch et al. analysis on how political initiatives should conceptually differ depending on specific stage of firm development (2020).

Stam et al. build on findings by Baumol (2002) that economic growth is likely to be achieved by a mix of small high-growth firms and large, mature firms, and point out that highly developed economies have more to gain from entrepreneurial activity in general (Stam et al. 2007). Then, Bornhäll, Daunfeldt & Rudholm (2015) also point towards a specific type of firm that is highly profitable but does not generate employment growth, fittingly named “sleeping gazelles”, which make up a significantly larger share of firms than high-growth ventures. The authors subsequently suggest that public policy should concentrate on removing growth barriers for those firms, which might entail more potential for job creation than targeting a small number of high-growth firms (Bornhäll, Daunfeldt & Rudholm 2015). Also, Thurik, Stam & Audretsch (2013) question whether current policies focusing on promoting new and small firms are misguided and recommend a more pervasive and encompassing approach, consistent with an entrepreneurial economy.

The next section will cover a considerable gap between entrepreneurship policy research and enacted policy agendas, calling into question the policy formation process and being one of various root causes for the author to conduct the study at hand.
2.2.3 The Gap Between Entrepreneurship Policy Research and Practice

The very divergent perspectives on entrepreneurship policy, their impact on economic growth as well as the seemingly ill-advised industry focus indicates the complexity of the issue at hand. Still, the implemented policies often do not reflect one position or the other and are often criticized as not being effective (C. Mason & Brown 2014; Arshed, Carter & Mason 2014, 2016; Arshed & Drummond 2020), calling into question government interventions that are perceived as mistargeted by entrepreneurs (Massa & Testa 2008). Even though various studies exist, with empirical evidence supporting one approach or the other, there seems to be a considerable gap between entrepreneurship policy research and policy practice.

Overall, it seems evident that research findings can be seen as a clear argument against general or uniform policies to advance entrepreneurial activity (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007; Kuckertz, Berger & Prochotta 2020). Yet, despite academic findings and interest from policy makers, most policy agendas remain general and unfocused, and accentuate quantity, while only few policy agendas focus explicitly or exclusively on high-growth firms (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007; C. Mason & Brown 2013; Brown & Mawson 2019), which would be an adoption of the “picking winners” strategy. In cases where a high-growth oriented policy was adopted, policy makers seem to follow highly selective approaches as is evidenced in policy documentation and its reliance on selective (if any) and sometimes outdated literature and evidence (Brown et al. 2017), which results in misguided policy frameworks that are unable to provide appropriate support for growing firms (Nightingale & Coad 2014, Arshed & Drummond 2020).

Also attempts to develop entrepreneurial ecosystems are open to wide-ranging misinterpretation and misuse by policy makers, rendering its concept being used to promote “more” entrepreneurship (Brown & Mawson 2019). As it seems, policies do not reflect the presented tangents of debate and newly proposed and more defined mechanisms to implement policy. In consideration of common misconceptions - or myths - among policy makers presented by Brown et al. (2017), a deficit in systematic, rigorous, and holistic policy evaluation is also contributing to their persistence (Stam et al. 2007; Kantis, Federico & Girandola 2021). In addition, Arshed & Drummond point towards a failure to engage with empirical evidence in favor of ideology driven policy (2020), leaving the “black box” of entrepreneurship policy evaluation largely unattended (Kantis, Federico & Girandola 2021). Beyond possible ignorance or omission of academic findings, there are also very practical implications from political practice that weigh in on this challenge. Most critically, policy works on different and much shorter timelines than academic research (Westwood 2015) and relies on loosely connected streams of information aligned in “policy windows” (Rutter, Marshall & Sims 2012). Also, policy is not a science and does not rely on the scientific process but rather a composite of various things (Westwood 2015), only one of which may be input from academia (Hodgson & Spours 2006; Perry et al. 2010). Massa and Testa also highlight that policy makers tend to rely on non-targeted search, subjecting themself to persistent romantic views of entrepreneurship or innovation as portrayed in media
coverage (Massa & Testa 2008; Perry et al. 2010; Arshed & Drummond 2020). Policy evaluations often focus on short-term rather than long-term outputs, rendering their effectiveness for policy adaptation limited (Arshed, Carter & Mason 2014, 2016) and rather accentuate tangible outcomes relevant to electoral imperatives (C. Mason & Brown 2013). It is also pointed out that policy makers are typically involved in various different policies at the same time, resulting in much less time spent on important aspects of policy than academics would like (Westwood 2015). This arguably makes the consideration of academic input or in-depth study of complex phenomena even less likely. Then, another critical issue is that policy makers often do not have access to academic publications, either as in not knowing about it or as in unable to get access to journal archives etc. (Westwood 2015). Findings by Arshed, Carter & Mason (2016) also indicate that entrepreneurship policy appears to exist at a macro-level but changes its focus in the process of finalising for delivery on the micro-level. This may very well be linked to the widely different perception and understanding of entrepreneurship phenomena among policy makers, entrepreneurship researchers and entrepreneurs (Massa & Testa 2008). In search of good explanations, it must be attested that indeed little is known about the policy formation process, and the little that is known indicates it is a complex and messy process (Lundstrom & Stevenson 2005; Arshed, Carter & Mason 2014). In fact, Arshed, Carter & Mason (2014) conclude that policy making, even though rationally designed to achieve specific goals, is impacted by non-rational dimension of organisational behaviours, such as self-interest of ministers, their ideologies and policy interests (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum 2009; Perry et al. 2010), above formal structures.

Also in academia, there are plenty of pointers to go around. Frank & Landström (Frank & Landström 2015) for example call upon the “rigour-relevance gap” to explain why the connection between academic findings and practices is low and recommend that more applicable knowledge should be developed for entrepreneurship research to be read and used, a notion also supported by Davidsson (2002). To this end Hoffman (2015) points out the “brick making” nature of academia, with research fixating on generating pieces of knowledge cited by other academics, and less with creating a cohesive whole or obsessing with “theory fetish” with limited practical relevance. With the increasingly smaller and narrower academic audience, real world applicability of research is rarely a primary objective and external engagement may be considered complementary, time consuming and distracting for researchers. Due to the pressure on academics to publish research articles and aim for citations, interests are misaligned with public policy. Brown et al. (2017) use this notion to explain why public policy assumptions have not caught up with empirical findings on high-growth firms and further substantiate this with the fact that many academic publications focus on high-growth, technology-driven and venture capital financed corporates such as Apple, Google and Amazon, largely over-emphasising the “Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship” that is the main inspiration of many policy agendas (Welter et al. 2017). To that effect Nightingale & Coad (2014) also highlight that demand for positive evidence
is causing bias in entrepreneurship research towards increasingly positive interpretations for policy. To counter that, in his discussion on how academia can support business and policy practice, Davidsson (2002) calls upon researchers to “make life hard for policy-makers of the kind that with well-intended but over-ambitious support measures make the entrepreneurial spirit choke rather than flourish”. Lastly, Audretsch, Siegel, & Terjesen point towards public administration scholars being slower in their consideration of entrepreneurship in comparison to business administration and economics (2020), which could also contribute to the disconnect between theory and practice.

Beyond gaps and tension between policymakers and academia, there seems to be a deeper cultural and practical disconnect (Westwood 2015). Policy makers and researchers alike might be called upon for their contribution in this matter. Just as policy makers have an obligation to listen to academics’ informed advice, researchers must ensure that they are heard (Hoffman 2015).

The next section covers the increasing integration of entrepreneurship education in educational programs of all kinds. As this seems linked to both the phenomenon of entrepreneurialism and the general professionalisation of the field of entrepreneurship in general, it also carries weight in the entrepreneurship policy discourse under investigation, especially since regional universities are called upon as sources for innovation and knowledge spill over as will later elaborated in section 2.3.

2.2.4 Systemic Entrepreneurship Education

As fostering entrepreneurship is a common goal in western policy agendas, it is not surprising that education is also subject to entrepreneurialism. While there are obvious tendencies to accentuate new firm formation out of university contexts - repositioning universities as entrepreneurial universities (Kailer 2009) - with support of research and development funds as mentioned before, also education programs themselves have been increasingly adapted to integrate entrepreneurship alongside hot debate in the 1980s (Plaschka & Weisch 1990). This is also underpinned by academic findings, for example by Ács & Szerb (2007) who point out that even though not a guarantee for success, strong education systems are prerequisites for economic development. It may even be one of the few universally applicable policy measures to promote effective entrepreneurship education to affect entrepreneurial activity (Gibb 2002; Davidsson, Delmar & Wiklund 2006; Herrmann et al. 2008; Richardson & Hynes 2008; Wennekers et al. 2010; Oosterbeek, van Praag & Ijsselstein 2010; Dahlstrom & Talmage 2018). In line with government interventions, higher education throughout the western world, and the European Union in particular, is tasked with stimulating and increasing entrepreneurialism (European Commission 2006b; Wilson 2008; European Commission 2013; Oosterbeek, van Praag & Ijsselstein 2010; Hoppe 2016; Hägg & Kurczewska 2020). Consequently, it is no surprise that prominent business schools started offering entrepreneurship courses in the 1970s (Hoppe 2016), with some earlier pioneers in the UK and the US, e.g. the first course in entrepreneurship at
Harvard Business School being thought in 1947 (Carlsson et al. 2013), with rapidly growing acceptance in recent decades (Rasmussen & Sørheim 2006; Wilson 2008; Gupta et al. 2017) and soon to follow extensions in other disciplines as pursuing entrepreneurial behaviours is potentially relevant to everybody in society (Gibb 2002). To that effect, Formica (2020b) highlights how entrepreneurship is extended beyond the realm of business and STEM - Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics and integrates Arts - into an acronym he coined STEAM - to break traditions of incrementalism by coupling know how to do, know how think, imagine, and understand. Kuckertz, Berger & Prochotta (2020) point out that entrepreneurship education is beneficial for society and for employment, which seems linked to the different types of entrepreneurs presented before (Masurel 2019a) and the pervasive notion of general entrepreneurialism.

According to Lackéus (2017) and Kakouris & Liargovas (2020), entrepreneurship education can be differentiated along the modes of 1. “about”, as in a theoretical approach providing general understanding of the phenomenon; 2. “for”, as in occupationally building knowledge and skills; and 3. “through”, as in experiential learning processes. The classification is building on notions of “for” entrepreneurship and “about” entrepreneurship research articulated by Gibb (2002) and other seminal work on evaluating teaching methods (Kakouris & Liargovas 2020; Pittaway & Cope 2007; Hoppe 2016). It also referred to as “about”, “for” and “with” by Masurel (2019b) or by “know-what” (about), “know-how” (for) and “know-why” (through) by Williams Middleton & Donnellon (2014) and is more or less defined in similar ways. In general, the educational agenda focuses on fostering entrepreneurial attitudes or mindset (McGrath & MacMillan 2000; Rasmussen & Sørheim 2006), entrepreneurial knowledge skills (Krueger 2007), with expansion into informal settings (Kakouris 2015), resulting in the adoption of notions from adult education and experiential learning (Hägg & Kurczewska 2020; Kakouris & Liargovas 2020), as entrepreneurship is best learned by practice (Politis 2005). Yet there has been little consensus in academia about content and delivery of entrepreneurship education (Williams Middleton & Donnellon 2014). While most business schools use a combination of theoretical and practical approaches, more recent and popular formats focus on practice and business plan development (Matlay 2008; Hoppe 2016). The common theme in entrepreneurship education revolves around the notion of the “business plan” and is usually the focus of any real or simulated project activity, even though it is questionable whether a plan is adequate to describe entrepreneurial activity (Gibb 2002). The practical orientation, however, seems merited.

Stumpf, Dunbar & Mullen (1991) point out the potential of experiential activities in teaching entrepreneurial skills, as in simulating a real entrepreneurial experience. Also, Plaschka & Weisch (1990) suggest experimenting with entrepreneurship curriculum to be more creative, process-oriented, multi-disciplinary and practical. This approach was substantiated over the years in various studies (Gibb 2002; Antonites & Van Vuuren 2005; Rasmussen & Sorheim 2006; Marshall et al. 2006; Heinonen & Poikkijoki 2006; Richardson & Hynes 2008; Neck & Greene
as in “learning by doing” (Politis 2005; Masurel 2019b) and building on notions of experiential learning (Loué & Baronet 2012; Kakouris 2015; Hägg & Kurczewska 2020) originally articulated by Dewey (1938) and further developed by Kolb (1984), indicating that entrepreneurial skills can be improved through project-based or problem-based learning and students’ interacting with real businesses in live projects (Chang & Rieple 2013), compelling them to be self-directed learners (Krueger 2007). This approach has also been linked to successful launching of new firms (Herrmann et al. 2008, Marshall et al. 2006) or at least the expectation based on anecdotal evidence (Matlay 2008) and is widely adopted.

The type of entrepreneurial skills supported through this type of learning extend beyond core managerial competencies such as motivating others, influence skills, information sharing and collecting, delegation, communications skills, control, organising, and planning (Stumpf, Dunbar & Mullen 1991) and can be classified along 17 categories developed by Lichtenstein and Lyons (1996) that can be used to assess novice entrepreneurs independent of any skill level (Lyons & Lyons 2002; Smith, Schallenkamp & Eichholz 2007), divided into four meta-categories (Chang & Rieple 2013):

1. technical skills, broken down into managing operations; managing supplies; office space skills; managing equipment, technology and prosecuted processes;
2. management skills, broken down into management skills, including organising and supervising; marketing skills; financial management skills; legal skills; administrative skills; higher order skills related to learning and problem solving;
3. entrepreneurship skills, broken down into ability to develop concepts and business plans; environmental scanning; opportunity recognition; networking; and
4. personal maturity skills, broken down into self-awareness; accountability; emotional coping; and creativity.

Even though there is continuing debate about the portfolio of entrepreneurial skills in academia (Gibb 2002; Antonites & Van Vuuren 2005; Davidsson, Delmar & Wiklund 2006; Richardson & Hynes 2008; Loué & Baronet 2012; Stuetzer et al. 2013) with only limited consensus (Dahlstrom & Talmage 2018) and this framework by Lichtenstein & Lyons (Lichtenstein & Lyons 2010; Smith, Schallenkamp & Eichholz 2007) seems in line with the aforementioned more fundamental list of entrepreneurial competencies presented by Shane, Locke & Collins (2003) and is prominent in academia (Dahlstrom & Talmage 2018).

Whether entrepreneurship is something that can be taught (Rasmussen & Sørheim 2006; Pittaway & Cope 2007; Wilson 2008; Neck & Greene 2011; Hoppe 2016) or whether entrepreneurship education is having the intended effect of fostering entrepreneurial activity is highly debatable. Pittaway et al. (2007), Kailer (2009), Wilson (2008) and Lau & Lo (2015) point towards a deficit of evaluation and Oosterbeek, van Praag & Ijsselstein (2010) show in their
analysis of the dominantly established Junior Achievement Young Enterprise student mini-company (SMC) program in secondary schools and universities in the U.S. and Europe that the program does not have the intended effects and impact on the intention to become an entrepreneur is even significantly negative. Lackéus (2017) points towards criticism that entrepreneurship education contributes to neoliberalism in education, increased inequality, neglect of civic values and unjust blame of misfortunate citizens.

Notwithstanding sufficient issues for in-depth debate with entrepreneurship education, this brief overview illustrated the process of professionalisation within the field of entrepreneurship education alongside increasing attention to entrepreneurial activity in the field of policy. As a field of applied knowledge, it is not critical to the study at hand, which is focusing on the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. Yet, universities, professors, and researchers, as well as students and alumni are relevant actors in any entrepreneurial ecosystem and may even be nascent or actual entrepreneurs, and thus constitute at least some part of the intended audience of enacted policies and might even be potential actors in the discourse itself.

The next section will introduce literature on regional innovation theory and ways to understand, describe or even manage relationships between regional entities with the goal to induce innovation as a driver for economic development. As this is a key objective of many policy agendas, relevant theories are briefly discussed to provide context for the interrogation of the regional entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg.

2.3 From Industry Clusters to Ecosystems

For a better understanding of mechanics and interdependencies within regional startup economies, this section discusses some underlying concepts, namely the triple helix approach, industry cluster initiatives - often referred to as cluster policies - and the entrepreneurial ecosystem approach. These topics help to contextualise policy measures and qualify elements of the discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg.

2.3.1 The Triple Helix Approach

The triple helix approach was developed by Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff in the 1990ies, and its phenomenon can be traced back to the second half of the 19th century (Leydesdorff 2000; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000). The model is commonly used in innovation theory and practice as an alternative to “innovation systems” approaches, such as the Regional Innovation System or Sectoral Innovation System (Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013). It describes the persistent shift from the historically predominant setup of an industry-government dyad in the industrial society to triadic dependencies between university, industry, and government in the knowledge society, that can be considered as evolving networks of communication (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 1997; Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013; Etzkowitz 2016). Building on systems theory, the triple helix model is
constituted through a set of 1. components, as in the institutional spheres of government, industry, and university; 2. relationships between components, as in collaboration, conflict, leadership, substitution, and networking; and 3. functions, as in a process taking place within a “knowledge, innovation and consensus space” (Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013). According to the model, triple helix configurations advanced from a setup with industry as the driving force for innovation and universities mainly providing human capital for its application, to a “balanced” setup where universities are crucial in facilitating innovation in more and more joint partnerships with both industry and government (Leydesdorff 2000; Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013). Subsequently the approach positions university as a leading entity to generate knowledge spill over that induces innovation as well as economic development (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 1997; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000), as part of universities’ “third mission” of involvement in socio-economic development in addition to teaching and research (Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013). The triple helix approach also realises that research and development (R&D) is not the sole driver of innovation or growth and considers interdependent relationships and functions between university, industry, and government as well as activities like technology adoption, organisational capacities, or the individual innovator/entrepreneur, means for networking and collaboration, leadership and conflict management capabilities equally relevant (Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013). This approach calls for collaboration at the intersection of the university, industry and government domains, e.g. in form of technology transfer offices, joint research labs, science parks or technology incubators since arrangements and networks provide means to foster innovation and economic growth rather than any single actor; resulting in government policies more and more being a result of interactions among triple helix entities (Etzkowitz 2016). As such, cooperation and partnerships between university, industry entities and government play a capital role in the innovation policies of the European Union (Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013), e.g. the Innovation Union (European Commission 2011a) as a part of the Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission 2010), and is therefore tied to regional innovation strategies.

During the last years, the triple helix approach was further developed into a quadruple helix approach (Carayannis & Campbell 2009), that also incorporates civil society as a key actor promoting innovation in addition to university, industry, and government. This model extends the triple helix’ focus on the knowledge economy with the perspective of the knowledge society. This can be seen as an evolution of several modes of producing exploitable goods within the knowledge society (Carayannis, Barth & Campbell 2012), “mode 1” being knowledge production in form of university research organised by discipline, “mode 2” being knowledge application or knowledge-based problem-solving - a transition described in the works of Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000; Etzkowitz 2016) and coined the triple helix model - and “mode 3” being knowledge production systems, an architecture focusing on processes and dynamics that allow top-down government, industry and university policies and bottom-up civil society activities to co-act in a more intelligent, effective and efficient fashion (Carayannis & Campbell
Carayannis, Barth & Campbell (2012) consider “mode 3” as a “tighter and more robust coupling of vision and reality” and position knowledge production system architectures as the essential building block for innovative ecosystems in the twenty-first century, explaining the addition of the fourth helix representing the “public” to constitute the quadruple helix model (Carayannis & Campbell 2009; Salmelin 2018). To take this even further, the quintuple helix approach (Carayannis & Campbell 2010) adds another layer of context to the knowledge economy perspective of the triple helix model and the knowledge society perspective of the quadruple helix model by incorporating socio-ecological transitions of society and economy, making the model sensitive to natural environments that can be understood as drivers for knowledge production and innovation, subsequently providing opportunities for exploitation in the knowledge economy for sustainable development (Carayannis, Barth & Campbell 2012). To this effect, a fifth helix for “the natural environment” is added to constitute the quintuple helix approach (Carayannis & Campbell 2010). This evolution certainly matches the overall trend in the field of entrepreneurship research and the increasing permeation of entrepreneurial notions in all aspects of society, described as entrepreneurialism before. Deeper considerations for societal participation in knowledge formation and accentuation of ecology is also apparent in recent global climate initiatives such as The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015), the European Union’s recognition of the socio-ecological transition (European Commission 2009) and the European Green Deal (European Commission 2019) and various regional policies.

Beyond the triple helix approach and its derivatives, there are some other regional innovation theories to consider, as they are the driving force behind commonly adopted cluster policies within the European Union. Building on this historical context, more recent theories evolve around notions of ecosystems.

2.3.2 Regional Development, Clusters and Entrepreneurial Ecosystems

Policies for regional development are key in economic policy worldwide and as such also are central components of European Union and country level measures to promote regional development based on clusters or innovation systems with the ultimate goal to achieve economic growth (Eklinder-Frick & Linné 2017). As such this is in line with previously presented perspectives on entrepreneurship policies, so this section focuses on the overall concept of clusters and the conceptual transition towards ecosystems in recent years.

Regional Innovation Systems (RIS) can be described as networks between public and private entities in a region that interact mutually to generate knowledge and innovation (Porter 1990; Lau & Lo 2015, Moutinho et al. 2015) and as such spatially organised systems (Stam 2007). Following the overall notions in OECD publications about regional economic development (2009, 2013), it is no surprise that the Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission 2010) largely established a regional cohesion policy as a continuation of the focus of geographical regions within the EU’s policy doctrine (Manzella & Mendez 2009), despite empirical evidence showing
that innovation happens within or between firms and therefore cannot be attributed with regional settings alone (Eklinder-Frick & Linné 2017). However, regions with higher R&D investment seem to generate more knowledge spill over and venture sustainability, which is tied to knowledge and technology generated by universities (Moutinho et al. 2015), which consequently led to an accentuation of R&D investment in European Union policy agenda (European Commission 2010). The cluster approach was also set forth by the OECD (1999, 2001, 2005) as drivers of economic growth and a means for national competitiveness (Eklinder-Frick & Linné 2017). It builds on Porter's “cluster diamond” model, describing how industry agglomerates in geographical locations (Porter 1990), which led to the cluster approach (Eklinder-Frick & Linné 2017) described as “geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions [...] in a particular field that compete but also cooperate” (Porter 2000, p.16). Despite criticism in academia that geographical proximity does not define innovative abilities of local firms, the EU adopted the cluster approach to copy success of “best practices”, among which also California is mentioned (Eklinder-Frick & Linné 2017), to which extend Isenberg points out that the German Government “essentially wasted $20 billion” trying to create biotechnology clusters on a par with those in California (Isenberg 2010, p.48). Moutinho et al. (2015) point out that R&D investments are not maximally effective and deem increased funding not sufficient to generate employment and economic growth, calling “throwing money at the problem” policies neither efficient nor effective. Rather, Eklinder-Frick & Linné (2017) summarise that the innovation process may span regional borders and therefore policies should consider synergetic alignment or local resources with “firm-centric” policies that could consider place-based policies rather than region-centric policies. Salmelin (2018) also suggests fostering cross-fertilisation beyond value chains and considers companies as part of an ecosystem as a mechanism to describe modern innovation processes along the quadruple helix approach and as an evolution of the cluster model, accentuating diversity, and more flexible operating principles.

Stam (2015) describes a recent shift in regional policies for entrepreneurship towards quality over quantity and increasing consideration of entrepreneurship not as an output but rather entangled in an entrepreneurial ecosystem, as in a community of interdependent actors, a concept that attracted much attention (Alvedalen & Boschma 2017). Most importantly, it calls to align specific measures to foster regional startup economies to regional characteristics to be effective. It builds on entrepreneurial activity being connected to a community of actors and strongly emphasises social contexts to hinder or support entrepreneurship (Isenberg 2010; Stam 2015; Ács, Szerb & Autio 2014). What is similar to other concepts such as clusters or innovations systems is the attention towards external business environments, however the entrepreneurial ecosystem approach largely emphasises the entrepreneur rather than the enterprise as the “leader” in the creation of the entrepreneurial ecosystem itself, which can be seen as a “privatisation” of
entrepreneurship policy, as it decreases the role of government compared to previous approaches (Stam 2015) to that of a “feeder” (Feld 2012).

There are also similarities with Lichtenstein, Lyons & Kutzhanova (2004) notions of entrepreneurial communities that are described as regional networks among entrepreneurs and their companies, spanning private and public sectors and constituting the “social capital” needed to create environments that foster entrepreneurship. While there is no formula to create a thriving entrepreneurial ecosystem, Isenberg proposed nine principles for building such an ecosystem (Isenberg 2010):

1. stop emulating Silicon Valley;
2. shape the ecosystem around local conditions, as in local entrepreneurship dimensions, style and climate;
3. engage the private sector from the start;
4. favor the high potentials;
5. get a big win on the board;
6. tackle cultural change head-on;
7. stress the roots, as in meting out money carefully to ensure entrepreneurs’ resourcefulness;
8. don’t overengineer clusters, help them grow organically, as in reinforce and build in existing and emerging clusters rather than creating new ones;
9. reform legal, bureaucratic and regulatory frameworks, as in decriminalising bankruptcy, removing administrative and legal barriers etc.

Additionally, Feld (2012) identified nine attributes that emphasise the interaction between actors inside the ecosystem to qualify a vibrant community:

1. leadership, as in highly visible entrepreneurs committed to the region;
2. intermediaries, as in advisors, accelerators and incubators;
3. network density, as in a well-connected community of startups, entrepreneurs, investors, advisors and supporters;
4. government, as in strong support startups and supportive policies;
5. talent, as in a talent pool for all levels of employment and areas of expertise;
6. support services, as in accessible professional services;
7. engagement, as in events for the entrepreneurial community;
8. companies, as in large companies interested in cooperation with startups;
9. capital, as in a network of venture capitalists, angel and seed investors and other financing options.
Furthermore, Isenberg (2010, 2011a) lists six distinct domains within the entrepreneurial ecosystem: 1) policy; 2) finance; 3) culture; 4) support; 5) human capital; and 6) market, which is largely similar to entrepreneurial ecosystem pillars named by the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum 2013; Stam 2015). All in all, the attributes, principles, and domains show how the entrepreneurial ecosystem approach shifts traditional economic thinking from accentuating businesses, markets and market failure towards a new economic view that accentuates people, networks, and institutions (Stam 2015).

While no uniform definition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem exists and the approach entails some weaknesses open for debate (Alvedalen & Boschma 2017), there seems to be widely applicable consensus on describing it as a set of interdependent actors and factors that are coordinated in a way that enables productive entrepreneurial activity that may ultimately create opportunities for innovation (Stam 2015). As such, future policies should shift from regional “entrepreneurship policy” to a policy for an “entrepreneurial regional economy” (Thurik, Stam & Audretsch 2013) and create a context in which entrepreneurship can develop rather than maximising indicators of entrepreneurial activity (Stam 2015). To that extent Isenberg (2011a) also points out that entrepreneurial ecosystems tend to become relatively self-sustaining, calling for high priority of entrepreneurship to generate the stimulus to create a self-sustaining ecosystem with a holistic and comprehensive ecosystem perspective (Isenberg 2011b), a perspective shared by Mason & Brown (2014).

In the next section, an additional angle will be provided that is relevant to the interrogation of the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. Building on the phenomenon of entrepreneurialism, narrative motives in the discourse, such as the aforementioned “creative class” or “creative city”, are closely connected to visionary statements, expectations, or aspirations for the future. To contextualise this component, the concepts of fictional expectations and imaginaries will be presented.

### 2.4 Imaginaries as a Catalysts for Innovation

To contextualise the different notions and concepts relevant to the study at hand, there is one last element that is essential to the discourse that can be approximated under the umbrella of shared expectations or vision for the future that drive the discursive formations within the field of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg. Following section will elaborate on this phenomenon and provide some backdrop for the empirical investigation.

#### 2.4.1 Fictional Expectations

There are a few approaches that differ in terminology and focus but generally point out the same relations and implications. Beckert (2013a, 2013b) for instance describes imaginations of future states of the world as “fictional expectation”, considering these as motivating factors for actors
within the dynamics of capitalism that are shaping present decisions. In his view these imaginaries of the future take narrative forms of stories, theories, or discourses, tend to draw visions of a better future and are most successful if their inherent innovation is considered inevitable. As such, decision-making in economic contexts of uncertainty is anchored in fictions and the belief that causal mechanisms lead to the imagined future state (Beckert 2013b), calling into question the assumption that decisions are based on rational calculation of outcomes and rather associating them with social structures, institutions, networks, and cultural framing.

Building on Mische’s notion of actions taking place in the present as directed towards the future (Mische 2009), Beckert (2013a, 2013b) argues that images of future - or imaginaries - shape the present and explain decision-making despite uncertainty as disconnected from rational calculation and driven by not necessarily true but convincing fictions. As such, they provide seemingly good reasons for decisions and are open to influence of collective beliefs and manipulation while fostering a situated rationality where fictional expectations are the outcome of an ongoing process in which actors act, based on contingent interpretations of the situation (Beckert 2013b). Beckert points towards Austrian philosophers Alfred Schütz’ distinction between “mere fantasies”, without any intention of actually realising them, and “design fantasies”, which entail plans for their materialisation and highlights that same as in literary fiction, fictional expectations are disconnected from reality and represent the future as if they were true, enabling actors to act towards an uncertain future that is pretended in the expectations, which function as “placeholders” (Riles 2010) in the decision making process to overcome paralysis or randomness under uncertainty.

For Beckert this concept is also visible in Schumpeter’s work The Theory of Economic Development (1934) and its notions of innovation that are incompatible with calculative decision making assumed by economic theory but instead are connected to inherently incalculably activity driven by contingent imaginaries that the entrepreneur is basing his behaviour on towards new combinations of knowledge in the future (Beckert 2013a; 2013b). As such these future projections are shaped by a social process that affects peoples’ decisions, practices and relations and process action (Mische 2009). In his account of capitalism as a system of expectations, Beckert also gives attention to creativity and innovation as one of the four Cs in capitalism (credit, commodification, creativity and competition) and describes technological vision as imaginaries of the future, as in narratives about a better world to come, with the most successful narratives presenting innovation as not just desirable but rather inevitable, that are subject to deliberate influence in regard to the prospects of innovations (Beckert 2012; Beckert 2013a). As such fictional expectations as placeholders are a political device, as in a collective commitment or a proxy, that forecloses uncertainty of the moment for future re-evaluation without resolving it, but “papering over it” (Riles 2010, p.803) as if already resolved.
The overall notion of fictional expectations seems closely tied to discursive power struggles as described by Foucault and Bourdieu in chapter 4 and therefore serve as a meaningful mechanism to describe imaginaries at play in the discourse under investigation.

2.4.2 Sociotechnical Imaginaries

There is another approach that may serve to contextualise the phenomena described here. Jasanoff (Jasanoff 2015, Jasanoff et al. 2015) draws upon technological innovations following narratives of science fiction, such as the creature created by Dr. Frankenstein in Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* (1818), the Nautilus submarine in Jules Verne’s *Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Seas* (1870), the artificial intelligence HAL 9000 in Arthur C. Clarke’s *Space Odyssey* (1968-1997) series culminated in the motion price *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968) by Stanley Kubrick etc. in an attempt to develop a new theoretical understanding of the politics of innovation (Jasanoff, Kim & Sperling 2007) in the field of science & technology (S&T).

Subsequently, Jasanoff considers imaginaries as visions of what can be in regard to science and technology as well as of what might be a socially and ethically good life, essentially articulating what is good and evil. To this effect, grounded in the field of science and technology studies (STS) Jasanoff, Kim, & Sperling (2007) coined the term “sociotechnical imaginary”, which incorporates a collective and publicly formed vision of a desirable future that can be ascertained through science and technology.

The term exemplifies the multidisciplinary perspective, spanning across social sciences (socio-), science and technology (technical) and humanities (imaginaries), to provide a suitable interpretive perspective to address the meaning of technological developments, links to social and political institutions and implications of the social embeddedness of technology for the governance of knowledge and technology (Jasanoff, Kim & Sperling 2007). It also resembles other accounts of future-oriented abstractions that explain how expectations can be mobilising resources at macro, meso and micro levels (Borup et al. 2006). Jasanoff and Kim define “sociotechnical imaginaries” as:

“collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology.” (Jasanoff 2015 p.6)

As such, scientific knowledge and technology are not transcendent mirrors of reality but rather embed and are embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, and institutions and tied to imagination as a social practice (Jasanoff 2015). Calling upon the seminal work of Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities* (1983) and his account of nation as “an imagined political community” (Anderson 1983 p.6) and Charles Taylor in *Modern Social...*


Imaginaries (2004) and his realisation of changing imaginaries as well as Yaron Ezrahi in Imagined Democracies (2012) and the focus on “necessary fictions” adopted by society, Jasanoff (2015) argues that imaginaries serve as a performative mechanism to bridge the epistemic, normative as well as objective and subjective and attests that imagination is a crucial element in social and political life and in fact forms social reality and allows the simplification and standardisation of subjects to create cohesion.

While imaginaries can be considered as being most powerful when they are commonly shared by a large group, they might be perceived differently by diverse groups of people. Borup et al. (2006) point out that people who think of themselves as having little influence on the outcomes of an imaginary tend to see it as a greater authority and might adhere to the normative narrative “it’s going to happen so you might as well get used to it”. As such sociotechnical imaginaries are distinct from political ideologies, which can be seen as entrenched, immovable, and lacking imagination and orientation towards possible futures (Jasanoff 2015). They can be considered an influential part of capital in contemporary politics and shape technology design, channel public expenditure and justify mechanisms of exclusion or inclusion with respect to presumed benefits of technological progress (Jasanoff, Kim & Sperling 2007). Policy, courts, media, or other institutions of power may thereby elevate some imagined futures over others, making them dominant, even though many imaginaries can coexist in tension or productive relationships (Jasanoff et al. 2015).

A powerful example of a social imaginary is provided by Anderson in his work Imagined Communities (1983), illustrating how nations can be understood as “imagined political communities” that are constructed in a collective mind and cultivated by common narrative and memory but remain intangible in real life. In his work Imagined Democracies (2012), Ezrahi describes “necessary fictions” democratic societies adhere to, neglecting obvious background mechanics, buying into illusion and pretense to make it work. As a more concrete example of a prominent sociotechnical imaginary, the “internet imaginary” can be called upon. It can be seen alongside sociotechnical reordering with emerging information and communication technologies (Felt 2014) that were coined as a “network society” (Castells 2010). As Flichy (2007) points out, the internet was conceived based on intentions and expectations shared by academic computer science departments and largely focussed on technical concepts of network computing, hypertext format and toolchains for accessing information etc., resulting in the technical setup of the internet as we see it today, making the initial internet framework an insuperable construct for all internet users today. Despite these technocratic beginnings, the author sees the internet as a “self-realising prophecy” that came to be mainly by constantly repeating that it is going to be the epicentre for the future society. This narrative is not limited to the scientific/technology community, it extended to counter-culture, hackers as well as politics and business and while many of the initial utopia long faded, they have been influential to the way we see the internet today, e.g. in envisioned narratives such as “a tool for exchange”, “a tool for cooperation” or “internet for all” and provided
actionable guiding principles. Felt (2014) calls the sociotechnical imaginary of the internet as a “one-world world” that gained meaning in techno-political cultures and can be observed in a convergence of public discourses, normative framing, or even moral order. She considers the materialisation of a global technological project such as the internet which in collective reinvention of social lives and social order as an instance of Jasanoff and Kims’ sociotechnical imaginary (2015) that has been articulated on highest levels of government, e.g. by Al Gore at an International Telecommunications Union meeting in Argentina in 1994:

“These highways—or, more accurately, networks of distributed intelligence—will allow us to share information, to connect, and to communicate as a global community. From these connections we will derive robust and sustainable economic progress, strong democracies, better solutions to global and local environmental challenges, improved health care, and—ultimately—a greater sense of shared stewardship of our small planet” (Gore 1994)

Felt (2014) also points towards other phrases in the speech such as the global information infrastructure being “a metaphor for a functioning democracy” or even a “new Athenian Age of democracy” (Gore 1994) to stress how benefits of technological advances are unbound and risks are framed as limited or manageable in terms of Jasanoff and Kim. Over the years the internet imaginary transformed from being techno-optimistic to also involve more nuanced or critical notions, such as the “digital divide”, as in regional inequalities in access to the internet (Dahlberg & Eugenia 2007) or necessary knowledge to search, sort and access information (Wyatt et al. 2005); or “social isolation”, as in increasing social disconnectedness and non-inclusiveness (Turkle 2011).

Also the aforementioned works of Florida in The Creative Class (2002) or Landry in The Creative City (2008) can be seen as articulations of imaginaries or fictional expectations of the future. These could be seen in the wider context of an imaginary of the entrepreneurial city or even entrepreneurialism in itself and are highly relevant to the discourse analysis in this study, as these imaginaries provide easy to adopt narrative themes. The reorientation of urban governance from provision of welfare and service towards fostering growth and economy involve risk taking, inventiveness and profit motivation and a more initiatory and proactive role of governments (Hall & Hubbard 1996) and can thus be characterised as entrepreneurial (Harvey 1989). To that effect urban politics pays close attention to imagination (Mosco 2019) to power place marketing to position the city as more attractive to external investors but also to convince citizens of the entrepreneurial strategies (Hall & Hubbard 1996). Mosco describes this phenomenon as narratives or myths about places - such as the imaginary of the “creative city” - becoming alive through retelling, making cities larger than life and language, justifying “whatever it would take to sprinkle a little Hollywood stardust or perhaps even host the next Silicon Valley” (Mosco 2019,
p.191) to live up to the role model or adhere to “Californian Ideology” (Barbrook & Cameron 1995).

Some more powerful examples of sociotechnical imaginaries are provided by Jasanoff (2015), pointing out that they may very well be linked to very concrete political action, e.g. the Apollo moon landing, sequencing the human genome or curing cancer. These imaginaries might also entail a master narrative, such as “American exceptionalism”, and can be articulated and advertised. This aspect is extremely relevant when it comes to visions and expectations of the future in connection to entrepreneurship and its impact on innovation, economic growth and job creation and the author's exploration of the discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg.

2.5 Conclusion: The Context of Entrepreneurship Policy Discourse

The previous sections provided an overview of the academic fields of entrepreneurship. It described the general emergence of entrepreneurship as a phenomenon and as a field of research. Concepts of entrepreneurship and innovation, entrepreneurial activity, the entrepreneur, his roles, attitudes, and skills as well as the concept of new firm formation and the growth cycle of firms were presented. Also, the increasingly ubiquitous notion of entrepreneurship that is permeating all areas of social life was presented and seems to indicate modern life to happen in an era of entrepreneurialism. Without providing a complete picture of the academic debates in the field of entrepreneurship research, most salient aspects were highlighted to provide some context to the study at hand. To further contextualise the context, the increasing professionalisation of entrepreneurship has been illustrated alongside the development of entrepreneurship policies and entrepreneurship education. While some common understanding about the economic impact of select high-growth firms exist, there are divergent perspectives on how to foster entrepreneurial activity and stimulate job creation and economic development. To that extent, the most relevant orientations with the academic debate have been presented and the apparent gap between empirical findings in academia and policymaking in practice was showcased with some examples. Even though the study at hand does not deal with policy effectiveness per se, the overall doubt of policy effectiveness was elemental into the formulation of the study at hand. After the author analysed the entrepreneurship policy agendas in both Sydney (Recke & Bliemel 2017, 2018) and Hamburg (Recke 2016, 2020b) with results indicating a significant gap between theory and practice, the study presented here focuses on the entrepreneurship policy discourse to investigate the policy formation process to understand what underlying mechanics drive the policy formation in order to provide deeper insight into the misalignment between academia and policy.

Additionally, secondary theories and models to describe the presented innovation process. They are more of contextual relevance to the study at hand but help to understand specific developments in the discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg which are aligned to some notions of these models and theories. The triple helix model was presented as a way to describe
interdependent dependencies between industry, government and university. Recent evolutions of
the model also integrate public society in the approach, as in the quadruple helix, or even
environmental considerations, as in the quintuple helix approach. Alongside an alternative way
to describe innovation processes, the Regional Innovation System, the industry cluster approach
was presented as a mechanism to organise innovation policies along regional parameters, which
was a cornerstone of the European Union strategy over the past decades. More recently, the
concept of an entrepreneurial ecosystem has emerged to describe the innovative process alongside
entrepreneurial activity that is embedded and mutually dependent on various actors within a
community. The approach shifts the accentuation from the firm and government towards the
entrepreneur and networking within the community. The latter is a commonly referenced
approach in increasingly appearing goals of transforming cities to entrepreneurial economies.

This transition and the overall vision of the entrepreneurial city can be seen in the context
of imaginaries as catalysts for innovation. The concepts of fictional expectations, as in not true
but believable visions of a desired future that may drive decision making in the present, were
introduced to highlight how powerful narrative influences public discourse and also political
decision making. The model of sociotechnical imaginaries by Jasanoff and Kim was presented to
contextualise this phenomenon along the tangent of science and technology. Sociotechnical
imaginaries as performative images of the future that can be materialised through technology and
entail what is a socially viable outlook on life are powerful phenomena that heavily influence
societal and political narratives. Using the example of the “internet imaginary” among others, it
was shown how imaginaries can be articulated and enacted on the highest level of government
and reshape social life on even a global scale. As such, it seems evident that sociotechnical
imaginaries inherent in the entrepreneurship policy discourse may have the power to influence or
even shape the policy agenda. Recent imaginaries of the “creative city” or “entrepreneurial city“
may serve as examples to this effect, as notions from these imaginaries are visible throughout
urbanity in the western world.

In summary, this chapter provided an overview of the most relevant literature and lines
of thoughts that may influence the discourse under investigation. Notwithstanding that there
might be more related fields and disciplines that may weigh in on the discursive mechanics, the
presented theoretical backdrop provides sufficient context to evaluate the empirical realities of
entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. Before engaging with discursive realities in the
city of Hamburg, the next chapter will present the theoretical perspective and methodological
approach of the study to position the author’s knowledge production within the primary schools
of thoughts.
3. An Entrepreneurial Ethnography

The author examines the structural relations within the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg by mapping public bodies and related entities that speak directly and indirectly to each other as well as the actors and influencers and their associates. To this effect the author is employing an analytical coupling of theories by French philosophers Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, which will be presented in detail in chapter 4. However, before diving into the depths of their theoretical bodies of work, the author wants to present the overall approach to the study. To give a basic overview of the various research methods, methodologies, theoretical perspectives, and epistemology relevant to the outlined research, the author delineates his approach in terms of Crotty (1998) and Blaikie (2007, 2010) as follows. The author’s research into the discourse of regional entrepreneurship policy towards high-growth entrepreneurship in Hamburg largely focuses on the social realm and the complex interrelations of various stakeholders within the policy making scope and therefore cannot be conducted with a positivism perspective. The proposed research is explicitly qualitative in nature and hence requires an interpretivist perspective. Lacking conditions for the collection of objective data and utilising the scientific method in this context, the research explores commonly constructed views and assumptions about reality, subsequently utilising a constructionism epistemology. An objectivistic approach is not suitable for the outlined research since there is no reality or truth to be discovered independent from the individual perceptions of the relevant stakeholders who are shaping the entrepreneurship policy agenda in Hamburg. Especially considering sociotechnical imaginaries at play in the entrepreneurship policy discourse, it seems evident that these commonly shared visions for the future and the ethical implications embedded in them are constructivist in nature.

The following sections will elaborate on the philosophical underpinning and the primary schools of thought in the social sciences to then elaborate on the research strategy, the authors ontological, epistemological, and theoretical perspectives as well as the research process, the governing methodology and used research methods in more detail.

3.1 Philosophical Underpinning and Primary Schools of Thought

Following Grotty (1998), epistemology is the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective - called research paradigm by Blaikie (2007, 2010) - which provides the context for the research process and establishes its logic and criteria. The theoretical perspective thus informs the methodology as the strategy behind choices for particular research methods - also referred to as techniques and procedures by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009) - to reach desired outcomes, as in answering the research questions. The methods are techniques used to obtain and analyse
data related to the research questions or hypothesis. As epistemology informs the theoretical perspective that informs methodology which then informs choice of methods, there is a hierarchical dependency that allows to elaborate on the overall underpinning for the presented research in this order through means of the overall research design.

3.1.1 Ontology and Epistemology: Theories of Reality and Knowledge

Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge - how it can be known - and therefore closely linked to ontology, which is concerned with the nature of existence, to construct meaning. As such, ontology refers to the essence of things in the social world (J. Mason 2002) as in what is and how things relate to each other, or the nature of reality (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). Creswell (2014) uses the term “worldview” to describe general orientation about the world and nature of research, however, the author decided to adopt the more philosophical terminology of epistemology and ontology in this study.

On a very general level, two ontological perspectives can be shaped in the realm of social sciences: realism, as in external reality existing independently of our beliefs and understanding; and idealism, as in reality being mind-dependent and only knowable through constructed meanings (Ormston et al. 2013). Blaikie (2007, 2010) more granularly distinguishes six types of ontological assumptions:

1. shallow realism, sometimes called naive realism (Ormston et al. 2013), that assumes phenomena we study as existing independently from us and that they can be discovered, observed and described directly and accurately;
2. conceptual realism, that assumes reality having an existence independent from us and it is not a property of construction by social community but rather a collective consciousness that is not directly observable;
3. cautious realism, that assumes reality as an independent existence but since any act of observation is interpretive in nature, it cannot be observed accurately and thus requires a critical attitude;
4. depth realism, sometimes called critical or transcendental realism (Bhaskar 1975), that assumes reality consisting of three domains that can be observed (empirical) while existing independently of the observer (actual) and may be connected to underlying structures and mechanism that may not be observed (real);
5. idealism, that assumes reality consists of representations created by the human mind, created by shared interpretations produced and reproduced by social actors with reality existing independently from social constructed realities, reality impacting reality constructing activities or reality as a construction of different perspectives on an external world; and
6. subtle realism, sometimes called contextual or collective idealism (Ormston et al. 2013), that assumes reality as an independent, knowable reality with cultural assumptions preventing direct access and considering knowledge as based on assumptions and purposes and therefore a human construction.

In consideration of epistemology, three main positions can be abstracted on a high level (Crotty 1998):

1. objectivism, considering knowledge inherent to objects under investigation and discoverable as objective truth;
2. subjectivism, considering knowledge constructed internally and therefore completely subjective; and
3. constructivism, rejecting the view of objective truth and considering knowledge as socially constructed.

As such epistemology deals not just with the basis of knowledge, but also with how we can learn about reality, and consequently relates to strategies or approaches through which knowledge can be acquired, typically described as inductive or deductive (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009, Ormston et al. 2013). Blaikie (2007) uses the term research strategy to describe the inherent logic of knowledge generations along 4 distinct concepts:

1. inductive logic, aimed at establishing universal generalisations used as explanations of patterns through observations which can be developed in theories;
2. deductive logic, aimed at investigating patterns to formulate explanations through formulating theory and evaluating, rejecting or adjusting it through observations;
3. retroductive logic, aimed at uncovering underlying mechanisms to explain patterns through trying different models to fit observations; and
4. abductive logic, aimed at describing actors’ construction of reality through creation of technical accounts of actors' practices.

One of the main differentiators between such strategies is the perspective on process. Ormstrom et al. (2013) describe deductive logic as taking a “top down” approach to knowledge, while inductive logic is building knowledge from the “bottom up”. Blaikie (2007) provides a more nuanced consideration and understands abductive and parts of retroductive logic as “bottom up” by creating theory from situations, and both inductive and deductive logic as “top down”, starting with a theory or idea that may represent reality. There are also other epistemological concepts, such as correspondence theory, considering statements true if matching an independent reality; coherence theory, considering accounts true as socially constructed representations of reality if
supported by other accounts; or pragmatic theory, considering beliefs as true if they have practical utility (Ormston et al. 2013). However, for the context of this elaboration, the perspectives provided by Blaikie will be used moving forward. Each of these research strategies has different philosophical heritage and epistemological and ontological assumptions. Extending the abstract epistemological perspectives of objectivism and constructivism, Blaikie (2010) provides a more granular distinction between six types of epistemological assumptions, namely:

1. empiricism, also described as positivism (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009, Ormston et al. 2013), that considers knowledge as being produced and verified by human senses, which can be obtained as reliable knowledge through neutral and trained observation and thus can be certain knowledge accurately representing the external world;
2. rationalism, that considers knowledge arising from the examination of the structure of human thought, with logic and mathematics providing standards for judging knowledge claims;
3. falsificationism, also referred to as post-positivism or post-empiricism (Ormston et al. 2013), that considers knowledge as produced from trial and error, testing theories against empirical evidence, with inability to observe reality directly and thus testing theories through falsification rather than confirmation, consequently seeing knowledge as tentative and open for revision;
4. neo-realism, that considers knowledge as derived from structure or mechanics that produce observed patterns, with discovery necessitating postulation of entities and process beyond surface appearances and possibility of competing or cancelling mechanism as causation for no event or change being observable;
5. constructionism, that considers knowledge as the outcome of people making sense of their encounter with the world and other people and scientific knowledge being reinterpretations of this everyday knowledge into technical language and considering true discovered about the world impossible due to concepts, theories, background knowledge and past experience influencing human observation, thus required reflective practices for any researcher as all observation is imprinted by theory as there is no permanent criteria for establishing knowledge as true; and
6. conventionalism, that considers scientific theories as creations for dealing with the world that do not describe reality but determine what is real to the scientist and thus subject to judgement not proof when competing theories (Blaikie 2010).

The underlying theoretical perspectives in terms of Crotty (1998), referred to as research paradigms by Blaikie (2007, 2010), will be discussed in the following section to provide a basic overview of the primary schools of thought that may govern the research process.
3.1.2 Primary Schools of Thought: Theoretical Perspectives

Blaikie (2007, 2010) distinguished between four classical and seven contemporary research paradigms. The classical paradigms are

1. positivism;
2. critical rationalism;
3. classical hermeneutics; and
4. interpretivism.

The contemporary paradigms are

1. critical theory;
2. ethnomethodology;
3. social realism;
4. contemporary hermeneutics;
5. structuration theory;
6. feminism; and
7. complexity theory.

In positivism, reality is understood as a series of events that can be observed through human senses and knowledge can only be derived from experience. Any truth can thus be determined through observation - though the scientific method - and is not tainted by theoretical notions, constituting general laws of explanation (Blaikie 2010). It can be traced back to René Descartes’ (1596-1650) work *Discourse on Methodology* (1637), in which he highlights objectivity and evidence as key to the search for truth, and other influential contributions from Isaac Newton (1643-1727) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626), emphasising acquisition of knowledge through direct observation, or David Hume (1711-1776), associated with establishing the empirical research tradition, and Auguste Comte (1798-1857), considered the founding father of sociology (Ormston et al. 2013). Ormstrom et al. also point out that positivist assumptions have evolved to include a deductive approach in which hypotheses were first articulated and then tested, which is referred to as post-positivism.

In critical rationalism sensory experience is rejected as a source for theories, rendering pure observation impossible as observations are always made with expectations. Tentative theories are formed to account for observations, which are then used to try to reject false theories, which then need to be dropped, or modified and retested (Blaikie 2010). It can be attributed to works of Karl Popper (1902-1994), most critically *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1934/1959), and his notion that statements that cannot be logically deduced from what is known, may still be
logically falsified, thereby rejecting inductive reasoning that seems to provide more knowledge than inductive logic would allow.

Classical hermeneutics can be understood as the study of interpretation (George 2020). It started with exploring historic texts to discover meaning and evolved towards discovering socially produced systems of meaning. Its origins can be traced back to Plato (428-348 BC) and later Aristotle (384-322 BC) and his work De Interpretatione. In more recent history, hermeneutic thought emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and is especially attributed to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), highlighting that successful understanding depends on successful interpretation of grammatical and psychological discourse, and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), focussing on understanding of lived experience as the goal of hermeneutics in context of his critique of historical reason (George 2020). In Blaikie’s account (2010) classical hermeneutics considers understanding inevitably being distorted by any interpreter prejudice, leading to concerns about the possibility of producing objective knowledge, thus rejecting notions of establishing a path to pure consciousness and pure truth as impossible as people cannot step outside the social world and historical context they exist in. The paradigm of contemporary hermeneutics is largely influenced by works of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) and his “philosophical hermeneutics” (George 2020) and will be elaborated later.

The interpretivism paradigm can be traced back to German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), most critically to his work Critique of Pure Reason (1781), and his realisation that there is knowledge about the world not derived from direct observation but human interpretation and as such is based on “understanding”. Ormstrom et al. (2013) point towards works of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), which informed interpretivist thinking through his emphasis on “understanding peoples’ lived experiences” in their historical and social context, as well as Max Weber (1864-192), who attempted to bridge the gap between interpretivist and positivist perspectives and proposed two types of understanding, observational understanding and explanatory or motivational understanding, thereby differentiating between law-like propositions procured through observations in natural sciences and providing understanding of subjectively meaningful experiences in social sciences. As such, the importance of interpretation and observation for understanding the social world is at the core of interpretivism. The world is interpreted by meanings people produce and reproduce as part of their daily practice. According to Blaikie (2010), the perspective followed thoughts from classical hermeneutics trying to establish objective knowledge about the subjective to verify the meaning of social life by constructing models of typical meanings for typical actors in typical activities and situations and using tentative hypotheses to be tested to generate understanding of rational social actions. Notions of “value neutral” observation or universal laws are rejected and understanding of experience derives from points of view of the actor who experienced it (Ormston et al. 2013). To
this effect, the observer’s perspective may be problematic in attributing meaning to social actions, as it may also be derived from social actor’s meanings (Blaikie 2007).

Blaikie (2010) points out that contemporary research paradigms reject or at least heavily criticise positivism and critical rationalism and rather extend classical hermeneutic or interpretivism perspectives. The contemporary paradigms can be described as follows.

Critical theory is attributed to The Frankfurt School, the social and political philosophical movement of thought, also known as Institute for Social Research, founded in 1923 in Frankfurt to develop Marxist studies in Germany (Corradetti 2013). The seminal work of Jürgen Habermas in *Knowledge and Human Interest* (1971) points out that the subject matter of natural and social sciences is fundamentally different and thus requires a different logic and argues towards the pre-interpreted nature of social reality and its methodological implications, in line with notions of interpretivism and structuration theory, but rejecting the notion of objective observations (Blaikie 2010). Blaikie (2007) highlights three categories of Habermas’ scientific inquiry, 1. empirical-analytical sciences, aimed at technical control over nature and social phenomenon; 2. historical-hermeneutic sciences, based on practical interests of communicative understanding; and 3. critical theory and its emancipatory interest in human autonomy.

Ethnomethodology focuses on the way members of society achieve and maintain a sense of social order in everyday practices through a continuous process of creation and adaptation of norms in their practices (Blaikie 2010). The approach was originally developed by Harold Garfinkel (1917-2011), most critically in his work *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967), where he rejects notions of social facts as determining constraints on social behaviour and rather considers them as produced by members of society in and through their everyday practices. As such, ethnomethodology focuses on how social facts come into being and how they are used to maintain social order with strong emphasis on awareness of assumptions and norms researchers are relating to (Blaikie 2007).

Social realism, sometimes also called critical realism, tends to replace both positivism and critical rationalism with a reflective view on science (Blaikie 2010), making the positivism view on reality just one of many domains of reality (Bhaskar 1975). The approach was initially developed by Roy Bhaskar (1944-2014), most relevantly in his work *A Realist Theory of Science* (1975) and describes reality as constituted not just by experienced events, but also by other events and their producing structures and mechanisms, whether they are experiences or not, which social realism attempts to discover through use of instruments extending the senses by building on theoretical models and searching for evidence of their existence, using positivistically observed patterns as a way to explain structures and mechanisms that produce events (Blaikie 2010). Blaikie (2007) also highlights that debate in the social realism realm surrounding the ontological status of social structures and mechanisms resulted in the versions of the paradigm, namely structuralism and constructionism.
Contemporary hermeneutics is largely attributed to Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” as an evolution of work by Heidegger, who explored the meaning or sense of being, most critically in *Being and Time* (1927), and defined such inquiry as a hermeneutic self-interpretation as well as described understanding as a mode of human existence projected towards interpretive possibilities available to actors in their situation (George 2020). George points towards Heidegger notions being cause of considerable debate in academia and Heidegger himself considering his later works no longer served by hermeneutics, still his use of hermeneutics in phenomenological inquiries into human existence were a breakthrough in the historic development of hermeneutics (Gadamer 1975). With his hermeneutical phenomenology, Heidegger took an opposing position to Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and his epistemological considerations, questioning the very foundation of the sciences, and the concept of transcendental consciousness limiting all possible knowledge within an “epoché” that “brackets” existential belief within a priori eidetic structures of appearance (Husserl 1982; George 2020). Heidegger’s phenomenological thinking is not guided by epistemological concerns but rather by ontological structures that constitute human existence - the being in the world - and thus limits any understanding as conditioned by pre-structures that determine what is significant and how situations are attuned (Heidegger 1996; George 2020). Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (1975) is building on Heidegger’s work and introduces the notion of understanding as a means to understand something as true through a distinctive experience of truth that cannot be derived from the scientific method in his work *Truth and Method* (1960). The hermeneutical experience of truth is contingently constituted by tradition, as in idiomatic, dynamic, and evolving processes, and language, as in showing meaningful order of the world, that govern attempts of understanding that therefore cannot reach self-certainty but should always be delimited by delphic self-knowledge of our limits (George 2020). In the account of Blaikie contemporary hermeneutics is moving the attention from what an author of a text intended in classical hermeneutics towards engaging with the text in dialogue to “fuse the horizon“ of the text and interpreter (Gadamer 1975), thus transforming the text through the altered horizon of the interpreter, resulting in different understanding of different interpreters and as such conceptualising reality is ever-changing (Blaikie 2010). As Blaikie (2007) summarises, contemporary hermeneutics is interested not in subjective meanings but in shared meanings, which are objective and can be shared as truths.

Structuration theory is attributed to work by Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1979; Giddens 1984), most prominently *The Constitution of Society* (1984), and can be described as an attempt to bridge between notions of experience of social actors (agency) and forms of social totalities (structure) that reconceptualised dualities such as “subject” and “object” or “action” and “structure” under the concept of “duality of structure” that recognises social actors as producing and reproducing the social world (Blaikie 2010). Blaikie highlights that, contrasting an interpretivist perspective, while actors have reflexive capacity to monitor, rationalise and change
their action that can be subject to unconscious motives, actions occur within unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences. Giddens’ double hermeneutics may be seen as sympathetic to Gadamer's fusion of horizons (1975), yet he differentiated between “mutual knowledge” in everyday practices and “common sense” to justify that actors know (Giddens 1984; Blaikie 2010). Giddens also rejected notions of universal laws and rather proposed generalisations limited by time and space, as knowledge can change (Blaikie 2007).

Feminism is building on the critique that natural and social science largely being androcentric and as such provide a distorted understanding of both nature and social life and omit or distort women’s perspectives and can be seen alongside the development of these traditions: 1. feminist empiricism, representing an attempt to reform science through recognition of scientific communities as creators of knowledge and arbiters or as rules on what counts as objectivity or evidence; 2. standpoint feminism, rejecting legitimacy of established scientific norms and practice and promoting revising notions of objectivity and truth; and 3. feminist postmodernism, raising doubt about any attempt to establish science that is able to avoid replicating undesirable forms of human existence (Blaikie 2010).

Complexity theory accentuates system analysis and is concerned with a new scientific ontology that also rejects epistemological notions of universal knowledge, experimental control, determinism, or linear logic of causal expectations but rather relies on explanatory accounts of contextual knowledge, complex and nonlinear interactions between elements that let emerging properties and self-organising structure appear (Blaikie 2010). As such it can be seen as in between modernism and postmodernism, rejecting traditional views of science as well as anti-scientific notions of postmodernism (Blaikie 2007).

These theoretical perspectives provide divergent approaches to social inquiry with sometimes diametrical positions on what constitutes reality and knowledge, the ontological and epistemological assumptions that are at the core of any of these research paradigms. Thus, these perspectives also inform the choices of methodology and methods. In the following section, a general overview of qualitative research methodologies will be presented.

3.1.3 Qualitative Research Methodologies

There is an extensive number of qualitative research methodologies that have been developed over the years. To provide a broad overview of the most important methodologies in social sciences, the author is limiting the number of different approaches to exemplify qualitative characteristics rather than providing a complete account of available options.

As an early qualitative methodology, ethnography was coined in the nineteenth century and has served as a way to generate understanding of the social world or culture through immersion in community, originally often in the form of studying “native” populations outside western world or as in case of the Chicago school from the 1920s to 1950s in cities through means of observation and from the middle of the twentieth century onwards also through interviews.
(Ormston et al. 2013, Creswell 2014). Through empirical field research and theoretical and comparative interpretation, ethnography became a central component in anthropology to generate knowledge about social organisation and culture through mostly unstructured data collection, e.g. participant observations or informal conversations and strong emphasis on reflexivity in the research process. (Atkinson & Hammersley 2007).

Phenomenological research, originally based on the work of Husserl and his seminal works *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901) and *Ideas I* (1913) and then further developed by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and others is aimed at describing structures of conscious experience (Smith 2018) and constructing meaning people attach to phenomenon or concepts (Ormston et al. 2013, Creswell 2014). Smith (2018) names three classical phenomenological methods, 1. describing experience as in our own past experience, referred to as pure description of lived experience by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty; 2. interpreting experience through relation to social and linguistic context, referred to as hermeneutics by Heidegger; 3. analysing the form of experience; as well as more recent methods like 4. logico-semantic phenomenology, as in specifying truth conditions for types of thinking or satisfaction conditions for types of intentions; or 5. neurophenomenology, as in empirical experiments aimed to confirm or refute aspects of experience; which as such engage in interpretive-descriptive analysis of experience to reveal conditions of possibility of intentionality (Smith 2018). Building on the experience of the individual and construction of meaning in the subjective consciousness of actors, Alfred Schütz (1899-1959) framed life-word phenomenology as an empirical process involving not just interpretation but also reflexivity to advance towards controlled abstraction formulations to reveal universal structure in subjective behaviour (Hitzler & Eberle 2004). This thinking inspired Garfinkel’s work on ethnomethodology to understand how people construct social order and make sense of the world through their practices (Ormston et al. 2013).

Conversation Analysis is another empirically driven approach to understand social interaction as a continuing process of producing and maintaining social order (Bergmann 2004) and is influenced by the heritage of ethnomethodology (Ormston et al. 2013). It can be traced back to Harvey Sacks (1935-1975) and Erving Goffmann (1922-1982) and involves a comparative-systematic process of analysis of recordings or transcriptions of real and authentic social events to reconstruct generative principles for an observable and uniform phenomenon (Bergmann 2004).

Discourse Analysis studies how texts are structured and aims to reveal their function and contradictions in different contexts and can be traced back to the works of Michel Foucault (1926-1984), influences from structuralist and post-structuralist theories as well as Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and his notion of semiotics, as in signs and symbols in social life (Parker 2004). As such discourse analysis investigates how knowledge is produced in discourse (Ormston et al. 2013) in form of patterns in language related to ideology, power and institutions, a process
which cannot be characterised as an objective analysis but rather as an interpretive construction influenced by context and disposition of the researcher (Parker 2004) and thus requires reflexivity.

Symbolic interactionism is an American sociological perspective that can be traced back to pragmatist theories such as William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) or George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) and deals with symbolic linguistic foundations of social life and the developmental course of action occurring when people with agency enter into joint action (Denzin 2004). As such it focuses on interactions between people and symbolic meaning that is attached to social actions or environments to create understanding of human behaviour (Ormston et al. 2013). According to Denzin, the approach is following structuration theory and Gidden’s notion of duality of structure in which “*structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize*” (Giddens 1984, p.25) and accentuates local narratives about how people act together rather than why and rejects theories to objective or quantify human experience (Denzin 2004).

Grounded theory is informed by symbolic interactionism and can be described as an approach to generate theories from analysis of data from accounts of participants of an experience to explain social processes or behaviour (Ormston et al. 2013, Creswell 2014). It is attributed to Barney Galland Glaser (*1930) and Anselm Leonard Strauss (1916-1996) and their seminal work *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (1967) in which their emphasis on theory generation rather than verification of theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) aims towards systematically discovering “good” theory from verified data with an inductive process to explain and predict phenomena under investigation (Blaikie 2010; Birks & Mills 2015). Research using grounded theory does not start with theoretical assumptions but generates theoretical concepts during a triadic and circular discovery process, requiring any discovery concept derived from abductive inference to be verified in the data in the circular steps of 1. data collection; 2. coding; and 3. writing of memos (Hildenbrand 2004). The original concept of grounded theory has undergone various revisions over the years (Blaikie 2010), is sometimes used as a term to describe loosely inductive research strategies (Ormston et al. 2013) and can be seen as one of the most popular research designs (Birks & Mills 2015).

The use of mixed methods as a methodological strategy is describing the collection, analysis and mixing of quantitative and qualitative data within a study (Creswell 2014) and is related to other nomenclature such as triangulation (Denzin 1970, 2012), initially just referring to combination of different qualitative methods, or multi-method, referring to studies using more than one method of the same type, either quantitative or qualitative (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill 2009). Denzin points towards the inherently multi-method nature of qualitative research, also substantiated by Flick (2007), and highlights the divergent epistemological assumptions behind many qualitative methodologies that cannot be easily combined to position triangulation as an alternative to validation and a strategy to add rigor, breadth complexity, richness, and depth of inquiry to the research (Denzin 2012).
As is evident from the exemplary methodologies presented here, these qualitative approaches to research share certain similarities that can be roughly summarised under interpretivist and constructivist connotations and emphasis in reflexivity to properly contextualise the research position in the research. Most critically, modern incarnations of qualitative methodologies are heavily influenced by postmodernist critique, as in challenging that an objective reality independent of human beings exist, that we can develop objective knowledge or general laws that explain aspects of the social world or that language represents a reality outside of itself, and critical theory, concerned with empowering people to overcome social constraints, such as race, class, gender, disability or sexual orientation, giving rise to research methodologies that call for greater equality between participants and researcher, such as participatory research or more general use of narratives to provide greater understanding of phenomena on people’s own accounts (Ormston et al. 2013).

To qualify the research at hand and based on the presented theoretical backdrop, the following section will elaborate on the adopted research strategies and the ontological and epistemological choices the author made to shape his investigation of the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg.

3.2 Research Design and the Production of Knowledge

As outlined in chapter 1, the aim of the research at hand is to investigate the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg to unmask its inner workings that inform the policy formation process towards entrepreneurship. As has been shown in the author’s previous research (Recke 2016; Recke & Bliemel 2017, 2018), academic insights do not seem to weigh in on the policy agenda one way or the other, which prompts the need to gain deeper understanding of the policy formation and underlying motivations of involved stakeholders. To that effect the study does not deal with policy evaluation or policy effectiveness but with a social process of articulating policy agenda which can be found in official documents, enacted activities, programs, or measures and in written or oral testimony by stakeholders within the regional entrepreneurship policy field. Since the most promising sources of data for an exploration such as this are these documents and potential insights to be gained from stakeholders themselves, the author engaged in qualitative research as it explores commonly constructed views and assumptions about reality, constituted and embedded in social practice. The choices made by the author are represented in a layered visualisation based on the research onion (see figure 3.1) developed by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009).

Following the aforementioned strategies, the ontology is idealist, since in view of the author, the social reality is produced through shared interpretations of actors and as such is a construction of reality that may be one of many different conceivable perspectives. Consequently, the epistemological perspective is that of constructionism, as knowledge is the outcome of
people’s sensemaking process that informs any theory derived from observations and therefore must be regarded as not universally true but rather contingent to context.

![Layered visualisation of research in this thesis based on research onion by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009), works of Blaikie (2007, 2010) & Crotty (1998)](image)

**Figure 3.1**: Layered visualisation of research in this thesis based on research onion by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009), works of Blaikie (2007, 2010) & Crotty (1998)

The author is adopting an abductive research strategy through his analytical coupling of Foucault and Bourdieu (see chapter 4) in which knowledge is constructed derived from social actors’ language, practices, and accounts in their real daily life by describing these practices and meanings, extrapolating categories and concepts that provide understanding. As such, it incorporates what inductive and deductive strategies omit, interpretations of motives and intentions that direct social practices from an inside view (Blaikie 2010). Consequently, as the social world is constituted as meaningful by actors, the strategy involves immersion into this world to “*know what social actors already know*” (Giddens 1979) and abduction of a technical description of that social life (Blaikie 2010). Following this distinction, the author is adopting an interpretivism research paradigm as in his view reality is perceived through meanings produced and reproduced by social actors in their practice. Lacking merits for the collection of objective data and utilising the scientific method in the context of exploring the public discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg, the research explores commonly constructed views and assumptions about reality, constituted and embedded in social practice, and how they develop.
over time using the methodological approach of a critical discourse analysis combined with an ethnography in a longitudinal study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009).

These ontological and epistemological assumptions as well as the adopted theoretical perspective in terms of Crotty (1998), inform the question of methodologies and methods based on the available or obtainable data as presented by the author (Recke 2019, 2020a). To further qualify the research, the following will present the methodology and methods employed in the study.

3.2.1 Methodological Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis & Ethnography

As an essential part of the methodology for the outlined research, critical discourse analysis was chosen as the right tool set to organise the research. It was deemed particularly appropriate for critical policy analysis, e.g. by S. Taylor (2004) or van Dijk (2005) for its ability to investigate the relationship of language to other social processes and their inherent power relations. Also, discourse includes imaginaries as representations of things that might, could or should be, according to Fairclough (2001), which makes the concept highly relevant to the outlined study. The critical discourse analysis approach was initially coined as a network of scholars by Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak in 1991 to summarise a number of approaches within the field of discourse analysis. The field is rooted in rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, socio-psychology, cognitive science, literacy studies, socio-linguistics, applied linguistics and pragmatics, according to Wodak & Meyer (2009), and dates back to elements of the Frankfurt School before the Second World War in the view of van Dijk (2005). It is a problem oriented and an interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary approach that is not investigating singular linguistic units, but rather social phenomena (Fairclough 2001; Wodak & Meyer 2009), social problems or political issues (van Dijk 2005). Rather than just describing discourse structures, it aims to explain them by exploring the discourse dimension of power abuse (van Dijk 1993, 2005). Discourse is understood as both the semiotic elements of social life, such as language and visual expression etc., as well as the representation of different categories of social life, such as different political discourses, which are defined through social practice that constitute social fields, institutions, and organisations (Fairclough 2001; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). This view is largely building on theories of Foucault, who Wodak et al. call the godfather of critical discourse analysis and sees text understood as a manifestation of social action that is determined by social structure within the field (Wodak & Meyer 2009), thereby representing power structures within the discourse.

In the context of this research, discourse is therefore understood in tradition of Foucault’s formation of statements (Foucault 1972) as an accumulation of ideas or ways of thinking that can be identified in textual and oral communication which are also apparent in wider social structures of involved entities and constitute their inherent belief systems (Lupton 1992). As social practice (Foucault 1972), the discourse is delimited by particular discursive events, situations, institutions
as well as social structures and has ideological effects (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2009). By analysing the discourse in its role to produce, reproduce or challenge dominance/power (van Dijk 1993), the ideologies and power structures inherent in the discourse can be demystified (Wodak & Meyer 2009). Subsequently, the proclaimed “truth” can be uncovered as the product of discourse and power, the will-to-power rather than the will-to-truth, and reveals its contradictions and shortcomings (Hook 2001). This approach is building on Foucault's perspective on power relations that in his view exist on the societal level and informs strategies to impart micro-practices in everyday life with power effects as unintended consequences rather than intentional choices with clearly identifiable objectives (Powers 2007). The overall perspective for the critical discourse analysis is that of a critical policy analysis.

To trace the imaginaries embedded in the discourse to their manifestations in the reality of the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem in Hamburg, the author decided to augment the critical discourse analysis’ validity through a secondary methodology, namely ethnography, and use of Bourdieu’s social theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). In his view, discourse creates legitimacy for social distinctions and hierarchy - power structures - and can be analysed with his theoretical concepts of capital, fields, and habitus (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015). Any use of language is therein understood as a contribution to the power struggle for symbolic domination (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; Keller 2011). The network of entrepreneurship policy stakeholders in Hamburg and their interrelations constitutes the field in the terms of this study. Inherent practices, rules and structures can be understood as the habitus and can unveil different kinds of capital (such as social, cultural, economic, etc.) used within the field to manifest power structures and means for exclusion. As the nature of critical discourse analysis and ethnography suggests, it allows the author to explore the entrepreneurship policy discourse in a form of longitudinal study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009), interrogating change and development within the discourse over time.

The author does not claim to be an ideologic follower of Foucault or Bourdieu but merely draws upon their work to utilise an analytical framework to conduct a critical policy analysis and unmask hidden sociotechnical imaginaries in the entrepreneurship policy discourse and the inherent power structures of the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem in Hamburg. The outlined concepts also show how imaginaries might not just be hidden in publicly available policy documents, but to a large degree can be manifested in wider social structures, calling for the additional ethnographic component to the research. Key to the study is therefore the analytical coupling of theories of Foucault and Bourdieu, which will be elaborated in detail in chapter 4 as a cornerstone of the research. In the next section, the methods employed by the author will be presented.

3.2.2 Methods: Document Analysis and Covert Observations
The author conducted a document analysis of relevant published materials (such as government strategy documents, senate resolutions, press releases, public records, etc.) as well as documents
obtained during the field research (such as authorities’ meeting protocols, internal working documents, presentation slides, drafts, etc.) to map the policy and entity terrain in Hamburg. The collection of documents was ongoing during the entire research process and extended considerably during the ethnographic field research as new material became available. The body of documents was restricted to items created and published until the end of 2018. Further limitations excluded specific entities in the ecosystem to focus on the core stakeholders in the discourse under investigation. The analysis allowed coding of the document’s content into themes for further consideration in the Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis. The theoretical concepts are explained in depth in chapter 4.

The outlined research approach is largely building on covert observations as a complementary ethnographic component to the document analysis to qualify the critical discourse analysis. To better understand the conducted observations, a short differentiation seems prudent. Friedrichs (1985) introduced 5 dimensions of observations to classify the method. These are

1. covert/open (do participants know they are observed?);
2. non-participant/participant (does the researcher engage with the field?);
3. systematic/unsystematic (are the observations standardised by pre-built schemes?);
4. natural/artificial situation (does the observation occur in the natural field or under special fabricated circumstances?); and
5. self/external observation (in which way are external subjects or the researcher himself objects under observation?).

In this case, covert observations are the complementary cornerstone of the outlined research. The investigation could not be conducted as open observations, e.g. in form of questionnaires or scripted interviews, as the level of insight would have been highly limited. Not only would many if not all obtainable information be aligned to publicly available information and agendas pursued by either the stakeholders themselves or their superiors, they would also have been influenced by the fact that they might have felt scrutinised by the research if the objective would have been fully disclosed. Only a covert observation allowed a more detailed and much deeper understanding of factors at play. Ethical implications of this research have been considered thoroughly and since the focus of the research was identifying structures of discourse and inherent sociotechnical imaginaries rather than individual contributions to public policy agendas, impact on individuals was deemed highly limited. The outlined research has been granted approval by University of the West of Scotland’s School of Business & Enterprise Ethics Committee in August 2018. More details are covered in the following section 3.2.3.

The observations are ethnographic and mostly participant in nature, as they entailed communication with the stakeholders and active participation in events and institutional contexts by the author. Friedrichs (1985) articulates 5 conditions for participant observation:
1. the researcher requires access to the field (e.g. in form of organisational consent, group membership etc.);

2. the researcher has to take on a role that does not disturb or even induce interactions in the field;

3. the researcher needs to be trained to perceive through the categories of the observation scheme;

4. the researcher has to be aware of his double role as participant and distant observer; and lastly

5. the researcher needs to ethically justify the endeavour.

Flick (1991, 1995, 2007, 2011) understands participant observations as a social and communicative process and builds on Denzin (1970, 2012) who described it as a field strategy that involves document analysis, interviews, direct participation, observation as well as introspection, thereby characterising it as a triangulation of different research methods that adds depth and rigor to the research and can serve as an alternative to validation (Flick 2007), that might otherwise not be obtainable. The researcher is meant to immerse as a participant in the field to gain access during this process, which is divided into 3 phases according to Spradley (1980), descriptive, focussed, and selective observation. In the first phase, the field is explored for a first orientation and unspecific description that narrows the research question as the field’s complexity is determined. In the second phase, the observational perspective is narrowed to observe the most relevant problems, processes, and people in relation to the research question. In the third phase, additional examples and evidence is collected to substantiate previous findings. The overall goal of the participant observation is to understand the object of investigation from the inside, to decode its subjective perspectives, its social processes, its cultural or social rules that shape its practice (Schöne 2003). Starting from singular observations, more general and comparable statements can be developed into a typology by analysing other observations. The resulting reality perceived by the researcher is thereby not determined but constructed by different individual or collective actors, according to Schöne.

As the outlined research is investigative in nature, the observations were mostly unsystematic. While the goal was to discover the phrase regime within the public policy discourse to uncover hidden sociotechnical imaginaries, it was deemed unlikely to approach stakeholders in a unified scheme. Different stakeholders and their institutional context required very divergent strategies to gain access and were highly dependent on the personal relationship that could be created with the author over time. Meaningful insights were considered unlikely to be discovered in superficial dialogue but required a substantial immersion into the social practices and rules of the field. The only systematic scheme was building on preliminary findings of the document analysis that indicated certain phrases, articulations and belief systems that were relevant to explore in more detail. Based on first observations, a loose protocol guideline was developed that
contained aspects such as formal and informal rituals, chronological progress of events, atmosphere, styles, preferences, rules, roles, etc.; that could inform field notes.

As the author examined the public policy discourse towards Entrepreneurship in Hamburg, the observations took place in the natural field of the discourse. As outlined below, the network of actors in the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem was penetrated by attending events, visiting institutions, exploring wider institutional contexts, and immersing into the field to uncover the inherent power relations. Lastly, the subjects of the study have been external only. While the author is reflective of his role as a researcher in contrast to his professional role within the ecosystem, he was not a subject of the outlined research. The field is known to the author, but his double role was reflected constantly to not just confirm already existing convictions but to remain open for new and surprising discoveries. As such, the author used his habitus-field-capital in terms of Bourdieu and was able to penetrate and navigate the field as well as blend in to a certain degree. As this relation within the field is structuring and performative, the systematised reflection was a key component of the study. More details on the author’s reflectivity are presented in section 6.1.2.

The next section will cover the ethical implications of the study what decisions where taken by the author to conduct the research in accordance the with Code of Ethics at the University of the West of Scotland.

3.2.3 Ethical Implications for the Study

The author adopted the principles for good research established in the University of the West of Scotland’s School of Business & Enterprise Guidelines for Ethical Practice in research to ensure research integrity. The principles address honesty in reporting all findings and making valid interpretations and claims; rigour in choosing and adhering to appropriate methods; transparency in declaring conflicts of interest and in reporting data collection, methods and analysis; and respect and care for all participants to protect their dignity, rights, welfare and safety.

For the study at then, covert observations are a key to gain valuable insights to achieve the research objectives. As illustrated in the previous section, the investigation could not be expected to yield any relevant insight if the observations would be conducted as open observations, e.g. in form of questionnaires or scripted interviews. As the study critically interrogates the discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg, any if not all information obtained through open interviews was expected to be aligned to publicly available information and agendas pursued by either the stakeholders themselves or their superiors. If the aim of the study would be disclosed, participants would have felt scrutinised by the research which thus would heavily influence the way they would react in interviews or questionnaires. Only a covert observation allowed a more detailed and much deeper understanding of factors at play. Yet, this approach comes with considerable ethical implications, especially in regard to participants’ dignity and right to privacy.
Ethical implications of this research have been considered thoroughly. Since transparency and full disclosure to participants would be preferential framing conditions for any study, the decision to conduct the covert observations was not taken lightly and involved considerable deliberation and debate with academic supervisors to ensure academic rigour, professionalism and integrity for the study. Most critically, participants’ dignity and rights to privacy were addressed in these considerations. In context of the study, it was determined that since the focus of the research is the structure and mechanisms of discourse rather than individual contributions to the actual policy agenda, there is no need to disclose any information about the individual participants in the study. Consequently, the author went through a process of anonymising all participants’ personal information and replacing their names with abbreviations that represent an association to entities within the entrepreneurial ecosystem only. Apart from the mayor of Hamburg and the senator for culture and media, both of which are persons of public interest and therefore can be mentioned by name, no other identities are revealed in this thesis. Participants contribution to discourse dynamics are at the core of any analysis and thus any risk of impact on individuals was deemed highly limited.

In the process of the research project, the author obtained independent ethical review through the School of Business & Enterprise Ethics Committee. The outline of the study and the overall approach towards the covert observations were presented honestly and accurately with results being shared in this thesis in a transparent fashion. The Ethics Committee terms of reference are defined by the UWS regulatory framework and were followed in the approval request. The outlined research has been granted approval by University of the West of Scotland’s School of Business & Enterprise Ethics Committee in August 2018 before any field research activity has commenced. For further reference, the Ethics Approval Letter has been attached as Appendix F to the thesis document.

The next section will present the research execution and how the interplay of the chosen methods allowed the interrogation of the entrepreneurship policy discourse on both abstract and embodied levels for an in-depth analysis.

3.2.4 Research Execution: An Interplay of Methods

The author spent a considerable amount of time gathering data in form of official documents, overt policies, manuscripts, reports, protocols, legal documents, public speeches, press releases or media coverage from both relevant entities within the entrepreneurial policy ecosystem in Hamburg and from relevant individual stakeholders, such as government officials, ministry staff, or stakeholders from private or academic entities. This process was mainly conducted as a bibliography research from 2017 to 2020 and built on previous research by the author, using publicly available sources. Among those are the official database of the Hamburg parliament, the Hamburgische Bürgerschaft (buergerschaft-hh.de), which contains documentation of all printing matters, protocols, legislation etc. as well as directories of related institutions in the city, such as
ministries, public offices, banks, advocacy groups etc. Even though the number of major publicly available sources remained stable over the course of the study, except for subsequent releases of new documents by entities and stakeholders under investigation, informal access to additional documents grew in parallel to the field research, as many participants made more material available from either their private archives or non-public repositories. For example, certain stakeholders offered to share documents that informed articulation of official publications, internal presentations, drafts, or unreleased information. The initial body of documents enclosed hundreds of documents from the parliamentary database and ministries as well as 1165 public speeches by Olaf Scholz, mayor of Hamburg between 2011 and 2018. All in all, 301 key documents, of which 138 are records of public speeches by high government officials and 44 are articles in general media coverage were considered in the analysis. The author filtered the documents by distinguishing the weight they carry in the discourse. Documents articulating policy agenda on the highest level of government, e.g. articulations by the mayor or documents release from the Senate Office, carry most weight and inform documents created by ministries or other public entities. Also parliamentary debates or plenary speeches shape the discourse rather than press commentary, short contextual paragraphs or footnotes in otherwise not related documents. Such less relevant documents still serve to exemplify how the discourse operated and can be traced from the centre to the periphery of the discourse community, still the relevance of these documents is limited as they don’t add more insight to the analysis once a representable sample size is considered. While initially perspective for mass analysis of all documents were explored, the author decided to reduce the amount of documents to a manageable sample size while ensuring relevance and appropriateness of individual documents for the study. For the document analysis these select documents were catalogued and assigned to entities and, where possible, specific stakeholders, to create an overview of entity relationships and identify the network of actors shaping the discourse. While Foucault would refer to the discourse stakeholders as subjects, as in being in subjection, Bourdieu would refer to them as agents, denoting agency, and freedom. To remain independent from methodological confusion, the author adopted the term actor to describe stakeholders within the discourse under investigation. To account also for geographic dimensions, the network of actors was also projected on a map to visualise the entrepreneurship policy discourse and its stages in Hamburg. The content of the documents was then coded in several rounds of reading, resulting in categories and clusters of codes with the data analysis software MaxQDA and were then used to develop narrative themes and the inherent phrase regime within the discourse that outline the policy trajectory over time. This process provided a skeleton of insights for the critical discourse analysis that was then augmented through the complementary observations within the field that added the ethnographic component to the study, showing the biopower - how discourse shapes behaviour in terms of Foucault - and performativity - how discourse is performed or acted out in terms of Bourdieu - of discourse. An in-depth introduction to theories of Foucault and Bourdieu is presented in chapter 4.
The covert observations targeted relevant stakeholders that are preparing political decisions in Hamburg (e.g., members of the Senate Office, officials of administrative bodies such as the ministry for economics, transport and innovation, the ministry for science and research or the regional development bank, etc.) and their associates. The selection of suitable stakeholders was based on the document analysis and actor visibility in the discourse as well as a deeper investigation of informal backstage areas of the discourse, to identify actors that could contribute to the investigation. Additionally, regional entrepreneurs and/or other recipients of public policy measures (e.g., subsidies or non-monetary benefits) have been targeted. However, the field research revealed that very few were invested or even aware of the policy discourse. The sample size for the outlined covert observation within the entrepreneurship policy making realm in Hamburg grew substantially in the beginning of the field study, as the author underwent a lengthy process of identifying relevant stakeholders and mapping the innovation and entrepreneurship policy ecosystem. In this process the author compiled a list of 181 public and private entities, of which a subset of 25 have been classified as highly relevant to the public discourse on entrepreneurship policy. This filtering was conducted based on entities being involved in articulation of documents or appearing on stages of the discourse. As entities are institutions within the discourse community, their representing stakeholders are the actors that embody the discourse and are the target of the covert observations. To this effect, 121 individual stakeholders have been identified for consideration. Through filtering of their roles within the field of entrepreneurship policy, their habitus and capital in terms of Bourdieu, 17 have been considered very relevant to the discourse. Among this small subset are the mayor of Hamburg and some of his direct subordinates as well as high profile representatives of ministries, advocacy groups and the regional subsidy bank as well as select individuals with less exposed positions but deep involvement in the discourse dynamics. Suitable participants were defined as people directly or indirectly involved in preparing political decisions regarding innovation and entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg, people working in key positions within the municipal administrative bodies relevant to fostering innovation and entrepreneurship as well as actors within the regional subsidy system, such as the regional subsidy Bank, IFB Hamburg. Regarding regional entrepreneurs and/or other recipients of public policy measures, the author focussed on individuals relevant to the discourse under investigation, which turned out to result in very few cases to be relevant. In any case, a list of entrepreneurs that received funding from resources of the regional subsidy bank in Hamburg provided a good starting point for collecting suitable participants. The process of observing the participants was quite lengthy, since most of the potential participants were not only stretched thin on time, but also required long term relationships to share any relevant insights. A reasonable timeframe is difficult to estimate on an aggregate level, but a period of at least 6-12 months was common to gain a satisfactory quality of insights. Depending on the concrete dynamics of the relationship between the author and individual participants, observations were recorded in very divergent manners. In some cases, the relationship allowed for taking notes
during conversations or recording parts of the conversations, while in other cases the interactions were very informal, and observations had to be recorded from memory after the encounter. Some interactions were text based through messenger services or email, while in some instances observations were limited to just observing participants from a distance without any verbal interaction. For example, high profile government officials may have been observed at public appearances, while representatives of ministries or members of concrete working groups were interacted with repeatedly over longer periods of time. Of the 17 highly relevant stakeholders, the author managed to develop relationships of different quality with 6, in addition to various opportunities to observe public appearances of the mayor of Hamburg within the discourse ecosystem. Beyond that, the author developed relationships with 8 additional actors within the discourse community that are subsidiaries of relevant stakeholders or contribute to articulation of discourse in media or at specific institutions within the city. Observations took place from 2018 to 2020 and were partly building on pre-existing relationships with stakeholders that the author either developed in his prior studies of the regional entrepreneurial ecosystem or in his professional capacity in more than 10 years of working the media industry in Hamburg. The details of the data collection are presented in section 5.1.

With his ethnographic approach, the author focussed on identifying repetitive articulation of statements that could be discovered in stakeholders’ procedures and processes, their verbal and written testimony. To this effect the author either recorded or memorised and later transcribed observations. Depending on the relationship, more obvious mechanics of note taking were impossible, thus requiring observations to be documented from memory. These procedures and verbal articulations constitute the phrase regime of the entrepreneurship policy discourse. By covertly observing stakeholders in their habitat (e.g. in their offices, during public events, in personal meetings, in private social encounters etc.), the author analysed the embodiment and performance of the regime at events the stakeholders ran and attended, or in reports they claimed. With his established role in the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Hamburg as a media industry professional and former executive, the author had easy access to various entities and individuals within the ecosystem. The personal networks developed out of previous engagements extend into industry, government as well as academia. Building on research into the composition of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Hamburg (Recke 2016, 2020a), the author could identify target stakeholders and was able to conduct observations in day-to-day operation during startup events, public testimonies but also at networking events, of which many exist in Hamburg. Depending on the position and a viable relationship, some stakeholders were approached more directly and asked for information, while others could only be observed from a distance.

For a better understanding of potential situations for covert observation, a few examples can be provided. A good starting point for observations is provided by highly frequented institutions within the entrepreneurial ecosystem, most importantly co-working spaces. The most prominent co-working space in Hamburg is the betahaus in Hamburg Sternschanze. It hosts not
only freelance professionals or digital nomads, but also various startups and accelerator programs. Many public events in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, e.g. accelerator demo days, hackathons, small conferences or workshops, are also hosted at betahaus (and some select other co-working spaces) and frequented by stakeholders relevant to the research. Other institutions relevant for the observations might be the various accelerator and incubator programs operated in the city. Many of the programs have open doors or host events to present their startup batches to the public and potential investors. Relevant stakeholders frequently attend these events or have more active roles within the accelerator programs themself. Some of the most relevant accelerators are Next Media Accelerator, MusicWorX Accelerator or Social Impact Lab, relevant incubators are Hanse Ventures or TruVenturo. Additionally, some of the venture capital companies (and other entities) invite members of the entrepreneurial ecosystem to casual events, such as summer parties or anniversary events. All these events and institutions might be understood as “center stages” of the entrepreneurial policy discourse in terms of Goffman (1956), where actors behave or rather perform according to established conventions in the field. The author attended open office days at various entities, such as Hanse Ventures, eVenture Capital Partners, Next Media Accelerator, etc. and frequently spent time in shared office environments such as the betahaus Hamburg.

Another layer of access to the discourse was provided at various networking formats available in Hamburg’s entrepreneurial ecosystem. Some relevant formats might be meetings organised by Hamburg@work or Gamecity Hamburg as well as nextMedia.Hamburg. Most of these are informal meetups of industry professionals but are also frequently attended by stakeholders relevant to the public policy discourse as some of these formats are organised in collaboration with public entities such as the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) or the Ministry of Culture and Media (BKM). Furthermore, there is a format hosted by Hamburg Chamber of Commerce dedicated at individuals interested in venture capital and private equity, called VC Stammtisch (VC round table) that provided another opportunity for observation and at least potential access to the “backstage” area of the discourse in terms of Goffman (1956), where actors might act differently with less fear of disrupting their performance. The author was able to find individuals that allowed at least a limited access to the “backstage” to unmask the inner workings of the discourse and shared publicly unavailable information of their internal perspective on discourse dynamics. The author regularly attended the VC Stammtisch, as well as informal Hamburg@work meetups. Additionally, the author could draw on previous professional experience when he participated in working groups on the Hamburg Media dialogue organised by the Senate Office and other working groups within associations such as the VDZ, the association of German magazine publishers, that were invested in media policy discourse that is deeply interconnected to entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. In this context the author also took the opportunity to meet with representatives of ministries and public offices to discuss elements of media and entrepreneurship policy, which was only possible due to prior access to the field.
On a larger scale, the various festivals and conferences organised in the entrepreneurial ecosystem provided suitable access to stakeholders relevant to the discourse. Some of the events are public and free, e.g. Hamburg Innovation Summit, Social Media Week or Webmontag while others are privately organised or charge substantial fees, such as Hamburger IT-Strategietage, Solutions.Hamburg, Next Conference, or the Reeperbahn Festival. The author attended large scale events, such as media industry conferences (e.g. VDZ Publishers Summit, Social Media Week HH or Online Marketing Rockstars) to observe high level stakeholders’ speeches (e.g. mayor of Hamburg giving public keynote addresses). Beyond that, the author was actively involved in taking mentoring roles at festivals and accelerator events such as during the workshop festival A/D/A Hamburg to observe actors within the discourse community.

Hamburg’s various universities were also considered, as some entities have close ties within the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Hamburg, such as Startup Dock at Hamburg University of Technology or the Gründer service at Hamburg University of Applied Sciences. In addition, some research labs, such as the CSTI - Creative Space for Technical Innovations - at Hamburg University of Applied Sciences, allowed access to relevant stakeholders that attended specific public events. In this dimension, the author attended open door events at Hamburg University of Applied Sciences and Hamburg University of Technology, ranging from Nacht des Wissens (night of knowledge) to specific events to present research labs or programs at the local universities. Also, as part of his association to Hamburg University of Applied Sciences, the author attended podium discussions and lectures from stakeholders within the discourse community, most prominently the city privy council on digital media and later senator for media and culture.

Lastly, specific entities and stakeholders were approached directly, as some advertise an open-door policy or function as a contact point for people interested in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, such as the IFB Innovationstarter or InnoRampUp at Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (IFB) or nextMedia.Starthub and other initial contact points within the public administration of the city of Hamburg. The author was able to discuss the historical genesis of certain entrepreneurship support programs within the city of Hamburg with representatives of these entities and gained knowledge of processes, sources, and organisational arrangements within the discourse community. Also, the author applied to job positions within the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem, such as with the IFB Hamburg to gain more formal and informal insights into program requirements.

In summary, the covert observations allowed a significant number of documents to be considered in the overall document analysis that would have otherwise not been obtainable. Also, the critical discourse analysis was augmented with a high degree of empirical reality that would have not been so apparent from just analysing the body of documents. The lengthy and in-depth immersion into the field of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship policy discourse revealed relationships between actors, informal arrangements and discursive patterns that solidify the
overall analysis of the discourse power dynamics and its self-perpetuating nature as the presentation of data and analysis in chapter 5 reveals.

3.3 Conclusion: Philosophical Foundation & Practical Implications

Chapter 3 introduced the philosophical underpinning of the study at hand by elaborating on epistemology, theoretical perspectives, methodology and methods. To that effect general ontological and epistemological assumptions and perspectives have been presented that are strongly connected to divergent perspectives on research strategy and the underlying logic of knowledge generation. Then, the most prominent research paradigms were discussed to inform choices for methodology and methods. The most relevant methodological approaches and commonly adopted methods were introduced. Building on this theoretical backdrop, the study at hand is then qualified through articulation of the authors ontological and epistemological position, and an elaboration of the adopted research strategy and theoretical perspective, methodology and methods used to investigate the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. Without elaborating on the intricate details of the collected data that is presented in chapter 5, the general research process was illustrated to provide an understanding of how the author conducted his study.

To summarise, the author employs methods of document analysis and covert observations to inform his methodology of a critical discourse analysis augmented through an ethnographic component, an approach the author coined an entrepreneurial ethnography. The approach is qualitative in nature and explores commonly constructed views and assumptions on reality, constituted and embedded in social practice of the stakeholders within the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. As such, the author is adopting an interpretivism research paradigm or theoretical perspective as meaning is produced and reproduced by social actors in their discursive practice. By describing the discourse and extrapolating categories and concepts that provide understanding of the underlying power dynamics and habitual realities that govern the perpetuating nature of the discourse from the inside, the author employs an abductive research strategy and immerses himself in the social world under investigation. The ontological assumption is that of idealism, understanding social reality produced through shared interpretations of actors that as such is a constructed reality that is just one of many different perspectives. Consequently, the epistemological perspective is that of constructionism and the knowledge generated is contingent to the context of the study rather than a description of an absolute or objective reality.

In the following chapter the key component of the author’s analytical framework, the coupling of theories by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, will be explored in more detail. As the author generated his findings through this analytical coupling, the approach deserves in-depth elaboration and central attention.
4. Analytical Coupling: From Foucauldian Abstraction to Bourdieu’s Pragmatism

This study draws upon the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu and conceptually couples their approaches towards discourse and the inherent power relations. Both have spent considerable effort in targeting various areas of public life and the modern state in their body of work. Ranging from areas such as academia (Foucault 1970; Bourdieu 1984a), the medical (Foucault 1973) or penal system (Foucault 1977) to the political economy (Foucault 1970; Bourdieu et al. 1999), both show in different ways how subjects - or agents in Bourdieu's language - are produced within discourse and how they are governed in their environments. The author is not a social theorist but utilises these concepts to provide an analytical lens to investigate the phenomena under investigation.

In terms of Foucault, the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg, its institutional arrangements and manifestation, is a product that is named, categorised, and governed. Same as in the field of medicine, as eloquently presented by Foucault in his work *The Birth of the Clinic* (1973), where the medical discourse creates governmentality through mechanisms of distinction by creating governing knowledge such as medical classifications, procedures, supervision, regulation, etc., the field of entrepreneurship policy discourse is governed by knowledge representing its power relations. Through a Foucauldian analysis the past knowledge formation within the discourse can be shown, while a Bourdieusian analysis allows to augment the abstract with embodied realities to reveal how the discourse dynamics are enacted and reproduced within its environment. As such, Foucault provides the skeleton of discourse, its institutions, structures and arrangements, policies and procedures that speak themselves into being and provide us with the “said and seen” of discourse between which the productivity of power takes place, including the production of its own resistance. Bourdieu puts flesh on the skeleton of discourse, showing us how it is performative and enacted in everyday life, how power-knowledge of discourse is encrypted in physical space, in institutions and policies and then acted out. Through this enactment, Foucault’s concept of biopower becomes visible through the embodied actions of the “subjects”, revealing the power-knowledge-subject of discourse and the governmentality at work.

Consequently, the coupling of Foucauldian and Bourdieusian theories allows to “analyse what is” by revealing the historical genesis of the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. Even though both theorists provide sound means to analyse discourse on their own, the conceptual coupling further enhances the analytical depth and level of insight in the inner working of the discourse under investigation.

Yet, the work of both Foucault and Bourdieu is complex and presents considerable challenges to the research process. Therefore, it seems prudent to examine the theoretical backdrop of Foucauldian and Bourdieusian social theory in more detail to understand their
relevance to the research at hand. In the following sections, the ontological and epistemological perspective of both theorists will be introduced and critiqued. The coupling of the approaches will then be presented and discussed in more detail to bridge the abstract and empirical chasm. Since the vocabulary established by Foucault and Bourdieu also constitutes the analytical phrase regime, in terms of Lyotard (Sim 1998), for this study, it will serve as a baseline for the exploration and analysis of the regional entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg presented in chapter 5 and will enable the unmasking of knowledge structures and power dynamics. Foucault’s theory is used to analyse the power-knowledge-subject triad and its interrelations (Kendall & Wickham 1999) in the discourse on an abstract level to show how it organises and produces the social space of entrepreneurship policy and the subjects within through the notions of history, archaeology, and genealogy as well as governmentality and technology of the self. Complementary, Bourdieu’s theory is used to show how the discourse is operated and embodied by stakeholders in their embodied reality through concepts of habitus, field, and capital to reveal processes of exclusion and domination.

4.1 Foucault and Discourse Analysis

Michel Foucault certainly has been both, heavily criticised and vilified as well as considered most influential to our understanding of the world (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000) or even seductive (Allan 2013), besides the fact that his texts are often considered difficult (Hunt & Wickham 1994). Alongside fellow predominantly French theorists such as Baudriallard, Derrida and Deleuze, his concepts and ideas were stigmatised as threats to fields and disciplines ranging from history, political economy and philosophy to sociology, literature and psychology as the postmodernist theories challenged established assumptions about knowledge (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Foucault's historical and philosophical approach was coined as “interpretive analytics" in Dreyfus and Rabinow’s interpretation (1982), which is considered most intelligent and interesting (Gutting 2005). In their view, Foucault’s body of work constitutes the most important contemporary contribution towards a method to diagnose the current state of society through coherent and powerful alternative means of understanding (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Even though criticism persisted throughout the years, Foucault's theories have been increasingly utilised in academia, such as in cultural studies and history, sociology, literature or philosophy, as well as in professional contexts, such as medicine, public health, social work, law, economic, business management, government, education and other sectors, underscoring the enormous influence (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015), widespread popularity and persistent relevance of his theories (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000), even though also Dreyfus and Rabinow agree they do not constitute a general method (Gutting 2005).

Foucault’s body of work can to a large extend be seen as a reaction against Marxism and phenomenology, the most influential body of theory in post Second World War France
postulated by intellectuals such as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Hyppolite, Heidegger, Kojeve and others, which aimed at overcoming violence and irrationality as an inevitable resolution driven by the working class (Marxism) on the one hand and finding meaning in perception of the universal essence of objects or things (phenomenology) to overcome evil by coming to full knowledge of truth on the other (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Rather than following the notion of a hidden deep truth (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982) or the “one and only” truth, Foucault explored different kinds of truth, knowledge and rationale and how it developed in culture, putting him at odds with the absolutist perspectives of Marxism and phenomenology (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000) and eliminating “notions of meaning altogether and substitutes a formal model of human behavior as rule-governed transformations of meaningless elements” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982 p.xxiii). Influenced by phenomenologist Martin Heidegger, his “historicising” work and the consideration of cultural contexts in which truth and meaning are produced and George Canguilhem and his realisation that rationality and reason was always changing, resulting in thought to be eternal truth being replaced by a different truth, Foucault adopted the notion that people’s knowledge is limited by their context and truth and rationale change over time (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

Other influential bodies of theory that influenced Foucault are structuralism and psychoanalytic theory. Fitting within his perspective, structuralism extends Heidegger’s notion that people are not free to think and act but are rather produced by social, political and cultural structures, understands meaning as relational and focuses on “structures thinking and speaking through people rather than people thinking or speaking ideas” (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Psychoanalysis, most prominently developed through the works of Sigmund Freud and Jaques Lacan substantiates this critique. However, Foucault also rejected elements of structuralist analysis, most critically because of its inability to provide the whole meaning of something by analysing all its relevant relations - which would not account for what is not there - and its ignorance of change and discontinuity (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Regarding psychoanalysis, he had difficulties with the notion that the approach introduces repression and the unconscious, yet at the same time claims to understand the truth about the subject (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

The most influential impact on Foucault’s thinking can be attributed to the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and his ideas about the relationship between truth, knowledge, and power as well as the rejection of history unfolding in a rational way and the notion that any form of knowledge or truth prevailed not because of its value but due to people's power over others (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Following this logic, rather than being universal and objective, ideas are historically contingent. Consequently, similar to morality being historically contingent as the main discontinuity emerging in the era of Enlightenment, knowledge and truth are also historically contingent. Foucault also adopted the notion of critique from the legacy of Enlightenment, most particularly as formulated by German philosopher Immanuel Kant, as it
allows investigation into our thinking, values and understanding and considering how things could be different (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

In summary, Foucault’s work can be understood as “influenced by Marxism” (Agger 1991) but as a “a self-conscious avoidance of Marx” (Hunt & Wickham 1994, p.34) or even rejection of essentialist theories such as Marxism or phenomenology and adopts a “historicising” perspective when analysing notions of truth and knowledge (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Even though the early archaeological focus of his work was considered structuralist or quasi-structuralist (Hoy 1988) and the complex nature of his work led to him being attributed with post-structuralism - although not accurate in view of Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) - and even postmodernism (Agger 1991; McKinlay & Starkey 1998; Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000), Foucault openly rejected these claims and positioned himself as “counter modernity” and an “archaeologist of knowledge” (Hoy 1988). As such, his work is anti-Platonic and individualist as he calls his nominalism a form of methodological individualism (Flynn 2005). Since Foucault drew sharp epistemic lines between modernity, preceding and succeeding epistemes, with a radicalisation of his position in combination with a Nietzschean appeal for power relations and resistance, it seems appropriate to speak of his histories as “agonistic” in terms of Lyotard (1984) and as a “spatialization of reason” and therefore postmodern (Flynn 2005; Agger 1991). Lyotard sums up the ethos of postmodernism as in rejecting all grand narratives or universal theories as no longer credible (Sim 1998), a notion that certainly fits in well with Foucault’s line of thinking. However, Foucault himself denied any categorisation of himself (Allan 2013).

“I think I have in fact been situated in most of the squares on the political checkerboard, one after another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the service of Gaullism, new liberal, and so on. An American professor complained that a crypto-Marxist like me was invited to the USA, and I was denounced by the press; in Eastern European countries for being an accomplice of the dissidents. None of these descriptions is important by itself; taken together, on the other hand, they mean something. And I must admit that I rather like what they mean.” (Foucault 1997, p.113)

Confusion about the exact placement may rather be caused by critics and followers and their interpretations, as Foucault can be interpreted and understood in different ways (Gutting 2005), e.g. as a philosopher, historian, sociologist or not bound by any classification (Hunt & Wickham 1994), especially depending on the period of his work (Grenz 1996). As such, there may not be one Foucault but rather many (Hunt & Wickham 1994) as his work was developmental and evolved, expanded and focused over time, moving from accentuating texts in early works such as Madness and Civilization (1961), The Order of Things (1966), Discipline and Punish (1977) and The History of Sexuality (1978), in which denaturalising discourses and limitations of
knowledge are the core, towards later works such as *The Use of Pleasure* (1976 - 1986) and *The Care of the Self* (1986), in which he accentuates how subjects adjust and may move beyond their historical context (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). His work spans from archaeology - description of discourse or disciplines of knowledge (McHoul & Grace 1993) - in his early years, to genealogy - addressing political issues of power and discipline (McHoul & Grace 1993) - and late technologies of the self (Kendall & Wickham 1999; Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000; Allan 2013). Foucault insisted that the focus on power in his genealogies was an evolution of the archaeologies and later accent on issues of truth and subjectivity in his final works were his concern all along, which allows his work to be reviews in sequential order, even though it may be more of an aspiration for consistency rather than what Foucault is attributed with (Flynn 2005).

Critics such as Rorty, Dreyfus and Rabinow all seem to agree that his body of work is not a major social theory, however, even though it “*does not fit comfortably into any ready-made discipline*” (Hunt & Wickham 1994, p.5), he provides new ways of inquiry into what we think we know (Murphy 2013) and encourages us to challenge what is given to us as necessary (Burchell 1993) and to realise we are “freer than we feel” (L. H. Martin, Gutman & Hutton 1988).

The author does not claim to be an ideologic follower of Foucault or attempts to contribute to academic debate on modern interpretation of his work, but rather draws upon his work to provide an analytical lens to critically interrogate the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. Set aside the difficulty to classify Foucault’s work as a major social theory, the author sees strong merit in Foucault's approach towards discourse that serves to inform the study at hand.

Discourse, in terms of Foucault, is understood as language in action (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000) rather than the social function of language and examines political, social, and historical contexts in which constructed knowledge produces social subjects (McHoul & Grace 1993, p.30) and the structure of discourse (Rouse 2005). By uncovering the integral component of the discourse, such as events, institutions, groups, words and how they are produced and used, the conditions of possibility (Kendall & Wickham 1999; Gutting 2005) are revealed, that enable understanding and interaction. The term archaeology is used by Foucault in his early work as a reference to describe the process of identifying such discursive formations that create the fields of knowledge in different historical periods (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000; Flynn 2005). He adopts the term genealogy from Nietzsche to describe the process of analysing the relationship between truth, knowledge, and the will to power and its historical development (Kendall & Wickham 1999; Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000; Allan 2013). In his late work, the terms technologies as the means through which societies pacify, dominate, and regulate subjects, and technologies of self as means through which individuals shape their own bodies and thoughts (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000; Allan 2013) became prominent. These discursive arrangements, like Lyotard’s phrase regime (Sim 1998), establish the rules for governmentality that effectuate how people live, speak, and even think (Grenz 1996). It also illustrates how the
idea of a self-governing subject is rejected by Foucault, as in his view people are influenced, regulated, or even controlled by discourses (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Some classic structuralist and agency limiting critique has attacked Foucault’s position on this account, yet it is related to his perspective on relations of power, domains of knowledge, games of truth, forms of subjectivity, technologies of self and orders of discourse in which the relations, domains, games forms, technologies and orders shape the kind of power, knowledge, truth, subjectivity, self and discourse in any context (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

In the following segments the central notions of Foucault’s work, namely his work on histories in forms of archaeology and genealogy, the concepts of episteme, discourse, knowledge, and power as well as biopower, biopolitics and the production and regulation of subjectivities and technologies of the self will be presented in more detail.

4.1.1 Historicising: An Archaeology of Knowledge

With his avoidance of Marxism legacy and its absolutist and essentialist notions, Foucault deemed his writing an “archaeology of knowledge” and rejected history as an impartial, objective recovery of truth but rather understood it as a discursive representation of teleological attempts to legitimise the rationale of the present (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000), a “history of systems of thought” (McHoul & Grace 1993, p.1) or in Canguilhem’s terms a “history of concepts” (Gutting 2005, p.7). As a consequence, for him the present cannot be seen as ordered by logic or objective or linearly sequenced entity but rather as “just as strange as the past” (Kendall & Wickham 1999). Opposing notions of total history, Foucault rather emphasised “general history” (Foucault 1972, p.9) and in not separating philosophy from history (McHoul & Grace 1993; Gutting 2005) took a problem-based approach toward it (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015), in an attempt to not letting history stop (Kendall & Wickham 1999) and employing concepts of discontinuity (Sim 1998).

Foucault coined the term episteme to describe periods of history organised around their contingent and specific world views in The Order of Things (1970), also referred to as history of ideas in Western Europe by Michel de Certeau (de Certeau 1986), which did not conform to narratives of origin, continuity or progress but rather appeared and disappeared suddenly and arbitrarily (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Such epistemes - of which Foucault identified the Renaissance, the Classical and the Modern on a very general level over the last 400 years - refer to “historically enduring discursive regularities” (Hunt & Wickham 1994, p.9) - the “order of things” - and describe what is possible and what is not, what is sayable and unthinkable and is understood as the product of more or less unconscious organising principles that create relations between things and determine how to make sense of the world, what is known and said (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000), establishing the epistemological field of assumptions, expectations, values and beliefs of a society (Sim 1998). As such, these rules and contexts of discourse condition the existence of any episteme and shape objects of knowledge (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015). Foucault rejected preoccupation with causes as for him it is closely entwined with assumptions
that he preferred to avoid (Hunt & Wickham 1994). Rather than attempting to explain significant changes in discourse formations, Foucault rather displays their structural difference (Rouse 2005), how forms of knowledge after a period of stability undergo fundamental transformations (Sim 1998) and result in new epistemes, based on conditions of possibility as in combinations “of circumstances in dispersed and seemingly unconnected fields of social activity” (Hunt & Wickham 1994, p.6) that condition developmental shifts.

All major works of Foucault can be understood as histories of sorts, with the early accounts being called “archaeologies” and the later “genealogies” (Flynn 2005). Archaeology can be understood as a methodology that presents methodological tools (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015) to explore networks of what was said and could be seen by exploring the archives of discourse (Kendall & Wickham 1999). As such, archaeology is counter history through the contrapuntal relationship to traditional history and social critique as it radicalises the sense of contingency, bias and accepted necessities (Flynn 2005), tries to overcome traditions of phenomenology and existentialism and is anti-humanist and non-Marxist (Kendall & Wickham 1999). The emphasis on epistemes led to Foucault being seen as a structuralist, an affiliation rejected by him, even though his nominalism and positivism are rather post-structuralist (Flynn 2005) and his archaeological method undermined structuralist principles by examining the structural rules that govern discourse (Allan 2013), and shows how through the production of discursive formations or order of discourse the episteme’s inherent organising principles are established and produce objects of knowledge (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Critics such as Rorty, who claimed that Foucault’s archaeology does not constitute a method, or Dreyfus and Rabinow, who claimed Foucault’s “close to structuralist theory” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p.32) a failure, neglect the problems which Foucault identified in his analysis (Allan 2013).

This perspective provides a suitable methodological approach for the author to interrogate the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg along tangents of narrative themes. The themes presented in chapter 5 adopt the structure of histories and can be attributed to genealogical representations of the discourse under investigation.

Before elaborating on Foucault’s genealogy, it is important to understand the notion of discourse in terms of Foucault. As a “critical” approach (McHoul & Grace 1993) it is radically different from anthropology and humanistic attempts to centre the human subject and rather accentuates marginalised discursive areas such as tabooed human activity, topics neglected by proper science or civilised society to be included in legitimate discourse (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015). In Foucault’s view our experience is most significantly shaped by language and he considers discourse as language in action, that influences, regulates, or even controls our thoughts or actions (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000) and as such our experience and needs to be seen in terms of bodies of knowledge (McHoul & Grace 1993). Any set of practices constitute the “conditions for existence” for other practices, which can be seen as the point of linkage of what is said and done,
establish and apply norms, controls, and exclusion, and renders true or false discourse possible (Flynn 2005) in form of expropriating the other (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015).

Linking this to the study at hand, discursive practices within the field of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg provide the conditions for the “said and seen” and the governmentality of institutional arrangements, policies and processes, rules, regulations, norms, and technologies of the self.

The relationship between people and their experiences is contingent on cultural and social fields, e.g. politics, education or science, with inherent and distinct rules, procedures, positions and regulated behaviours that produce hierarchies and power structures (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Relatively stable sets of relationships within a field between people and between people and objects are understood as institutions within the discourse, that may be more structured and regulated when they are public and have wider reach and societal impact or may be much less rigid when they are private and have limited impact (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Foucault uses the terminology “games of truth” to describe the institutional and discourse practices (Hunt & Wickham 1994) that justify claims of truth as in “a set of rules by which truth is produced” (Foucault 1997, p.297), that produce subjectivity, shape our experience, and create truth as an effect of the work of discourses and institutions (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

“Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.” (Foucault 1980, p.131)

“In societies like ours, the 'political economy' of truth is characterized by five important traits. 'Truth' is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic power as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, notwithstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation ('ideological' struggles).” (Foucault 1984, p.73)

In that sense, discourse is the means by which the field speaks that can be mapped out to trace particular instances of discourse (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000) into a discursive formation (Foucault 1972). Discourse can be found in government records, books, people
correspondence, oral memory or in any series of events in a particular period and is constituted by statements as the basic unit of discourse - and as such a “function that operates vertically in relation to these various units” (Foucault 1972, p.86) - that create relationships with other statements to establish space and context (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000) and can be understood via the rules which govern its function (McHoul & Grace 1993). There are also non-discursive formations that, even though considered secondary in their relevance in view of Foucault, relate to practices and social relations and augment the discursive unit of statements with the non-discursive element of visibility (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015). The process of identifying such discourse formations - the discursive and non-discursive - creates the field of knowledge (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015) and the games of truth by which society governs itself and is the archival and archaeological work Foucault is referring to, much like an actual archaeologist digging through layers of soil to uncover historic relics (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

Genealogy, adopted from German philosopher Nietzsche’s work on the “will to power” (Nietzsche 1887), was viewed as a successor to the notion of snapshots of discourse in archaeology by Foucault and emphasised the element of power and the processual aspects of the web of discourse and its ongoing nature (Kendall & Wickham 1999). As “a multidisciplinary technique for discovering the contingent historical trends that underpin contemporary discourses and practices of power” (Katz 2001, p.120), genealogy translated history from looking for meaning towards “micro-physics of power” (Foucault 1977 p.139) and describes strategy and tactics rather than providing historical understanding through Marxist science and ideology or hermeneutical text and interpretation (Flynn 2005).

“The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has no 'meaning', though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail-but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics.” (Foucault 1980, p.114)

Even though differences between archaeology and genealogy are not straightforward (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015), there are clearly different emphases embedded in the approaches. Archaeology is the method to identify principles of ordering that enable discursive formations - as in statements and visibilities that mutually condition each other - and epistemes, while genealogy accentuated truth as disinterested and knowledge as independent of power in a reciprocal relationship (Kendall & Wickham 1999), resulting in knowledge and truth being produced and sustained by epistemes and interwoven in power struggles (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). As such, genealogical analysis provides a possible narrative of the present as a non-deterministic effect of the past (Fejes 2013). Through genealogy relationships of power are
described and how knowledge and power relate as historical and contextual contingencies (Rouse 2005) and constitute descending and emerging epistemic fields (Fejes 2013).

Also, genealogy focuses on how discursive power works on bodies (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000), a concept later developed into the notion of “biopower”.

“So, the various discourses that make up a school curriculum (mathematical, scientific, literary) express the archaeological approach. But the organisation of the space of the school, the way in which classrooms are designed in such a way that the teacher is empowered to move about and monitor each student’s behaviour, has more to do with the genealogical side.” (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000, p.98)

4.1.2 Power, Knowledge and the Subject

Particularly in his genealogies, the term power is used by Foucault to describe a separate aspect of discursive relations that he understands as a strategy to maintain a relation between the sayable and the visible (Kendall & Wickham 1999). As such the Foucauldian view on power is radically different from other accounts of power (Hunt & Wickham 1994; McHoul & Grace 1993), such as Dahl’s in The Concept of Power (1957), Luke’s in Power: A Radical View (1974) or even Gaventa’s in Power and Powerlessness (1984), all of which focus on power as possessed by people and repressively applied on others. In Foucault’s sense, power is not something to possess or maintain, but rather a technical process of “keeping things going” that produces all aspects of social life (Hunt & Wickham 1994). Therefore, power can be understood as being productive (Kendall & Wickham 1999; McHoul & Grace 1993) or positive, as Foucault sometimes calls it (Hunt & Wickham 1994) and creates knowledge and truth through power struggles that authorise and legitimise the workings of power (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). In this context it is important to highlight that the concept of power deals with how things work not what it is and as such it is not essentially repressive but rather constituted as practices (Kendall & Wickham 1999) which produce reality (Allan 2013).

“We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These 'power-knowledge relations' are to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces
a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.” (Foucault 1977, pp.27-28)

Foucault considered relations between power and knowledge inevitable (Hunt & Wickham 1994), which led to critics such as Jürgen Habermas seeing him as neoconservative (Flynn 2005), even though he emphasises that power always exists in context of resistance as an integral part of how power works (Kendall & Wickham 1999), which opens opportunities for freedom in any context, a position somewhat close to Jean-Paul Sartre’s notion that “we can always make something out of what we have been made into” (Flynn 2005).

Subjects are the products of power; they produce themselves as objects of knowledge subjected to power (Allan 2013) - a process Foucault calls subjection (McHoul & Grace 1993) - and form a triad with power and knowledge in which all condition each other and no one is determined by the other (Kendall & Wickham 1999). In what Foucault calls micro-power he points out that power is not a property of sovereignty, but a set of forces establishing position and behaviours that influence people's lives (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). As such, power is never present but a relation depending on re-enactment and reproduction to sustain power relationships (Rouse 2005). Foucault describes technologies for analysing, controlling, regulating and defining the human body and its behaviour throughout his work (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000), most prominently in his history of the development of the penal system over the last centuries - entailing the infamous analysis of the panopticon prison design and Foucault’s famous construct of the panoptic gaze - in Discipline and Punish (1977), which represent diametrically contrasting ideas to the notion of the progress and reform the Enlightenment era (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). While Enlightenment ideals aimed at freeing people from domination, new knowledge and technologies evolved since - that are associated with biopower in terms of Foucault - aim at the opposite goal of control, regulation, and domination to make people “docile bodies” (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). According to Foucault, this development led to evacuating the place of power and a separation of the principle of sovereignty from its embodiment in any sovereign (Rouse 2005) and concealing it in knowledge and technologies used to control and regulate - as the exercise of power (Rouse 2005) through “few watching the many” but also as self-surveillance and acceptance of the normalising nature of the discourse embedded in monitoring (Hope 2013) - while at the same time proclaiming welfare of the individual and the population (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982) and the truth of “working in our interest”, “taking care of us”, “watching over us” or acting “for our own good” (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Subsequently, power functions in terms of relations between fields, institutions, and groups within the state and as such is not static but mobile and contingent (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Coined as biopower, it completely regulates bodies and behaviours but at the same time produces
resistance within a multitude of different ideas, institutions, and discourses so that no single authorised truth can emerge to dominate society (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

Critics claim Foucault neglected contemporary development of surveillance technologies or mass media, while commentators also consider his metaphors compelling for understanding modern society (Hope 2013). In consideration of contemporary society, surveillance is seen as inter-relational by A.K. Martin, van Brakel & Hutton (2009) that describe how individuals not only engage in counter surveillance but are engaged in creatively constructing their own data identity. With recent development of digital technologies, individuals may no longer be aware of surveillance and while Foucault suggested that subjects were conscious of their own self-determination (Poster 1995, p.95), they may not understand the construction of their disparate identities, that - yet unknown to the individual - have impact on their lives (Poster 1989). However, since Foucault writes that “turning of real lives into writing [...] functions as a procedure of objectification and subjection” (Foucault 1977, p.192), he certainly highlighted the relevance of data collection and should not be criticised for not anticipating the full width of information flow in modern society, which is rather an extension of Foucault's metaphors than anything fundamentally different (Hope 2013).

As will be highlighted within the analysis of this study in chapter 5, the Foucauldian concept of governmentality is practically located and critiqued. In his attempt to counter Marxist traditions of giving great significance to the state (Hunt & Wickham 1994), Foucault uses the concept of governmentality as a matter of conventional politics as well as of body politics, understood as ways of conducting ourselves in relation to our own bodies and bodies that constitute society (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). As such, governmentality can be seen as an encounter or interaction of technologies of power and technologies of the self (Fejes 2013; Burchell 1993):

“technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; [...] technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.” (Foucault 1997, p.225)

Foucault acknowledges two distinct types of governmentality, namely the social contract model, in which individuals consensually or just implicitly agree to give up freedoms to benefit from consolidation by contracting in certain groups and excluding others, and the social warfare model, in which a group seizes power and established ideas, values, laws and principles to protect and justify their truth to maintain power and control until overthrown by another (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). While agreeing with exploitation and repression under pretext of being
just and fair, Foucault considers the circulation of power more complex than identifying oppressors and the oppressed as it involves complex flows of relationships between groups with changing identities depending on circumstance and historical context (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

“\textit{hence one should not assume a massive and primal condition of domination, a binary structure with 'dominators' on one side and 'dominated' on the other, but rather a multiform production of relations of domination which are partially susceptible of integration into overall strategies;}” (Foucault 1980, p.142)

While power may be enclosed in groups of the same by keeping others “at a distance by difference” (Foucault 1972, p.12), the discourse is non-continuous (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015) and subsequently, Foucault considers the two versions of society and power as social stories procured by different historical periods that point to the institutionalising of government and the emergence of a rationality that rather accentuates how power is exercised efficiently - through knowledge that would allow the state to analyse population and regulate its behaviour, a process Foucault calls biopolitics (Foucault 1978) - than who has power and influence and how it can be maintained (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Another notion in context of governmentality is Foucault’s approach to strategy as combinations of plans, programs, specific knowledge, and practices emerging so that the identification of such strategy is made possible, while at the same time rejecting that any strategy constitutes a coherent set of intentions of identifiable social agents (Hunt & Wickham 1994).

“domination is organised into a more-or-less coherent and unitary strategic form; that dispersed, heteromorphous, localised procedures of power are adapted, re-inforced and transformed by these global strategies, all this being accompanied by numerous phenomena of inertia, displacement and resistance” (Foucault 1980, p.142)

Foucault’s thoughts on governmentality can be seen in context of his other concepts of discourse, biopower and the production and regulation of subjectivities and biopolitics (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). His approach contrasts accounts by Marxism and social contract theory, such as proclaimed by English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, and emphasizes the attitude of liberalism (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). For Foucault, liberalism emerges from relations between institutions, fields and their contexts and the shift from state monopoly on regulation and prosperity towards the awareness to involve civic society in governance, as underscored by Foucault’s notion of power not being possessed by anyone but passing through while being transformed and creating its own resistance (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).
4.1.3 Subjectivity and Technologies of the Self

The subject cannot pre-exist in social order in view of Foucault, because it is constituted by social rules that vary over history and between cultures, which led to his proclamation of the “death of the subject” (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000):

“As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility – without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises – were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.” (Foucault 1970, p.422)

As such, the notion of human being is historical and produced by discourses, institutions and relations that changes with context and circumstance, as a matter of biopower and biopolitics that define who is a genuine subject, which Foucault calls the production of subjectivity, through technologies of classifying, disciplining, analysing, normalising, differentiating, and excluding (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Critics claim that human beings are no more than “docile bodies” for Foucault (Allan 2013), yet he sees the self not just as docile body being worked on by discourse, institutions and power relations but as having agency (Allan 2013) and being capable of moral and ethical dimensions, making us not helpless objects subject to power, but individuals constituted as subjects by governmental practices of power that we can respond or resist to (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

As subjectivity is a product of discursive patterns, institutional practices, and games of truth rather than of conscious self-governing, Foucault emphasises concepts of thought, criticism and problematisation to reflect our own position as social subjects and our negotiations with the social order and to potentially transform our subjectivity (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

“Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem.” (Foucault 1997 p.xxxv)

”[Criticism is] a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not to that of making a
metaphysics possible; it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method...

[It will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility
of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think ... it is seeking to give
new impetus, as far and as wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.” (Foucault
1997 p.xxxv).

Techniques that individuals utilise to work on themselves, their bodies, thought, and conduct were coined as technologies of the self by Foucault and aimed at obtaining subjectivity through self-examination to develop self-knowledge that enables us to take, verbalise and change our position within society (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000). Furthermore, these ethical practices may serve as techniques to resist oppression and power as “practices of freedom” through deliberate choices to construct ourselves as ethical subjects in relation to the self and others (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

“Of course all moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply ‘self-awareness’ but self-formation as an ‘ethical subject,’ a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself.” (Foucault 1985, p.28)

Even though Foucault denies ideas of a true self, he argues that we can improve and reinvent ourselves as subjects better fitting in with the self and others and craft our lives as works of art in relation between freedom and power (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000).

“the ‘techniques of the self,’ which is to say, the procedures, which no doubt exist in every civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge. In short, it is a matter of placing the imperative to ‘know oneself’ - which to us appears so characteristic of our civilization - back in the much broader interrogation that serves as its explicit or implicit context: What should one do with oneself? What work should be carried out on the self? How should one "govern oneself" by performing actions in which one is oneself the objective of those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the instrument they employ, and the subject that acts?” (Foucault 1997, p.87)
4.1.4 Conclusion
Despite the complexity of Foucault’s body of work and the evolution of his theories over time, the general notions of his archaeological and genealogical work and especially his concept of power and knowledge, and governmentality seem perfectly suited to investigate the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. His methodological approach provides a toolset to analyse the discursive formations that constitute the knowledge that governs the regional policy agenda and the strategies for differentiation and exclusion. Yet, employing the concept of Foucault and analysing the discursive statement will limit discoveries to a somewhat abstract level. To trace the power relations back to their embodied reality in real life, the author further augments his approach through the social theories of Bourdieu, which will be presented in the following section. Through utilisation of this analytical coupling, the inherent dynamics of the entrepreneurship policy discourse can be ethnographically located, which adds an empirical layer to the theoretical discursivity.

4.2 Bourdieu’s Social Theory and Discursive Power Dynamics
Alongside fellow French thinkers like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu is seen as one of the most influential with his work that succeeded structuralism (Calhoun, LiPuma & Postone 1993, p.7). He was named “the pre-eminent sociologist of the late twentieth century” (Rawolle & Lingard 2013, p.117) and contributed significantly to various areas of cultural theory, such as cultural studies, anthropology, sociology as well as literary studies and philosophy or media studies as “the most significant and successful attempt to make sense of the relationship between objective social structures (institutions, discourses, fields, ideologies) and everyday practices (what people do, and why they do it)” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002, p.1) with increasing popularity in Anglophone social sciences (Maton 2003) and global influence (Rawolle & Lingard 2013) in recent decades (Burawoy 2018). Sharing many perspectives with Foucault and his ideas of power and knowledge (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015), Bourdieu’s status seems far more peripheral, a fact attributed with many explanations, running from critics’ inability to categorise his body of work according to Loïc Wacquant (Calhoun, LiPuma & Postone 1993, p.237) to difficulty to read his dense style and language, even though that is something that can also be said about Foucault (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Another perspective on his critical reception may also be seen in consideration of the chronology of the translation of Bourdieu’s work into English (Harker, Mahar & Wilkes 1990; Robbins 2004), ultimately resulting in different significance and reception of his arguments in national debates across the globe, which in turn results in a range of different national variations of narratives about Bourdieu's influence (Rawolle & Lingard 2013).
Yet, Calhoun, LiPuma & Postone point out Bourdieu’s extensive range of empirical topics and theoretical themes running from “education, labor, kinship, economic change, language, philosophy, literature, photography, museums, universities, law, religion and science” (Calhoun, LiPuma & Postone 1993 p.1), which is hard to summarise (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015) and despite the extensiveness presents an appealing framework for critically minded scholars (Burawoy 2018). Yet, it may also be seen as a form of eclecticism with no clear theoretical progression (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).


Bourdieu can be seen as a social scientist, using both empirical and theoretical methodologies (Rawolle & Lingard 2013) that for him were inseparable, which contrasts positivist theory (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). He also rejected notions of a substantialist account of social phenomena, rather recognising relational working of social arrangements (Rawolle & Lingard 2013). Bourdieu considered his eclecticism approach as a sociologist in another field, enabling him to move freely across fields and use insights from different theorists to add a practical dimension to bodies of knowledge (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

In the following sections his main concepts of habitus, field and capital will be discussed in more detail on the backdrop of his intellectual inspirations and his approach to power and discourse as well as his key concept of reflexivity, that is instrumental to his method and approved so widely, that “it now has become a sin to not be reflexive” (Maton 2003, p.54).

4.2.1 Politicising: A Practical Approach to Power and Discourse

Bourdieu is employing a politicising disposition, which is to a large degree inspired by German philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx and Ludwig Wittgenstein as well as Blaise Pascal, that is combined with drawing on theories from sociologists such as Émile Durkheim, Norbert
Elias or Max Weber as well as other fields such as anthropology (Claude Lévi-Strauss), the history of science (George Canguilhem), phenomenology (Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty), philosophy (Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Kant), psychology (Sigmund Freud) or social anthropology (Erving Goffman) among others (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002), many of which also served as inspiration for Foucault. Most prominently, Marxist concepts of class and capital, Pascal’s notion of interrelations of bodily rituals and imprinting beliefs as well as Wittgenstein’s criticism of “intellectualising” practical experience (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002) are key to understanding Bourdieu’s work and his focus of giving practical dimension to bodies of theory.

Taking the example of Marxism, Bourdieu considers the discourse of the working class as coming to existence by not just predicting history but actually helping to shape it, a notion close to Louis Althusser’s concept of interpellation, as in authority calling identity into existence (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). As such, class is not invented by sociologists or given but an outcome of “classification struggle” (Burawoy 2018).

“it is only after Marx, and indeed only after the creation of parties capable of imposing (on a large scale) a vision of the social world organized according to the theory of class struggle, that one could refer, strictly speaking, to classes and class struggle” (Bourdieu 1991, p.133)

Neo-Marxist notions of Laclau and Mouffe that society is largely indeterminate (Laclau & Mouffe 2001) and as such both individual and communal identities are both “empty signifers” and signs of agonistics or struggle, constitute a constructivist approach Bourdieu thus applied to different social fields that have no innate identity but are continuously transformed by groups and individuals trying to impose their idea of the field and its function as in the production of discourse and social reality (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). In Bourdieu's view - and following Marx - supposedly apolitical fields are implicated in production, dissemination and naturalisation of repression - as in accepted as inevitable or unalterable like the weather (Burawoy 2018) - and therefore support the power structures they theoretically ignore, a notion that he connects first and foremost with self-interest and competition, ideas adopted from Nietzsche’s idea of “will to power” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002), even though Bourdieu had some reservations for Nietzsche’s thinking as he considered any theorist constrained by circumstance and historical context (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.85). In connection to Nietzsche’s reflections on Christianity in The Antichrist (1918), Bourdieu writes:

“What Nietzsche means is that delegates base universal values on themselves, appropriate values, ‘requisition morality’. And thus monopolize the notions of God, Truth, Wisdom. People, Message, Freedom, etc. They make them synonyms. What of? Of themselves. ‘I am the Truth.’ They turn themselves into the sacred, they consecrate
themselves and thereby draw a boundary between themselves and ordinary people. They thus become, as Nietzsche says, 'the measure of all things'.” (Bourdieu 1991, pp.210-211)

As such, legitimation can be understood as discourse in the form of social practice of the relations of power (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015). Bourdieu uses this approach to describe how power works, how it produces meaning, allocates cultural capital and how it transforms rising and falling fields, which he sees as a way to understand human activities and their practices as ultimately competitive as well as utilitarian (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Bourdieu’s ideas on power, or rather domination, are heavily influenced by Foucault’s work Discipline and Punish (1975) and the description of the shift of power exerted by the sovereign towards ubiquitous and interiorised forms of oppression (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015) through discipline and surveillance. While Foucault accentuates the self-legitimation of knowledge (Grenz 1996), Bourdieu highlights power as an embodied interest that is enacted or played out (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.101) competing for distinction, position, and domination. Bourdieu refers to this as symbolic manipulation and writes:

“So long as overt violence, that of the usurer or the ruthless master, is collectively disapproved of and is liable to provoke either a violent riposte or the flight of the victim - that is, in both cases, for lack of any legal recourse, the destruction of the very relationship that was to be exploited - symbolic violence, gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such, chosen as much as undergone, that of trust, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all the virtues honoured by the ethic of honour, presents itself as the most economical mode of domination because it best corresponds to the economy of the system.” (Bourdieu 1990a, p.127)

Another aspect of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein for that matter - deeply tied to Bourdieu’s methods is the idea of language as a practice that “makes the world”, as in each field having its set of discourses and linguistic style that define what is seen, how things are valued, what can be said and thought, as well as what language is “made to mean”, as in being subject to competition to positions of authority trying to impose their meaning of language, thereby “politicalising” language as a way of “making the world” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Again, this links well to concepts of Foucault, underscoring the compatibility between the two theorist’s and thus the analytical framework the author is employing in this study.

“If I, Pierre Bourdieu, a single and isolated individual, speak only for myself, say ‘you must do this or that, overthrow the government or refuse Pershing missiles’, who will follow me? But if I am placed in statutory conditions such that I may appear as speaking
'in the name of the masses', or, a fortiori, 'in the name of the masses and of Science, of scientific socialism', that changes everything.” (Bourdieu 1991, p.212)

Furthermore, there is the notion of “interestedness” of activities, as in repressing any overt sense of interest in actions to a state of unconsciousness, taken from Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, which Bourdieu sees as a central aspect for his notion of habitus, his most ambitious attempt to explain practices in terms of specific and general socio-cultural contexts as historical and cultural production of individual practices, speaking through individuals never fully aware of it, as well as individual - and self-interested - production of practices (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

“In practice, it is the habitus, history turned into nature, i.e. denied as such, which accomplishes practically the relating of these two systems of relations, in and through the production of practice. The "unconscious" is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself produces by corporating the objective structures it produces in the second natures of habitus” (Bourdieu 1977a pp.78-79)

For Bourdieu, the unconscious, rather than something that is repressed and occasionally appears in terms of Freud, is a process arising out of and creating agendas, goals, and strategies as well as values and desires of habitus, a notion openly accredited to Pascal in a materialist dimension of habitus (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

“Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. And when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a "fish in water": it does not feel the weight of the water, and it takes the world about itself for granted. I could, to make sure that I am well understood, explicate Pascal's formula: the world encompasses me (me comprend) but I comprehend it (je le comprends) precisely because it comprises me. It is because this world has produced me, because it has produced the categories of thought that I apply to it, that it appears to me as self-evident.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, pp.127-128)

Bourdieu emphasised the self-reflexive and peripatetic nature of his work as a direct consequence of the materialist dimension of habitus (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002), which made anyone in any field being turned into “a fish in the water” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.127) through his theory of cultural trajectory, as in the “social history that produces an agent with a particular habits and place within a field” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002, p.18). To that effect discourse is a critical notion for Bourdieu, as it requires reflection and critical meta-analysis as part of sociological inquiry (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015). His critic and self-reflexive stance of “anti-
intellectualism” mainly targeted the intellectual field as an autonomous and self-regulating field with considerable cultural capital and authority, independent from political and economic influence, preoccupied with contemplation and discussion of ideas rather than problems and issues affecting peoples’ lives (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Loïc Wacquant writes:

“This is arguably the most significant difference between him and Sartre or Foucault: whereas the latter have used their intellectual capital primarily in the broader politics of society, Bourdieu has aimed his critical arsenal first and foremost at the forms of tyranny—in Pascal’s sense—that threaten the intellectual field itself.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.56)

4.2.2 Cultural Field, Capital & Habitus

Bourdieu’s concept of cultural field can be described as any dynamic set of institutions, categories, and designations as well as distinct rules, rituals or conventions and their interactions that establish an objective hierarchy that produces discourses, inherent activities as well as conflicts arising from the determination of what constitutes capital within the field and how it is distributed (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

“a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.97)

Social arrangements may consist of multiple fields with different degrees of autonomy from overarching power (Rawolle & Lingard 2013). Power within the field largely depends on people’s position and the amount of possessed capital, Bourdieu’s multi-dimensional view on capital (Rawolle & Lingard 2013; Kleanthous 2013), which is usually confined to particular fields, e.g. as educational capital (Bourdieu 2005), scientific capital (Bourdieu 2004), journalist capital (Bourdieu 1998a) etc., and can be designated as “authentic” by those in positions of power (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Additionally, there is the notion of elementary capitals (Rawolle & Lingard 2013), such as social capital, cultural capital or symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986). As the field is dynamic and characterised by competition for capital, the terms reproduction and transformation serve to explain what Bourdieu calls symbolic domination (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002), as in domination not recognised as such (Burawoy 2018). In this sense, symbolic
capital masks domination and socially legitimises hierarchy through essentialisation and naturalisation of social position (Calhoun, LiPuma & Postone 1993).

“The realistic, even resigned or fatalistic, dispositions which lead members of the dominated classes to put up with objective conditions that would be judged intolerable or revolting by agents otherwise disposed can have the appearances of purposiveness only if it is forgotten that, by a paradoxical couterfinality of adaptation to reality, they help to reproduce the conditions of oppression.” (Bourdieu 2000, p.217)

In Bourdieu’s view, agents adjust their expectations for attainable capital as “practical” limitations by their position within the field, their educational milieu and social status as well as connections and consequently are less ambitious the lower their capital tends to be (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

“This tendential law of human behaviours, whereby the subjective hope of profits tends to be adjusted to the objective probability of profit, governs the propensity to invest (money, work, time, emotion, etc.) in the various fields.” (Bourdieu 2000, p.216)

Bourdieu also acknowledges forms of agents “gambling” for capital to improve their position within the field through transformation, yet deems these attempts largely doomed to failure (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002) as he considers notions of equal opportunities as social - and as such not fair - games (Bourdieu 2000, p.214) and rather points to four main modes of how fields operate, namely misrecognition, symbolic violence, illusio and universalisation (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Misrecognition is elemental to the function of symbolic violence, which Bourdieu describes as “violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.167) and as such points out how agents do not perceive specific acts, such as being handled as inferior, being refused access to resources or limited in social mobility, as intended violence against them but rather as the “natural order of things” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Symbolic violence can serve as a means to trace exercise of power and cultural practices (Green 2013). Illusio is the mostly unconditional commitment to inherent logic and capitals of any field and its doxa, as in core values and discourses, (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002) and is described by Bourdieu as

“the fact of being caught up in and by the game, of believing the game is ‘worth the candle,’ or, more simply, that playing is worth the effort. In fact, the word interest initially meant very precisely what I include under the notion of illusio, that is, the fact of attributing importance to a social game, the fact that what happens matters to those who are engaged in it, who are in the game. Interest is to ‘be there,’ to participate, to admit
that the game is worth playing and that the stakes created in and through the fact of playing are worth pursuing; it is to recognize the game and to recognize its stakes. When you read, in Saint-Simon, about the quarrel of hats (who should bow first), if you were not born in a court society, if you do not possess the habitus of a person of the court, if the structures of the game are not also in your mind, the quarrel will seem futile and ridiculous to you.” (Bourdieu 1998b pp.76-77)

As cultural fields are dynamic and influenced by other fields, they can go through dramatic or gradual, non-consistent and non-homogeneous transformations and may develop from more autonomous configurations into heteronomous fields, resulting in overt disagreements and agonists over which part of the field represents its values (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002) as capital from one field is transferred into another (Calhoun, LiPuma & Postone 1993).

The notion of habitus - borrowing from philosophical tradition of Aristotle (Rawolle & Lingard 2013) - was introduced by Bourdieu mainly to overcome the dualistic split between subjectivism and objectivism (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002; Kłos-Czerwińska 2015). Regarding the subjectivist point of view, Loïc Wacquant writes:

“The subjectivist or ‘constructivist’ point of view [...] attends to this ‘objectivity of the second order.’ In contrast with structuralist objectivism, it asserts that social reality is a ‘contingent ongoing accomplishment’ of competent social actors who continually contract their social world via ‘the organized artful practices of everyday life’ [...] Through the lens of this social-phenomenology, society appears as the emergent product of the decisions, actions, and cognitions of conscious, alert individuals to whom the world is given as immediately familiar and meaningful.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.9)

As such, Bourdieu takes subjectivism as useful in its emphasis on how agents negotiate attempts by government, institutions or capitalism to tell them what to do, how to behave and think in contrast to Marxist theories (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015) that presume people as ignorantly absorbing ideologies of government and capitalism, while at the same time rejecting subjectivism for its inability to consider the close connection between objective structure of a culture and specificities of individuals (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Objectivism, primarily in its body of structuralist theory, is taken on by Bourdieu relevant to his notions of cultural fields and habitus, as it sees practice as the mechanism by which people reproduce the objective structures (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015) of society that are articulated in values and ideas and subsequently documents, policies, discourse or even, myths or dispositi ons and arbitrate how the world is perceived and how reality is processed through relational thinking - creating meaning in relation to other elements - encoded and constituted in our “sign system” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Bourdieu writes:
“Objectivism, which sets out to establish objective regularities (structures, laws, systems of relationships, etc.) independent of individual consciousnesses and wills [...] It raises, objectively at least, the forgotten question of the particular conditions which make the doxic experience of the social world possible.” (Bourdieu 1990a, p.26)

Bourdieu sees the accentuation on deterministic aspects in human practice as a weakness, since objectivism cannot look beyond practice as reproducing structures and does not account for the particular conditions which enable practices and how people actually use objective regularities (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Subjectivism points towards objectivist maps of cultures, editing out intentionality and individuality - or rather agency - while objectivism points out that individuality and intentionality are regulated by cultural context, as in people can only intend what is available to them within a culture (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Bourdieu bridges this divide and insists that practice is always informed by agency but is contextually confined by the relations to objective structures, which he calls cultural fields that in relationship with habitus make any practice non explicable without reference to them (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

Habitus can then be thought of as embodied and embedded dispositions and values (Burawoy 2018) accumulated over time from cultural history that remain with agents across contexts - or different fields - while being durable and transposable, which allow them to respond to cultural rules and contexts while subscribing to the values and imperatives of given fields and as such largely predetermined responses (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Habitus sees action as strategy, as a tendency to act also in moments of uncertainty or ambiguity, it is produced by structures, produces practices and reproduces structure (Kłos-Czerwińska 2015). The relation between field and habitus thus produces agent’s bodies as well as their bodily disposition, which Bourdieu calls bodily helix, contrasting common belief that the body is something individual with the notion of the body as a product of habitus (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002):

“On the other hand, the self-evidence of the isolated, distinguished body is what prevents the fact being realized that this body which indisputably functions as a principle of individuation (in as much as it localizes in space and time, isolates, etc.), and reinforced by the legal definition the individual as an abstract, interchangeable being, without qualities, is also as a real agent, that is to say, as a habitus, with its history, its incorporated properties a “principle 'collectivization' (Vergesellschaftung), as Hegel puts it. Having the (biological) property of being open to the world, and therefore exposed to the world, and so capable of being conditioned by the world, shaped by the material and cultural conditions of existence in which it is placed from the beginning, it is subject to a process of socialization of which individuation is itself the product, with the singularity of the 'self' being fashioned in and by social relations.” (Bourdieu 2000, pp.133-134)
In Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, knowledge is constructed through the habitus and agents are disposed towards attitudes, values, or behaviours through the influence of cultural trajectories (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Habitus is constituted as practice and operates at least partly unconsciously, which Bourdieu points out as arbitrary, without anything natural or essential to it (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

“The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus. It follows that these practices cannot be directly deduced either from the objective conditions, defined as the instantaneous sum of the stimuli which may appear to have directly triggered them, or from the conditions which produced the durable principle of their production. These practices can be accounted for only by relating the objective structure defining the social conditions of the production of the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is operating, that is, to the conjuncture which, short of a radical transformation, represents a particular state of this structure.” (Bourdieu 1977a p.78)

Critics point out that Bourdieu’s notion of the inevitability of the “game of culture” suggests a “self perpetuating and mechanical model of society” (Jenkins 2002, p.118), paying little attention to individuals’ agency (Green 2013) or sufficiently explaining how habitus interacts with agency (Connell 1983). Yet, despite these flaws, many critics accept Bourdieu’s theoretical work as a significant contribution towards better understanding of social work (Green 2013).

4.2.3 From Theory to Theorising Practice
Bourdieu attempts to bridge the chasm between intellectual theory and everyday practices and considers his theories as tools produced by and oriented towards a specific problem, a practical dimension antithetical to the "scholastic point of view" (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002):

“The scholastic view is a very peculiar point of view on the social world, on language, on any possible object of thought that is made possible by the situation of skholè, of leisure, of which the school - a word which also derives from skholè - is a particular form, as an institutionalized situation of studious leisure. Adoption of this scholastic point of view is the admission fee tacitly demanded by all scholarly fields: the neutralizing disposition (in Husserl's sense), implying the bracketing of all theses of existence and all practical intentions, is the condition at least as much as the possession of a specific
competence for access to museums and works of art. It is also the condition for the academic exercise as a gratuitous game, as a mental experience that is an end in and of itself.” (Bourdieu 1998b pp.127-128)

As such, Bourdieu thinks beyond the divide of qualitative and quantitative positions and calls his logic of research “inseparably empirical and theoretical” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.160) and insisted on indissolubly combining theoretical and empirical work (Calhoun, LiPuma & Postone 1993; Harker, Mahar & Wilkes 1990), tying any particular research to a “theoretically constructed empirical case” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.160). Theoretical notions arise of “an historical analysis of the specific properties of the contemporary societies” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.159) and as such always have to factor in other discourses, accounts, observations, documents, personal experience or knowledge that weigh in on their historical and contemporary validity (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). To build an empirical case and ensure its credibility, empiricism must be arbitrated with qualitative factors, an absolutely necessary process (Rawolle & Lingard 2013) that Bourdieu calls contextualisation through self-reflexive techniques, building on his approach of field and habitus (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

Consequently, the theoretical notions of Bourdieu are tools in cause of better social science - not as means of a relativist “anything goes” (Rawolle & Lingard 2013) - which are to be transformed and rethought as they are applied, rather than just theoretical filters to analyse social practice, and can be seen in tours of two distinct epistemological types (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). The first, which Bourdieu calls practical sense or logic of practice (Burawoy 2018) is characterised as the ability to comprehend and negotiate cultural fields (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002):

“In fact, these pre-perceptive anticipations, a sort of practical induction based on previous experience, are not given to a pure subject, a universal transcendental consciousness. They are the fact of the habitus as a feel for the game. Having the feel for the game is having the game under the skin; it is to master in a practical way the future of the game; it is to have a sense of the history of the game. While the bad player is always off tempo, always too early or too late, the good player is the one who anticipates, who is ahead of the game.” (Bourdieu 1998b pp.80-81)

Having a feel for the flow and logic of practice in the game (Rawolle & Lingard 2013) would then mean to “know the game” played out by agents in cultural fields, its rules, genres, discourses, capitals, values, and imperative that determine practice so that strategic decisions on how the field negotiated can be made, as in knowing what practices, genres or discourses fit circumstance (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). The second epistemological type Bourdieu refers to as the reflexive relation to the cultural field and practices to counter the naturalisation,
embodiment and enactment of imperative, values, and disposition in the given field (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). He highlights three main aspects for the reflexive relation to one’s own practice, namely one’s social and cultural origins and coordinates, one’s position within the field and lastly one’s “intellectual bias” (Maton 2003) as the tendency to “abstract” practices as “ideas to be contemplated, rather than problems to be solved” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

While the process of enacting reflexivity in research practice is less clear, there is widespread agreement that authors should position themselves in relations of their objects of study, e.g. in form of autobiographical reflection, so that claims to knowledge can be seen in context of social selves and potentially hidden doxic values and assumptions (Maton 2003), as there is never a neutral, disinterest perspective (Calhoun, LiPuma & Postone 1993). This process of “double distancing” (Green 2013), in submitting oneself as a researcher to the same rigorous critique as the object of research, Bourdieu calls “objectification of objectification” (Jenkins 2002). Yet, Bourdieu also accentuates that the focus is not individual researcher’s biases, but rather collective scientific unconscious embedded in the intellectual practices of the field (Maton 2003) and writes that it is not:

“a complacent and intimist return upon the private person [...] the kind of self-fascinated observation of the observer’s writing and feelings [...] opens the door to a form of thinly veiled nihilistic relativism [...] that stands as the polar opposite to a truly reflexive social science.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.72)

For Bourdieu the analysis of collective objectifying relations is not an individual practice (Maton 2003) but “the inclusion of a theory of intellectual practice as an integral component and necessary condition of a critical theory of society” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.36) and as such epistemological, collective (Maton 2003) and “fundamentally anti-narcissistic” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.72). The epistemic reflexivity is the cornerstone of Bourdieu’s work (Maton 2003), as Loïc Wacquant underscores:

“If there is a single feature that makes Bourdieu stand out in the landscape of contemporary social theory, it is his signature obsession with reflexivity.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.36)

Yet, Bourdieu has been criticised for confining his reflexivity to the field of sociology (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), while in reality he associates it with a various fields, groups and positions (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002), such as literature (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992 pp.206-208), science (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992 pp.175-176) or art (Bourdieu & Haacke 1995 p.1) and considers it applicable to any field, as it allows “the systematic exploration of the unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the thought” (Bourdieu &
Reflexivity is seen by Bourdieu as “science” in terms of a radical doubt, it contextualises social issues and objects of knowledge within a historical framework and requires research to be seen under an ethical imperative (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

“The construction of a scientific object requires first and foremost a break with common sense, that is, with the representations shared by all, whether they be the mere commonplaces of ordinary existence or official representations, often inscribed in institutions and thus present both in the objectivity of social organizations and in the minds of their participants. The preconstructed is everywhere. The sociologist is literally beleaguered by it, as everybody else is. The sociologist is thus saddled with the task of knowing an object—the social world—of which he is the product, in a way such that the problems that he raises about it and the concepts he uses have every chance of being the product of this object itself.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.235)

This approach is owed to Nietzsche’s work on genealogy, as Bourdieu attempts to overcome researchers’ tendency to reproduce “common sense” by investigating the politics of the “imposition of common sense” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

“Suffice it to say that the separation of sociology and history is a disastrous division, and one totally devoid of epistemological justification: all sociology should be historical and all history sociological. In point of fact, one of the functions of the theory of fields that I propose is to make the opposition between reproduction and transformation, statics and dynamics, or structure and history, vanish. [...] we cannot grasp the dynamics of a field if not by a synchronic analysis of its structure and, simultaneously, we cannot grasp this structure without a historical, that is, genetic analysis of its constitution and of the tensions that exist between positions in it, as well as between this field and other fields, and especially the field of power.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.90)

Through the compound of radical doubt as well as genealogical deconstruction and analysis, Bourdieu supplies a scientific method to not only uncover properties of a society, how they arise and naturalise, but also who benefits or looses in such processes, positioning reflexive research as epistemological ethics, a concept close to the position of Foucault (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002) and his concept of ethos “as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” (Foucault 1997, p.319). Through simultaneous immersion in the worlds of research and participants, the distinction between the researcher’s logic of theory and the participant’s logic of practice can be revealed (Burawoy 2018). Bourdieu writes:
“I believe that when sociology remains at a highly abstract and formal level, it contributes nothing. When it gets down to the nitty gritty of real life, however, it is an instrument that people can apply to themselves for quasi-clinical purposes. The true freedom that sociology offers is to give us a small chance of knowing what game we play and of minimizing the ways in which we are manipulated by the forces of the field in which we evolve, as well as by the embodied social forces that operate from within us. I am not suggesting that sociology solves all the problems in the world, far from it, but that it allows us to discern the sites where we do indeed enjoy a degree of freedom and those where we do not. So that we do not waste our energy struggling over terrains that offer us no leeway.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, pp.198-199)

Michel de Certeau (1984) accentuates how Bourdieu’s work is aligned on instances of practice and identifies strategies that emerge from the analysis of interrelations between people, conventions and social rules as well as times or places (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002) that may be called “cultural literacy” (Schirato & Yell 2000) and highlights three aspects of strategic thinking essential to successful practice, as in self-reflexive understanding of one’s position and resources in the field, awareness of rules, regulations, values and cultural capitals and most importantly ability to navigate best as possible lack of cultural capital and negotiate conditions and contexts “of the moment” (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Yet, Michel de Certeau also shows that Bourdieu’s position that habitus always drives practice, for example in Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), is contradicted by himself by considering acts outside the habitus unthinkable, pointing towards a “prison-house” of the habitus, while Certeau highlights that certain acts may be inarticulable within the habitus, but they may be very well be possible and arguments with Bourdieu's own notion (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002) that resistance “takes the most unexpected forms, to the point of remaining more or less invisible to the cultivated eye” (Bourdieu 1990b, p.155).

In his work Distinction (1984) Bourdieu presents an algebraic formulate to his theoretical framework: “[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice” (Bourdieu 1984b, p.101) to highlight the critical aspect of interaction between his theoretical concepts, as habitus is structured by practice with the field while at the same time thereby structuring the field (Kleanthous 2013).

“the unity hidden under the diversity and multiplicity of the set of practices performed in fields governed by different logics and therefore inducing different forms of realization, in accordance with the formula: [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice. It also conceals the structure of the symbolic space marked out by the whole set of these structured practices, all the distinct and distinctive life-styles which are always defined objectively and sometimes subjectively in and through their mutual relationships. So it is necessary to reconstruct what has been taken apart, first by way of verification but also in order to
rediscover the kernel of truth in the approach characteristic of common-sense knowledge, namely, the intuition of the systematic nature of life-styles and of the whole set which they constitute. To do this, one must return to the practice-unifying and practice-generating principle, i.e., class habitus, the internalized form of class condition and of the conditionings it entails. One must therefore construct the objective class, the set of agents who are placed in homogeneous conditions of existence imposing homogeneous conditionings and producing homogeneous systems of dispositions capable of generating similar practices; and who possess a set of common properties, objectified properties, sometimes legally guaranteed (as possession of goods and power) or properties embodied as class habitus” (Bourdieu 1984b p.101)

4.2.4 Conclusion
Even though significantly less straightforward than the theoretical notions of Foucault, Bourdieu provides tangible insights for developing understanding of the social world. With his approach of combining both theoretical and empirical approaches to research, he articulates a toolset that seems applicable to the author's research. Exploring the case of the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg, the presented concepts serve to reveal the inner workings of the field and how stakeholders deploy their capitals in a self-perpetuating game of distinction and domination that establishes the embodied reality of experience within the entrepreneurial policy ecosystem. As such, the methodological tools of Bourdieu can be used to provide an empirical dimension of concreteness to the abstract and largely theoretical perspective obtained through the theories of Foucault.

To achieve a deeper and more substantial analysis of the discourse under investigation, the author is combining the approaches of both Foucault and Bourdieu as in his view they complement each other to address different yet critical aspects of the discourse. In the following section, the analytical coupling and resulting analytical framework will be presented.

4.3 Conclusion: Convergences & Concerns
The complex bodies of research of both Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu are complex to handle. Even more so, their work is subject to substantial criticism, rendering their utilisation subject to controversy. Yet, as presented in previous sections, both scholars provide valid and critical new insights for new understandings of our modern world and despite widespread discussion, both are acknowledged as providing meaningful tools for analysis. The author is not a social theorist or aims to engage in certainly relevant and insightful debates on different modes of interpretation or critique of Foucault and Bourdieu. Rather, the author utilised the established concepts to provide an analytical lens – an analytical framework - to investigate the phenomena under investigation, namely the case of the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg.
While there are other theorists, e.g. Jacques Derrida, that would also provide interesting perspectives on the subject at hand, the combination of Foucault and Bourdieu seemed plausible in context of the general notion of policy analysis as presented in chapter 2. As such, critical discourse analysis in the tradition of Foucault is established as a tool for critical policy analysis, e.g. by S. Taylor (2004) or van Dijk (2005) and within its understanding of discourse also includes imaginaries as representations of things that might, could or should be, according to Fairclough (2001), which is especially relevant to the author's investigation. While Derrida’s deconstructive approach (Derrida 1976; Derrida 1981) may have also served towards unmasking epistemological truths as cultural constructions, it was deemed to be philosophically abstract and difficult to apply. With the highly empirical nature of the study at hand and need for a theoretical backdrop that would allow critical investigation and analysis rather than discovery of universal truths, while encompassing both abstract construction of histories and embodied reality, the rationale for the analytical coupling of the Foucauldian and Bourdieusian approaches was derived. To that effect, the converging elements as well as some elements of critics are presented in the following segment as a means to present the author’s approach to his discourse analysis.

In the context of the author’s study, Foucault’s notion of discourse is used. As shown in previous sections, Foucault established how institutions can emerge and how categories of subjectivity are produced through procedures of objectification and normalisation. As such within his highly dynamic triad of power, knowledge, and subject he considers power as productive in the creation of institutional arrangement as well as its own resistance. Using his approach of genealogical history, a “history of the present” can be developed that allows to show what can be said and seen, and how biopower has been and is contingently producing and governing bodies within the field of investigation. However, Foucault’s notion of history does not translate well to embodied views of individuals. For an empirical operationalisation of the investigation - the covert observations presented in chapter 2 - Bourdieu aids to augment the Foucauldian abstraction with an investigation how the discourse is enacted in reality to show how Foucault’s approach of governmentality is internalised, translated and resisted. With concepts of field, capital and habitus Bourdieu provides a perspective for a historical trajectory and embeds the Foucauldian notion of discourse in the dynamic field of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg. As such, Bourdieu adds a complementary layer of empiric reality to Foucault’s sophistication by revealing “a habitus that is itself the product of the embodiment of the immanent regularities and tendencies of the world” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.138), seeking to overcome the theory and practice chasm.

A major difference between Foucault and Bourdieu may be the openly political nature of Bourdieu’s work - e.g. in The Weight of the World (1999) where he openly challenges government, academics and activists due to social suffering in society, making him emancipatory. This can be seen in the context of his resistance to metanarrative positions (Bourdieu 2000), aiming to unmask symbolic violence in capitalism. As such he is sharing with Foucault the notion of critique for universalistic claims of truth. Foucault however is rejecting normative criteria as a
political process, which led to accusations of functionalism or conservatism as in maintenance of the status quo (Sim 1998) that is contrasting Bourdieu’s emancipatory stance. Yet, it could be argued that Foucault’s attempt to show how discourse creates legitimation for governance is in itself a challenge to its normalising nature, making the two theorists complementary.

Even though there may be many more arguments and avenues of debate for or against an analytical coupling of Foucault and Bourdieu, the author sees merit in the approach.
5. Empirical Realities of Entrepreneurship Policy Discourse in Hamburg

In the following sections of this chapter, the empirical realities of entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg will be presented. As such, this chapter represents the empirical data and analysis of the study and will unmask the inner workings of the discourse using the analytical coupling of Foucault and Bourdieu presented in chapter 4 on the backdrop of concepts and models presented in chapter 2 that relate to entrepreneurship, innovation, entrepreneurship policy, innovation processes and sociotechnical imaginaries etc. The chapter presents the critical discourse analysis alongside the complementary component of ethnography as outlined in chapter 3. The entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg is interrogated through a document analysis and covert observations to provide an additional level of empirical depth to the analysis. To provide a roadmap throughout the chapter, the overall structure will be briefly outlined.

To contextualise the study, section 5.1 will briefly introduce the city of Hamburg and its most salient metrics to provide a basic understanding of the surrounding conditions that the discourse under investigation is embedded in. Subsequently, the policy agenda towards entrepreneurship will be presented on a high level of abstraction and in relation to findings from entrepreneurship policy research presented in chapter 2. As the study does not deal with policy effectiveness or implementation failure, a deeper discussion on the actual implementation and effectiveness of the described policies is omitted. The author has presented findings to this effect in prior work (Recke 2016, 2020b). Still, the overall state of the policy agenda is a required backdrop for the analysis of the entrepreneurship policy discourse.

Then section 5.1 will present the entrepreneurship policy terrain in Hamburg and map out its key entities and stakeholders and its network of actors that are critical to the discourse under investigation. In this context the overall body of documents considered in the analysis as well as the number of entities and stakeholders within the discourse community as well as details on the covert observations of key actors will be elaborated with contextualisation of the following presentation of data and analysis.

Building on this foundation, section 5.2 then presents the empirical findings from the investigation and the discourse analysis. To this effect, the discourse will be portrayed in the form of a history, or rather a genealogy in terms of Foucault (1977), to show different narrative themes that emerged in the discourse over time and how they establish the trajectory of the discourse and the alignment of the policy agenda. To this effect, data obtained from the document analysis will be presented in the form of direct quotes or summative contextualisation of phrase regimes identified in the documents.

Since most of the textual elements are in German, the author translated the quoted passages into English. In each case, the original text is referenced in the appendix where it is
available in German. In the rare cases in which an English version of the text was available from public sources, the author used the provided English translation. As the number of quotes is extensive, the author uses select sample quotes to exemplify certain discursive formations. Additional statements to similar effects will also be referenced in the appendix. However, only the passages added to the main body of the study are translated.

Through the presentation of textual data from artefacts such as documents, articles, drafts, speeches, etc. the governmentality of the discourse (Foucault 1984, 1997) is made apparent as the author presents how knowledge is created by actors and then repetitively articulated through the discourse, establishing the power-knowledge and biopower (Foucault 1978, 1984), shaping actors’ behaviour in the field and their self-regulating subjection (Foucault 1985, 1997). Adding the complementary Bourdieusian analysis the author presents how the overall skeleton of discourse is enacted in real life in the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Hamburg. To this effect artefacts in forms of presentations, speeches, field notes, interview notes and ethnographic observations are used to assemble a representation of the discourse inner workings, its habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) and capitals (Bourdieu 1986, Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) that shape power dynamics and the self-perpetuating nature of the discourse, revealing its performativity and acts of misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) on behalf of the actors. Ultimately, the embodiment of the discourse leads to the symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) that creates mechanisms of differentiation, distinction, and domination.

The section 5.2 is divided into 4 distinct narrative themes that help to contextualise and deconstruct the discourse trajectory over an extended period of time. Even though the main period of investigation covers the mayorship of Olaf Scholz from 2011-2018, various narrative motives date back at least a decade preceding his mayorship. Tracing these narratives helps to illustrate the role of discourse dynamics, its institutional arrangements and inherent power relations as well as its perseverance over individual actors within the discourse community. To this effect, the first 2 themes establish base narratives that the second 2 narratives build upon. The narrative themes are:

1. Hamburg as a Growing City
2. Hamburg as an Innovative City
3. Hamburg as a Media City
4. Hamburg as an Entrepreneurial City

The discursive trajectory of Hamburg as a media city gained particular traction under Olaf Scholz’ mayorship and the later focus on entrepreneurship and the startup economy is commonly associated with his policy agenda. Therefore, this broad distinction provides a mechanism to divide different epistemic threads of a genealogical history that shape the entrepreneurship policy discourse as it presents itself to the author.
The analytical points will be presented alongside the 4 narrative themes and the author concludes each of the 4 subsections with a summative Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis to deconstruct the discourse within the narrative theme to reveal its institutional arrangements and practices that provides the conditions for its performativity.

Before starting with presenting the data and analysis, the following section will present the entrepreneurship policy terrain in Hamburg by providing a short portrait of the city, its current entrepreneurship policy agenda and most importantly an overview of the entities and stakeholders involved in the entrepreneurship policy discourse that form the network of actors shaping the policy agenda.

5.1 Mapping the Entrepreneurship Policy Terrain in Hamburg

To provide a baseline for contextualisation of the discourse under investigation, it is critical to understand the geographical, historical, and socio-economic circumstances in Hamburg that inform the regional policy agenda on innovation and entrepreneurship and regional specificities that constitute the entrepreneurial policy ecosystem. While entrepreneurship policy is also shaped on international (European Union) and national (Germany) levels, it is important to highlight that the study focuses on regional - as in state not federal - policy. The city of Hamburg is a city state and one of 16 federal states in the Federal Republic of Germany. To better qualify this context, a short city portrait will follow. Afterwards the relevant entities and stakeholders involved in entrepreneurship policy will be introduced to establish the network of actors that operate the discourse under investigation. A concluding analysis will follow after the city portrait and data presentation to then transition to the narrative themes of the discourse in following sections.

5.1.1 The City of Hamburg

To better understand the regional context of the study, it seems prudent to provide some background information about the city of Hamburg. Located in Northern Germany at the Elbe river and connected to the North Sea, the city state Hamburg is Germany’s second largest city with a population of 1.76 M (December 2014), compared to Berlin, Germany’s largest city and main capital with 3.47 M, and Munich, Germany’s third largest city with 1.43 M (HK 2016a). More than 5.2 M people live in the metropolitan area (BWVI 2018a) that includes parts of Germany’s federal states of Niedersachsen (Lower-Saxony) and Schleswig-Holstein. As a “second city” of medium size, Hamburg’s gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to EUR 117.6 B in 2017 with a growth of 4.1 % since 2016 and accounts for 3.6 % of Germany’s total GDP of EUR 3,263.4 B (Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2018).

Hamburg’s economy was traditionally focussed on ship building and trade (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2017) and while the harbour remains to be the second-busiest container port in Europe (Merk & Hesse 2012), the city’s economic strategy shifted towards high level skill-
based industries and is now based on a cluster policy approach as outlined in the regional innovation strategy - Regionale Innovationsstrategie 2020 der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg - (BWVI 2014a). Hamburg implemented the first cluster initiative in Germany in 1997 and supports eight clusters across various industries in the regional economy, namely media/IT, aviation, life sciences, logistics, creative industry, healthcare, maritime industry and renewable energies (BWVI 2014b). Despite some of these clusters appearing as heavy industry, the contribution to the city’s GDP by production and manufacturing industry is just 14.75 % (EUR 15.636 B in 2017), while the service industry’s contribution is dominant at 81.86 % (EUR 86.739 B in 2017) with the strongest segments being finance, insurance, service and real estate at EUR 33.971 B and commerce, logistics, tourism, information and communication at EUR 33.842 B in 2017 (Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2018).

The general goal of the cluster policy is to create new jobs as well as added value and builds on the supposition that innovation will be the deciding factor for long-term economic growth in a competitive global market (BWVI 2016). Cornerstones of Hamburg’s cluster approach are 1. the creation of spaces and formats in which industry and government discuss economic developments, 2. the initiation of joint strategy processes for the region and 3. the initiation of “Richtungsentscheidungen” (guiding decisions) for specific profiling of the city of Hamburg, also called “smart specialisation” (BWVI 2018a). The approach is building on networks between industry, university, government, and civil society and is attributed to the quadruple helix approach - an advancement of the triple helix approach (Leydesdorff 2000; Carayannis & Campbell 2010) - in documents by the city's Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI 2018b). Since 2014, Hamburg is one of 6 European „Model Demonstrator Regions for modern cluster policy“ among Stockholm (Sweden), Lapland (Finland), Nord-Pas de Calais (France), Central Portugal and West Romania (BWVI 2018c) and was awarded advisory support (such as regional benchmarking and policy briefing) from the European Cluster Observatory by the European Commission (Meier zu Köcker 2015). The cluster policy has since been extended to incorporate cross-clustering, an approach to nurture economic potential and innovation at intersections of the individual clusters that is called “Clusterbrücken” (cluster bridges) in Hamburg (BWVI 2016).

The articulated vision of Hamburg is to become an innovation capital of Europe (BWVI 2014b), which is also embedded in the city’s strong focus on startups. The entrepreneurial ecosystem is advertised as having a very positive dynamic in terms of increasing numbers of startups in the region and new entrepreneurs among the population as well as being integrated in a dense network of support, e.g. in form of accelerator programs, co-working spaces and consulting services by local universities as well as private and city entities (BWVI 2018a). Renowned international startup success stories such as XING, myTaxi or Kreditech started in Hamburg and leading global internet corporations such as Google and Facebook have their German headquarters in the city (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a; BKM 2017; BWVI 2019). In 2017
Hamburg overtook Berlin as Germany’s leading city regarding new firm formation expressed in the entrepreneurial index (HK 2018). In regard to the cluster policy, measures to nurture the local startup economy largely focus on the media/IT cluster with the city’s nextMedia.Hamburg initiative and its derivatives (such as Gamecity Hamburg or nextReality.Hamburg), but also other clusters (such as aviation and logistics) increasingly promote startups and their innovative potential (BWVI 2018a).

The allocation of startup initiatives within the media/IT cluster can also be explained by the city’s aim to position Hamburg as a “media city”. Calling itself home to various political journals, newspapers, magazine and book publishers, advertising, and PR firms as well as software and game companies, Hamburg advertises itself as a leading media city, ahead of Berlin, Cologne and Munich regarding number of employees, revenues generated etc. (HK 2015). The media/IT and creative industries are considered as prototypical for changes in working environment and daily life as well as for the development of new methods and markets, new value chains and therefore are drivers of innovation, according to Dr. Carsten Brosda, Hamburg’s senator for culture and media - previously privy council for Hamburg’s authority of culture and privy council to the senate’s office for divisions media and digitisation (Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2016).

The regional entrepreneurial ecosystem has developed into a diversified number of entities within the domains of policy, finance, culture, supports, human capital and markets in terms of Isenberg (Isenberg 2011b). There is a growing number of co-working spaces, such as betahaus, Beehive, Mindspace, Shhared or WeWork; accelerator & incubator programs, such as Next Media Accelerator, Greenhouse Innovation Lab or Liquid Labs as well as Hanse Ventures or TruVenturo; venture capital investors, such as eVenture Capital Partners or Neuhaus Partners; public loans and subsidy programs, such as Innovationsstarter Fonds Hamburg, InnnoRampUp or the Hamburger Existenzgründungsinitiative; universities and research institutes, such as University of Hamburg, Hamburg University of Applied Sciences or Hamburg University of Technology; public and private service providers, such as Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, Hamburg Innovation or the Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft; large corporations, such as Airbus, Deutsche Lufthansa, Otto Group or global internet corporations such as Google, Facebook or Twitter; initiative and advocacy groups, such as Hamburg@work, Hamburg Startups or Digital Media Women; as well as events and festivals, such as Hamburger IT-Strategietage, Next Conference, Online Marketing Rockstars, Social Media Week or the Reeperbahn Festival. In prior work, the author provided an in-depth overview of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Hamburg (Recke 2016). An alternative and more recent account with similar results is provided by Hamburg Chamber of Commerce (HK 2018) among various other sources.

The entrepreneurship policy framework is to a large degree defined by the “Regionale Innovationsstrategie 2020 der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg” (BWVI 2014a) - regional innovation strategy 2020 - and builds on strategic guidelines articulated by the InnovationsAllianz
Hamburg, an initiative started in 2008 that involved 1000 regional stakeholders from policy, industry and university to articulate a holistic strategy to secure the region’s competitiveness and develop the city into one of Europe’s leading regions (BWVI 2010a). The strategy is divided into areas of innovations, climate, as in nurturing an innovative culture; education, as in satisfying current future demand of skilled workforce; transfer, as in strengthening research and development cooperation; subsidies, as in creating an efficient subsidy system for innovation projects; and infrastructure, as in sustaining and extending facilities for practice-oriented research and development. In his analysis of the policy agenda (Recke 2020b), the author discussed the strategy alongside academic debate on entrepreneurship policy as presented in chapter 4 and classified the innovations strategy in terms of Autio & Rannikko (2016) in 1. buffering approaches, as in generally targeted measures to avert resource shortness, dependencies and to provide non-monetary services such as consulting, training as well as low cost office spaces etc.; 2. bridging approaches, as in targeted selectivity at high-growth firms in competitive procedures to connect such ventures with suitable investors; and 3. capacity-boosting approaches, as in generally targeted to nurture innovative capabilities of entrepreneurs without any financial components. The author’s case study finds that most measures focus on capacity-boosting and buffering policies, with only very few measures qualifying as bridging policies. Any alignment with some general research findings was deemed rather coincidental than deliberately planned, as most support measures lack appropriate focus and alignment to count as attentive to issues raised by scholars such as Shane (2008, 2009), Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko (2015), Morris et al. (2016), Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen (2007), Autio & Rannikko (2016), Ács et al. (2014), Brown & Mawson (2013, 2015), C. Mason & Brown (2013), Brown et al. (2017) or others. Even though some of the aforementioned researchers hold opposing positions in the academic debate in regard various respects, a deliberate focus on one particular position or the other could not be identified in the strategy documents and analysed measures. This evident disconnect between academic research on entrepreneurship policy and the policy practice in Hamburg prompted the study presented here. The fact that increasing relevance of university is acknowledged in the regional policy agenda, but insights and resources do not seem to be used in policy formulation, the policy formation process itself needs to be analysed in greater detail to understand what drives the public policy discourse.

Subsequently, the author endeavoured on the presented research in this thesis to investigate the discourse on entrepreneurship policy with the presented approach to unmask the inner workings of the policy formation process, which is certainly a complex and messy process that is not much known about in academia (Lundstrom & Stevenson 2005; Arshed, Carter & Mason 2014, 2016). To that extent, it is important to highlight again that the study investigates the discourse that shapes the policy, not policy effectiveness or implementation failure. The subsequent section will present the entities and stakeholders within the entrepreneurship policy
field and the data sources used by the author in the study. An analysis of the network of actors within the field of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg will follow.

5.1.2 Entities and Stakeholders: Data Sources

Over a period from mid 2017 to mid 2019, the author conducted an in-depth data collection to compile a body of public and internal documents as well as a list of entities and individual stakeholders relevant to the public policy discourse towards entrepreneurship in Hamburg. The list grew over time as the investigation into the public policy discourse unfolded. Furthermore, the author extended his previous analysis of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Hamburg (Recke 2016, 2020b) for a deeper consideration of informal networks relevant to the discourse. Using documents procured during this data discovery as described in section 3.2, the document analysis was conducted to create a historical genesis of themes and narratives in the discourse that shape and support the inherent power structures. Complementary, the field observations served as a way to identify the embodied manifestation of the discourse power structures in wider social structures of the regional ecosystem and revealed additional actors and documents that were not available in public sources.

During his investigation, the author collected hundreds of documents from either public sources, previous field research conducted in 2016 (Recke 2016) or within the exploratory phase of the presented research, during which some documents became available from members of the author’s professional network in Hamburg’s entrepreneurial ecosystem. Among public sources are the official database of the Hamburg parliament, the Hamburgische Bürgerschaft (buergerschaft-hh.de), which contains documentation of all printing matters, protocols, legislation etc. as well as directories of related institutions in the city, such as ministries, public offices, banks, advocacy groups etc. The number of publicly available sources remained stable over the course of the study, except for subsequent releases of new documents by entities and stakeholders under investigation. However, informal access to additional documents grew in parallel to the field research, as participants made more material available from either their private archives or non-public repositories. Some stakeholders shared documents that informed articulation of official publications, internal presentations, drafts, or unreleased information that subsequently prompted additional research in public repositories or media archives to complement the body of documents as the study developed.

As the number of documents was extensive, the author filtered the available data into 301 key documents, of which 138 are records of public speeches by high government officials and 44 are articles in general media coverage. The remaining 119 documents are files from public entities such as the Hamburg parliament (Hamburger Bürgerschaft), the Ministry of Economy, Transport and Innovation (Behörde für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Innovation - BWVI), the Ministry of Culture and Media (Behörde für Kultur und Medien - BKM), the Ministry of Science, Research and Equality (Behörde für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Gleichstellung - BWFG), the Ministry
of Urban Development and Environment (Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt), the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Behörde für Umwelt und Energy) and the Senate Office (Senatskanzlei), HIW Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft mbH (Hamburg’s business development entity), the regional investment and subsidy bank (Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank - IFB) or the European Commission as well as the Chamber of Commerce (Handelskammer Hamburg) or public private cluster initiatives like Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft, Hamburg@work and nextMedia.Hamburg.

The filtering was done by mapping the documents’ authoring entities or stakeholders and their weight within the discourse. Following this approach, documents articulating policy agenda on the highest level of government, like in articulations by the mayor or documents released form the Senate Office, carry most weight and inform documents created by ministries and other public bodies. As is evidenced in section 5.2 the discourse is seeded at the pin of the wheel by most powerful political entities in the city and then repetitively articulated throughout the discourse moving from the centre to the periphery. The body of documents could have been extended dramatically by also including various press releases of public bodies in the entrepreneurial policy ecosystem or through integration of editorial publications of entities like Hamburg@work or nextMedia.Hamburg. However, less relevant entities or those just implementing policy on lower levels or publishing press statements, editorial etc. serve as examples how the discourse is self-perpetuating rather than adding depth to the overall analysis. However, the author drew upon press releases at a later stage of his analysis for a narrow selection of relevant statements. This also translates to regional press coverage, which was also considered at a late stage of the analysis to also identify resistance to the dominant discourse. Lastly there are select industry reports about the entrepreneurial ecosystem, or any other regional development or documents released by the European Commission that have been considered, as they are commonly referenced as sources for arguments within the discourse or to market the policy agenda.

As the documents reveal a trajectory of narrative themes, as presented in section 5.2, and repetitive articulation of specific motives and phrases that establish a phrase regime alongside the branding of a “growing city”, “innovative city”, “media city” or an “entrepreneurial city”, the body of documents can be narrowed down to 5 key clusters of publications that inform the discourse:

1. Leitbild Hamburg: The city of Hamburg developed fundamental guiding principles, a so-called Leitbild, that evolved over time. Key documents in this respect are related to the 2002 Leitbild: Metropole Hamburg - Wachsende Stadt (SKHH Hamburg 2002; BFHH 2005), positioning Hamburg as a growing city. It was further developed in 2007 (BFHH 2007), adding dimensions for Hamburg as an international city for talents. In 2010 it was further extended to include notions of sustainability and ecology (BFHH 2009c, 2010).

2. InnovationsAllianz and the regional innovation strategy: The city of Hamburg initiated an InnovationsAllianz (BWVI 2010b) with more than 160 actors from university,
industry and policy to develop a common understanding and strategic principles - Strategische Leitlinien (BWVI 2010a) - for fostering innovation in the city. It can be seen as a base document for various subsequent publications that cover the operational program of the city for investment in economic growth and job creation (BWVI 2013) and lead to the regional innovation strategy 2020 (BWVI 2014a). Narrative motives established in these documents are adopted throughout the discourse in and heavily built upon the cities cluster policy (BWVI 2016, 2018a, 2019) to manage regional innovation.

3. Hamburg@work & nextMedia.Hamburg: The media/IT industry cluster initiative is attributed with being one of the first cluster initiatives in Germany (HK 2014) and is deeply interwoven in the discourse under investigation (Hamburg@work 2009a, 2010a, 2012a). Beyond providing the base narrative for various programs in the city, e.g. Gamecity Hamburg (nextMedia.Hamburg 2014a, 2015a) and nextReality.Hamburg (BFHH 2016b, 2018d; nextReality.Hamburg 2018), the initiative also introduced the language of startups into the discourse that was then popularised under Scholz’ mayorship and mainly promoted by nextMedia.Hamburg (2016a; HK 2018). Even though largely absorbed by nextMedia.Hamburg and later the HIW Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft mbH (HIW 2017a), Hamburg’s business development entity, Hamburg@work remained visible as initiative relevant to the discourse and repositioned itself as the digital cluster initiative in 2018, fostering cross-fertilisation beyond cluster silos (Hamburg@work 2018a).

4. Creative Cluster: The city of Hamburg initiated the creation of a create industry cluster in 2009 (BFHH 2009b, 2012a) that was preceded by reports in the culture economy in 2006 (BKM 2006). Subsequently, there have been reports on the creative industry in 2012 (Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2012) and 2016 (Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2016) that blend with the media/IT industry cluster and Hamburg’s narrative theme as a media city Medienstandort Hamburg (HK 2015) or city of content (BKM 2017).

5. Scholz Mayorship: Olaf Scholz mayorship from 2011-2018 covered many areas of policy. His main policy agenda was published by the Senate Office in 2011 (SKHH 2011a) and presented by him in his initial government address in March 2011 (Scholz 2011a). For his second term from 2015 onwards, his party SPD entered into a coalition with the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (green party). The main policy agenda was articulated in the coalition agreement (SPD 2015). For the discourse under investigation here, Scholz most relevantly accentuated Hamburg as a modern city and allocated key responsibilities for the media industry and media policy at the highest level of government (SKHH 2011b, 2014). Under his mayorship the Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt (WK Hamburg), the regional real estate development bank, was transformed into the Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (IFB), the regional investment and subsidy bank (BFHH 2012b). Under its umbrella various support and subsidy initiatives for
startups were aligned (BFHH 2016a, 2017b, 2018a) and an Innovation Funds was created to subsidise innovation and technology-driven entrepreneurship (BFHH 2017d, 2017e). Also, the support for spin-offs at universities was increased (BFHH 2018b) and a number of research and innovation parks were spawned (BFHH 2018c). Another related tangent of policies evolved, positioning Hamburg as a smart or digital city (BFHH 2014, 2015, 2017c, 2017e), ultimately resulting in a digital city strategy (SKHH 2015a, 2016). In 2018 Olaf Scholz became Federal Minister of Finance and left the office to Peter Tschentscher. The Senate Office published a summative document about Scholz’ mayorship, covering his policy agenda (SKHH 2018). Among 1125 public speeches the author retrieved from the public repository of the city of Hamburg and reviewed for relevance to the discourse under investigation, 120 were considered relevant as they cover aspects of the narrative themes presented in section 6.1 or entrepreneurship policy directly.

The author highlights that due to the period under investigation being aligned to the period of Scholz’ mayorship, data sources from his speeches and statements take on a disproportionate amount in the analysed documents. This relates rather to his position as the mayor of the city and head of regional government and the role within the discourse rather than his individual contribution to any narrative tangents. As a highly visible role within the regional policy ecosystem and public media coverage, speeches and statements of the mayor are often referenced in media and were also made available in public archives, providing a good data source for the discourse analysis in this study. As an example, the repository of all official speeches by the mayor (and other select politicians, such as senators) is extensive and is also not available for any other governmental period prior the period under investigation. As such, to some degree the mayor exemplifies a key part of the discourse, which is why he appears on all stages of the discourse under investigation.

The author compiled a list of 181 public and private entities from industry, government, university, and civil society - in line with the quadruple helix approach (Carayannis & Campbell 2009, 2010) within Hamburg’s entrepreneurial ecosystem, of which a subset of 25 have been classified as relevant to the public policy towards entrepreneurship discourse. The entities have been identified either within documents under investigation or as part of the in-depth investigation into institutions involved in the entrepreneurial ecosystem along dimensions presented by Isenberg (2011b). While some reports from local entities provide a good overview of the entrepreneurial ecosystem (HK 2018), such detailed information was not available at the beginning of the study, which prompted the author to conduct his own investigation. It is important to note that various entities changed their name, spawned, and disappeared from the discourse or even the entire entrepreneurial ecosystem over the course of the study. Most relevant entities however, remained both stable and few. Regarding ministries among these entities, some changed their name over the course of the study. For clarification the author will highlight such
changes throughout the document where applicable. The entities’ relevance was classified by either considering appearance within the discourse, e.g. number of documents authored or contributed to, or weight related to the political capital (such as ministries, Senate Office etc.). The 25 key entities identified can be divided in 15 entities of very relevance:

1. Senatskanzlei Hamburg (Senate Office): The office of the mayor represents the highest level of government. The Senate Office released various key documents over the course of the investigation and aggregated various areas of policy at the highest level of government under Olaf Scholz’ mayorship from 2011-2018, for example responsibility for the media/IT industry cluster and media policy (SKHH 2014) through the newly created Amt Medien - media department - (SKHH 2011b) or the digital city strategy (SKHH 2015a, 2016, 2020).

2. BWVI - Behörde für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Innovation (Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation): The Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation is a key entity in the entrepreneurship policy discourse and published various cornerstone documents articulating the policy agenda, ranging from the InnovationsAllianz Hamburg (BWVI 2010a) to the regional innovation strategy (BWVI 2014a) and various reports on Hamburg’s industry clusters (BWVI 2016, 2018a, 2019) or innovation parks (BWVI 2018c).

3. BKM - Behörde für Kultur und Medien (Ministry of Culture & Media): The Ministry of Culture and Media grew in significance within the discourse over the years alongside increasing attention to creative industries (Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2012, 2016) and the development of a creative cluster in Hamburg (BKM 2006). It was renamed from Behörde für Kultur (Ministry of Culture) to Behörde für Kultur und Medien (Ministry of Culture & Media) in 2017 when the privy council for media in the Senate Office took over the senator seat. Responsibilities for the media industry cluster and the Amt Medien - media department - were transferred from the Senate Office to the Ministry of Culture as part of this transition.

4. nextMedia.Hamburg: The media/IT industry cluster initiative was spawned out of the initial media/IT cluster initiative Hamburg@work and the Amt Medien - media department - at the Senate Office in 2014. The initiative was spearheaded by the head of the Amt Medien - media department - who became representative of the senate for the media industry in 2013 and was promoted to Staatsrat (privy council) for the Ministry of Culture and the departments media and digitisation in the Senate Office in March 2016. The nextMedia.Hamburg initiative released various key documents catering towards fostering the entrepreneurial ecosystem and support measures for startups in the city (nextMedia.Hamburg 2014a, 2014b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c) and can be seen as a key initiative developed under Scholz’ mayorship. Over the years the initiative created and
hosted various event formats like Scoopcamp or NewTV Kongress (nextMedia.Hamburg 2014a), published industry reports (nextMedia.Hamburg 2015b, 2017a, 2017b, 2018) and editorials (e.g. the nextMedia Kompass) and provided support for the startup economy with the nextMedia StartHub and Financing Starter Kit (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016d). During the transition into the Ministry of Culture and Media, the responsibility for the media/IT industry cluster remained with the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative, while the dedicated startup support was reallocated to HIW Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft mbH (Hamburg’s business development entity) in 2017 (HIW 2017a, 2018a).

5. IFB - Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (Hamburg investment and subsidy bank): The regional investment and subsidy bank spawned out of the Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt (Hamburg’s real estate development bank) and the Innovationsstiftung Hamburg (Hamburg’s innovation foundation) and is responsible for real estate and economic development, innovation, and environment (BFHH 2013a). Even though few relevant documents were published by the bank itself, the discourse evolved around the evolution of the regional subsidy bank for a number of years (BFHH 2012a, 2012b, 2016a) and also all monetary and various non-monetary subsidies and investment programs for fostering innovation and entrepreneurship are closely tied to the IFB Hamburg (BFHH 2017b, 2017d, 2018a), most relevantly through its immediate subsidiary, the IFB Innovationsstarter GmbH.

6. IFB Innovationsstarter GmbH: The subsidiary of the IFB Hamburg is directly responsible for all monetary programs catering towards startups and the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The entity operates various programs and investment funds that have increased in dimension and funding over the years. As such the entity and its representatives are key to the discourse under investigation and appear in various documents and on almost all stages of the discourse community, mainly to promote the offered support programs. Among the programs are InnoRampUp (IFB 2014), the Innovationsstarter Fonds (IFB 2016) or InnoFounder (IFB 2018), all of which are highly visible in other key documents and often referred to as the key elements of the entrepreneurship policy strategy.

7. Hamburg@work e.V.: The public private partnership Hamburg@work is the original cluster initiative for the media/IT industry in Hamburg. It was founded in 1997 as one of the first cluster initiatives in Germany and has published various key documents over the years that articulate the discourse under investigation. Similar to the later incarnation nextMedia.Hamburg, the initiative published industry reports (Hamburg@work 2008a, 2008b, 2012b, 2012c, 2013) and editorials (e.g. the Always On magazine) and hosted events like the Webfuture Award (Hamburg@work 2011a). In annual reports Hamburg@work also reports on developments within the cluster (Hamburg@work 2009a, 2010a, 2012a) and spawned the introduction of startup vocabulary in the discourse
that was later adopted on all levels. The initiative also hosted various informal meetups and networking events for various layers within the media and IT economy. Even though various aspects of the initiative were merged with the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative, Hamburg@work remained a visible brand and was reshaped into the digital cluster initiative in 2018 (Hamburg@work 2018a, 2018b) that is advertised as working across cluster silos to foster cross-fertilisation.

8. Gamecity Hamburg: The Gamecity initiative is a program spawned by Hamburg@work in 2004 that initially started as an industry guide (Hamburg@work 2004, 2006) and developed to foster the games industry development by providing dedicated services, subsidy programs etc. for new game prototype developments (Hamburg@work 2010b) etc. in collaboration with other entities in the city, like the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI). The initiative is portrayed as a narrative of success (Hamburg@work 2007b, 2009a) and is referenced throughout the discourse as a blueprint for new initiatives. Hamburg University of Applied Sciences created a master study program for game development in 2010 (Hamburg@work 2010c, 2011b). The game industry in Hamburg is represented in the discourse as creating jobs and economic growth as a result of the initiative, which was adopted by nextMedia.Hamburg (nextMedia.Hamburg 2015a) to align all measures in the Amt Media (media office) at the Senate Office under supervision of the mayor.

9. Handelskammer Hamburg (Hamburg Chamber of Commerce): The chamber of commerce published various reports and analysis of the city of Hamburg, portraying it as a IT industry location (HK 2014), a media city (HK 2015) and a diverse city (HK 2016b) and drawing comparisons with other cities (HK 2016a). The entity also published a white paper for the entrepreneurial ecosystem (HK 2018). These publications are aligned with narrative themes of the discourse under investigation and repetitively articulate the phrase regime over the years. The chamber of commerce also hosts various networking events, such as the Venture Capital-Stammtisch Hamburg, an informal meetup of people interested in the venture capital industry.

10. HIW Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft mbH (Hamburg’s business development entity): The HIW spawned out of the prior HWF Hamburgische Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung mbH in 2017 (HIW 2017a) and unified both the previous business development units as well as the operation of Hamburg’s research and innovation parks and the startup support unit that was previously attached to nextMedia.Hamburg.

11. BSU - Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt (Ministry of Urban Development and Environment): The ministry appears in early phases of the narrative themes in context of Hamburg being awarded as the European Green Capital 2011 (BSU 2013, BUE 2016), a
tangent that was later extrapolated to Hamburg as an innovative city with emphasis on renewable energy and new concept of mobility within the city.

12. BFWG - Behörde für Forschung, Wissenschaft und Gleichstellung (Ministry of Science, Research and Equality): The ministry appears in the discourse along research and innovation parks, knowledge spillover at local universities (BWFG 2016) and related narrative motives in light of the triple helix approach. The relevance of support for research and innovation is continuously addressed in the discourse, even if the entity itself appears only rarely on discourse stages.

13. Hamburg Marketing GmbH: Hamburg’s marketing communication entity articulates narrative motives within the discourse and is frequently involved in communicating aspects of strategy formulation or programs such as nextMedia.Hamburg to the public (Hamburg Marketing 2015a, 2015b, 2016) and media in particular (Hamburg Marketing 2018). Even though not visibly involved in formulation of any agenda, the entity repetitively articulates the discourse throughout the community (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016c, HK 2018).

14. Social Democratic Party (SPD): The SPD is the political party of Olaf Scholz and therefore relevant to the discourse under investigation. In his first term from 2011 to 2015 the SPD governed the city and therefore drove the political agenda (SKHH 2011a). For Olaf Scholz’ second term from 2015 to 2018, the SPD formed a coalition with the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (green party), resulting in a coalition agreement that defined the senate policy for the term (SKHH 2015b; SPD 2015).

15. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (green party), formerly Grüne Alternative Liste (GAL): The green party was part of Scholz’ coalition for his second term as mayor of Hamburg from 2015-2018 and therefore contributed to the senate policy as articulated in the coalition agreement senate policy for the term (SKHH 2015b; SPD 2015). The Bündnis 90/Die Grünen was called Grüne Alternative Liste (green alternative list) from 1984 to 2012 and was also part of the regional government from 2008 - 2011 under mayors Ole von Beust (2001 - 2010) and Christoph Althaus (2010-2011), both members of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Most relevantly, the GAL contributed to an extension of the political alignment along dimensions of sustainability and ecology in the Leitbild: Wachsen mit Weitsicht, the guiding principle of growing with foresight (BFHH 2010).

Another 10 that are not authors of documents or critical entities regarding policy formulation but serve as stages for the discourse to be performed and enacted or are frequently referenced as key to policy measures:

16. Hamburger IT-Strategietage: Germany’s largest IT-Management congress. An annual conference targeted at CIOs and high-level management representatives of large corporations, commonly used for political keynotes and articulation of policy agenda.
The format is also frequently referred to in the discourse as relevant on a national level. Among others, also German chancellor Angela Merkel spoke at this event in 2014 (Merkel 2014).

17. Hamburg Innovation Summit: A high-profile conference for stakeholders from university, industry, policy, and society (in line with the triple- or rather quadruple-helix approaches), advocating knowledge-based and innovative new form formation. The format is frequently referenced in the discourse as a key measure to support entrepreneurial activity.

18. HAW Gründungsservice: the founding service office of Hamburg University of Applied Sciences

19. Hamburg Innovation (HI): The knowledge transfer office of Hamburg University of Applied Sciences (HAW), HafenCity University (HCU), Hamburg University of Fine Art (HFBK), University of Music and Theatre (HFMT), Helmut-Schmidt-University of the Bundeswehr (HSU), Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH), University of Hamburg (UHH) and University Medical Center Hamburg Eppendorf (UKE).

20. TuTech Innovation: The knowledge transfer office of Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH)

21. Startup Dock (TUHH): The firm founding service by Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH)

22. Next Media Accelerator (NMA): The accelerator program was initiated in 2015 by the Deutsche Presseagentur (dpa) and is backed by 30 media companies from Germany and Austria. The program invests in young media startups in Europe, Israel, and the USA. It was supported by the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative as a key program within the entrepreneurial ecosystem (Hamburg Marketing 2015a, 2016; nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a) and even though independently operated, the coincidental naming stands out within the discourse under investigation. Various entities and stakeholders were involved in setting the entity up that were also involved in the initiation of new regional accelerator programs such as Next Commerce Accelerator (NCA) and Next Logistics Accelerator (NLA) that adopt similar structure and naming conventions (Hamburger Abendblatt 2017; BWVI 2018a; HK 2018).

23. betahaus Hamburg: The co-working office can be seen as a key hotspot within the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Not only did it host various events and formats of both formal and informal nature throughout the years, also many startups and accelerator programs, such as the Next Media Accelerator among others, were located within the same building of the betahaus Hamburg. It is therefore one of the main stages of discourse, as high-level stakeholders attended events and talked on those platforms. Also, lower-level actors within the discourse community frequently attended the betahaus to promote subsidy programs etc.
24. Venture Capital-Stammtisch Hamburg: The informal vc meetup is organised by Hamburg’s Chamber of Commerce and connects people in the venture capital industry. Even though highly informal, various aspects of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, entrepreneurship policy and subsidy programs are frequently discussed at these events. Also, relevant stakeholders attend the event from time to time, both as invited guests to present parts of their programs or policy agenda or as participants in discussions. Therefore, the venture capital meetup is a mostly informal stage of the discourse.

25. nextReality.Hamburg: At a late stage of the investigation at hand, a new initiative around virtual reality was spawned in 2017 (BFHH 2016b; nextReality.Hamburg 2018) as a public private partnership with various entities being involved, such as Hamburg@work, professors from Hamburg University of Applied Sciences (HAW) or Hamburg University (UHH) as well as industry entities. Even though contribution to policy articulation is limited, the similar naming convention, language and structure exemplifies the repetitive contribution to the discourse, adopting established narrative motives, phrase regime and performativity from nextMedia.Hamburg and preceding initiatives in the city.

Building on data collection from prior research (Recke 2016) the author compiled a database to track entities also over time and more importantly, stakeholders associated with the entities. During the investigation 121 individual stakeholders have been identified for further consideration. The list was compiled by identifying representatives of above-mentioned entities or individuals appearing in the wider context of the discourse. Among these individuals 50 have been classified as being visible in the discourse. For this classification the individuals have been matched against documents analysed to identify authors and contributors to articulations within the discourse. Above that, some individuals have been considered due to their high visibility on discourse stages, even though actual contribution to documents could not be verified through entity association or other mechanisms.

The list of stakeholders grew organically during the field research, however the number of individuals being highly relevant to the discourse and its inherent power structures remain rather small over the course of the investigation. Some of the identified actors within the public policy discourse towards entrepreneurship were individuals in high profile political positions, which made personal access (if any) over long periods of time very unlikely. For these instances the author relied on public records, interviews, and other written documents to consider their role in the discourse. Apart from symbolic statements from high profile stakeholders, the author found that stakeholders with less exposed positions provided far more revealing data to unmask the discourse power structures. These include but were not limited to staff of government authorities such as Hamburg’s Senate Office, Hamburg’s Ministry of Economy, Transport and Innovation (BWVI), Hamburg’s Ministry of Culture and Media (BKM), the regional investment and subsidy bank - Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (IFB) - , the media/IT cluster initiative
nextMedia.Hamburg, Gamecity Hamburg, Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft, Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, regional universities, accelerators, key investors and advocacy groups among many others.

The author identified 17 actors as being very relevant to the discourse. Of these highly relevant stakeholders, the author managed to develop relationships of different quality with 6, in addition to various opportunities to observe public appearances of the mayor of Hamburg within the discourse ecosystem. Beyond that, the author developed relationships with 8 additional actors within the discourse community that are subsidiaries of relevant stakeholders or contribute to articulation of discourse in media or at specific institutions within the city. Especially in context of the covert observation, the author anonymised these actors in this thesis, except for Olaf Scholz and Carsten Brosda, due to their highly visible position within the discourse and general public. Notwithstanding interesting individual profiles, the study focuses on position and function within the discourse rather than individual attribution.

This approach allowed the author to penetrate the field under investigation and obtain insights that would not have been feasible with an open approach, as most testimony would have been aligned to publicly available information as outlined in chapter 3. Key actors observed in the investigation of the discourse and their position within the field of entrepreneurship policy are:

1. Olaf Scholz, the mayor of Hamburg from 2011-2018: Apart from analysing the body of documents directly attributed with Scholz, such as Senate Office statements and policy articulations as well as 1165 publicly available transcripts of speeches during his mayorship, the author attended various events and witnessed the speech delivery directly (Scholz 2011g, 2012a, 2012l, 2012s, 2014e, 2014g, 2014i, 2014o, 2015d) and observed Olaf Scholz at various other meetups within the entrepreneurial ecosystem over the years. Olaf Scholz, or rather his role and position as the mayor of the city, is the proverbial pin of the wheel of the policy discourse under investigation and establishes the discursive formations that are then adopted by other stakeholders and entities. As the head of the regional government, the mayor establishes or seeds the discourse.

2. Carsten Brosda, head of Amt Medien (media department) at the Senate Office, later promoted to privy council and then senator for the Ministry of Culture and Media: Apart from analysing the body of documents attributed to responsibilities of Carsten Brosda, such as nextMedia.Hamburg and Ministry of Culture and Media, the author attended various events where Carsten Brosda delivered speeches or engaged in open discussions about media and entrepreneurship policy, such as open lectures at Hamburg University of Applied Sciences (HAW 2015). Beyond that, the author had several meetings with Carsten Brosda over the years, both in professional capacity as part of his executive position within a publishing company and entailed involvement in the organising
committee of the Mediendialog (media dialogue), and to discuss his investigation of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in light of his prior research (Recke 2016) and other instances to discuss media policy, digital transformation within the city and perspectives to contribute to public participation opportunities. As one of Scholz’ closest collaborators in regard to media entrepreneurship policy, Brosda is key in articulating discourse as a direct proxy of the mayor at the centre of the wheel at the Senate Office.

3. MDE1 is a member of the Amt Medien (media department) at the Senate Office and later at the Ministry of Culture and Media that is responsible for the media and digital economy. MDE1 is involved in preparing and articulating official documents and organising the implementation of concrete policy measures for the media/IT industry cluster. In various meetings MDE1 provided insights into the historic genesis of cluster initiatives such as Hamburg@work, Gamecity Hamburg or nextMedia.Hamburg and also shared various documents, e.g. industry reports, drafts and historic versions of current documents, to provide deeper insights into the genesis of the current state of public programs.

4. MDE2 is also a member of the Amt Medien (media department) at the Senate Office and later at the Ministry of Culture and Media that is responsible for the media and digital economy. MDE2 supports the organisation of various public advocacy programs and mainly provided insights into how support for startups is organised within the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative.

5. IFB1 is a responsible manager at the Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (regional investment and subsidy bank) IFB Hamburg and responsible for various monetary programs catered towards the innovative and technology-driven new firms. In multiple meetings IFB1 shared his perspective on the entrepreneurial ecosystem, current policy trajectories, needs, requirements and pressure on subsidy programs as well as insights into what is missing in the entrepreneurial ecosystem from his perspective.

6. BWVI1 is a member of the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) and responsible for general questions of economic policy. Initially approached in the context of the author’s prior research (Recke 2016) BWVI1 provided access to other stakeholders within the ministry and other public entities in the city to discuss the entrepreneurial ecosystem and entrepreneurial policy in general.

7. VC1 is a general manager of a local accelerator program, investing in innovative and technology-driven startups. Over a period of many years, the author interacted with VC1 both professionally and causally. In light of the study, aspects of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, entrepreneurship policy, the digital transformation and reform of public administration have been topics of discussions and helped to gain insights into an investor perspective on the regional entrepreneurship policy discourse.
Additional actors observed by the author are:

1. **IFB2** is a member of the Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (regional investment and subsidy bank) IFB Hamburg and responsible for specific monetary support programs offered to local startups. In various encounters the general perspective on the entrepreneurial ecosystem, the process of investing in newly started firms and objectives in the subsidy programs were discussed. Even though no tangible documentation that wasn’t publicly available was shared, informal insights into backstage dynamics served the analysis at hand.

2. **BMWI2** is a member of the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) and responsible for controlling subsidy programs within the regional subsidy system. In discussions with the author, the historical development of the various subsidy systems within the city were shared that were not easily discoverable from public documentation. The author was able to trace various programs back to their origins due to insights shared by BWVI2.

3. **SO1** is a managing member of the Senate Office and responsible for the operational activities of the Senate Office. Among others, the digital city strategy, and the Amt IT und Digitalisierung (IT office for digital transformation) was associated with SO1. The author met with SO1 multiple times to talk about the digital transformation of the city, relevance of the media/IT industry cluster as well as policy accentuation on technology-driven entrepreneurship. In an attempt to contribute to public participation opportunities, SO1 provided insights into organisational dynamics and how strategic projects under the mayor’s supervision were approached from within the Senate Office.

4. **MDE3** was a member of the Amt Medien (media department) at the Senate Office during the period in which the core program for the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative was created. MDE3 shared initial drafts and no longer publicly available publications from the nextMedia.Hamburg to provide a better understanding of the historical genesis of the program.

5. **UNI1** is a professor at one of the regional universities, responsible for various research projects and labs over the course of the last decades and co-author of various grant applications for research programs that are conceptually aligned to research and innovation policy agenda as set forth by the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation. The author gained insights into organisational procedures and how informal networks align strategic projects to the policy agenda.

6. **UNI2** is a staff member at one of the regional universities and charged with providing advisory support to aspiring entrepreneurs and researchers interested in knowledge transfer options within the city. In various consultations, insights into internal dynamics of non-monetary and monetary subsidy programs were gained that helped the author to
develop a more in-depth understanding of the historic genesis of various subsidy programs in the region.

7. HIW1 is a team lead at the HIW Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft mbH (Hamburg’s business development entity) and responsible for marketing and communication. In correspondence with the author HIW1 shared the historical genesis of the terminology introduced during Scholz’ mayorship and how the emphasis on startups became a guiding principle in the innovation policy agenda. Beyond that, HIW1 also shared insights into historic genesis of business development in the region, emphasising recurring patterns in regional policy.

8. VC2 is a managing partner at a regional business incubator, investing in innovative and technology-driven business models. In various both professional and informal encounters the dynamics of the entrepreneurial ecosystem were discussed. Also, the regional subsidy system and public support for entrepreneurship in general were frequently addressed, providing a more market-oriented perspective on the entrepreneurship policy discourse.

The overall composition of the network of actors will be presented below, building on the presented classification of entities and stakeholders to provide an overview of the field of power. To this effect, the next section will also present visual representations of the network of actors to show the distribution of power in the discourse. The summative analysis will be developed in the conclusion to this subsection.

5.1.3 Network of Actors: Hierarchy and Closed Circles

In his analysis of the entrepreneurial ecosystem and public policy discourse, the author identified a network of actors that constitute the subjects in the discourse in terms of Foucault (1997) and the agents in terms of Bourdieu (1984b, 2000; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) that form the field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). These are mainly representatives of public or private entities in the entrepreneurial ecosystem (see figure 5.1) that are visible on almost all stages of the discourse, e.g. in public documents by ministries, the regional subsidy bank or cluster initiatives, on websites, during events, conferences and in media coverage.

The network of actors is dynamic and pulls in representatives from other fields such as law, education, general politics etc. and constitutes the web of discourse in terms of Foucault or the field of power in terms of Bourdieu. The involved independent institutions and their legitimacy are validated by other institutions, establishing the institutional arrangements, as in policies, procedures, and professional practices of their representatives. To a certain extent, these actors establish the elite of discourse that is mainly driven through repetitive articulation of the elite’s statements and phrases in both written and spoken form.
Most prominently, the former first mayor of Hamburg, Olaf Scholz¹ (2011-2018 - SPD), must be mentioned as the key figure in the recent public policy agenda towards entrepreneurship in Hamburg, as he made innovation, digitisation and the startup economy major components of his government program (SKHH 2018). In his first speech as mayor, he already articulated his agenda for the regional economic development as a growing city by positioning it as a progressive metropolis with the ambition to become an innovation capital for Europe and connected this to new firm formations, economic growth and job creation:

¹ https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/federal-government/cabinet/olaf-scholz
“Economic growth, new prosperity and new jobs are created in big metropolises. Policy is charged to organise and shape this noticeable progress in a practical manner. Hamburg can only be a growing city if we provide the appropriate political framework. Along this understanding, I want to make Hamburg a metropolis of progress [...] We want to make Hamburg an innovation capital in Europe. We will succeed if we organise close collaboration between industry, university, and the public sector in individual industry clusters. Such clusters are the foundation for good ideas to find good surrounding conditions and available subsidies to become an economic success. This also means that we have to provide sufficient commercial space for companies. Anyone who wants new firm formation or firms to relocate or expand, has to provide the space for them” (Scholz 2011a, translated by the author)

From the very beginning of his mayorship, Olaf Scholz took ownership of the city’s cluster policy and aggregated responsibilities in the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI). He also initiated the creation of a regional investment and subsidy bank - IFB Hamburg, that would become critical to the entrepreneurship policy agenda:

“It is crucial to create an investment bank in which we aggregate all state subsidy measures from economic development and housing development to environmental and climate protection. To this end, we will convert the Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukancreditanstalt [Hamburg’s real estate development bank]” (Scholz 2011a, translated by the author)

Other related innovation initiatives by Olaf Scholz cater to climate change and the city’s ambition to become an innovation leader in related technology fields, such as renewable energy etc., as the city was awarded the label “Green Capital” by the European Commission (2011b). With reference to established research fields in the city, Scholz articulated his ambitions to create a Max-Planck-Institute in Hamburg and open an innovation campus around existing leading research institutions for new products and business ideas to spawn with the goal to create jobs:

“We will also take care of scientific progress. We are already excellent in areas of climate or fundamental physical research, for example we will negotiate with the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft [Max-Planck-Society] to support these achievements with an institute at the DESY. We also want to ensure that innovation campuses are developed around each of our top research institutes, where good ideas can become products, business ideas and new jobs.” (Scholz 2011a, translated by the author)
As will be illustrated in the following sections, Olaf Scholz took ownership of the transformational processes in the city. With narrative motives of “a growing city” and “a modern city”, he aimed at an economic policy agenda driven by internationalisation, digitisation and positioning Hamburg as an entrepreneurship and innovation metropolis (SKHH 2018). After consolidating different parallel and independent structures and entities for economic subsidies, the Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (IFB) - regional investment and subsidy bank - was created in 2013 and became the central entity for all regional subsidy programs, some of which have been explicitly targeted at startups and innovative new ventures, such as InnoRampUp initiated in 2013, Hamburger-Innovations-Wachstumsfonds - innovation and growth funds - initiated in 2017 or Hamburger Startup-Gründerstipendium - startup gounder scholarship - initiated in 2018 (SKHH 2018). Additionally, in 2017 the city created a one-stop agency for inbound investments with the Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft HIW (regional business development entity) that also initiated a Startup-Unit Hamburg in 2018 to represent the regional entrepreneurial ecosystem on national and international levels (SKHH 2018).

The digitisation and optimisation of the city and its government became another important component of Scholz’ mayorship. After consolidating various digital projects in different ministries and public bodies under a Leitstelle Digitale Stadt (coordinating office digital city), a strategy for a digital city was formulated in 2015 with the intention to leverage innovative potentials of digital technologies in all areas of the city, which was developed into a strategy of digital administration and extended in 2016 with a digital first program to support government entities in their digital transformation (SKHH 2018). In 2018, all organisational units of relevance for the digital transformation were united in a new Amt für IT und Digitalisierung (office for IT and digitisation) at the Senatskanzlei (Senate Office), the highest level of regional government, and a Chief Digital Officer was appointed to oversee the digitisation of the government administration (SKHH 2018). Although the strategy digital city is remotely connected to the narrative motives of innovation in public policy discourse towards entrepreneurship in Hamburg, the strategy itself and any digitisation projects for the regional government are not the focus of the study that focuses on the public policy discourse towards entrepreneurship.

The attribution of the new policy alignment on startups and digital transformation to Olaf Scholz’ political agenda has been substantiated beyond any official government documents, political speeches and media coverages but was also mentioned explicitly by various stakeholders in the ecosystem during the observational period of the study:

"Startup is a fairly new term, which is why the beginning of support for this area falls into the era of Scholz. Anything prior was classic support for entrepreneurship which was primarily situated at the chamber of commerce or the HEI [...] The startup unit came to us in the era of Olaf Scholz and is part of a comprehensive network for startups in Hamburg." (private correspondence with HIW1, translated by the author)
Since Olaf Scholz was appointed as Germany’s Federal Minister of Finance in March 2018, Peter Tschentscher (SPD) took over as mayor of Hamburg. Although he is also a prominent actor within the public policy discourse towards entrepreneurship and extends the policy trajectory inscribed in the position and role of the mayor, the analysis is focussed mainly on the period of Olaf Scholz’ mayorship from 2011-2018 as being critical to the articulated agenda under investigation in this study. Still, the author highlights that the discourse analysis is focusing on the role of the mayor with the discourse rather than the individual contribution of the individual.

Under Olaf Scholz’ mayorship, Dr. Carsten Brosda² (SPD) became the leading figure within the field of entrepreneurship policy. After filling various positions within the SPD from 2000 to 2009 and being department head for communication in the SPD executive committee from 2010 to 2011, he was appointed head of the Amt Medien (media department) of the Senate Office (Senatskanzlei) by mayor Scholz in June 2011, just 3 months after his election as mayor. Scholz consolidated the responsibility for the media/IT industry cluster at the highest level of government, positioning himself as the senator for the media industry:

“\textit{Therefore, I allocated the responsibility for media policy to myself within the Senate Office. I am your senator for the media, so to speak. I hired some first-class people in my office at city hall that are well acquainted with public administration, journalism, media industry as well as policy and will be your direct contacts.}” (Scholz 2011g translated by the author)

Scholz repeatedly articulated this emphasis of his policy agenda (e.g. in Scholz 2011h, 2011j, see Appendix A), underscored through his most relevant personnel decision in context of the discourse under investigation. In 2013 Brosda became representative of the senate for the media industry and was promoted to Staatsrat (privy council) for the Ministry of Culture and the departments media and digitisation in the Senate Office in March 2016. During this time, he was in charge of the nextMedia initiative of the city’s media/IT industry cluster, which played a predominant role in the regional advocacy of the startup economy and filled also a key role in the field of media policy on both regional and national levels, positioning Hamburg as key actor in the national media economy through industry platforms such as the Mediendialog (media dialog) and Musikdialog (music dialog) (SKHH 2018). Since February 2017 Carsten Brosda has been a senator of the Ministry of Culture, which integrated the media department and was renamed to the Ministry of Culture and Media (BKM) in April 2017. Brosda’s remarkable political career is underlined with the increasing relevance of the entrepreneurship policy agenda in Hamburg with its strong focus on the media/IT industry cluster.

² https://www.hamburg.de/senat/8038252/lebenslauf-carsten-brosda/
Some second-tier stakeholders accompanied Brosda in his ascent and were staff members at the Amt Medien (media department) of the Senate Office (Senatskanzlei) and then transitioned with him to the Ministry of Culture and Media. Most prominent actors under Brosda’s supervision are MDE0, head of the media office, MDE1, MDE2, MDE3 and MDE4, responsible for the media and digital economy as well as the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative. Together with other actors from public entities, they constitute the second tier of the public policy discourse on a governmental level. On a lower level of exposure but nevertheless crucial level, some representatives of the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) are critical to the discourse. They are associated co-authors of various public policy documents, such as the strategic principles of the InnovationsAllianz (BWVI 2010a) and the regional innovation strategy (BWVI 2014a) and prominent members of discussions in public or semi-private settings where industry, university and government entities collaborate. The most important actors in this category are BWVI0, privy council for economy and his subordinates BWVI1, responsible for matters of principle in economic policy at different time periods, BWVI2, BWVI3, BWVI4 and BWVI5, responsible for controlling subsidy programs, cluster initiatives and innovation policies as well as BWVI6, responsible for economic and medium size enterprise policy.

Another relevant actor is IFB1, managing director of the IFB Innovationsstarter GmbH, a subsidiary of the Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (investment and subsidy bank) - IFB Hamburg. Ever since its inception in 2013, IFB1 has been responsible for regional subsidy programs directed at startups, namely InnoFounder, InnoRampUp and the Innovationsstarter Fonds Hamburg, that are providing grants, subsidies, and venture capital for innovative new firms. As the main representative of the regional subsidy programs aimed at newly funded firms, IFB1 appears in various public documents and is a prominent guest at public events etc. On a secondary level, also various of his subordinates are visible actors in the field. These are IFB2, and other team members, responsible for regional subsidy programs InnoRampUp, InnoGrounder and the investor network among others. Without being perceived as contributors to any conceptual agenda on higher levels, they represent interfaces between the regional subsidy system and the local entrepreneurial ecosystem and serve as contact points to access the support system.

Over the period of investigation for this study, some responsibilities were shifted between some of the public entities. In addition to the newly formed regional investment and subsidy bank - IFB Hamburg - mentioned above, the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) initiated the transformation of the HWF Hamburgische Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung mbH (economic development organisation) into the HIW Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft mbH in 2017 with the goal to create a one-stop agency for investments in the region, including responsibilities for research & innovations parks and knowledge based startup up economy (HIW 2017a). As a result, some contact points that were previously distributed among various entities, such as the Amt Medien (media department) of the Senate Office (Senatskanzlei), the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) or
cluster initiatives such as nextMedia.Hamburg etc., were transferred to this new entity. Even though not necessarily involved in the articulation of public policy agenda, some representatives of HIW Hamburg Invest are relevant interfaces to regional, national, and international entrepreneurial ecosystems and have corresponding exposure. Among these are HIW1, responsible for marketing and communication, and other team members that are operating the startup unit at HIW Hamburg Invest.

Additionally, there are some actors within industry advocacy entities that prominently appear in the public policy discourse towards entrepreneurship in Hamburg. There are CRE1, former advocate of the Gamecity Hamburg initiative and CRE2, a member of the advocacy initiative Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft and advocate of Gamecity Hamburg, CRE3, chairman of the Hamburg@work advocacy and some other actors from the private initiative Hamburg Startups that reports on regional entrepreneurial ecosystem and published the Startup Monitor based on self-reported data from startups within the region.

Regarding investors and regional accelerator and incubator programs, only few actors appear relevant to the public policy discourse, beyond successful entrepreneurs or startups being cited as narratives of success. A prominent member of this stakeholder category is VC1, managing partner at Next Media Accelerator, a regional Accelerator program with ties to local banks and investors from the regional and national media industry. Even though similar naming to the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative for the media/IT cluster seems coincidental, strong ties between this accelerator and the involvement of Carsten Brosda and Olaf Scholz in media policy and regional entrepreneurship policy are hard to deny. It is also worth mentioning that VC1 is a member of Social Democratic Party (SPD), as are Olaf Scholz and Carsten Brosda. Also, VC3 from advisory firm Skillnet, seems to be a relevant stakeholder in the finance domain of the regional entrepreneurial ecosystem. Even though no indication could be found that he was actively involved in any policy development, he was instrumental in the setup of 3 regional accelerator programs with deep ties to regional banks and industry entities as investors, namely Next Media Accelerator, Next Logistics Accelerator and Next Commerce Accelerator. These programs cater to key industry sectors and associated cluster policy in Hamburg - media/IT and logistics - and align with the commercial innovation initiatives around ecommerce.

In university there are few actors that are relevant to the discourse. Despite the fact that many of the regional universities have entrepreneurship programs and knowledge transfer offices, representatives of these entities appear mostly as evidence of enacted initiatives on frontal stages rather than active members of the discourse community. Even though creation of research and innovation parks was a key policy agenda in recent years, the number of visible academics in the discourse did not increase substantially. Considering the local universities’ knowledge transfer organisation Hamburg Innovation, few members appear repeatedly in media coverage, without any significance to articulation of discourse. At Hamburg University of Applied Sciences, UNI2 is responsible for the founding support office, which caters support and consulting services to
aspiring spinoffs. Even though not involved in agenda articulation, UNI2 is quite visible within the academic community of aspiring entrepreneurs.

There are also some research labs that spawned in the context of Hamburg’s focus on innovation in research. Beyond success stories from renewable energy fields, some relevant initiatives regarding the knowledge-based startup economy are the Creative Space for Technical Innovation or human computer interaction research lab Living Space 2020 or GamecityLab at Hamburg University of Applied Sciences. The latter dates back to the period of the Gamecity initiative in the early 2000s, but frequently serves as a narrative of success for more recent initiatives. Also, research initiatives around virtual reality, spearheaded by academics at University of Hamburg are very prominent and spawned the initiative nextReality.Hamburg in 2018 based on a proposal to establish Hamburg as a pioneering location for virtual reality technology by representatives from SPD and Bündnis90/Die Grünen in the Hamburger Bürgerschaft presented in 2016 (nextReality.Hamburg 2018). On the backstages of the discourse and in semi-private settings, these and other academics are members of committees, authors of proposals, etc., which is also evident through the somewhat similar naming conventions of many of these initiatives.

The various other actors within the entrepreneurial ecosystem seem less connected to the policy field and have only minor or even no role in the analysed discourse. Yet, as an attempt to provide a more complete picture, the above illustrations (see figure 5.2) shows the composition of the network of actors and their relevance within the discourse. The illustration was created with the open source software Gephi based on a 2-mode network dataset created during the author’s data collection (Recke 2021) and considered individual stakeholders and the entities they are connected to. Using a MultiMode Networks Projection plugin, the entities have been projected on the entities (see figure 5.1) and stakeholders (see figure 5.2) to create 1-mode networks as a result. Every node represents an actor within the network that has been weighted through the author’s assessment of its relevance in the discourse, thus being represented through a different size. Representatives of key political bodies, such as the mayor of Hamburg or the head of the media department in the Senate Office and later Senator for Culture & Media, carry most weight in the discourse as they are seen on all public discourse stages and actively inform the discourse through their articulations. These actors are then connected to less exposed actors in the network either by directly collaborating with them, e.g. as subordinates or colleagues within their entities or through trans-institutional interaction, e.g. as co-authors of certain documents or publicly recognised interested peers from different ministries or other public bodies. The connections between the nodes thus illustrate the connections between entities/stakeholders, either by referencing each other or directly reporting to each other in the administrative hierarchy. As such subordinates of Carsten Brosda might be connected to other entities in the ecosystem, representing a direct line of control over discourse through the hierarchy starting from the centre of the wheel at the Senate Office, seeding the discourse through ministries and public bodies to entities on the
peripheries of the entrepreneurship policy discourse. The colour scheme was used to distinguish the different actors in the network by their domain, using the typology of domains within an entrepreneurial ecosystem presented by Isenberg (2011b).

Figure 5.2: Network of actors in the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg

To better illustrate the spatial distribution of involved entities within the city of Hamburg, the entities were also projected onto a map of the city, presented at the beginning of the section, showing where discourse is shaped (see figure 5.1 at the beginning of the section).

The geographical representation of the discourse also sheds light on the governmentality of discourse in terms of Foucault (1984, 1997) and so the discourse itself. The discourse is seeded from the pin of the wheel, quite literally the centre of the city outward. It is then virally adopted and repetitively articulated within local discursivities within the locations of core entities at city hall, downtown offices, and representative historic buildings. In terms of Bourdieu the discourse is embodied and acted out as entity representatives adopt behaviour and language that reflects
what is prescribed by policy and procedure. Most importantly, the repetitive performativity of the discourse is said and seed and constitutes a mutually conditioning relation that is encrypted in physical spaces and their institutions and embedded in embodied actions of the actors - or agents as Bourdieu would call them (1984b, 2000; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) - in the discourse community. Over time, these discursive practices and their performativity not only legitimate the discourse itself but become the basis for its self-perpetuation.

The most dominant domain - as one would expect - is the policy domain and consists of various stakeholders from different government entities, most prominently the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI), the Ministry of Culture and Media (BKM) and to a lesser degree the Ministry of Science, Research and Equality (BWFG) and the Ministry of Urban Development (BSU). Adjacent to this domain, the various regional subsidy entities have been highlighted as policy/finance although they would be categorised under policy in the Isenberg approach. Relevant entities here are the investment and subsidy bank - IFB Hamburg - and its subsidiary unit Innovationsstarter as well as the HIW Hamburg Invest, the city’s business development entity. In the support domain there are various public/private entities and cluster initiatives as well as many of the private actors in the city’s entrepreneurial ecosystem, such as co-working spaces, various conference formats etc., that often blend with entities in the culture domain, that propagate the entrepreneurial mindset and provide narratives of success. There are also some links to the markets domain in the discourse, mainly at the intersection with Hamburg’s Chamber of Commerce and through the various finance domain entities, which are accelerators, incubators, venture capital companies etc., of which only few appear relevant in the discourse. In the human capital domain, which encompasses regional universities and their knowledge transfer offices, the local research institutes and some academics appear in wider realms of the discourse, but surprisingly, academia is not particularly visible in the discourse front stages, except as evidence of success or innovative capabilities. Even though the perspective of the human capital domain by Isenberg is a bit limiting in terms of the triple or quadruple helix approach, it is suitable to illustrate the absence of weight in the discourse from an academic and from a market perspective. Also entrepreneurs - or aspiring entrepreneurs - themselves seem to be absent from the discourse, even though the formulated policy agenda is targeted at them as transformational and innovative thinkers that leverage new business opportunities to create economic growth and stimulate job creation for the region.

5.1.4 Conclusion
To a certain extent, the stakeholders mentioned above are the core contributors to the public policy discourse on entrepreneurship policy in the region. They constitute core aspects of Foucauldian discourse (Foucault 1972, 1980, 1977). In Foucault’s terms discourse is determined by the power-knowledge-subject triad, how power creates knowledge and subjectivity within a field of practice. The abstraction of Foucauldian discourse is animated through what Bourdieu refers to as a field
of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Here this is constituted through those institutions and their representatives, the network of actors within the field of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg. Therefore the field of power within this study is manifested from institutions at the highest level of government and their primary actors, such as the mayor of the city and his direct subordinates at the Senate Office and the governing cabinet controlling the ministries, that establish policies, processes and practices that are mirrored, mediated and celebrated in events, ceremonies, awards or political addresses where the phrase regime of the discourse is seeded and repetitively articulated, embodied and encrypted. The abstraction of discourse is embodied by these primary actors who virally deploy their capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) to others, who, through their performativity are docile to the field and acknowledge its illusio and doxa (Bourdieu 1998b) - the values, rules, believes of the game - and thus engage in acts of misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), taking the constructed social world to be a given reality, thus making it real to them and letting them forget that they are actually products of the discourse or this world which is discursive construct.

As section 5.2 shows, all key documents that establish the phrase regime and policy agenda originate at the Senate Office or the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI), with all other entities then adopting the narrative motives that shape the discourse trajectory over time. Like in an echo chamber the stakeholders articulate similar statements and use a specific phrase regime that is evident everywhere, from written documents authored by various independent entities to public speeches, press coverage, professional or personal conversations, informal gatherings or in direct collaboration. This demonstrates the governmentality of discourse (Foucault 1984, 1997) and self-perpetuating nature, as actors are the subjects of rationalised and regulating processes and, in embodying the discourse, willing placing themselves in self-regulating subjection (Foucault 1985, 1997). Beyond that, anyone involved in the discourse already accepts the discourse and subscribes to its power dynamics, its rules, institutions, and interrelations, representing the concepts of biopolitics or biopower for Foucault (1978, 1984), as the discourse shapes the behaviour of the involved actors. This can be seen in the way discourse is represented in offices of official entities in the city, how stakeholders approach the policy dimensions with a very formal perspective, including attire, entourage and choice of representative and central locations within the city (such as city hall), and at some times approach the entrepreneurial community with much less formal perspective, more casual attire, without entourage and at locations of relevance to the entrepreneurial ecosystem rather than the policy community (such as co-working spaces like betahaus). Any resistance generated from the discourse itself (Foucault 1980), e.g. in media coverage or from within the entrepreneurial community, is not visible in the official discourse and therefore silenced by the weight of what is “said and seen”, suffocating any alternative perspectives or reappropriating it within the discourse and reinforcing the governmentality. Yet, resistance is all around in everyday entrepreneurship and the workings of the local economy that functions beyond or even independent of this official
discourse. A key aspect of the discourse is its media mobilisation and dominance over public stages or arenas in which it can be acted out as well as a vested interest of actors against its resistance which is thus individualised in the individual entrepreneur or business that is engaged in day-to-day operation and not being actively invested in the participation within the discourse community. Entities not actively involved in the creation of policy or programs or actors not benefiting from the discourse or allegedly not willing to play by the established rules of the game - illusio and doxa in terms of Bourdieu (1998b) - are not visible within the discourse. This can be seen as a direct consequence of the way the discourse is operated by the actors, representing the symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) that denies people access to the field, or even as a mechanism of self-exclusion as the ultimate exercise of power.

These dynamics represent the habitus in the discourse in terms of Bourdieu (1977a). The spatial representation of the discourse developed by the author exemplifies the control over discourse being seeded from the centre to the periphery through the creation of knowledge. The visualisation of the network of actors shows how control over the discourse is maintained from the policy domain and the subsidy entities represented in the policy/finance domain, and then seeded to more peripheral areas, such as the support domain, which to a large degree is also politically controlled through public private partnerships with advocacy groups like Hamburg@work, nextMedia.Hamburg etc., or the human capital domain, which is also influenced by the policy domain as universities collaborate with the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) as well as the Ministry of Science, Research and Equality (BWFG) over subsidy and grant proposals etc. The domains of culture, markets and finance may be more independent but are much less visible within the discourse. To some degree, elements of resistance can be found here among proxies, e.g. criticism within the culture entities towards notions of culture industry etc., however as subsequent sections illustrate the discourse is re-appropriating resistance in a process of self-legitimisation. Events and formats in the culture domain that are visible are also heavily influenced or even organised by the policy domain or proxies within the support domain, such as Hamburger IT-Strategietage or Hamburg Innovation Summit. The finance domain may also be subject to influence from the policy domain as at least some of the regional accelerator and incubator programs are supported by entities in the policy domain or their proxies in the support domain. Various of these interdependencies will be further elaborated in section 5.2.

The knowledge of the discourse is created by key actors at the centre of the discourse through structures and mechanisms that are even independent of individuals but rather relate to position and roles, like the office of the mayor being the office of mayorship, not the office of the individual. It is like a “suit of discourse”, clothes that are to be worn and stay the same as individuals change. Any actor wearing the clothes ultimately engages in and reinforces the illusio and doxa (Bourdieu 1998b), the vested capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and misrecognition of the game in terms of Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant
1992). As the development of narrative themes in section 5.2 show, the mechanisms and structures stay the same, with changing individuals filling roles within the discourse. Moving from top level policy articulation at the Senate Office and ministries, any other entity engaging in the discourse is subscribing to the discourse, its rules, roles, mechanisms of differentiation and distinction etc. in terms of Foucault (1980). Adding to this skeleton, the Bourdieusian perspective reveals how actors in the discourse are mutually invested to embody the habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) through display of their social and political capital (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), establishing the language that is used and how entrepreneurship policy is talked about and by whom, and thereby encrypting the discourse and also the physical spaces and their institutions with the knowledge of the discourse. With all key entities being located at the proverbial pin of the wheel at the centre of the city in historic buildings or the majestic city hall, their power and control over the discourse is embodied through the seal of office, creating not just mechanisms of differentiation and distinction but rather exclusion or domination, making access to anyone not subscribing to the discourse and having access to the elite political institutions unlikely if not impossible.

Following sections will demonstrate the historical genesis of specific articulations and inherent narrative motives and sociotechnical imaginaries that constitute the phrase regime of the public policy discourse towards entrepreneurship in Hamburg. In terms of Foucault, it also establishes a very apparent power/knowledge structure within the discourse community, that operates as a closed network of appointed officials, their subordinates and direct beneficiaries of their formulated policy agenda and their enacted capitals in terms of Bourdieu (1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Unmasking the power dynamics in the discourse field of entrepreneurship policy through the display of capitals and habitus will reveal the self-perpetuating nature of the discourse, in terms of Bourdieu (1977a, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), and its practice in terms of Foucault (1972, 1997), that feeds the purpose of maintaining or advancing status and position of its actors rather than serving its postulated goals.

5.2 Themes of Local Discursivity in Entrepreneurship Policy

This section will present the main narrative themes of local entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg. Building on the afore-presented entities within the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem and the identified network of actors, this section is using both documents explored as part of the document analysis as well as observations gathered in the complementary ethnography to present data and analysis for the investigation of the inner workings of the entrepreneurship policy discourse. The critical discourse analysis aims to critically interrogate how entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg reflects a policy paradox that fosters symbolic rather than practical “real world” economic growth while perpetuating a self-sustaining discourse and capitals of sociotechnical imaginaries and the policy ecosystem itself.
Within the discourse, the governmentality (Foucault 1984, 1997) of entrepreneurship policy is shown through the application of power and knowledge that constitutes a field of practice in terms of Foucault. Similarly, for Bourdieu the habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) of actors is visible through deployment of capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) in the field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), resulting in a self-replicating reality that establishes the rules of the game. Capitals are deployed by agents (Bourdieu 1984b, 2000) - the aforementioned actors in the discourse - to support narrative themes, phrases, rules of distinction in a discursive construct that is exclusive to those in power. Even though some of the narrative may claim to be open for everyone, it is the discourse’s elite and their roles that produce a self-sustaining cycle of legitimation. Following themes showcase how the discourse is creating reality - or knowledge in terms of Foucault (1977) - for the privileged and encrypts the discourse to differentiate, exclude and dominate - symbolic manipulation in terms of Bourdieu (1990a).

Within the period under investigation - the mayorship of Olaf Scholz from 2011 to 2018 - various themes appear in the public discourse on entrepreneurship that can be considered key to alignment of policy agenda for the city of Hamburg. Some of these themes however are building on narratives from previous periods and create some continuity across different periods of political power structures within the city’s senate. In terms of Bourdieu, they constitute the field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) across different governmental periods and political parties and bleed across, inform and produce self-sustaining cycles of legitimation, as will be presented through their coherent and consecutive nature. The overarching field of power extends across institutions, politics, legislation from local to regional and federal or European governmentality. All of these themes may have a number of sub themes and can be seen as aspirational articulations of desirable futures for the city and the metropolitan region, or even sociotechnical imaginaries. Among those narrative themes are Hamburg as a “growing city”, as an “international city”, as a “city for talents”, as a “green city”, as an “innovative city”, as a “media/IT city” and Hamburg as an “entrepreneurial city” among various others.

In the following sections the main articulations of these themes will be introduced to provide an overview of the discourse in terms of Foucault and Bourdieu. The Foucauldian perspective serves to trace how knowledge, power and subjectivity is created within the field of practice and how governmentality (Foucault 1984, 1997) is represented within the entrepreneurship policy discourse. The various entities described above, their representatives and numerous other actors within the regional entrepreneurial ecosystem take on a series of roles and establish the habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) within the field of discourse. Through deployment of their political, cultural, social, or even economic capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) the actors support these narrative themes and consequently establish the rules of the game within the political discourse by defining what the aspirations entail and how to achieve the proclaimed goals. Especially through connection of social and ethical contexts, these aspirations constitute the sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff, Kim, & Sperling 2007, Jasanoff 2015) that drive the
regional discourse on entrepreneurship policy or even grander discourse on the metropolitan region of Hamburg and its role in the world in general and represent the doxic attitudes in terms of Bourdieu (1998b), the established values and attitudes of the field of entrepreneurship policy discourse. The Bourdieusian perspective thus allows to trace the actors’ misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) as they reinscribe the discourse legitimacy and repetitively enact the discourse performativity, creating mechanisms of differentiation, distinction, and domination.

The presentation of the narrative themes will follow a somewhat chronological structure while dividing the motives in broad categories for better understanding. Simultaneously, the presentation will start from very general aspirations and descriptive goals and become more granular and specific as it progresses. Consequently, through a process of in-depth circulation and triangulation from various sources, ranging from textual documents to observational notes, the overall narrative that constitutes the phrase regime and power structure within the discourse will become apparent. In the following sections the author first presents the data to establish the narrative themes and then follows up with the Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis in the conclusion of each subsection. The initial section introduces Hamburg as a growing city and other base narratives that are interwoven in the entrepreneurship policy discourse.

5.2.1 Hamburg as a Growing City and Other Base Narratives

This section presents the narrative theme of Hamburg as a growing city and other base narratives that inform the discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg. It serves as a baseline for the general policy orientation and discourse trajectory that is presented in following sections. The section will first present the data, ranging from textual documents to observational notes, and will conclude with a Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis in the conclusion.

Long before Olaf Scholz (SPD) took over the mayorship of Hamburg in 2011, the city of Hamburg had an established mission statement in form of an overall concept of regional policy - a Leitbild Wachsende Stadt - that describes Hamburg as a growing city along dimensions of population, economic growth, residential and commercial real estate development and international reputation, emphasising global competition and Hamburg’s challenge to remain competitive in a growth oriented global market (Leitbild: Metropole Hamburg - Wachsende Stadt 2002). It was established under mayor Ole von Beust (CDU) in 2003 and initially published through the press office of the Senate Office in 2002 (SKHH 2002). It instantiated a phrase regime and certain narrative motives that were adopted everywhere within the public policy domain and remain visible in the discourse up to this day. The main motives within this conceptual document are as follows.

The ambition proclaimed in the concept was to position Hamburg as a growing metropolis with international radiancy. In its initial statement, comparisons to Copenhagen, Barcelona,
Vienna, Seattle, or Toronto are named as a benchmark, preceding later notions of positioning Hamburg as an international city.

“The aim of the senate is to develop Hamburg into a growing and vibrant metropolis with international presence. Hamburg cannot rest on its leading position in domestic comparison. Dynamic metropolises like Copenhagen, Barcelona, Vienna or Seattle and Toronto are the benchmark that Hamburg has to be measured against.” (SKHH 2002 p.4, translated by the author)

The notion of growth is further described in the initial Leitbild as smart growth and sustainable development and connected to central objectives of growing the population, fostering economic growth and job creation, and increasing the international profile and attractiveness, among others.

“The main objective is to further increase the population, fostering economic and employment growth [...] as well as to increase Hamburg’s international attractiveness and profile.” (SKHH 2002 p.4, translated by the author)

Especially from an economic perspective, the document describes increasing earning power and job creation as mandatory conditions to reach the objectives within the policy concept (SKHH 2002) and establishes economic growth and job creation as the primary objective behind many if not all narrative motives within the public policy discourse on entrepreneurship over the years to come.

“The concept of a growing city is inseparably linked to a growing economy and the creation of new jobs in Hamburg.” (SKHH 2002 p.22, translated by the author)

The context of sustainable development can be seen as a sociotechnical imaginary on its own in terms of Jasanoff et al. (2015) and is described as an engine for innovation to leverage new market potentials within international competition and for small and medium sized enterprises. It also initiates the accentuation of innovation as a key component in the city’s strategy for growth.

“Sustainability acts as an engine for innovation and allows new market potentials to be unlocked, especially in global competition and also for small and medium sized enterprises.” (SKHH 2002 p.16, translated by the author)
As will become evident in subsequent sections, the principles behind the narrative motives of the Leitbild establish the baseline for subsequent themes within the discourse that can all be traced back to this document (or even further in some cases). Focus on growth, international comparison and innovation are at the base of all subsequent narrative themes that build upon this foundation. The thematic of local discursivities produce the overarching discourse as is reflected in the various institutions involved in the discourse community.

The document articulates a cluster policy approach to concentrate on specific future industries and fields of innovation and considers such clusters as regional engines of growth, an early commitment in national comparison (iit 2011). Industries mentioned in the initial Leitbild articulation are aerospace, harbour & logistics as well as so-called “young” industries such as IT and media or life sciences (SKHH 2002). In light of the shift towards a knowledge-based economy proclaimed by the EU (European Council 2000), these young sectors are associated with future proofing the regional cluster policy through accentuating innovation and aspirational leadership, as will become apparent from later evolution of this narrative tangent. The approach was considered as a mid- to long-term strategy to reposition the city and its activities, as substantiated by senate representatives in 2003 (BFHH 2003), that unified the entire policy agenda of the senate under its umbrella (BFHH 2005). In their statement, the senate representatives underline how all forces of the city are to be realigned and positioned behind the Leitbild.

“The senate representatives clarify their position on the ‘Leitbild: Metropole Hamburg - Wachsende Stadt’ [guiding principle: Metropolis Hamburg - growing city]. They elaborated that the topic has to be seen within a mid- to long-term perspective in which all forces of the city have to be realigned and various fields of activities have to be repositioned.” (BFHH 2003 p.10, translated by the author)

It exemplifies how all political power is aligned behind the guiding principles and how these will be enacted within the public administration, adjusting the agenda of ministries, public private partnerships, and related programs along the tangents of the Leitbild. As will become evident throughout the following sections, the policy discourse seeds at the highest level of government and is then enacted and repeatedly articulated by all other entities within the policy domain that ascertain power and control of the “said and seed” and thus create the knowledge that governs the discourse.

Talents, Environmentalism and Internationalisation

When focusing on the core role policy plays, the elements of talents, environmentalism and internationalisation are central to the overall discourse. In 2007 the Leitbild was extended to include a new aspiration for Hamburg as a city for talents and more ambitious articulations of Hamburg as an international city as well as to further raise the bar for now above-average
economic growth and job creation as the primary objective of the strategy (BFHH 2007). The strategic extensions to attract and foster more creative talents - Talentstadt Hamburg - was formalised in 2008 (Overmeyer et. al. 2010) and emphasises competition for people with innovative ideas and entrepreneurial ambitions, adumbrating later narrative themes about Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city.

“Competition is increasingly concerned about people with ideas, with entrepreneurial spirit and the courage to walk on innovative paths.” (BFHH 2007 p.2, translated by the author)

Hamburg’s international reputation is considered key to Hamburg’s success as an international city, especially amongst Europe’s most successful cities (BFHH 2007). Consequently, the Leitbild also mentions the goal of positioning Hamburg both nationally and internationally as a location for technology and innovation, adumbrating later narrative themes about Hamburg as an innovative city and matching the strategic goals articulated by the European Council to strengthen employment within the knowledge-based economy (European Council 2000).

“Hamburg intends to position itself as an outstanding location for innovation on both national and international level as well as profile the city as a leading location for technology and innovation.” (BFHH 2007 p.11, translated by the author)

Under the umbrella of the political coalition between Ole von Beust’s CDU and the Grüne Alternative Liste (GAL) from 2008 - 2011 - the first conservative-green coalition on a state level in Germany - the Leitbild was further augmented with a stronger emphasis on sustainability as growing with foresight - Wachsen mit Weitsicht - with primary emphasis on subsidised residential real estate development (BFHH 2009a) while maintaining the former aspirations.

"Hamburg has to set international standards as a growing metropolis of talents, sustainability and responsibility.” (BFHH 2009c p.1, translated by the author)

In 2010 the new Leitbild was formally established and added new areas for development, such as creative industries, renewable energies, or life sciences through an extended cluster portfolio. This trajectory shows how policy and practice are incrementally aligned along the established aspirational claims. With the emphasis on talents, the city also initiated the creation of a creative industry cluster (BFHH 2009b), acknowledging the relevance of creative products and services for economic development, similar to technical innovations.
“Similar to technical innovations, creative innovations and products are becoming decisive input factors for regional economic development.” (BFHH 2009b p.1, translated by the author)

Ever since, the creative industry is considered a solid component of the Leitbild (Wedemeier 2010) and augments other future industry initiatives and the established clusters that the senate identified as areas with potential for economic growth (iit 2011). The new Leitbild also integrated qualitative components to economic growth in relation to its environmental and societal impact (BFHH 2010), spawning a new theme adopted in following years for Hamburg as a green city.

“Surrounding conditions are constantly changing [...] That’s why it is important for Hamburg to also unlock new areas for development, such as the creative industry, renewable energy or health industry. In addition, unconditioned growth is subject to natural limits due to increasingly scarce and finite resources with considerable consequences for the environment and society.” (BFHH 2010 p.1, translated by the author)

Even though ecological perspectives have been present in consideration for Hamburg as a growing city as early as 2003 (BFHH 2003) and have been coined as requirements for growth while maintaining a green metropolis by the water (BFHH 2005), the new Leitbild to grow with foresight - Wachsen mit Weitsicht - established principles of sustainability and responsibility as core elements of the strategy and introduced the ambition to function as role model for developing future proof solutions for current ecological challenges and climate change. This represents a sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff et al. 2015) that is also aligned to developments within the field of entrepreneurship research surrounding social entrepreneurship (Masural 2019a; Chell 2007) and notions of the quadruple or even quintuple helix approach (Carayannis & Campbell 2010; Carayannis, Barth & Campbell 2012).

”Hamburg puts principles of sustainability and responsibility at the centre of its actions, beyond the city limits and with the view directed towards the future. Hamburg strives to be a role model for the development of future-proof solutions to current challenges, for people in the city, for the region and its sphere of influence in Germany, Europe and the world.” (BFHH 2009c p.1, translated by the author)

The aspiration of Hamburg as a green city certainly gained traction as an exploitable narrative. In 2009 the city was designated the European Green Capital of 2011 by the EU (BSU 2013; BFHH 2010; BWVI 2010a), which added to the international reputation of Hamburg within
Europe (European Commission 2011b) and was advertised and leveraged by various entities and
stakeholders in the policy domain (e.g. in BWVI 2013 p.60, 2014a p.58, see Appendix B),
especially in reference to the Europe 2020 strategy by the EU (European Commission 2010).

"The European Commission awarded Hamburg the title European Green Capital 2011,
making it the second ever city after Stockholm officially allowed to call itself European
Green Capital. " (Jutta Blankau (Senator of Urban Development and Environment) in
BSU 2013 preface).

Most prominently Olaf Scholz, who took over the mayorship in 2011, articulated the
ambition to establish Hamburg as a green capital and repeatedly leveraged the narrative motive
at various occasions (e.g. in Scholz 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011i, see Appendix B) as well as in
his initial government statement:

"We will establish Hamburg as a green capital. For us this is not just a marketing title
but a mandate." (Scholz 2011a, translated by the author)

In alignment with this strategic orientation, the mayor advertised various initiatives
within the renewable energy field (e.g. Scholz 2013c, 2013k, 2014j, 2014p, 2014q), such as smart
or electric mobility (e.g. in Scholz 2011e, 2012f, 2012k, see Appendix B) and wind energy (e.g.
in Scholz 2012j, see Appendix B), that serve as tangible narratives of success to position Hamburg
as a green city but also as a relevant driver of innovation in the field of environmentalism.

Even though this narrative subsequently developed more towards the motive of Hamburg
as an innovative city, the notion of environmentalism remained a common thread over the years
and expanded to other policy areas, such as the energy transition and climate policy. This thread
of discourse is clearly connected to innovation and technology and a sociotechnical imaginary
shaping the policy trajectory alongside other threads of discourse presented throughout the
chapter. Regarding innovation, the narrative was redirected towards technology driven areas, such
as car sharing, sharing economy, smart city etc. as the following sections will further illustrate.
Also, it shows how the city moves from one narrative theme to another, replacing key emphasis
on sustainability with innovation, merging notions of Hamburg as a green city as a given base
condition for Hamburg as an innovative city. Looking at these changing trajectories on the
backdrop of changing governments, with Olaf Scholz (SPD) succeeding the previous government
of Ole von Beust (CDU) from 2001-2010 and Christoph Althaus (CDU) from 2010-2011, it also
shows how policy opportunism serves to solidify self-legitimation of the field and its capitals
rather than establishing a truly new policy orientation under new government as subsequent
narrative themes will highlight.
As examples of how narratives from other regions or contexts appear in the discourse, comparisons with other regions (both regional and global) are frequently drawn, especially in the context of the narrative motive of Hamburg as an international city (e.g. in Scholz 2011k, 2011n, 2012p; Brosda 2018d, 2018e, 2018f). As will be highlighted throughout the following sections, imaginaries from other regions are commonly visible in the discourse, e.g. when comparing the innovative potential of Hamburg’s metropolitan region with Silicon Valley in the US or other global high profile regions. Beyond that, there are motives derived from popularised theories about potential developments in the discourse that out of themself constitute sociotechnical imaginaries of the future.

The term talent in conjunction with creative industries might serve as a suitable example. Part of the extended Leitbild introduced in 2007 and the term talent was a deep consideration of the concept of a rising “creative class” (Overmeyer et al. 2010), postulated by US economist Richard Florida (2002). References to Florida’s thinking were visible throughout the discourse for a span of years. His approach caters to the notion that access to embodied knowledge and creative skills in the form of human capital, capacity to use technology for innovation and an open-minded society are key to cities’ competitiveness (Wedemeier 2010). Considerations such as his might have been critical in the city’s focus on creative industries that emerged in development of the new Leitbild of growing with foresight - Wachsen mit Weitsicht - and the establishment of the creative industry cluster. Yet, the creative industry and its alleged innovative potential regularly intersected with the media and IT industry in the discourse, as following sections will illustrate. References to Florida’s implications are evident on the highest level of the discourse power structure, especially from the mayor (e.g. in Scholz 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012g, 2012o, 2013d, 2015f), who adopted the narrative motive in his governance (e.g. in Scholz 2012m, 2013f, 2016j, see Appendix B), even if with some scepticism, and considered himself - as a politician - part of the creative class:

“Since we as politicians also belong to the creative class according to Richard Florida, I feel no different. Change is necessary, not as an end in itself, but to maintain security. If the rules of the game change, our game has to adapt.” (Scholz 2013v, translated by the author)

Various narrative motives presented here thus far are recursively applied to subsequent themes within the discourse. The general premise of fostering Hamburg as a growing city provides the foundation for many of the current policy initiatives to support economic growth and job creation as the primary and eternal goal for the city of Hamburg in a global competition for a prosperous metropolis. The presented narrative tangents illustrate the policy trajectory that can be understood as an incremental evolution to align policy and practice to aspirational claims. The motives serve either as a premise to argumentatively base new motives on or as a tangible
narrative of success that might serve further extensions through metrification of the entailed imaginaries. Actual policy implementation and concrete programs previously described are aligned to the overall narrative structure, as is evident in their public documentation and real-world manifestation through representative stakeholders within the entrepreneurial ecosystem and their formal or informal testimony.

**Conclusion**

The fundamental policy orientation informing the current entrepreneurship policy agenda was established at the highest level of government, the Senate Office, long before Olaf Scholz became mayor of Hamburg in 2011. From a Foucauldian perspective this represents the genealogy of the discourse as in clothes to be worn in office that do not change with the individual. A Bourdieusian perspective attributes this to the prescriptive nature of the discourse, as the book is already written in people’s head. Under the reign of Ole von Beust (2001-2010) and his successor Christoph Althaus (2010-2011), both CDU, the guiding principle of Hamburg as a growing city was seeded into the policy discourse from the centre of the policy domain and then recursively enacted on all levels of government, public administration, and all attached programs. In terms of Foucault, power creates knowledge and knowledge represents power in the discourse. As such, seeded and echoed from the centre of political power outwards, the discourse is articulated and shapes the behaviour - biopower of discourse in terms of Foucault (1978, 1984) - of anyone subscribing to it, thus creating the knowledge that enables the governmentality of discourse in terms of Foucault (1984, 1997). By talking about Hamburg as a growing city, any actor already accepts the discourse on Hamburg as a growing city itself, the rules, roles, and the institutional arrangements of discourse established by the stakeholders in the policy domain. These structures and mechanisms of discourse stay the same, even if the individual stakeholders change or political formations of governments evolve. New narrative tangents introduced in the extensions of the guiding principles, such as Hamburg as a city for talents, Hamburg as an international city or Hamburg as green city do not fundamentally differ in content, nor do they fundamentally change the way the discourse is organised, shaped, or enacted. The narrative theme of Hamburg as a green city for example certainly gained traction in the period from 2008-2011 under mayors Ole von Beust (CDU) and Christoph Althaus (CDU) as part of their political coalition with the green party, the Grüne Alternative Liste (GAL). Yet, notions of sustainability were already an integral part of the guiding principles in the original Leitbild established in the early years of Ole von Beust’s mayorship. It exemplifies how the new narrative theme does not represent a fundamental shift in policy orientation but rather serves as a mechanism to solidify self-legitimation of the field and its social, cultural, and political capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) with new policy stakeholders entering the government. A similar development can be attributed to Olaf Scholz’ mayorship, who inherited the narrative themes of Hamburg as a growing city, as a city for talents, Hamburg as an international city or Hamburg as a green city. Political and cultural
capital is deployed along the tangent of environmentalism on institutional levels, green labelling a revolution in innovation on all stages of the discourse, e.g. in adopting specific environmental-aware language, promoting events and practices that serve to embody the discourse trajectory. Building on technology driven fields like electric mobility or renewable energy under the backdrop of the energy transition and nuclear phaseout passed by the German federal government in 2011 (Die Bundesregierung 2011) after the Fukushima nuclear disaster (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2011), a new narrative theme adopted the notion of innovation to portrait Hamburg as an innovative city to solidify the self-legitimation and imprint the discourse with the new seal of office, even though notions of innovation have also been named in the original Leitbild from 2002. Regarding the narrative theme of the international city within local discursivities, certainly the city’s most prestigious project, the Elbphilharmonie concert venue, can be considered as an example that was also picked up by international media. It was originally initiated under von Beust’s mayorship and scheduled to finish in 2010, then delayed multiple times and finalised in late 2016 and officially opened in January 2017 under Scholz (da Fonseca-Wollheim 2017). The project not only drew on regular comparison between Hamburg and Sydney (Carmody 2009; Oltermann 2016) and its prestigious opera house but also dominated public discourse with severe criticism over years due to the many delays and inconsistencies in construction, resulting in the initial costs estimated at 77 million Euro in 2005 to result in final costs of 866 million Euro announced in 2013 (Maak 2015), but ultimately was too big to fail and resulted in world-wide appreciative media coverage, quickly turning its image into the new symbol of Hamburg on regional, national and international arenas (Hasse 2016).

Examples surrounding the narrative theme of talents (also adopted by Scholz in his early mayorship) also show how resistance to the dominant discourse, e.g. in form of fundamental critique to sociotechnical imaginaries and fictional expectations represented in the frequently referenced creative class (Florida 2002) or creative city (Landry 2008) is created as an ultimate consequence of discourse (Foucault 1980) but then silenced under the weight of what is “said and seen” and reappropriated within the discourse, reinforcing the governmentality of discourse in terms of Foucault (1984, 1997). Despite considerable criticism of Florida’s theories mentioned by entities within the regional policy discourse, e.g. lacking empirical data to substantiate a homogeneous “creative class” or prove real connection between living environments of creatives and technology driven industries among others (Overmeyer et al. 2010) and the realisation that a projection of generalisations from the US economy are not matching the complex realities in Europe (Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2016), references to Florida persisted in the dominant discourse. This phenomenon showcases how resistance to the discourse is created within the discourse community but then silenced under the weight of the dominant discourse, reinforcing its governmentality. The seeded discourse at the centre of the wheel, the office of the mayor, is internalised and repetitively adopted throughout the discourse (e.g. in Brosda 2017a, 2019). The knowledge created at the centre of the policy discourse establishes the control from the centre to
the periphery of the discourse community - and its subjects in Foucauldian terminology - with entities and stakeholders echoing and self-perpetuating what is said, thus embodying the discourse, creating mechanisms of differentiation and distinction and so domination.

With a Bourdieusian perspective, the field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) is constituted by the mayor, or rather the position of the mayor more than any individual in office, and other outlets under its reign, like entities and stakeholders within the policy domain that are mutually invested as a field of peers to operate and maintain the discourse. These actors - or agents in Bourdieusian terminology (1984b, 2000; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) - embody the discourse with their habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) and display of social and political capital (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Their practices and embodiment of the discourse establish the language and phrase regimes in the discourse, what and how they talk about it, and thus creates the knowledge about what Hamburg as a growing city, a city for talents, an international city, a green city or innovative city means. The discursive practices of the actors establish the discourse illusio (Bourdieu 1998b), the rules of the game, how the discourse works, what can be said and what is considered part of the dominant discourse, resulting in the exclusion of resistant voices articulated outside the policy domain. Entities and stakeholders buy into the narrative by making it their own, an act of misrecognition in terms of Bourdieu (1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), interpreting notions like growth, talent, sustainability, or innovation in their domain and then articulating it in their documents, written and oral testimony, believing it is a new policy orientation, while in reality it is the same as before under different labels. Beyond the language appearing in official documents, programs, media coverage etc., entities and stakeholders wear the clothes and speak the language of the policy discourse, starting from their actual geographical position within the city at city hall or in historic buildings, encrypting the spaces and institutions of the discourse with knowledge to create mechanisms of distinction, exclusion and domination, making it impossible for anyone without the necessary capital to navigate the field of public policy to participate or influence the discourse. Any program they author, any event they attend with their segregated position as policy representatives with entourage and privilege, any marketing or press material they release to underscore the narrative motives of growth, talents, sustainability, internationality, or innovation is a re-enactment of the discourse. In their practice actors thus internalise the illusio and doxa in terms of Bourdieu (1998b) as the rules of the game to a degree of misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) so that they no longer realise the constructive nature of the social world they embody and enact, representing the performativity of discourse.

The genealogical account of the presented base narratives also illustrates how the discourse dynamics are established and are self-perpetuating independently of individual actors or even the mayor in office. The office of the mayor is rather a position or role within the discourse, prescribed to reattribute discourse under his governance. Consequently, the individual mayor in office may be of high prominence during his reign but the inner workings of discourse
and the self-serving nature of the discourse are untainted by any individual contribution. As such Scholz’ mayorship may serve as a historical period suitable to the investigation in this study, but the underlying mechanics of discourse have preceded his period of mayorship and prevailed long after he left office, revealing true relevance of institutions and institutional arrangements, practices, rules and procedures to unmask the inner workings of the discourse under investigation.

The following section will elaborate on the narrative theme of Hamburg as an innovative city, a theme also predating the era of Olaf Scholz that was then reappropriated under his mayorship along the primary tangents of the media city and the entrepreneurial city, presented later on. The narrative themes extend the political trajectory established within the Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city and its derivatives. Same as before, the section initially presents the data to establish the narrative theme and then concludes with a Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis of the narrative theme in the conclusion of the section.

5.2.2 Hamburg as an Innovative City
This section presents the narrative theme of Hamburg as an innovative city and its weight in the policy agenda and discourse trajectory as it unfolds towards notions of entrepreneurship policy. The section will first present the data, ranging from textual documents to observational notes, and will conclude with a Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis in the conclusion.

Building on the established base narratives presented above, the emphasis on innovation and positioning Hamburg as an innovative city increased over time and became a central notion of the policy trajectory in 2010, when the strategic guidelines of the InnovationsAllianz, an initiative formed by 160 actors from policy, industry, and university entities in 2008 (BWVI 2014a), were published (BWVI 2010b) as part of the evolved Leitbild “Wachsen mit Weitsicht” (BFHH 2010). The general goal of the strategic guidelines was to articulate an innovation strategy to develop Hamburg into a leading region for innovation in Europe, with the ambition and vision to become an innovation capital for Europe (BWVI 2010a).

“The aim of this joint initiative by Hamburg’s political, business and research institutions is to develop and implement a holistic innovation strategy that is supported by all key stakeholders. On this foundation, the competitiveness of the sciences and business location Hamburg is to be secured and sustained, especially for small and medium sized enterprises, and our city and its metropolitan area is to be developed into one of Europe’s leading innovation regions.” (BWVI 2010a p.1, translated by the author)

An Innovation Capital in Europe
The ambition to become a leading metropolis in Europe was not new. In fact, it was already visible in the extended Leitbild from 2007 (BFHH 2007) and was cemented in the evolved Leitbild “Wachsen mit Weitsicht” - growing with foresight - from 2010 (BFHH 2010). The ambition was
mentioned in various other documents from the senate and Bürgerschaft, e.g. in context of the formation of the regional investment and subsidy bank IFB Hamburg (BFHH 2012b), in context of debates around the regional cluster policy (BFHH 2013b) or the creation of an innovation and growth investment fonds (BFHH 2016a). Consequently, this ambition can also be found in documents from other public entities (e.g. in BWVI 2014b, 2014c, 2017, see Appendix C), for example:

“By this holistic approach Hamburg aims to strengthen the regional economy and to provide an innovative eco-system that involves all regional actors. The overall vision of Hamburg is to become a capital for innovation in Europe by 2020.” (BWVI 2014b p.1)

Most prominently however, the mayor repeatedly articulated the goal of becoming an innovation capital in Europe in his public speeches (e.g. in Scholz 2011a, 2011c, 2012u, 2015w, see Appendix C) throughout his entire governance period with increasing confidence over time, building on narratives of success from the past (e.g. in Scholz 2013t, 2016e, see Appendix C), for example:

“The avowed aim of our economic policy is to develop Hamburg into Europe’s Capital of Innovation by 2020. In the years to come, the ability to innovate will determine economic success and, in the long term, secure the creation of wealth and keep jobs in the city. Ultimately, however, innovation is successful only if the business and academic communities coordinate efforts and enter into an exchange. We are working hard to promote this exchange in areas such as fuel cell and wind power technology, lasers, nanotechnology and marine engineering. One fact that reveals how seriously we take our ambition to become Europe’s Capital of Innovation in 2020 is our decision to spend a larger proportion of the total budget on research and science - raising the total from 870 million to about a billion euros by 2020.” (Scholz 2013u)

The InnovationsAllianz’ strategic guidelines outline principles to improve innovative activities and knowledge transfer, definition of an efficient innovation subsidy system as well as development of future initiatives to remain competitive. Along the established policy trajectory, these aspirations are now increasingly future oriented and use innovation as the key ingredient for success. These general principles are to be found in almost all documents moving forward.

“The strategic guidelines of the InnovationsAllianz Hamburg articulate principles for the improvement of innovative activity and knowledge transfer, for the efficient design of the Hamburg subsidy system as well as the development of future fields and initiative for Hamburg. Building on today's conditions within the economic and scientific landscape
of Hamburg, they aim to make the science and business location Hamburg competitive for the future.” (BWVI 2010a p.1, translated by the author)

The document is articulated as an innovation and technology-strategy and focuses on research intensive industries and knowledge intensive services (BWVI 2010a). Also support for young and innovative companies is addressed explicitly from this time forward, which was perceived as a significant shift also by the press (Dey 2010). Even though the term startup appeared later in the discourse, this emphasis was intensified under Olaf Scholz, who is often attributed with the initiatives catering towards startups.

“An overarching innovation and technology strategy is being developed with the Hamburg InnovationsAllianz over the next years to advance innovation and networking in Hamburg. An investment fund for young, innovative startups - the Innovationsstarter Fonds Hamburg, will provide better support for technology-oriented startups in the future.” (Scholz 2011l, translated by the author)

In the working agenda of the senate for 2011, the year Scholz took office as mayor of the city, the goal to become an innovation capital for Europe is highlighted as a key element in the economy and innovation segment of the document in addition to the creation of a regional investment and subsidy bank (SKHH 2011a). It outlines the intention to provide research and cooperation space for universities, businesses and innovative founders, evolution of application-oriented research institutes, optimisation of the regional subsidy system, fostering technology oriented firm formation with financing support, creation of a central innovation portal for the city and lobbying activities in Brussels with the aim to streamline subsidy programs and emphases innovation and research subsidies.

“The innovative strength of our companies determines the growth opportunities of today and tomorrow. We want to make Hamburg an innovation capital in Europe through the targeted collaboration between economy, science, policy, and administration. Topics are funding of research and cooperation areas for universities, companies and innovative entrepreneurs (technology parks, innovation and research campus with universities; further development of application-oriented research institutes and extension of join institutions for professional and academic training and education; optimisation of the Hamburg subsidy system; promotion of technology-oriented startups through interlinking consecutive financing instruments; development of a new innovation portal for Hamburg that displays all information relevant to innovation; activities in Brussels to encourage the EU to focus its funding programs more on innovation and research
while simplifying procedures; [creation] of an innovation contact point between companies and universities.” (SKHH 2011a pp.5-6, translated by the author)

Immediate results of this working agenda document can be found in the operational program for the goal of investment in growth and employment for the EFRE founding period 2014-2020, which was published in 2013 by Hamburg’s Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI 2013). Building on the InnovationsAllianz’ strategic outline and the working agenda of the senate, the document emphasises the collaboration between university and industry for application-oriented research and fostering the regional industry clusters as strategic initiatives (BWVI 2014b).

“In sight of intensifying collaboration between science and industry, the further development of application-oriented research institutes as well as the sustainable strengthening of the clusters and networks are intended.” (BWVI 2013 p.10, translated by the author)

As the main investment priorities in this context, the document highlights research and innovation infrastructure and the capacity to develop research and innovation excellence and competence centres as well as supporting investments in innovation and research, especially in areas of product and service development, technology transfer etc. (in BWVI 2013 p.13, see Appendix C) and cements the policy agenda in practice. In 2014, the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation published the documentation of the regional innovation strategy 2020 - Regionale Innovationsstrategie 2020 der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg - that outlines the intelligent specialisation (RIS3 Hamburg) for the EFRE period 2014-2020 (BWVI 2014a) with eight industry clusters as strategic areas for specialisation (see table 1).

Table 1: established & young industry clusters in Hamburg, taken from BWVI (2014a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>established</th>
<th>cluster name</th>
<th>industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>nextMedia.Hamburg (previously Hamburg@work)</td>
<td>media, IT, telecommunication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Hamburg Aviation</td>
<td>aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Life Science Nord</td>
<td>life science, innovative medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Logistik-Initiative Hamburg</td>
<td>logistics, traffic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Gesundheitswirtschaft Hamburg</td>
<td>health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Kreativgesellschaft Hamburg</td>
<td>culture, creative industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Erneuerbare Energien Hamburg</td>
<td>renewable energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Maritimes Cluster Norddeutschland</td>
<td>shipping, maritime trade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The goals articulated in these documents are recursively applied to various programs that spawned in the period of Scholz’ mayorship, e.g. the InnoRampUp or InnoFounder programs of the newly created regional investment and subsidy bank IFB Hamburg (e.g. in IFB 2014 p.3, 2018 p.3, see Appendix C), the masterplan industry 4.0 (BWVI 2017) or the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative for the media/IT industry cluster (SKHH 2014).

“We also support innovation and the development of technologies in Hamburg. Among others for example with the centre for applied aviation research, where very progressive research on production processes is conducted, commonly known as 3D printing, or the emerging research and innovation parks (F&I-Parks), the masterplan industry 4.0, the investment and subsidy bank [IFB Hamburg], our cluster policy and initiatives like nextMedia.Hamburg, which chaperons the media and digital economy. All of these are examples for promoting innovation.” (Scholz 2016i, translated by the author)

Especially the overall alignment of discourse along knowledge seeded at highest levels of governments exemplifies how the policy discourse is dominated from the centre of the wheel and then enacted throughout the policy domain towards the periphery, shaping policy agenda, programs, initiatives and institutions etc. (Scholz 2016i). The phrase regime is adopted throughout the policy domain and represents the repetitive articulation of discourse, the “said and seen” and is embedded in the cluster policy that is adopted from much earlier narrative themes of the policy discourse as the following section shows.

Hamburg’s Cluster Policy

Hamburg’s cluster policy is first mentioned in the 2002 Leitbild Wachsende Stadt - Hamburg as a growing city - where clusters are described as networks of businesses in related markets, research institutes, associates and government that create conditions for innovation and competitive abilities (e.g. in SKHH 2002 p.20, see Appendix C). Further extensions of the Leitbild build on the established cluster approach (e.g. in BFHH 2007 p.3, see Appendix C) and introduce the establishment of cluster networks and a holistic perspective on innovation (e.g. in BFHH 2010 p.3, see Appendix C). The regional innovation strategy was aimed to specifically augment the cluster policy to create a comprehensive innovation approach (e.g. in BFHH 2010; BWVI 2013 p.24, see Appendix C). In the regional innovation strategy, the overall aim of the cluster policy was articulated as:

“It is the overarching aim of the cluster policy to strengthen the economy in Hamburg and its innovative power, value creation and employment, that is of particular relevance in international competition, through coordinated networking between economy, science
and the public sector. In this sense, successful clusters strengthen Hamburg as an innovation location.” (BWVI 2014a p.105, translated by the author)

In 2010 the city considered 8 industry clusters, 4 established and 4 newly created “young” clusters, which are described as being of high relevance for Hamburg as an innovative city (BWVI 2010a) and serve the notion of future proofing within the “Clusterpolitische Gesamtstrategie für Hamburg” (iit 2011) - overall strategy for the cluster policy. Also, they are directly attributed with economic growth and job creation, a notion that is repetitively articulated throughout the discourse (BWVI 2014c p.3, see Appendix C), most predominantly by the mayor (e.g. in Scholz 2011a, 2011l, 2012j, 2013t, see Appendix C), for example:

“The keyword ‘cluster policy’ was already mentioned. It is a successful instrument of economic policy to secure the competitiveness and innovative power of a metropolis such as Hamburg. It secures and creates sustainable jobs and corresponding added value.” (Scholz 2011f, translated by the author)

Within the public discourse, the cluster initiatives are traced back to the first industry cluster in Hamburg, the media/IT cluster and its initiative Hamburg@work, formed in 1997 as Hamburg media@work, which is considered early compared to other regions in Germany. This is a fact commonly used in the articulation of discourse as a narrative of success and example of the innovative power of Hamburg (e.g. in iit 2011 p.13; Scholz 2011j; BWVI 2014a p.50; HK 2014 p.19, see Appendix C). A more detailed consideration for the frequently used Hamburg@work narrative of success will be presented later as part of the narrative theme of Hamburg as a media city. Suffice to say, that also highest levels of government made use of this narrative, for example the mayor himself and the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI):

“The Senate of Hamburg is concerned to secure the city’s competitiveness and powers of innovation by pursuing sustainable economic policies that focus on clusters. In 1997 Hamburg was one of the first states to launch a cluster policy and at first its “Hamburg@work” initiative was greeted with a certain amount of scepticism. Now the various clusters - aviation, logistics, life sciences and healthcare, maritime industry and renewable energies - are indispensable forces sparking innovation and growth in our city and lending Hamburg a distinctive skills profile.” (Scholz 2013u)

“The Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg (herein further referred in as Hamburg) took the pioneering role, when establishing Germany’s first cluster initiative in 1997. Ever since Hamburg is pursuing a consistent cluster policy and has gained a lot of experience
in the development, implementation, and coordination of cluster networks. Today, the city-state supports a healthy mix of eight cluster initiatives representing a cross-section of all key sectors of the regional economy: media & IT, aviation, life sciences, logistics, creative industry, healthcare, maritime industry, and renewable energies.” (BWVI 2014b p.1)

In 2014, when the city of Hamburg became a model demonstrator region for modern European cluster policy (European Commission 2014), the policy was extended towards building cluster bridges to foster cross-cluster fertilisation between sectors, value chains or cluster organisations (e.g. in BWVI 2014a p.104, 2016 p.7, see Appendix C). One example being:

“Due to Hamburg’s specific conditions such as a spatial contiguity of clusters and a high concentration of innovative SMEs within an urban region, the city has a particular interest in building cluster bridges. Cross-cutting topics offer new services, new value chains and business opportunities to regional actors. To foster such cross-clustering activities, Hamburg locates related cluster managements in one place.” (BWVI 2014b p.2)

This new orientation also became integral part of the coalition agreement between SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen for Scholz’s second term from 2015 onwards (SKHH 2015b; SPD 2015, SKHH 2018 pp.18-19, see Appendix C) and was also frequently addressed in the discourse, especially by the mayor (e.g. in Scholz 2016e, 2017b, see Appendix C) and was then adopted by other entities within the policy domain, for example:

“One key success for Hamburg came when it was selected by the European Commission as one of six model regions showcasing modern cluster policies. Hamburg’s goal is to systematically develop cluster bridges (cross-clustering), with the aim of making better use in future of the potential for innovation and value creation in the areas of overlap between the clusters.” (BWFG 2016 p.16)

It yet again exemplifies how a shift in political power - the coalition formed between SPD and the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen party from 2015 onwards (SKHH 2015b; SPD 2015), resulted the articulation of new narrative motives that serve to solidify self-legitimation of the field and its capitals with new policy stakeholders entering the government. Yet the trajectory of the policy discourse was already established beforehand and evolved along its established independence from individual stakeholders in office but rather reaffirming mechanisms and structures of discourse and the power-knowledge that creates its governmentality.
Another tangent of the regional innovation strategy is the strong emphasis on research and knowledge transfer, a commonly adopted perspective in innovation policy as outlined in section 2.2. Overall, it can also be traced back to articulations of discourse from the themes of Hamburg as a growing city and Hamburg as a city for talents as the following section illustrates.

Research & Innovation

A key component of the regional innovation strategy and cluster policy is fostering knowledge transfer between university and industry entities - in line with the triple or quadruple helix approach - and subsequently supporting ambitions for research excellence in the region, which was specifically addressed in the extended Leitbild from 2007 that positioned Hamburg as a city for talents (e.g. in BFHH 2007 p.12, see Appendix C) and reiterated over in the new Leitbild Wachsen mit Weitsicht - growing with foresight - 2010 (BFHH 2010 p.2, see Appendix C). In context of the InnovationsAllianz’ guidelines, principles for innovation and knowledge transfer were established (BWVI 2010b) under the umbrella of Innovationsförderung - fostering innovation. Along the policy trajectory of accentuating innovation, converting innovation into economic contribution represents another incremental step:

“Promotion of innovation is the entirety of monetary and non-monetary incentives and support mechanisms for innovation, technology transfer, learning and qualification as well as knowledge- and technology-based startups.” (BWVI 2010a p.5, translated by the author)

Strong emphasis was given to fostering excellence in university and research institutes by the mayor (e.g. in Scholz 2012r, 2013i, 2013v, 2013w, 2015k, 2015v, 2017i, 2018a), with the expressed goal to establish more high-profile research entities within the city, developing research & innovation parks and attracting entrepreneurs (BWVI 2014a). This ambition also aligns to other narrative tangents such as national and international comparison or focusing on talents as well as ecology or climate change, especially with endeavours catering towards renewable energy, and was frequently addressed by the mayor (e.g. Scholz 2011a, 2012u, 2013a, 2015t, see Appendix C), and articulated in the working program of the senate for his initial term in 2011:

“The working conditions for science in Hamburg are to be improved through a number of measures, e.g. targeted funding of research projects, promotion of young researchers, doctoral training, top-level research funding as well as improved cooperation between science and Hamburg-based businesses” (SKHH 2011a, pp.5-6, translated by the author)

The seeded discourse trajectory was adopted by ministries (e.g. in BWVI 2013 p.22, 2014a p.79, see Appendix C) and was subsequently integrated in various measures to develop research and
innovation parks and other programs that manifested the discourse in the city of Hamburg, for example:

“*The initiative aims to gradually establish a network of research and innovation (R&I) parks focusing on selected areas of specialisation. R&I parks comprise facilities and working spaces for technology and knowledge transfer where businesses and researchers can carry out research and development activities with a focus on practical applications. Recent examples include the EnergieCampus Bergedorf Technology Centre, the Innovationszentrum Bahrenfeld business incubator and the Innovations-Campus for Green Technologies Harburg.*” (BWFG 2016 p.17)

Endeavours in research and innovation are directly attributed to economic growth and job creation in the discourse, which is visible throughout various documents from entities in Hamburg. This link is also used as argumentation for creation of the regional investment and subsidy bank IFB Hamburg (e.g. in BFHH 2012b, see Appendix C) and creation of innovation parks and extension support for startups (e.g. in BWVI 2013 p.21; Scholz 2016g; HIW 2017a; BFHH 2018c p.3, see Appendix C).

In the cluster policy and outlines for fostering research & innovation, the InnovationsAllianz is often referenced as the basis for most of the guidelines, ambitions, and aspirations. Therefore, the discursive formations surrounding this narrative motive are presented as follows.

**The InnovationsAllianz**

The InnovationsAllianz is mentioned throughout the discourse as the source for the city’s innovation strategy that is justified through its inclusive process and incorporation of representatives from industry, university, and policy domains, in accordance with the triple helix approach (Ranga & Etzkowitz 2013). The established guidelines were based on an online participation process with more than 1000 actors from policy, industry and university entities and presented as a continuously evolving process (BWVI 2014a) that was also picked up by the media (e.g. in Hamburger Abendblatt 2008; HWWI 2016 p.57, see Appendix C).

Even though originating from a period prior to Olaf Scholz’ mayorship (BWVI 2010b), he appropriated the InnovationsAllianz as aligned to his political agenda (e.g. in Scholz 2012j, 2013e, see Appendix C). Similar to the previously established cluster policy, the elements are aligned along the narrative theme of Hamburg as an innovative city.

“In Hamburg investors can rely on the fact that their concerns are actively supported. We create favorable conditions with primarily two instruments: our long-term cluster
Various documents by ministries and other public entities that spawned under Scholz’ mayorship adopt the InnovationsAllianz as the root of innovation policy in the city and align it along the narrative theme of the innovative city (e.g. in BWVI 2014a p.67, 2016 p.3, 2018a pp.5-6, 2018b, 2019 p.9, see Appendix C). It once again exemplifies the repetitive articulation of discourse starting from the centre, the Senate Office and mayor of the city and then ascertaining control over the discourse towards the periphery, creating the knowledge of what constitutes innovation and how Hamburg is positioned as an innovative city, building on narratives of the past that create an undeniable discursive trajectory, especially by emphasising the inclusive nature of the InnovationsAllianz and the consideration of input form actors in industry, science and public administration, even though no evidence of open and public participation is to be found.

The overall mechanic within the discourse to reappropriate existing narratives to solidify self-legitimation in the field can also be seen on another tangent that emerged, for example the notion of smart or digital cities. The following section will present how narrative motives of the digital city were aligned with the narrative theme of Hamburg as an innovative city.

**Digital City**

Another tangent connected to the narrative of Hamburg as an innovative city is the notion of becoming a digital city or smart city. Spawning from measures to modernise the administrative processes within the city and provide access to city services via the internet, it can be traced back to the E-Government-Strategie from 2002, which was operationalised in a reform project in 2005 (BFHH 2005). During Scholz’ mayorship the term smart city entered the discourse around the modernisation of the city. In 2012, Hamburg ranked first among all German cities in a digital city ranking by IDC (2012a, 2012b). In 2014, Hamburg entered into a Memorandum of Understanding for a “Smart City” Hamburg with CISCO (BFHH 2014) and in 2015 the senate announced to be working on a digital city strategy (e.g. in BFHH 2015, see Appendix C). This line of policy matches increasing emphasis on innovation and technology-driven services in the knowledge economy as presented thus far. As another incremental step towards futureproofing the city, the digital city tangent matches other motives and is interwoven with research initiatives and international comparison tangents (e.g. in Scholz 2014b, 2015h, 2015p, 2017h). In this context a pilot project for a Digital City Science Lab at the HafenCity University was established in 2015, which was formed in collaboration with the prestigious MIT Media Lab (BSU 2017). This high-profile international collaboration is used in the discourse to underline Hamburg as an innovative city, most prominently by the mayor (e.g. in Scholz 2015c, see Appendix C), who frequently named other city initiatives within the smart city or digital city contexts, e.g. digital administration, intelligent or smart port, smart energy etc., for example:
“The reason is that in the major metropolises infrastructure, population and business density are all high enough to profit from the opportunities offered by digitalization. This will not, however, happen unless a city has political leaders with a clear, creative vision and a government that sees new technologies as a chance for further improvements. Hamburg has both. In order to provide an academic framework for this process, we will collaborate with HafenCity University and MIT Media Lab to establish a Digital City Science Lab. This is to incubate a think tank for the issues facing modern digital cities; it will engage in basic research and applications-oriented projects and will be explicitly open to partner companies if the latter wish. In January the Senate passed its “Digital City” strategy paper, detailing what potential the digitalization of the city can unlock. Our aim is to create a climate for innovation in Hamburg that is conducive to the development of modern, digital applications and will promote networking between the enterprises and institutions involved.” (Scholz 2015e)

The Strategie Digitale Stadt - digital city strategy - was presented in 2015 and extended beyond the E-Government and IT strategy that largely focuses on the city’s administration and accounted for increasingly digitised value creation in business as well as everyday life (e.g. in SKHH 2015a p.1, see Appendix C). The digitisation of the city evolved to a key element of the coalition agreement between the SPD and the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen from 2015 onwards (SKHH 2015b; SPD 2015). Similar to other key initiatives taken on by the mayor, a Leitstelle Digitale Stadt - staff position for digital city - was created within the Senate Office to (K21 media AG 2015, see Appendix C) aggregate responsibility for the digital transformation at the highest level of government, as articulated by the mayor:

“The digital transformation of the big city is a cross-sectional task. That is why we created a Leitstelle für die digital Stadt [coordinating office for the digital city] in the Senate Office that will maintain oversight of the various projects and take on coordinative tasks. While responsibility for the individual digitisation projects will remain within the specialised authorities, the Leitselle [coordinating office] shall advance overarching topics.” (Scholz 2016a, translated by the author)

The strategy was referenced as a blueprint for cities and regions as launch pads for digital transformation in the Strategic Policy Forum on Digital Entrepreneurship by the European Commission (2016a, 2016b, 2017), augmented with a “Digital First” program as the guiding principle for administration of the city in 2016 (BFHH 2017c, 2017e) and culminated in the creation of a Chief Digital Office position for the city in 2017 (Meyer-Wellmann 2017a).
The narrative motives Hamburg as an innovative city and digital city in particular are often interwoven with another prominent motive that is based on the media/IT industry cluster, the first cluster initiative of the city, which was founded in 1997. It is used as a foundation for positioning Hamburg as a media city, which was later evolved into Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city. All of these higher-level motives still use notions of Hamburg as a growing city, Hamburg as an international city and especially Hamburg as an innovative city as will be presented in the following segments of Hamburg as a media city and Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city.

Conclusion

The notion of Hamburg as an innovative city also predates Olaf Scholz’ period of mayorship from 2011-2018. It was established in the various derivatives of the Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city and culminated in the InnovationsAllianz in 2010 as its primary incarnation that ultimately led to the regional innovation strategy in 2014. It is apparent that the narrative motive of innovation is seeded from the highest levels of government, as the Senate Office and parliament are the main authors of the Leitbild documents that established the language and phrase regime adopted by ministries and other entities within the discourse community and repetitively articulated moving forward. Just shortly after the strategic guidelines of the InnovationsAllianz were prominently established within the discourse, Olaf Scholz became mayor of Hamburg in 2011 and adopted the discourse trajectory and reappropriated the notions of an innovation and technology-strategy under his governance. His political agenda seeded the aspiration of Hamburg becoming an innovation capital in Europe in the regional innovation strategy that is an extension of the already established trajectory of the growing city theme as well as the InnovationsAllianz strategic guidelines. It builds on established rationale about industry clusters (Porter 1990, 2000; Eklinder-Frick & Linné 2017), that have been established as early as 1997 with the Hamburg@work media/IT cluster initiative, and research and innovation support, that was also part of the extended Leitbild in 2007, positioning Hamburg as a city for talents. The InnovationsAllianz, as the most recent narrative within the discourse at the beginning of Scholz’ mayorship served as a base argument for the entire policy agenda regarding innovation, research and development and later also entrepreneurship as it was accepted as a given, portrayed as an inclusive and participatory process (Hamburger Abendblatt 2008; BWVI 2010a, 2014a, 2016) and referenced throughout Scholz’ mayorship as the baseline for strategy orientation.

From a Foucauldian perspective this reflects the discourse in action being seeded and controlled from the Senate Office and the working program of the senate established in 2011 and enables the governmentality (Foucault 1984, 1997) of discourse form the centre to the periphery, with all entities aligning being the proclaimed ambitions, echoing what is said and self-perpetuating the discourse moving forward. It exemplifies the institutional arrangements and biopower of discourse (Foucault 1978, 1984), as the entities do this to themselves, reshaping their orientation and behaviours, as is evidenced in the increasing occurrence of the narrative theme in
their documents. The discourse created the new knowledge about Hamburg as an innovative city, thereby creating mechanisms of difference and distinction from prior narrative, and by talking about it, all involved entities accept the discourse of the innovative city, its roles, abilities, and discursive formations. Similarly, it exemplifies how the discourse creates power, knowledge, and subjects in terms of Foucault (1985, 1997), attributing the structure rather than the individuals. Apart from adjusting the narrative tangents on innovation and technology-driven opportunities, the overall discourse follows its established trajectory independent from individuals. Even through a change in regional government at the highest level, replacing a 10-year period of government formed by CDU and later CDU and GAL with a SPD led government, the overall discourse trajectory, its structures and mechanism stay the same. When exploring details of the policy agenda developed under Scholz and its historical genesis, the overall policy seems similar or even identical to prior incarnations, programs, and initiatives, rebranded under new names - a phrase regime - of the narrative theme of Hamburg as an innovative city to solidify self-legitimation of the field.

With a Bourdieusian lens, the abstract skeleton of the discourse established through the Foucauldian analysis can be augmented through embodied realities, the proverbial flesh to the bone. The discourse elite is established through the mayor and the Senate Office and other outlets, like ministries or other entities and their stakeholders, all of which are mutually invested in the political process within a field of peers, the network of actors in terms of the author. They embody the discourse through their habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) in the field and display of social, cultural, and political capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Through the language they speak, the phrase regime they establish and how they talk about it, they produce the knowledge about Hamburg as an innovative city. Above all, the mayor and the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) buy into their own narrative - an act of misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) - and consider the new policy orientation as new and real, not realising it is a new construct building on what was already there. It results in the symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) of exclusion fuelled by the “natural order of things”. The discourse elite establishes and adopts the illusio (Bourdieu 1998b) - the rules of the game - on how Hamburg as an innovative city can be talked about, what its values are - doxa in terms of Bourdieu (1998b) - and what makes it innovative, e.g. the cluster policy approach and accentuating research & innovation support at local research institutes, thus creating mechanisms of exclusion and domination through the seal of office. In their institutions, their interrelations, and arrangements they encrypt the places of discourse with the knowledge, making it impenetrable for anyone without buying into the discourse and accepting the doxa as is. As such, the entities and actors speak the discourse into existence and act it out, establishing the performativity of the discourse in terms of Bourdieu.

A great example for this mechanism can be seen in the narrative motive of the digital city that originated in the E-Government-Strategie from 2002 (BFHH 2005), a process from more
than a decade before it was reattributed under Scholz’ mayorship (BFHH 2015; SKHH 2015a) as a key component of being an innovative city that ranks well in international comparison. Initially coined as smart city in a very publicly exploited memorandum of understanding (BFHH 2014) with US technology manufacturer CISCO, providing networking hardware, telecommunications equipment and high-technology services, the term was quietly replaced with digital city in light of other international cities spawning digital strategies, e.g. Roadmap to a Digital New York City (nycroadmap.us). The discursive formation was then used in various programs to encrypt institutions and places with knowledge, e.g. the Digital City Science Lab established at the HafenCity University in collaboration with the MIT Media Lab, another high profile partnership drawing on aspirations in relation to Hamburg as an international city. The digital city tangent was embossed into the research lab in a project to establish a CityScope simulator (media.mit.edu/projects/cityscope/) at the regional university to be used for research projects but even more importantly for public participation in urban planning projects (BSU 2017). The author was involved in the technical setup of the CityScope simulator in collaboration with technical staff from MIT in 2015 and can attest that even though the project had nothing to do with new technological infrastructure for the city, digital administration or any other tangent of transformation the digital city strategy articulated by the Senate Office in 2015, the tool to simulate elements of city planning served as a highly visible and exploitable narrative adopted not just by academics, but most critically the mayor (Scholz 2015e) and general media in light of high profile visits, e.g. from MIT representatives, that were invited to representative events at the city hall with political entourage and high levels of formality as well as to visits to research institutes with much less formal proceedings. Even if the digital city narrative is only indirectly connected to the entrepreneurship policy agenda of the city, its inherent structures and references to research & innovation allow to showcase the working dynamics of the discourse and how its knowledge is embodied through its performativity in terms of Bourdieu.

Another example is the general usage of the InnovationsAllianz as a narrative motive to legitimise the discourse in itself. Portrayed as an inclusive and participatory process (Hamburger Abendblatt 2008; BWVI 2010a, 2014a; HWWI 2016) and referenced throughout Scholz’ mayorship as the baseline for strategy orientation, it was accepted as a given for the entire policy agenda in regard to innovation, research and development. Building on established trajectory within the documents attributed to the InnovationsAllianz, the discourse is creating its own metrics, the data of discourse, e.g. by presenting the strategic guidelines with reference of more than 1000 involved actors from policy, industry and university entities (BWVI 2014a), thus creating its own audience and evidence based sanctification of the discourse trajectory. It establishes the weight of what is “said and seen” that cannot be undone and is no longer questioned at later stages, even though the actual data that established the metric was never solidified or made public. As such the discourse is reappropriating parts of the regional economy,
the representative entities that contributed to the strategic principles, as a mechanism of legitimation.

The following section will present the narrative theme of Hamburg as a media city and will adopt the same structure, first presenting the data to establish the narrative theme and then following up with a concluding Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis in the conclusion of the section.

5.2.3 Hamburg as a Media City

This section presents the narrative theme of Hamburg as a media city and its relevance within discourse trajectory as it develops towards entrepreneurship policy. The section will first present the data, ranging from textual documents to observational notes, and will conclude with a Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis in the conclusion.

Historically, Hamburg has been a city with many media and press outlets, agencies and other media industry related firms, a fact that is commonly referenced in the discourse under investigation. This is often attributed with tradition and pride, when mentioning that leading magazines, newspapers and tv news are produced in the city (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016b) and also highlighted by the fact that the media cluster initiative Hamburg@work was founded in 1997 under the name of Hamburg newmedia@work as the first cluster initiative in the metropolitan region and as one of the first in German comparison (BWVI 2016). When the Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city was established in 2002, the senate referenced an unnamed and unpublished study by KPMG about strengths and weaknesses of the IT sector in Hamburg, highlighted its potential as an information and communications technology location and emphasised the importance of the new media industry and its relation to the IT sector by integrating it in the media cluster initiative under the new name Hamburg@work (SKHH 2002). Consequently, from this time forward the industry cluster was addressing the media/IT industry.

"An analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the IT location Hamburg by management consultancy KPMG from 2002 highlights that Hamburg has good chances to advance its position as an information and communication technology location and catch up to the competition [...] On this premise, the successful new media initiative ‘Hamburg newmedia@work’ has been commissioned, due to the close proximity of the NewMedia sector to the IT industry and its existing networks, to consistently extend the focus of its activities to include companies in the IT industry. Among other things, this shall be made clear through the new name hamburg@work.” (SKHH 2002 p.35, translated by the author)

In context of the extended Leitbild for Hamburg as a city for talents and Hamburg as an international city published in 2007, the media and IT industry is already portrayed as a leading
sector in German comparison that is closely linked to the culture or creative economy (BFHH 2007 p.13, see Appendix D). The historic relevance of the media industry in Hamburg is commonly used to portrait Hamburg as a media city, or rather a media capital, for example in context of the creation of the creative industry cluster that spawned from a 2006 report on the culture industry in Hamburg (BKM 2006 p.6, see Appendix D) and various other instances, like reports of the Hamburg@work initiatives (e.g. in Hamburg@work 2008b p.6, 2009a p.2 and p.4, see Appendix D). With increasing relevance of digital media, the industry cluster is also more and more associated with technology-driven innovation in analysis by the chamber of commerce (e.g. in HK 2015 p.3, 2016b p.6, see Appendix D) and Hamburg@work, for example:

“Technological innovations and the convergence of previously separate areas of the media and IT industries are providing the industry with an increasing and unprecedented dynamic. The internet as a driver of innovation provides a platform for numerous new services and business ideas. Our city has long been a stronghold not just for traditional media but also for new digital media.” (Prof. Dr. Karin von Welck (senator for culture) in Hamburg@work 2010a p.1, translated by the author)

Also in the era of Scholz’ mayorship, the historic relevance of the media industry is commonly used as a narrative of previous success that new narrative motives build upon. Especially in public speeches, the media industry is used as a key element for Hamburg’s prospering economy (e.g. in Scholz 2011h, 2011f, 2012h, 2012q, 2013h, see Appendix D), both in the past and for the future and with special reference to motives of internationality, creativity and innovation:

“Hamburg is Germany’s media metropolis. And we will stay that way.” (Scholz 2011g, translated by the author)

“We are proud to be home to high performing companies across all branches of the media and creative industries: From long established publishing horses such as Gruner + Jahr, Axel Springer, Spiegel, Zeit, Bauer und Ganske to NDR and the German headquarters of leading global companies of the new economy such as Google, Facebook and XING.” (Scholz 2012l, translated by the author)

“The changes of the digital transformation are particularly dynamic in the media industry. In publishing, media, music, film and game industries, creativity and economic success and technology go hand in hand. The city made good use of its opportunities: More than 25.000 companies and more than 100.000 employees make Hamburg the leading IT and media location.” - (Scholz 2016b, translated by the author)
The mayor is building on an exploitable narrative of the past, the long-standing tradition of classical media outlets profiling the city as a media city and attributed the media/IT industry cluster with technology-driven innovation. On the backdrop of the digital transformation and the rise of the internet, the alignment of the media industry and the IT industry serves the narrative theme of the media city, while extending the pre-existing notions of internationality and innovation as aspirations.

Initially formed as “Hamburg newmedia@work” in 1997, the media/IT cluster initiative was renamed to Hamburg@work in 2002 in the context of the Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city (SKHH 2002 p. 35). Its main objective was to foster the network of decision makers within the media and IT industry to secure Hamburg's leading position among Germany’s media and IT locations (e.g. in Hamburg@work 2008a p.3, 2009a p5, see Appendix D). Over the years, various so-called Aktionslinien - lines of actions - have been spawned to address trends within the media industry, such as eCommerce, games or newTV (e.g. in Hamburg@work 2010a p.3; BFHH 2012a p.21, 2013b p.15, see Appendix D). Hamburg@work is considered not just as one of the first cluster initiatives but also the largest media/IT industry network in Germany and a prime example of how networks of actors are operated in the city.

In the period of Scholz’ mayorship, the media/IT industry cluster and its networking organisation Hamburg@work became deeply intertwined with policy agenda and new initiatives at the highest level of government. The media industry served as a blueprint for the digital transformation and innovative change attributed to it and provided the foundation for the various policy programs catering towards innovation and with increasing intensity during Scholz’ mayorship also towards entrepreneurship.

Amt Medien

Starting from the working agenda of the senate formed in 2011, responsibility for the media/IT cluster and more importantly media policy (e.g. in Scholz 2012i, 2012t, 2012v, 2013b, 2013l, 2013m, 2015m, 2017a) was allocated at the Senate Office, consolidating the responsibility for the media/IT industry cluster at the highest level of government (e.g. in SKHH 2011a p.26; Scholz 2012a, 2012e, 2013r, see Appendix D). Shortly after Scholz took office, Carsten Brosda was appointed head of the newly created Amt Medien (media department) of the Senate Office (Senatskanzlei) (SKHH 2011b), reaffirming the mayor’s strategic emphasis on media and IT (e.g. in Scholz 2013p, 2013q), for example:

“That’s why, at the beginning of term of office, I allocated responsibility for IT, among other things, in the new Amt Medien [media department] at the Senate Office. This should make it clear that this is a very relevant area for Hamburg and its economy.” (Scholz 2011j, translated by the author)
Under direct oversight of the mayor, Brosda was responsible for anything related to media policy and the media/IT industry cluster as well as elements of the creative industry (SKHH 2011b), all of which culminated in the creation of the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative (SKHH 2014). The mayor also made it evident that these topics had high priority for him (e.g. in Scholz 2015g, 2015j, 2015o, 2017g) by advocating himself as senator for the media industry (e.g. in Scholz 2012h, 2014c, 2014h, see Appendix D) with strong emphasis on media policy for a number of years (e.g. in Scholz 2011g, 2013j, see Appendix D) and attributing innovative programs to his mayorship:

“We created a Kreativgesellschaft [creative society - advocacy group for the creative industry] that looks after young and creative founders in particular. We created the Amt Medien [media department] at the Senate Office that aims to improve the general conditions of the media location Hamburg and also accompanies the ADC festival. [...] And we are starting a new initiative with nextMedia.Hamburg that aims to help the development of digital business models.” (Scholz 2014e, translated by the author)

Beyond the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative that was operated from the Amt Medien, media policy and digital policy became integral parts of the responsibilities of Brosda and Scholz. Topics such as copyright legislation reform, the federal interstate broadcasting treaty and other internet related legislation were advocated out of the Amt Medien to emphasise and strengthen the position of Hamburg as a media city, a city of content and a media capital in Europe (Scholz 2011g, 2013j, 2014l, 2014m, 2017c, 2017e). Among others, Hamburg hosted the annual Media Dialog event - Mediendialog - to discuss media policy with stakeholders from Germany’s media industry (BKM 2019), the Hamburg Innovation Summit, a platform event for innovation and knowledge transfer with representatives from civic society, university, industry and policy entities (BWVI 2018a), or the Hamburg IT strategy conference - Hamburger IT-Strategietage - which attracted high profile stakeholder from industry and policy to discuss the digital transformation (nextMedia.Hamburg 2014a) and was also attended by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014 (Merkel 2014).

The author participated in various meetings to organise the Mediendialog in 2015, which was organised by the Amt Medien - media department - at the Senate Office before it was reallocated at the Ministry of Culture and Media (BMK) during Carsten Brosda’s ascent as Senator for Culture and Media in 2017 (hamburg.de/bkm/mediendialog/). As an executive of a regional media corporation the author was invited to participate and contribute to the agenda of the event as well as to advocacy surrounding new legislation in media policy, mainly surrounding copyright and the to be reformed Interstate Broadcasting Agreement. The meetings were all hosted at the Amt Medien in a representative building at the city centre, across from the city hall and hosted by Carsten Brosda who joined the meeting composed of around 20 members from
regional media corporations with his entourage and clear layer of detachment from participants. Even though advertised as being discursive and considerate of perspectives from industry, the meetings were by invite only and unknown outside the cycles of its attendees, solidifying the closed network of actors within the discourse community that did not adequately represent the media industry within the region. Beyond that, the meetings turned out to be not discursive but rather affirmative. While policy stakeholders presented current thinking and preliminary programs and proposals for the Mediendialog and the advocacy initiatives on a legislative level, no details were shared and the opportunities to actually debate the concrete policy were limited to contextual commentary. The main objective of the organising committee seemed confined to witness the organisation of the high-profile media industry event that also involved a senate reception with prominent attendees from the regional media/IT industry, national press, and guest speakers, such as the MIT Media Lab director (Scholz 2015r), and thereby sanctify the agenda, program and overall orientation as co-authored by industry representatives, as publicly advertised (SKHH 2015c).

However, since media policy is not at the core of this discourse analysis, the authors refrain from deeper consideration and highlights only elements that bleed into the field of entrepreneurship policy. The initiative nextMedia.Hamburg is a cornerstone of the entrepreneurship policy agenda under Scholz’ mayorship and popularised the emphasis on startups on top of existing narrative motives of innovation. The next section summarises the configuration of discourse that ultimately leads to the narrative theme of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city on top of Hamburg as a media city.

nextMedia.Hamburg

Within the Amt Medien at the Senate Office a new next media initiative was formed in 2012 which was intended to augment existing Aktionslinien - lines of action - around eCommerce and games - Gamecity Hamburg - within the Hamburg@work cluster initiative for the media/IT industry (BFHH 2012a, 2013b) and address the digital transformation in the media industry (Hamburg@work 2012a). The mayor adopted existing programs and attributed them as narratives of success to position the new initiative spawned under his leadership:

“We are leading in Europe in the field of online browser games, we are Germany’s eCommerce capital and the incubator for Next Media, i.e. the generation of media, may it be print, digital or moving images.” (Scholz 2012a, translated by the author)

The initial phase of the next media initiative was met with some scepticism, especially from the press and due to the fact that it was controlled from within the newly created Amt Medien that aggregated the responsibility for the media/IT cluster at the highest level of government, for example:
“In addition, there was no call for tenders for the Next Media program developed in 2012, even though it has a budget of more than 200,000 Euro and would subsequently have been required to issue a call for tenders. Also, the Senate Office, which is channeling its contribution through the Hamburgische Wirtschaftsförderung (HWF) [Hamburg’s business development entity], ultimately steers the project itself and bypasses the HWF.” (Meyer-Wellmann 2013, translated by the author)

Yet, the official discourse did not engage with the criticism and in 2014 the initiative was officially launched as nextMedia.Hamburg and introduced by the mayor as the evolution of Hamburg@work (e.g. in SKHH 2014; Scholz 2014g, 2014h, 2014n, see Appendix D), another narrative of success to build upon and picked up by the press (e.g. in Geisler 2014; Meyer-Wellmann 2014, see Appendix D). It integrated other initiatives like eCommerce, Gamecity or newTV under its umbrella towards a content industry at the intersection of content & technology and also increasingly emphasised startups (e.g. in BWVI 2014a p.112; HK 2014 p.19, 2015 p.39; ECCE 2017, see Appendix D), reaffirming the leading position of Hamburg as a media city and a creative city:

“nextMedia.Hamburg is not just supporting the digital transformation of companies and the location but also aims to secure and extend the leading position of Hamburg as a media and creative city.” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2014a p.6, translated by the author)

In context of the regional innovation strategy published in 2014, the media/IT industry cluster was not just used as the reference industry cluster for the cluster policy approach in the city, but also directly attributed with high relevance for transformational processes and new business models that are linked to the strategic goal of fostering innovation (BWVI 2014a p.112, see Appendix D), a connection heavily enforced by nextMedia.Hamburg (e.g. in nextMedia.Hamburg 2014a p4, 2014b, 2016a p.6, 2017c, see Appendix D) the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (e.g. in BWVI 2016 p. 9, see Appendix E) and also Carsten Brosda, who became senator for Culture and Media in 2017 who also repetitively articulates the narrative motive of Hamburg as a media city (e.g. Carsten Brosda in BKM 2017 p.3; Brosda 2018a).

Special attention was given to startups that are associated with innovative potential. Especially the mayor emphasised their relevance within the digital transformation (e.g. in Scholz 2014i, 2014o, see Appendix D) and has been attributed with being the mayor for the startup economy, as he appeared in various entities within the entrepreneurial ecosystem, such as the shared office beta haus Hamburg (Scholz 2014k, see Appendix D), or in community events and
conferences (Scholz 2014i, 2013s, 2015d) that were not frequented by high profile politicians before.

“That’s why we put the topic of content and technology on the agenda of the IT-Gipfel der Bundesregierung [IT summit of the federal government] in 2014. And we started the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative that supports the digital transformation of the media and creative industries. We have the opportunity to grow a vibrant digital startup scene around the established and successful companies and brands. This interaction creates the innovations we need to win the future of the media.” (Scholz 2015u, translated by the author)

This emphasis on startups is later picked up by other entities in the city as well as by the EU Commission in its Digital Entrepreneurship Monitor and Digital Transformation Monitor (e.g. in European Commission 2016b p.4, 2017 p.5, see Appendix D). In 2017 Carsten Brosda, who was head of the Amt Medien at the Senate Office until then, became Senator for Culture and Media. This shift resulted in the Amt Medien being integrated in the renamed Ministry of Culture and Media, formerly named the Ministry of Culture (Nünning 2017). Following these changes, the startup targeting services were reallocated inside the Hamburg Invest - the city’s business development unit, formerly known as HWF - Hamburgische Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung mbH - while the nextMedia initiative aimed at the media industry was reallocated to the KreativGesellschaft under great affirmation of senators from Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation as well as Media and Culture (e.g. in Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2016 p.84, 2017):

“The project comes under the nextMedia.Hamburg campaign run by Hamburg’s media and digital business sector, whose goals include: developing content-business models for the future at the interface between content and technology; encouraging knowledge transfer between research, industry and businesses; and linking start-ups with the local media and digital industry.” (Brosda 2018b)

The development of nextMedia.Hamburg as the platform initiative to foster the digital transformation is thus linked to narrative of innovation and growth, Hamburg as a media city and ultimately through the increasing professionalisation of the support mechanisms within the city alongside the evolving subsidy system to a wider notion of Hamburg as entrepreneurial city with a vibrant startup economy and entrepreneurial ecosystem. This was also substantiated in talks with MDE1 and MDE2, who shared a number of documents that informed the overall program design of nextMedia.Hamburg and the startup support services within the nextMedia.StartHub. All documents where industry reports or startup monitor data created by consultancy firms or
media coverage on entrepreneurial ecosystems in Berlin or New York underscoring the premise that entrepreneurial activity is good and should be encouraged (Lundstrom & Stevenson 2005; Ács & Szerb 2007; Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko 2015), as discussed in section 2.2. However, beyond the affirmative proposition no other substantive input to the program design could be mentioned. Academic insights towards one perspective or another cannot be found, matching findings by scholars (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007; Mason & Brown 2013; Westwood 2015; Brown et al. 2017). Rather the policy makers used non-targeted industry reports and general media, subjecting themselves to persistent romantic views of entrepreneurship or innovation (Massa & Testa 2008; Perry et al. 2010).

Before elaborating on the narrative theme of the entrepreneurial city however, the phenomenon of building on previous narratives of success warrant some more attention. In context of the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative, which spawned out of the 1997 cluster initiative Hamburg@work, also the Gamecity Hamburg initiative, originally also part of Hamburg@work and then later absorbed by nextMedia.Hamburg, illustrates the appropriation of narrative despite criticism or resistance in the discourse.

Gamecity Hamburg

As a narrative of previous success, the Gamecity initiative is frequently mentioned in entity documents and media coverage and especially by the mayor throughout the years. It was an initiative created in 2003 within the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation - named Gamecity Hamburg - that was adopted by the Hamburg@work cluster initiative for the media/IT industry (Hamburg@work 2004). The initiative fostered the game industry through direct and indirect subsidies and led to the creation of the GamecityLab at Hamburg University of Applied Sciences (Greule at al. 2007; Hamburg@work 2009b, 2010a; BWVI 2014c) and subsequently the creation of a game development master program at the Media Technology department of the university in 2010 (Hamburg@work 2010a; BKM 2019). It also served as a platform frequently referenced as making Hamburg the leading location for games in Germany (e.g. in Hamburg@work 2008a p.9; BFHH 2009b p.3, see Appendix D) and was adopted in Hamburg’s Leitbild and accompanied by specific subsidy programs (Hamburg@work 2006, 2009a).

“For the Ministry of Economics, the’ 'Game-City” is part of the concept ‘Wachsende Stadt’ [growing city] because the industry is constantly increasing revenue and jobs. In the summer Hamburg was the first federal state to start a special funding program for the development of computer games.” (Späth 2006, translated by the author)

Alongside these developments, Hamburg was perceived as a prospering location of game development firms in media coverage (e.g. in Laufer 2008; Reuther 2008; Wassink 2018, see Appendix D), that underlines the perceived success of the Gamecity initiative and was commonly
connected to economic growth and job creation (e.g. in BFHH 2009b p.3; Hamburg@work 2009a p.16, 2010a p.12, 2010a p.12, 2012a p.12; Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2012 p.74; HK 2014 p.7, see Appendix D), for example:

“Games can serve as an example: As an Aktionslinie [line of activity] of Hamburg@work the gamecity:Hamburg ensures optimal conditions for around 150 Hamburg-based games companies. With around 2000 actors the gamecity:Hamburg is already the largest regional network for the game industry in Germany. Since gamecity:Hamburg was founded in 2003, the number of permanent employees in Hamburg’s game industry has increased from 800 to more than 4000.” (BFHH 2013b p.27, translated by the author)

Once integrated in nextMedia.Hamburg as the umbrella initiative for the media/IT industry cluster, the Gamecity narrative was also adopted in context of the new activities spawned by nextMedia.Hamburg. To some extent, it served as a blueprint and is commonly mentioned throughout the evolution of the initiative (e.g. in Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2016 p.85; Games Career 2016, see Appendix D).

“Launched in 2003, the project gamecity:Hamburg supports businesses from Hamburg’s gaming industry. The network was founded with the intention of developing Hamburg as an attractive location for the industry. The plan has proven to be a success: since the launch of gamecity:Hamburg, the number of jobs in the value chain of games has increased from 800 to 4,500 with a good 150 businesses in the segment. The network itself, related collaboration opportunities, links with the media and IT industries as well as the range of sector-specific support services make Hamburg one of Germany’s leading games locations.” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2015a p.1)

The narrative of success was also adopted by the mayor (e.g. in Scholz 2011j, 2012n, 2015l, 2015x; Opresnik 2014, see Appendix D) and often underpinned the tangents of Hamburg as an international city, as a media city, as an innovative city and also as an entrepreneurial city, which will be presented in detail later on, for example:

“We are leading in Europe in the sector of Online Browser Games.” (Scholz 2012a, translated by the author)

“From the outset, the GameCity Initiative was part of why this partnership happened in the first place. The project managers at GameCity helped with the initial relocation to Hamburg as well as with this latest move. To this day, the company has remained a very committed supporter of the work of the cluster initiative and also joined the new initiative
nextMedia.Hamburg as soon as it was launched. With a payroll of 330 people from 25 different countries, you are one of the cornerstones of the games industry in Hamburg.” (Scholz 2014d)

“Hamburg provided targeted support to the games industry early on, the first German federal state to do so. Right from the beginning, gamecity:Hamburg was part of this. This initiative from nextMedia began in 2003 with the goal of meeting other media at eye level. This wasn’t primarily about funding, but about quite ordinary things such as organizing a trade-fair booth for gamers. gamecity also helped InnoGames to settle and relocate to its new premises. To this day, they consider themselves a caretaker for the games industry – facilitating contacts and opening doors. Their success speaks for itself. By now, almost 4,000 people in Hamburg work for companies in the games industry. Three of the five most important online games companies were founded here and are still located in the city.” (Scholz 2017d)

Yet, despite the appearance of the Gamecity narrative as a reference of success, general media coverage also highlights less favourable developments in the game industry throughout Scholz’ mayorship (e.g. in Geisler 2013; Hamburger Abendblatt 2016; Hüsing 2016; Schmidt 2017, see Appendix D), for example:

“Bigpoint is laying off 120 employees. The game developer Bigpoint is laying off 120 employees, Founder Heiko Huberts draws the consequences and resigns his position as CEO.” (Hofmann 2012, translated by the author)

“Germany’s game developer with the largest number of employees is cutting hundreds of jobs and a number of games. Alarming: the success of Goodgame Studios essentially depends on two sales hits. The GamesWirtschaft-Analyse evaluates the prospects of the Hamburg game giant.” (Games Wirtschaft 2016, translated by the author)

“From 1200 to 350 employees in just six months: According to a confirmed dpa report, Goodgame Studios is cutting another 200 jobs. Just over a year ago, Goodgame Studios could barely run in front of its power - more than 10000 applications were reviewed per month, 80 employees were busy with recruiting suitable candidates alone. Now the company is fighting against doom: After a wave of layoffs during the Gamescon 2016, the Hamburg browser game and app developer (Goodgame Empire, Empire: Four Kingdoms) is cutting another 200 jobs.” (Games Wirtschaft 2017, translated by the author)
Significant shifts in the industry seem to have affected regional game development firms. Despite these indications, the narrative of success used by stakeholders within the entrepreneurship policy discourse did not reference any of these developments, showing how resistance to dominant discourse is silenced and suffocated under the weight of the machine repetitively articulating the dominant discourse, its control and governmentality. In talks with MDE3, it was also shared that original materials created for the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative used the Gamecity as a reference, copying and pasting established content pieces, changing names and context but leaving overall structure intact. Beyond that, the primary objective of creating content exploitable for media coverage and public relations at local events was driving the content produced that MDE3 was charged with in the program’s initial phase. In talks with UNI1 about the historical genesis of the GamecityLab at Hamburg University of Applied Sciences, it was also shared that for example the naming convention was chosen in reconcilement with other entities involved in the original proposal to align alongside established programs and conventions, namely the Gamecity initiative at Hamburg@work, thus subscribing to the existing narrative in the discourse.

In a senate document summarising the era of Scholz’ mayorship once he became Finance Minister for the federal government in 2018, the leading position of Hamburg as a media city and digital city is highlighted as a key achievement of his policy agenda and directly linked to economic growth and job creation, without providing any indication of how this change is related to any political program:

“Hamburg has successfully expanded its leading position as a media and digital location. This can be seen in the increasing number of employees in the media and digital industries: For the years 2011 to 2016, a growth of 13.5 percent or increase of just under 11000 employees with social security was recorded.” (SKHH 2018 p.106, translated by the author)

In summary the narrative motives around Hamburg as a media city are key to the discourse under investigation. Especially in the later years of Scholz’ mayorship, it merged with narrative motives for Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city with strong emphasis on startups, technology-driven innovation etc.

Conclusion

Also for the narrative theme of Hamburg as a media city, a very clear trajectory of the discourse is apparent from the evaluated documents and observations within the discourse community and policy ecosystem. Same as the narrative of Hamburg as an innovative city, the media city dates back decades and is associated with the IT industry sector ever since the Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city was established in 2002 through the official commission of Hamburg@work as
the media/IT industry cluster initiative (SKHH 2002). This seminal establishment is based on an unnamed and unpublished study by KPMG (mentioned in SKHH 2002) that cannot be found in public repositories or private archives of any stakeholder the author contacted or developed a relationship with. The premise, however, is accepted as given in the discourse and perpetuates ever since, especially in narrative motives around comparison with other cities - Hamburg being portrayed as a media capital - and technology-driven innovation, which is primarily attributed to digital media and IT sector in light of the digital transformation and the internet. Certainly, sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff, Kim & Sperling 2007; Jasanoff 2015) about the internet (Felt 2014), the creative city (Landry 2008) and the creative class (Florida 2002) intertwined in this layer of the discourse that gained considerable traction under Scholz’ mayorship, as presented before.

From the very beginning Scholz reattributed the narrative of the media city under his governance and made the media/IT industry and media policy in particular a cornerstone of his political agenda, as was evidenced through the establishment of the Amt Medien - media department - at the Senate Office and the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative spawning under his direct supervision, circumventing traditional operating procedures. Building on the existing narrative of success from the media industry in Hamburg, strongly connected to motives of tradition and responsibility in regard to the fourth power in the state, the media industry is portrayed as a stronghold of employment in Hamburg with an explicitly referenced growth trajectory, even though the connected metric may be largely contaminated through blurry lines between the media/IT industry and the creative industry cluster created in 2010 (BFHH 2009b; Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2012, 2016) that is characterised through proportionally high amounts of self-employment rather than prosperous entrepreneurial activity the narrative seems to suggest.

As such, the mayor did not change the narrative about media but reappropriated the narrative theme to self-legitimise his position and take direct ownership over media policy at the highest level of government. This decision to create the Amt Medien at the Senate Office under his direct supervision can be seen as a previously unattempted approach to circumvent typical association and oversight over cluster policy at lower entities within the political hierarchy. Even though the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) aggregated ownership over all cluster initiatives under Scholz (SKHH 2018), the media/IT industry cluster became key to profiling Hamburg and especially the mayor as the senator for media, an advocate of media policy on a federal level with direct control over the media/IT industry cluster initiative nextMedia.Hamburg that spawned out of the Senate Office and assimilated various activities previously operated by the public private entity Hamburg@work. Despite criticism from general media (e.g. in Meyer-Wellmann 2013), the nextMedia.Hamburg program was steered through appointed officials at the Senate Office, most prominently Carsten Brosda, who can be seen as a direct proxy of the mayor (see section 5.1).
Most critically within the discourse under investigation, the narrative of Hamburg as media city is seeded by the mayor at the highest level of the regional government and in this case directly controlled and managed through direct oversight of the Amt Medien that repetitively articulates and embodies the discourse through the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative, introducing new terminology - the phrase regime - and knowledge about Hamburg as a city of content & technology and thus creating the governmentally of the discourse (Foucault 1984, 1997) from the centre to the periphery. The government seizes its ability to intervene, manage and rationalise the behaviours and practices within the media/IT industry cluster through allocated resources. As such the productivity of power effects overt change and regulation on how the media industry is understood, operated, and advocated for on both economic and political levels, hence the media policy advocacy. Other entities, such as the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) or Ministry of Culture, and later Ministry of Culture and Media (BMK) as well as place marketing entities such as Hamburg Marketing or Hamburgische Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung (HWF), later rebranded as Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft (HIW), echo what is said and self-perpetuate the discourse, illustrating the biopower of discourse (Foucault 1978, 1984) as it shapes their appearance and behaviours, e.g. the various documents highlighting Hamburg’s relevance as the media city, the emphasis on media policy and the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative as a cornerstone of the regional innovation strategy that is also increasingly adopted in the narrative theme of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city with dedicated programs catering towards startups. As such it creates the metrification or “data of discourse” by ranking, partitioning, labeling and defining social structures and subjects therein, what they are and how they should behave, that are then accepted and ultimately provide legitimacy to control, legislate and discipline.

Any resistance to the dominant discourse from media about the political control over the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative or commonly adopted narratives of success justifying the initiatives or program orientation (e.g. in case of Gamecity Hamburg as described above), is silenced or ignored and does not appear in official discourse, neither in written oral or enacted form. While the media seems boxed in on the side-lines to comment on the discourse, the reach of the mayor transcends policy silos. Beyond the role of the mayor himself, civil service personnel carrying out policies, rules and regulations serve to make the lie real. In circulating the discourse and its entailed knowledge, these representatives in proverbial terms say that the emperor has clothes and brings the biopower (Foucault 1978, 1984) of the subjects through the productive power of what is said and seen. These dynamics allow the discourse to be shaped to reinforce the governmentality (Foucault 1984, 1997), suffocating any resistance through the weight of what is said and seen. The direct attribution of media policy and support for media/IT industry interests allows the network of actors to create the knowledge that governs the discourse - as makers of knowledge - and constitute mechanisms of difference and distinction, for example in comparison to other metropolises like Berlin, Cologne, or Munich. Anyone talking about Hamburg as the
media city already accepts the discourse seeded at the pin of the wheel with its roles, abilities, institutional arrangements, and practices.

The Bourdieusian perspective shows how the discourse is embodied within the field of public policy through the actors' habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) and display of their cultural, social, and political capital (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Above all, the mayor is gaining direct control over the media/IT industry cluster policy agenda with undeniable capital that allowed him to allocate control at the Senate Office despite publicly expressed resistance. The mayor and his subordinates establish the field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and dominate the discourse through the establishment of the rules of the game - illusio (Bourdieu 1998b) - and the fields inherent values - doxa (Bourdieu 1998b) - that ultimately results in the misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) as the actors think and act as if their discursive construct is real. Within the field all institutions that are directly or indirectly involved in the discourse (e.g. media, law, education, local government) are invested in the predetermined nature of the mayor’s position and the discursive institutional arrangements that provide the legitimacy through the embodied performativity of their capitals. Even though capitals differ from position to position, e.g. actors from different entities and related fields will have distinct motives, interests, priorities and means to influence the discourse depending on their position within the field, their role, rank and exploitable capital, actors ultimately align behind the trajectory of the discourse. A prime example of this may be prominent actors such as Carsten Brosda that, even though pursuing his own political career, serves as a primary proxy for the media policy agenda and the media/IT cluster initiative. Also less visible actors such as IFB2 or MD3 shape their behaviour according to their practically attainable capital (Bourdieu 2000), deploying their weight on individual documents or program implementations they are involved with and can actually influence, while remaining overall aligned to the discourse illusio and doxa (Bourdieu 1998b).

Even though reappropriating prior narrative motives, entities, and programs within the discourse community to self-legitimise the position within the field, the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative is presented as a genuinely new program, addressing previously unanswered needs, while in reality it is just extending the previously operated initiative Hamburg@work under a new label with mostly same personnel, programs and orientation. The narrative of Hamburg as a media city is deeply interconnected with previously described themes of innovation and growth and positions the media/IT industry as a driver of innovation and growth through technology-driven entrepreneurship, that is later mutated towards the narrative theme of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city, mostly alongside the evolution of the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative, resulting in the new phrase regime being adopted and integrated everywhere, starting from ministries to universities and private entities within the entrepreneurial ecosystem, such as the Next Media Accelerator, a privately operated business accelerator with close ties to the discourse community. It shows the illocutionary force of the discourse. As if spoken into existence, actors
adopt and believe it - misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) - as the spaces are encrypted with the knowledge and the discourse is performed through prescribed practices. The knowledge of the media city, what can be said and by whom is embodied by representatives of the nextMedia.Hamburg, the Amt Medien, Carsten Brosda and Olaf Scholz, that wear the clothes, talk the language and manifest symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) through the seal of office as they foster programs for the media/IT industry, advocate media policy initiatives on federal levels or increasing accentuate support for technology-driven entrepreneurship to establish Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city. Anyone not permitted within the network of actors, so potentially most citizens, must assume the capitals of the dominant discourse and either follow policies, practices, processes and procedures to conform to the prescribed rules of the game or opt to self-deny access to the discourse. Lacking access to the required capitals or resources, such as expertise, education, training, social network, funding etc. they are marked as lesser beings, showing the discourse’s inherent mechanisms of differentiation, distinction and so domination.

The author’s experience of participating in various meetings to organise the Mediendialog in 2015 not just exemplifies the necessity to possess sufficient social and political capital to carry any weight in the discourse. Furthermore, the process of organising the event with an agenda that is building on co-authorship from the ecosystem can be seen as an act of appropriation. Some entities and actors in the ecosystem are invited to participate and by playing the game create the “data of discourse” as a mechanism to self-legitimise the process. The experience illustrates the encryption of spaces with knowledge, as in the offices of the Amt Medien, and how the discourse was performed or enacted with acts of symbolic violence, excluding members of the media industry from attending or even knowing about and heavily limiting influence of actual attendees through display of political and social capital, suffocating any alternative voice to what is proposed on highest level of the organising committee, dominating the discourse and revealing its self-serving nature in terms of Bourdieu.

The Gamecity narrative can serve as another example of how power knowledge and dominance is created within the discourse. Building on narratives of success from early days of the Gamecity initiative in the 2000s, the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative adopts not just similar lines of advocating programs but uses the Gamecity narrative and anecdotal evidence of success stories as unrefusible evidence of the program having long-term impact and positive effect on job creation, economic growth, and vibrancy of the media/IT industry in general. Various public documents advocate how the game industry created jobs in certain periods (e.g. from 2003 to 2008 in BFHH 2013b p.27 or nextMedia.Hamburg 2015a), but this seems dated to say the least and was not updated over the years while narrative focuses increasingly on mostly browser game development studios having offices in Hamburg, popular games and brands to illustrate the validity of the Gamecity narrative (Scholz 2011j, Scholz 2012a, 2012n, 2015i, 2015x, 2017d, Opresnik 2014). The author is not claiming that the Gamecity initiative did not impact job creation.
or that it had no effect. In fact, as there are those who “play the game” and the discourse can be seen to work. As such, the discourse is appropriating actors within the field to legitimise the discourse. To this effect, the programs established to support development of new game prototypes are made available with considerable support efforts from supporting entities, providing advice to applying companies or individuals on how to write applications, how to qualify etc., ensuring that some successfully access funding. Beyond any company having received funding, the process is legitimising the discourse itself through the “data of discourse” or its metrification as evidence-based sanctification, creating the audience for the policy itself. However, for the perseverance of the discourse is more critical who really benefits from the game, which are the producers of the knowledge within the discourse. The city created a special funding program for development of computer games in 2006 (Späth 2006) and even though no metrics of actual impact or return on investment is to be found in that regard, it might have contributed to employment growth that certainly represents a general trend of online/browser games or games in general in the early 2000s (Statista 2014, 2020a). However, the Hamburg game industry heavily emphasised browser games, which certainly underwent heavy crisis over the years, with revenues stagnating or declining ever since 2008 (Statista 2020b, 2021a) along the rise of games for mobile phone platforms (Statista 2021b) and the persistence of console games (Statista 2021a). Various reports of Hamburg based companies cutting jobs or even closing offices illustrate this effect (e.g. in Hofmann 2012; Geisler 2013; Hamburger Abendblatt 2016; Hüsing 2016; Games Wirtschaft 2017; Schmidt 2017) and at least call into question the long term viability of the Gamecity initiative and its effect on economic growth and job creation. Beyond the in vain attempt to conclusively resolve any questions regarding the Gamecity initiative’s impact on employment growth due to lack of any substantive data, the discourse analysis reveals that none of these less-favorable tangents of narrative are considered in the dominant discourse. Even despite repeated articulation of resistance and critique of the dominant narrative with clear empirical evidence from industry, the narrative of the successful Gamecity initiative remains intact as a justification for the nextMedia.Hamburg program alignment. If at all, the emphasis on the game industry has faded out over time in favour of startups within the narrative theme of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city, where similar mechanisms of support exist to support entities to successfully apply to subsidy programs provided by IFB Hamburg. Despite the criticism and unresolved challenges, the discourse formation in itself and the inherent structures, entities and actors of the discourse remain unharmed if not strengthened by the exploited narrative. The example showcases how the discourse creates its own resistance (Foucault 1980) which is then ignored or suffocated under the weight of what is said and seen in the dominant discourse. Despite increasing criticism about the actual impact of the Gamecity initiative and indications of negative effects, the initial narrative of success prevails. As criticism is mainly confined to the industry itself and boxed in media coverage, the dominant discourse is operated across policy silos and repeatedly articulated on all stages of the discourse. The narrative of success does not only appear in
media/IT cluster documents but in official government statements, political speeches, strategy documents, place marketing campaigns, industry reports and press material, overshadowing any tangible counter narrative. As such the dominant power-knowledge reinforces its governmentality in terms of Foucault (1984, 1997) and the misrecognition, symbolic violence and mechanisms of distinction and domination in terms of Bourdieu (1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992).

The analytical coupling of Foucault and Bourdieu reveals the self-perpetuating nature of the discourse along the predominantly and illocutionary force of the mayor and his proxies, realigning all existing programs, initiatives, entities, and stakeholders under the directive of the new knowledge about Hamburg as the media city, establishing the policy trajectory. As such the trajectory is self-serving as it revolves around the core field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), most relevantly the mayor himself and his direct proxies to self-affirm and advance their position within the field, as evidenced for example through Carsten Brosda’s remarkable career from being appointed head of the Amt Medien of the Senate Office in June 2011 to representative of the senate for the media industry in 2013, then Staatsrat (privy council) for the Ministry of Culture and the departments media and digitisation in the Senate Office in March 2016 and finally senator of the Ministry of Culture in February 2017, which led to the media department being integrated into his ministry that was then renamed to the Ministry of Culture and Media in April 2017.

The following section will elaborate on the narrative theme of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city, which is also closely tied to the mayorship of Olaf Scholz. While it also builds on the previously presented narratives of growth, innovation, and internationalisation it extends the media city narrative towards a new phrase regime that only existed within the media/IT industry cluster and reappropriated it as the general new knowledge about the entrepreneurial city through its emphasis on startups, the entrepreneurial ecosystem and the entrepreneurial index as the performance indicator to solidify the validity of the policy orientation. The following section will first present the data to establish the narrative theme and then conclude with a Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis in the conclusion of the section.

5.2.4 Hamburg as an Entrepreneurial City

This section presents the narrative theme of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city and its relevance within the discourse on regional entrepreneurship policy. The section will first present the data, ranging from textual documents to observational notes, and will conclude with a Foucauldian and Bourdieusian analysis in the conclusion.

The narrative of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city is certainly most tied to Scholz’ mayorship from 2011 - 2018, even though there are references to entrepreneurialism before, like in the city’s vision of “Enterprise Hamburg” from 1983 that was intended to appeal to entrepreneurial residents to create economic growth (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2017). However, usually new firm formation is referred to as “Existenzgründungen” or “Gründungen”,

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with the term startup being largely absent until the period of Scholz’ mayorship. A common denominator is the intention to stimulate economic growth and job creation through firm formation, as was visible throughout the other narrative motives presented thus far.

In the 2002 Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city, Hamburg is portrayed as a leading location for new firm formation and the inherent opportunity for growth is highlighted (e.g. in SKHH 2002 p.47, see Appendix E). In the extended Leitbild from 2007, new firm formation is linked to the innovation policy, especially in the context of technology intensive industries (e.g. in BFHH 2007 p.3, see Appendix E), for which the city already created some subsidy programs, e.g. in the context of the creative industry cluster creation (e.g. in BFHH 2009b p.9; Hamburg@work 2009a p.12, see Appendix E). In the InnovationsAllianz’ guidelines from 2010, innovative new firms are also mentioned as key for leveraging innovative and growth potentials for the city. It also defines innovation support - Innovationsförderung - as the sum of all monetary and non-monetary incentives and support measures for innovation, technology transfer, learning and qualification as well as knowledge- and technology-based firm formation (e.g. in BWVI 2010a p.5 and p.29, see Appendix E).

Prior Scholz’ mayorship, there are only few references to the term startup in Hamburg@work activities, e.g. in the Gamecity or newTV Aktionslinie - line of action (e.g. in Hamburg@work 2008b p.8, 2009a p.16, see Appendix E) - for example:

“To make an example, we offer a prize at the Webfuture Award for startup companies to support the eCommerce and web 2.0 scene.” (Hamburg@work 2009a p.8, translated by the author)

“Already for the third time, innovative startup ideas from online industries made in Hamburg have been awarded with the Webfuture Award in 2009. The goal of the eCommerce competition is to support the innovative potentials of the startup scene in the metropolitan region.” (Hamburg@work 2010a p.8, translated by the author)

In summary, the terminology tied to the startup economy seems to be confined to the media/IT industry and did not appear outside the cluster initiative until the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative put it under the spotlight from 2012 onward (SKHH 2014). Even though a lot of the terminology was also used in narratives on Hamburg as a growing city, international city, innovative city or media city, narrative tangents converged in the period of 2011 - 2018 along the lines of the newly formed Amt Medien (SKHH 2011b) and attention on the media/IT industry cluster on highest level of the government with increasing attention to startups, their alleged innovative potential and relevance to the digital transformation of the economy along the established policy trajectory. In line with the mayor’s political agenda, various independent
activities tied to fostering entrepreneurial activities were aggregated and streamlined, as presented before.

Scholz initially also used the term Existenzgründungen or Gründungen (e.g. in Scholz 2011l, 2011m, 2012u, see Appendix E). In 2012, alongside the formation of the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative within the Amt Medien and the formation of the regional investment and subsidy bank IFB Hamburg and the regional innovation strategy, his vocabulary switched to startups and ever since then, the new dominant terminology was established alongside terms like ecosystem, Gründerquote (entrepreneurial index), accelerator, incubator etc., which was also adopted by other entities and stakeholders in the ecosystem. For example:

“Companies and ‘start-ups’ are typically not founded at a desk, but rather on the christmas market or a night while drinking beer [...] This is about creating a climate for creativity and entrepreneurial courage. Where, if not in the city, these two virtues can flourish? The founders need a city as a milieu to be active worldwide. Also through education and scientific research new perspectives are enabled. New ways of thinking, ideas and innovations arise and enable progress.” (Scholz 2012m, translated by the author)

“We want to support a comprehensive ecosystem that is open to anyone, who earns money with creative content. We want to support the digital transformation of existing successful content-driven business models as well as the development of new ideas on how content can be produced and distributed digitally.” (Carsten Brosda in Geisler 2014, translated by the author)

In the coalition agreement between SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen for Scholz’ second term from 2015 onwards, startups were mentioned specifically alongside the intention to create dedicated financing options for them (e.g. in SKHH 2015b, see Appendix E) which resulted in more enacted policies towards entrepreneurship (e.g. in nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a p.20; BFHH 2017d p.1, 2018b p.7; SKHH 2018 p.20, see Appendix E), for example:

“Furthermore, there are plans for a platform to support start-up companies. The platform will help stimulate the founding of new university spin-offs. This requires a support concept to be developed on the basis of existing structures that addresses various issues linked to founding new companies, such as entrepreneurial motivation, technology and idea scouting, networking and funding options.” (BWFG 2016 p.17)
“The explicit goal is to finance promising and profitable companies to strengthen Hamburg’s position in competition on innovative businesses and as an entrepreneurial and startup metropolis.” - (BFHH 2017d p.2)

“New firm formations of the type ‘startups’ as well as favorable conditions for their development (‘startup ecosystem’) are associated with increasing relevance for the positive development of innovation systems and the competitiveness of existing companies within the international competition in light of the progressing digital transformation.” (BFHH 2018a p.1)

Other stakeholders in the policy domain attribute this directly to Scholz, as correspondence with HIW1 reveals. Highlighting various support and subsidy initiatives within the city, a process of renaming, repositioning, and rebranding aligned existing and new programs under the new terminology and directive, as with the restructuring of the IBF Hamburg (BFHH 2013a) or the HIW Hamburg Invest Wirtschaftsförderungsgesellschaft mbH (HIW 2017a). The attribution of entrepreneurship policy and introduction of terminology like startups, ecosystem, accelerator etc. to Scholz’ mayorship was shared by many of the observational target (e.g. SO1, UNI1, VC1, VC2), for example:

“Startup is a fairly new term, which is why the beginning of support for this area falls into the era of Scholz. Anything prior was classic support for entrepreneurship which was primarily situated at the chamber of commerce or the HEI [...] The startup unit came to us in the era of Olaf Scholz and is part of a comprehensive network for startups in Hamburg.” (private correspondence with HIW1, translated by the author)

This development exemplifies how the existing measures within policy agenda and specific subsidy programs long preceding the mayorship of Olaf Scholz are reattributed under the umbrella of support for startups and the entrepreneurial ecosystem, building on established narrative of innovation, talent, internationalisation established in the city’s Leitbild (SKHH 2002; BFHH 2005, 2007, 2010) and the InnovationsAllianz (BWVI 2010a) and success stories from cluster initiatives (BWVI 2018a, 2019), such as Hamburg@work or nextMedia.Hamburg and its derivatives like Gamecity Hamburg as presented above.

Promotion of Entrepreneurship and the Regional Subsidy System

Key elements of the city’s measures to promote entrepreneurship are consulting and advocacy services as well as providing spaces for newly founded firms. These elements can also be found prior to Scholz’ mayorship, but rather in the context of firm formation from within universities or aimed towards more general forms of entrepreneurship (e.g. in BFHH 2007 p.19, see Appendix E). Prominent examples are the University for Technology TU Harburg and Hamburg University
of Applied Sciences (e.g. in BFHH 2077 p.20, see Appendix E) or the entrepreneurship initiative HEI - Hamburg Existengründungsinitiative (e.g. in BFHH 2012b p.13, see Appendix E).

In light of the regional innovation strategy in 2014, the non-monetary support for entrepreneurs has been extended and advertised more prominently (e.g. in HK 2014 p.24; Games Career 2016, see Appendix E). The Innovations Kontakt Stelle (IKD) Hamburg was established to provide better access to subsidy programs (BWVI 2014a) and the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative played a prominent role in establishing the networks in the entrepreneurial ecosystem and promoting the services available in the city, whether they are offered by official or private entities (e.g. in nextMedia.Hamburg 2014a p.6, 2014b, 2016a p.10, 2016b, 2016c p.2, 2016d, see Appendix E) until the startup centred services were moved inside the Hamburg Invest regional business development entity in 2017 (e.g. in HIW 2017a; SKHH 2018 p.21, see Appendix E). For example:

“HWF Hamburgische Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung mbH is extended towards a One Stop Agency for investment under the new umbrella brand ‘Hamburg Invest’ [...] Additionally, it will be the central contract point for knowledge- and technology-oriented start-ups and will connect within the startup ecosystem in the city of Hamburg.” (HIW 2017a, translated by the author)

“The Startup Unit is the new port of call for knowledge- and technology-oriented startup businesses in Hamburg. By consolidating several different services under the umbrella of Hamburg Invest, Hamburg’s rapidly growing startup ecosystem has been professionalised even further.” (HIW 2018a p.5)

Alongside the InnovationsAllianz’ guidelines published in 2010, also the regional subsidy system has been outlined to meet requirements from innovative founders, businesses, universities, research institutes and cooperation among them (BWVI 2010a). This general orientation and a subsidy system that encompasses information/consulting; coaching/qualification; monetary support; networking; culture and infrastructure can be identified in the later regional innovation strategy from 2014 (BWVI 2014a) and various activities directed from the Amt Medien, the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) as well as the regional investment and subsidy bank IFB Hamburg, which was created in 2013 as the evolution of the Hamburgische Wohnungsbaufondskreditanstalt (WK) (BFHH 2012b, 2013a). It also absorbed the Innovationsstiftung Hamburg, which hosted various activities and subsidy programs to foster innovation since 1996 (Kompetenzzentrum HanseNanoTec 2005). The IFB Hamburg also controls the subsidiary entity Innovationsstarter GmbH, originally started in 2011 (Wassink 2012), which is hosting the subsidy programs aimed at the startup economy.
One of the programs is called InnoRampUp, which already appeared in the InnovationsAllianz guidelines from 2010 (e.g. im BWVI 2010a p.39, see Appendix E). It outlines a regional monetary subsidy program aimed at innovative firm formations to support the entrepreneur’s living costs, consulting, development of prototypes and technological innovation. It is explicitly defined to complement federal subsidy programs, such as EXIST and already highlights the need for investment funds for innovative businesses in Hamburg.

“The idea of the “InnoRamp-Up” program is to establish a modular and flexibly usable program for innovative start-up projects to reduce the administrative effort on the part of the sponsors and recipients and to significantly increase the clarity and effectiveness. [...] The ‘InnoRamp-Up’ program should be complementary to the federal EXIST program. [...] Capital-intensive start-ups find opportunities for follow-up financing during the seed and start-up phase through the investment fund for young innovative companies in Hamburg.” (BWVI 2010a p.39, translated by the author)

The mayor quickly adopted the existing guidelines and took ownership of the innovation strategy and regional subsidy system reform, attributing his mayorship with the creation of the IFB Hamburg (e.g. in Scholz 2011f, see Appendix E), starting from the initial statement of his government after taking office in 2011 (Scholz 2011a, see Appendix E). In 2012 the city already created investment funds for young innovative firms, called „Beteiligungsfonds für junge innovative Unternehmen in Hamburg“ alongside the decision to create the IFB Hamburg (e.g. in BFHH 2012b p.19; BWVI 2013 pp.25-26, see Appendix E). Scholz made this move a cornerstone of his policy agenda towards entrepreneurship, for example:

“What we need is a clear and goal-oriented subsidy system that combines financing of promising research and development projects with strong consulting competence. In addition, we need a powerful net of innovation supporting infrastructure. That is why the senate has decided in December to develop the Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt [Hamburg real estate development bank] into the Hamburgischen Investitions- und Förderbank [Hamburg investment and subsidy bank], IFB in short. This way, public support for innovation will be improved and the entire support spectrum will be unified under one roof.” (Scholz 2013e, translated by the author)

“We want to use it [IFB Hamburg] to improve the impact of Hamburg’s funding policy and offer the entire range of funding from a single source. At the start date, the Innovationsstiftung Hamburg [Hamburg innovation foundation] was also merged into the Investitions- und Förderbank Hamburg [IFB Hamburg]. [...] The share capital of the
innovation foundation is retained as earmarked special capital for innovation promotion in the investment and development bank.” (Scholz 2013t, translated by the author)

This development exemplifies once more the overall approach to reattribute existing programs and motives within the discourse and align them under the policy agenda of the mayor. Building on pre-existing discourse trajectory along narratives of innovation and the established InnovationsAllianz, the creation of the IFB Hamburg reappropriates the entire subsidy system and its existing programs under a new umbrella that is then used to seed the discourse formation of an entrepreneurial city from the centre to the periphery, continuously extending attached programs along the policy trajectory.

In the regional innovation strategy 2014, the support system mentions the InnoRampUp program defined by the InnovationsAllianz in addition to the Innovationstarter Fonds Hamburg and a central contact point - Innovations Kontakt Stelle (IKD) Hamburg - to provide better access to subsidy programs (BWVI 2014a). These measures augment other tangents previously described, such as fostering research and development activities at local universities and research institutes, promoting spinoffs and creating research & innovation parks as part of the innovation strategy (e.g. in Scholz 2014h, 2015u, see Appendix E).

This tendency is intensified in the coalition agreement between SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen from 2015 onwards, which mentions the support for more firm formations explicitly (e.g. in SPD 2015; SKHH 2015b, see Appendix E). Moving forward, the subsidy programs are extended (e.g. in nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a p.13; BFHH 2017d p.1, 2017b p.5; BWVI 2017 p.26, see Appendix E), most prominently with a “Startup-Gründerstipendium” - an entrepreneurial scholarship (e.g. in BFHH 2018a pp.1-2, see Appendix E), a special loan program “Hamburg Kredit Innovativ” (e.g. in HK 2018 p.19, see Appendix E) and the intention to create a 100 Million EUR investment funds (BFHH 2016a p.1). Some examples are:

“IFB Hamburg’s innovation programme PROFI supports industrial research and experimental development projects with up to 500,000 euros of funding per project.” (BWFG 2016 p.18)

“Following corner point apply to the ‘Hamburger Innovations-Wachstumsfonds’ [Hamburg innovation growth funds]: The funds volume will be up to 100 million Euro in form of equity capital, loan guarantees and grants for innovative companies that are entering the growth stage after the start-up phase with new product, processes or services” (BFHH 2016a p.2, translated by the author)

“Our InnoRampUp program supports innovative companies with grants. The InnoStarter Fonds II has been restructured and endowed with 12 million euros. The planned growth
In the discourse on supporting entrepreneurship in Hamburg there is little criticism to be found. The spawned programs mentioned before are all aligned to pre-existing programs or are the actual pre-existing programs under new names. Any parliamentary debate, for example regarding the 100 million Euro investment funds (e.g. in BFHH 2016a, 2017b, 2017d 2017c) or discussion in media (Dey 2016, 2017; Meyer-Wellmann 2017b) is not challenging the policy agenda itself but rather demands more of the same at faster speeds. Notions of more of the same at faster speeds consequently did not change any dynamic or general orientation in the policy trajectory but demand structurally the same under different - more and faster - naming.

Observations also reveal how the measures are focussing on “making them happen”, without any prioritised evaluation. In talks with BWVI1 and MWVI2 it came to light that the dominant metrics to track initiatives mentioned in the innovation strategy (BWVI 2014a), which are spendings in subsidies for research and development, number of employees in university as well as research- and knowledge-intensive industries, the amount of external funding acquired by university professors and the number of new firms in form an entrepreneurial index, are considered as easy to please metrics, as the spending increased as part of the policy agenda and other indicators are supported by general trends in academia, e.g. increasing relevance of third-party funding, as well as general trends of entrepreneurialism. The entrepreneurial index can distinguish between certain industry segments but does not distinguish high-growth enterprises from general forms of entrepreneurship and therefore has limited actual meaning in view of BWVI1 and BWVI2. The regional innovation strategy also mentions an extensive and standardised reporting system developed by the IFB Hamburg (BWVI 2014a) that is intended to measure effectiveness of the programs. The so called Progammindikatorenpanel (BWVI 2014a pp.162-165) - program indicator panel - entails various information about a to be subsidised project, ranging from overall metadata to timelines, classification along Hamburg’s future initiatives as well as number of jobs created, revenues, number of patents, processing time, number of press releases, released documents, events attended etc. While the author already argued that metrics to track impact are unsuitable to track the dynamic of startup life cycles, e.g. in seed stages startups rarely have high revenues or growing number of employees (Shepherd & Wiklund 2009; Masurel 2019a), and do not entail any meaningful measures to evaluate mid or even long term effectiveness (Recke 2016), various of the success indicators cater towards exploitability in terms of public relations and narrative of success. The number of press releases and a short processing period certainly indicate priority of narrative over effective subsidy or even profitable investment. In talks with IFB1 and IFB2 this impression was substantiated as the IFB Hamburg was not able to provide any financial performance metrics for the funds allocated to startup support and in a situation where the author was discussing specific programs such as

*fund will provide venture capital in the future. But private investors are also welcome to make contributions.*” (Scholz 2017d)
InnoRampUp and InnoFounder, the primary objective was disclosed as “spending the money” (notes from private conversations with IFB1 and IFB2, translated by the author) over selecting projects that qualify as innovative or promising in terms of economic success. To that end, also talks with UNI2 revealed how non-monetary support and consulting services to aspiring entrepreneurs at local universities increasingly align towards the regional subsidy programs offered. Beyond also promoting subsidy programs offered on a federal level, the specific support infrastructure in the region was adopted and promoted to interested people, typically by using materials provided by the entities, thus adopting the discourse established in their documents, publications and appearances and representation at events etc.

The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem

Strong emphasis is given to the entrepreneurial ecosystem, entrepreneurial culture and other entities within the region that are connected to startup creation or the startup economy. Also, examples of prominent startups or successful digital businesses are used to describe the vibrancy of the regional entrepreneurial ecosystem. Again they serve as a narrative of success, even if they are companies only associated with the city because they choose it as an office location that is spread by the mayor (e.g. in Scholz 2014h, 2014i, see Appendix E), adopted by ministries and official bodies as well as the media (e.g. in Hamburger Kreativ Gesellschaft 2012 p.109; Lauterbach 2014; Meyer-Wellmann 2014; Hamburg Marketing 2015b; Accenture 2017; BFHH 2017a, see Appendix E) and even by the European Commission:

“The digital start-up scene in Hamburg is extremely exciting and interesting. The city government is working hard at the task of helping to make the scene more visible and better networked.” (Scholz 2014d)

“In recent years, a number of Hamburg start-ups have turned into successful “grown-ups”, among them the online business platform Xing, which generated profits from an early stage and has more than 15 million members today; the website toolbox Jimdo is now among the world’s most successful web hosting services; and MyTaxi, which revolutionised the taxi market long before Uber and received several million euro of investment from Daimler.” (Hamburg Marketing 2016)

“Over the years, Hamburg has developed a strong digital entrepreneurship culture. This is demonstrated by the fact that many start-ups originally from Hamburg (e.g. Facelift and Xing) have become known worldwide and digital giants have chosen Hamburg as the location for their headquarters in Germany.” (European Commission 2016a)
The term Startup Ökosystem - entrepreneurial ecosystem - is also explicitly mentioned in the coalition agreement between SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen from 2015 onwards (e.g. in SPD 2015 p.24, see Appendix E), cementing the accentuation of startup centric policy with the goal to create an entrepreneurial ecosystem in the city. Many entities adopt this tangent and frequently report on activities within the ecosystem, prominent events and new services offered (e.g. in BWVI 2016 p.8; nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a p.1; BKM 2017 p.18; HIW 2017b p.5; BFHH 2018c p.22; BWVI 2018a p.5, see Appendix E), for example:

“A strong and diversified economic structure, together with a vibrant start-up ecosystem, has played a crucial role in Hamburg’s digital transformation. Many start-ups from Hamburg have gone on to become international players: InnoGames, Bigpoint, Facelift, Goodgame Studios, Jimdo, myTaxi and Xing to name just a few, and start-ups such as Dreamlines, Kreditech, Protonet, Stuffle and Sonormed are continuing with this success story. In this context, it is certainly no coincidence that leading internet giants such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Hootsuite and Yelp have chosen Hamburg as the location for their German headquarters.” (European Commission 2016b p.4)

“Hamburg is a hotspot in the German Start-up scene. A strong, diversified economic structure and a vibrant start-up ecosystem provide a solid basis for successfully implementing ideas” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016c p.1)

There are many events that are attributed to vibrancy of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, even if their initial origin may be tied to specific industry verticals within the media/IT cluster. Most prominently, events such as Social Media Week, Online Marketing Rockstars, newTV Kongress, solutions.hamburg, NEXT Konferenz, Reeperbahn Festival, Scoopcamp and the Hamburg Innovation Summit are frequently mentioned (HIW 2018a). The vibrancy of the entrepreneurial ecosystem is also addressed in public speeches by the mayor (e.g. im Scholz 2016h, 2017f), where he repeatedly emphasises the relevance of startups for the local economy, often linked to the media/IT industry, illustrating how the policy trajectory developed from the narrative theme of Hamburg as a media city and innovative city, for example:

“But it’s not only the fact that these players are literally quite close to each other that draws so much of the talent that we call media workers here from around the world. It is also the diversity of media companies based in Hamburg. Recording studios, graphic artists, marketing specialists, plus Facebook, Twitter, Google and XING all operate here, forming a unique ecology that promotes reciprocal learning. Micropayments, free-to-play models and community building are solutions developed by games companies for challenges that also occupy the press, film, and music industries. The games sector is
clearly an important component of Hamburg’s content industry, which we have promoted from early on and to which we are still going to be committed in the future. [...] the digital start-up scene in Hamburg is highly exciting and interesting. Helping create better visibility and greater networking opportunities for start-ups --we as a city will continue to work hard on these tasks, which includes providing financial means.” (Scholz 2017d)

This line of discourse is also adopted by public bodies, such as the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) in its reports of the regional cluster policy (e.g. in BWVI 2018a p.5, see Appendix E) or in descriptions of the entrepreneurial ecosystem from within the entrepreneurial ecosystem itself:

“Another thing Hamburg is known for? Media. The northern German City is home to prestigious news outlets, such as Die Zeit and Der Spiegel, as well as large publishing and media companies, such as Gruner + Jahr and Bauer Media Group. This has given rise to entrepreneurial initiatives and programs like nextMedia.Hamburg and the Next Media Accelerator (which are not affiliated with each other). Gaming is another big industry in Hamburg, with established German game developers like Goodgame, InnoGames and Bigpoint all based there. Other industries that have left a mark on the city include commerce, services and fintech.” (Sissel Hansen in Raisher et al. 2018 p.9)

One example of the mayor giving particular attention to the entrepreneurial ecosystem and the city’s support for startups is the creation of an accelerator program created by dpa and other prominent publishing companies in 2015, conveniently named Next Media Accelerator. For some period, it served as a blueprint for success and was portrayed by him as an initiative he was deeply invested in (e.g. in Scholz 2015l, 2015r, see Appendix E), for example:

“Together, companies and the city create an attractive and dynamic ecosystem for the industry. The Next Media Accelerator, founded with the support of the city and an association of many important media companies, promotes media-related startups with a six-month intensive program.” (Scholz 2016h, translated by the author)

Building on the Next Media Accelerator blueprint, other Accelerator programs such as Next Commerce Accelerator with an emphasis on eCommerce (Hamburger Abendblatt 2017; Geisler 2017) and Next Logistic Accelerator (HK 2018) with an emphasis on logistics are created with support of identical consulting firms and endorsement from highest level of the policy domain.

“One example are accelerator programs that we tried here in Hamburg with the Next Media Accelerator and the Next Commerce Accelerator. These are two fundamentally
Talk with VC1 reveals that the creation of the Next Media Accelerator (nma.vc) was orchestrated with various entities within the entrepreneurial ecosystem, among which are the Hamburger Sparkasse - Hamburg’s savings bank - and management consulting and corporate finance service provider Skillnet (skillnet.com) as well as the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative, which is named as a partner of the program (nma.vc/about-us/partners/), underscoring the political support for the initiative from highest levels of local government. Apart from the close relation regarding naming convention that is marked as coincidental, same entities and actors were involved in the configuration of the Next Logistics Accelerator (nla.vc) and Next Commerce Accelerator (nca.vc) that are operating under similar structure with different companies of their specific industry cluster as investors. In the case of the Next Logistics Accelerator representatives of these entities are also named as members of the accelerator’s board (nca.vc/people/).

Discussion with VC2 that is representing another venture capital entity within the ecosystem reveals that the political support for the Next Media Accelerator may very well be linked to political affiliation, as both members of the executive team of the accelerator as well as Carsten Brosda and Olaf Scholz are all SPD members and known to be political peers, as fact also substantiated by SO1 in various talks about the historical genesis of the Amt Medien (SKHH 2011b) - media department - as well as the digital city strategy (SKHH 2015a, 2016).

In the area of research and innovation, another initiative was spawned from the University of Hamburg with an emphasis on virtual reality and its innovative potential for industry (e.g. in nextReality.Hamburg 2018, see Appendix E). Proposed in 2016 (e.g. BFHH 2016b p.1, see Appendix E) and supported by Hamburg@work and the Amt Medien, the initiative was officially formed in 2017 (BWVI 2018a; BFHH 2018d; nextMedia.Hamburg 2017b) with the intention to become a pioneering location for virtual reality was named nextReality.Hamburg to match the established naming convention and integrated under the umbrella of nextMedia.Hamburg and again endorsed from the highest level of government:

“Since the end of 2016, Hamburg has been working to a mandate from the city’s parliament to establish itself as a “pioneer location for virtual reality”. The goal is to be at the forefront of this innovative technology field, working with players from research, established companies and start-ups, and to gain worldwide visibility. We’re already seeing very lively communities in the areas of VR/AR/360 video, for example VR meet-ups (about every two months), the VR developers’ ‘jour fixe and the virtual weekend. The Human-Computer-Interaction working group at Hamburg University and the Faculty of
Design, Media and Information at HAW – Hamburg University of Applied Sciences represent research expertise of international excellence within our universities. In 2017 the Hamburg Senate made available a total of €300,000 to start the nextReality.Hamburg initiative. Strategic management is provided by the Ministry of Culture and Media, while Hamburg University (Informatics) is the project coordinator. Marketing and networks are main themes, but education and research plus service and support also play important roles. The project comes under the nextMedia.Hamburg campaign run by Hamburg’s media and digital business sector, whose goals include: developing content-business models for the future at the interface between content and technology, encouraging knowledge transfer between research, industry and businesses and linking start-ups with the local media and digital industry. nextReality.Hamburg e.V. was born at the end of 2017 as a result of cooperation between active and innovative figures in the creative industries. It’s working to promote awareness of Hamburg beyond the city limits as a pioneering centre of VR/AR/360°.” (Brosda 2018b)

The historical genesis of privately operated programs such as Next Media Accelerator or Next Commerce Accelerator as well as public private partnerships such as the advocate groups Hamburg@work (2012b) show how political capital serves to align discourse from the highest level of government. Spawning from the centre of the wheel at the Senate Office, the policy agenda towards media and entrepreneurship is aligned under control of the Amt Medien and later Ministry of Culture and Media to reorganise all public facing programs relevant to narrative themes of innovation and entrepreneurship, such as Gamecity Hamburg, nextMedia.Hamburg, Hamburg Kreativgesellschaft or nextReality.Hamburg to align along the policy trajectory, which is supported within the policy domain with the restructuring of the regional subsidy system under the umbrella of the new IFB Hamburg (BFHH 2013a), that reassembles existing programs already set forth from earlier policy trajectory, dating back to at least the InnovationsAllianz in 2010 (BWVI 2010a), the Gamecity initiative in 2004 (BFHH 2009b) and the Innovationsstiftung Hamburg - Hamburg innovation foundation - that was established even in 1996 and subsidies projects with 21 million euros between its foundation and 2008 (Kompetenzzentrum HanseNanoTec 2005, Hamburg@work 2007a). Even though met with initial criticism from the chamber of commerce that was picked up by the press (Mester 2012; Dey et al. 2012), the weight of political capital behind the discourse trajectory silenced the resistance without any impact on the dominant discourse that is portrayed as a natural extension of what was already established.

Since the overall discourse trajectory and its narrative theme of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city builds on previous narratives surrounding innovation, talents, internationality and most importantly growth, the metrification of success is a key component to the discourse. As presented before, initiatives like Gamecity Hamburg were commonly attributed with direct impact on economic growth and job creation, despite counter-indications from the media. This
tendency was intensified under Scholz’ mayorship, especially regarding the metrification of entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial ecosystem as the next section demonstrates.

The Metrification of Entrepreneurship

Throughout the discourse the need for metrification frequently appears. The ultimate goal of economic growth and job creation is deeply interwoven in the discourse and is commonly traced back to the 2000 Lisbon European Council attention to the economic growth with the goal to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world through research & innovation (e.g. in European Council 2000):

“to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. [...] The shift to a digital, knowledge-based economy, prompted by new goods and services, will be a powerful engine for growth, competitiveness and jobs.” (European Council 2000)

The Europa 2020 strategy published in 2010 extends these ambitions by augmenting the growth with intelligence and sustainability (European Commission 2010 p.14, see Appendix E) as well as regional research and innovation strategies for smart specialisation, called RIS3 (e.g. in European Commission 2010 p.15, 2012 p.9, see Appendix E). The narrative themes presented thus far seem to follow this policy trajectory and increasingly aligned along these principles over time. The Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city from 2002 is already referencing the EU strategy, acknowledges the relevance of digital technologies and directly links the growing city to job creation (e.g. in SKHH 2002 p.47; BFHH 2005 p.2, see Appendix E). In the extended Leitbild from 2007 support for innovation and new firm formation is mentioned in direct connection to technology-enabled innovation in the economy (e.g. in BFHH 2007 p.3, see Appendix E), alongside the relevance of the creative industry (e.g. in BFHH 2009b p.1, see Appendix E). In the 2010 established Leitbild of growing with foresight, elements of sustainability, ecology are also mentioned alongside innovation within the context of job creation and economic growth (e.g. in BFHH 2010 p.2, see Appendix E) and match the extended policy trajectory from the EU Commission presented above. It was also established in the InnovationsAllianz’ guiding principles, cementing the premise for the policy discourse trajectory:

“The ability to innovate is the key success factor of today’s increasingly knowledge-based societies in Europe in order to effectively meet the opportunities and challenges of globalisation. According to empirical studies, technological progress is responsible for around a third of economic growth. Innovations enable high-quality jobs with
appropriate productivity-oriented salaries and thus are a significant contribution to lucrative participation in working life.” (BWVI 2010a p.3, translated by the author)

The mayor also adopted the key objective of economic growth and job creation for the working agenda of his government (BFHH 2012b), starting from the initial government statement in 2011 (e.g. in Scholz 2011a, 2011f, 2014a. 2017f, see Appendix E). This line of argumentation was also referenced in context of the creation of the regional investment and subsidy bank IFB Hamburg, the working agenda for the EFRE subsidy period 2014-2020 (BWVI 2013 p.22, see Appendix E) and the regional innovation strategy from 2014 (BWVI 2014a p.66, see Appendix E) as well as other. The narrative is directly linked to the themes of innovation, startups and entrepreneurship:

“Promotion of innovative startups. From the point of view of the senate, the startup process plays an important role in Hamburg's economic development. Startups generate innovations, create jobs and are a driving force behind the economy and structural change. It is mainly successful and dynamic founders who create the jobs of tomorrow.” (BFHH 2018c p.20, translated by the author)

Consequently, measures introduced in this period integrated requirements for growth and job creation, for example in the InnoRampUp or Innovationsstarter Fonds programs’ requirements for subsidies or investment (e.g. IFB 2014 p.5, IFB 2016 p.3, 2018 p.3; IFB Innovationsstarter 2017, see Appendix E) as well as concrete metrics, like number of new firm formations (BWVI 2014a), number of firms supported or number of jobs created:

“Based on the application documents, the companies supported by PROFI and InnoRampUp expect an average annual turnover of 5 million euros per project as well as the safeguarding and creation of an average of 17 jobs in the third year after the end of the project” (BFHH 2018c p.23, translated by the author)

In regard to Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city and especially in comparison to other cities or regions - Berlin in particular - the Gründerquote as an entrepreneurial index is used alongside other indicators - such as size of investments, number of patents or participation in prominent events - that serve as means to quantify the success of the entrepreneurial ecosystem along the lines of economic growth and job creation (e.g. in BFHH 2012a p.21; Hamburg@work 2012b p.1; BWVI 2013 p.12, 2014a p.64; HK 2014 p.19, 2015 p.11, 2016b p.7; European Commission 2016b p.4, XX; BWVI 2018a p.3 and p.5; BFHH 2018c p.24, see Appendix E). Some examples are:
“Hamburg’s creative companies create on average twice as much turnover as their Berlin counterparts.” (Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2012 p.12, translated by the author)

“According to the KfW Start-up Monitor 2015, the start-up rate in Hamburg is around 2.36 percent, just behind Berlin (2.60 percent).” (HK 2015 p.13, translated by the author)

“According to the KfW Start-up Monitor 2015, Hamburg has the second highest start-up rate in Germany, with an average start-up rate of 2.36 percent (share of new entrepreneurs as a proportion of the population aged 18 to 64).” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016c p.1)

“Hamburg’s business soundness is reflected in many recent rankings. For instance, the KfW Start-up Monitor 2015 ranks Hamburg with the second highest start-up rate in the country, with an average start-up rate of 2.36% (share of new entrepreneurs as a proportion of the population aged 18 to 64). Between 2012 and 2014, Berlin and Hamburg remained at the top of the list with the highest start-up rates, while Hamburg further closed the gap with the frontrunner Berlin.” (European Commission 2017 p.2)

Also the mayor used this narrative motive frequently in his speeches (e.g. in Scholz 2011j, 2012m, 2014h, 2016a, 2016h, see Appendix E), largely emphasising the relevance of startups in context of the policy measures of his government. Similar to other examples presented thus far, they serve as narratives of success, for example:

“The young founders with good ideas have long been living with us. It is not without reason that we have been at the forefront of all start-up statistics for years.” (Scholz 2013a, translated by the author)

“Start-ups in Hamburg are playing an increasingly important role in the development of new, especially digital, technologies. With 25 start-ups per 1000 employees, the start-up rate has again developed slightly positively compared to the previous year and, according to the KfW Start-up Monitor, Hamburg continues to be well ahead in the federal states ranking.” (Scholz 2016i, translated by the author)

In 2017 Hamburg overtook Berlin as Germany’s city with the highest Gründerquote - entrepreneurial index - which was exploited in the discourse and directly attributed to the entrepreneurship policy agenda and its success (e.g. in BFHH 2018c p.4; HIW 2018b; SKHH 2018 p.21; HK 2018; Raisher et al. 2018 p.12, see Appendix E) and also attributed by Olaf Scholz and Carsten Brosda:
“This year Hamburg was chosen as the start-up capital. Our city, which has united creativity and merchanting spirit for centuries, apparently offers excellent conditions for start-ups and an attractive, urban living environment. This is particularly important for the creative industries to expand. Almost 80,000 people work in the creative industries in our city - making this one of the most job-intensive industries. In addition, we note that it has long since become an engine of innovation for other industries as well, because it has developed tools and techniques to deal with constant change and uncertainty in order to prevent the impending disruption through timely transformation. Creative industry processes have long since become the blueprint for innovation beyond the routines in the classic departments for research and development in companies.” (Brosda 2017b, translated by the author)

“Hamburg has the reputation of being Germany’s innovation capital. We are a metropolis of science in the North. We have interwoven research and development so tightly that scientific findings can be passed on easily and in an uncomplicated manner to application-oriented enterprises.” (Scholz 2018b)

To a certain extent this metric is portrayed as a culminating achievement of the Scholz’ mayorship from 2011-2018. The narrative theme of the entrepreneurial city was established and the metric devised within the policy agenda solidifies the self-affirmation and overall validity of the policy trajectory in the discourse. In a document summarising Scholz’ mayorship after he became Federal Minister of Finance in 2018 also accredits the successful development of the entrepreneurial ecosystem with intensive support for startups under his mayorship:

“The intensive promotion of start-ups and the increasing attractiveness of Hamburg are already having an effect: Hamburg has replaced Berlin as the start-up capital and will grow sustainably over the next few years as a start-up and innovation location.” (SKHH 2018 p.21, translated by the author)

However, the fact that the metric does not represent any actual contribution to economic growth nor qualifies the entailed entrepreneurial activity is not addressed in the discourse. Also, discussion in entrepreneurship policy research as presented in section 2.2 carry no weight. Many of the divergent perspectives by scholars (Shane 2008, 2009; Coad et al. 2014; Ács & Mueller 2008; G. Mason, Bishop & Robinson 2009; Henrekson & Johansson 2010; Moreno & Coad 2015; Morris, Neumeyer & Kuratko 2015; Bornhäll, Daunfeldt & Rudholm 2015) could represent resistance to the discourse, but the author could not find any indication that their position is even known.
Part of Hamburg as a growing city and other base narratives embedded in the Leitbild from 2002 and the extended Leitbild from 2007 is the notion of Hamburg as an international city. Beyond the aspiration to rank well among other prominent cities or regions in Europe, hence the goal to become an innovation capital in Europe, comparisons with other global cities or regions are commonplace in the discourse (e.g. in BFHH 2007 p.7, see Appendix E). This is not limited to areas of innovation or entrepreneurship, but extends to general city marketing for Hamburg as a green city, a city for talents and ambitions to host olympic games in 2012 (BFHH 2003) and again in 2024, which was part of Scholz’ political agenda (Scholz 2015a, 2015b, 2015i, 2015q, 2015s, SPD 2015) and rejected in a citizen census - Olympia-Bürgerschaftsreferendum - in November 2015 that resulted in Hamburg cancelling its application (BIS 2015, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2015).

However, also in the context of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city, comparison with other hotspots for innovation and entrepreneurship is widely visible in the discourse, either as a way to compare Hamburg as an equal or better location or as a way to articulate aspirations of what Hamburg could become or how visible Hamburg is amongst the global competition. Also, it is frequently mentioned how global players choose Hamburg as an office location over cities like Berlin. This trend was increasingly apparent during the primary period under investigation (e.g. in Hamburg@work 2012a p.17, 2013 p.2, 2018c; Meyer-Wellmann 2014; nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a p.1; Ilken 2017; Hamburg@work 2018c, see Appendix E), for example:

“From Hamburg to the world. Many start-ups from Hamburg have long since become international players, among them InnoGames, Bigpoint, Facelift, Goodgame Studios, Jimdo, myTaxi and Xing. Start-ups such as Dreamlines, Kreditech, Protonet, Stuffle and Sonormed continue this success story. It is certainly no coincidence that leading internet giants such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Hootsuite and Yelp decided to choose Hamburg as the location for their German headquarters.” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016c p.1)

“When it comes to acquiring investments, Hamburg’s start-up businesses are also at the forefront: in 2014, marketing specialist Facelift received 15 million US dollars of funding from London – the world’s largest growth investment in the business segment in Europe at the time. And the FinTech start-up Kreditech received US investment totalling 200 million US dollars – the largest amount that was ever invested in the digital financial services industry outside the United States.” (Hamburg Marketing 2016)
“With the energy campus, a ‘Silicon Valley’ of renewable energies is to be created in Hamburg, which promotes innovations and the establishment of the industry.” (HK 2018 p.18, translated by the author)

The overall tendency is also visible in various documents by public entities within the policy domain (e.g. in HWF 2015 p.2; BKM 2017 p.46; BWVI 2018a p.3; HIW 2018b). The narrative was adopted by the mayor frequently and is apparent in various speeches even if just remotely connected to innovation, media, media policy, startups or economic development in general to establish the vibrancy of the regional entrepreneurial ecosystem and position Hamburg as an international city of relevance (e.g. Scholz 2013g, 2013n, 2013o, 2016d, 2016f, 2016l), even if compared to metropolises such as London or New York (e.g. in Scholz 2012l. 2013s, 2014i, 2015r, 2016k, 2016i, 2016m, see Appendix E), for example

“That is no small matter, but there is already, for example, the MIT Media Lab in Boston, USA, whose City Science Initiative, “given the commitment to urban innovation in Hamburg”, could well imagine cooperating with Hamburg in a European Living Lab City project. In Boston, “urban development” in general and Hamburg’s HafenCity in particular are on the radar. I find that exciting, and not only because I was able to gain a personal impression some time ago on a visit to Boston. But above all because that is exactly the idea we ought to have: to be a “City Lab” in a “Living Lab City”. The HCU must be the place for discourse, where people not only talk about crucial issues in the urban development field, but also experiment with them, develop ideas that are good and - why not? - avant-garde too, in order to arrive, finally, at practical proposals.” (Scholz 2014f)

Another line of comparisons is drawn to the most prosperous entrepreneurial ecosystem in the world, Silicon Valley. It is frequently referenced, especially by the mayor (e.g. in Scholz 2013j, 2014h, 2014r, see Appendix E), and increasingly applied to the regional context of Hamburg by adopting its naming in wordplay etc. (e.g. in Scholz 2014g, 2015n, 2016c, see Appendix E). Some examples are:

“We can be proud that in London, on the east coast or in Silicon Valley, too, people can see that you can do good business in Hamburg.” (Scholz 2012n, translated by the author)

“The second reason is that I am delighted to see that you have set up a start-ups floor in your new building and have already persuaded Mesosphere Inc. from California to move in.” (Scholz 2014d)
“We are certain that Snapchat will achieve much more, working from Hamburg. In our city, you will find an environment which encourages and nourishes innovation-driven growth. We are happy that you, your competence and your solutions will enrich Hamburg’s position as a digital city and will strengthen our good relationships with California even further.” (Scholz 2018b)

As an interpolation of the policy trajectory and its entitled aspiration it serves as a reference to draw from initially and a benchmark that may be met by Hamburg over time. The references are commonly adopted by other entities and stakeholders in the discourse (e.g. BFHH 2017a p.1; Brosda 2018g, 2018h), especially when used with wordplay, such as “HammerBrooklyn” (Iken 2018a, 2018b, 2018c), a business and innovation park in Hamburg Hammerbrook, or Hamburg’s “Silicon Alley” (Scholz 2016c). Also in context of the Harburger Innovation Port, high ranking policy representatives to reference Silicon Valley, associated the region with technological avantgarde:

“Harburger Innovation Port is the Silicon Valley of Hamburg. [...] His predecessor Frank Horch [Senator for Economics] helped initiate the HIP project. He emphasised the "tremendous opportunity to bring business and science together" and to connect the south of Hamburg more closely to the city. Horch: “One day you may no longer go to Silicon Valley to see the technological avant-garde, but to Harburg.” (Hillmer 2019, translated by the author)

Olaf Scholz became Finance Minister for the federal government in Berlin in March 2018 and left office to Peter Tschentscher (SPD). Some key players followed Scholz to Berlin, such as the head of the Senate Office (Arndt 2018), or resigned posts in following months, such as the senator for Economics, Transport and Innovation (Schade 2019). The most prominent member of Scholz inner circle, Carsten Brosda, became senator for Media & Culture in 2017, after serving as head of the Amt Medien, representative of the senate for the media industry and Staatsrat (privy council) for the Ministry of Culture and the departments media and digitisation in the Senate Office. The political agenda followed the established paradigms of Scholz’ period as mayor, yet his successor is less visible in the discourse around entrepreneurship and his governance period is no longer part of the investigation, while Scholz remained a prominent actor in the field of entrepreneurship policy on national level. Yet, as this discourse analysis revealed, the regional discourse on entrepreneurship policy can be expected to evolve along established trajectories, reappropriating existing narrative themes, and replicating similar structures, institutional arrangements and practices that are enacted no matter who is in office.

The thesis primarily focuses on the period of 2011-2018, the period of Olaf Scholz’ mayorship. As the role and position of the mayor is of critical importance to the discourse under
investigation, the mayor appears on all prominent stages of the discourse, resulting in a disproportionate representation of Scholz within the data presented in this chapter. Apart from the fact that for no prior mayorship the number of documents about the mayor’s statements is that extensive (e.g. in form of a new database of all speeches by the mayor), the author highlights, that the study focuses on the function of the role within the discourse, not the individual contribution. Similar, preceding, and subsequent mayors have a similarly exposed position within the discourse community and appropriate the policy agenda as head of regional government. As the presented data suggests, the position and associated rules, arrangements and practices are the same, even across decades, political affiliation, and individual profiles.

Conclusion

The narrative theme of Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city culminates the political trajectory regarding entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg in the period under investigation for this study. Despite other tangents of the political agenda presented before, e.g. strong emphasis on media policy, research excellence, renewable energy and sustainability, the overall goals of growth and job creation as well as international competition prevailed and were reappropriated in the theme of the entrepreneurial city, self-legitimising and securing the mayor's position within the political field, even beyond Scholz’ period of mayorship and in his position of Federal Minister of Finance since 2018.

During the appropriation of the media/IT industry cluster under his direct control with the Amt Medien at the Senate Office and the subsequent incarnation of the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative absorbing large portions of the public private partnership Hamburg@work under direct political control of the mayor’s proxy Carsten Brosda, language and terminology previously more or less exclusively used within the media/IT industry was adopted on the highest level of regional government. The mayor incorporated terminology of the startup economy to establish the new phrase regime of the political agenda, re-labelling pre-existing and pre-dating programs established along the derivatives of the Leitbild (SKHH 2002; BFHH 2005, 2007, 2010) or the InnovationsAllianz (BWVI 2010a, 2010b) under the new knowledge of Hamburg as the entrepreneurial city. The regional innovation strategy (BWVI 2014a) outlined as an innovation and technology strategy introduces measures to foster entrepreneurial activity in strong alignment with the regional cluster policy, attributes the media/IT industry cluster with the startup terminology and connects it to the reorganisation of the regional subsidy system under the newly formed Hamburgische Investitions- und Förderbank (IFB) in 2013 (BFHH 2012b, 2013a). Existing subsidy measures and programs are reorganised under its umbrella and the subsidiary Innovationsstarter entity that advocates the startup specific funding programs InnoRampUp (IFB 2014), which was originally articulated in the InnovationsAllianz’ strategic guidelines in 2010, InnoFounder (IFB 2018) and the Innovationsstarter Fonds (IFB 2016) and extended over the period of Scholz’ mayorship. Strong emphasis is given to the startup-scene and the entrepreneurial
ecosystem, especially in fierce competition with other national hotspots such as Berlin and international ecosystems such as London, New York and of course Silicon Valley. Adopting a holistic perspective, all entities, activities, programs, initiatives, and institutions within the city that are remotely connected to entrepreneurship are integrated into this new approach, exemplifying the entrepreneurial ecosystem approach from Isenberg (2010, 2011b) and its domains. A clear process of increasing metrification is apparent within the discourse trajectory, extending the economic growth and job creation aspiration toward the entrepreneurial index, to provide evidence of a growing and prospering entrepreneurial ecosystem. The use of metrics as such materialises the “data of discourse” that serves to label, categorise, and provide means of differentiation and distinction. The entrepreneurial index - an output measure in terms of Ács, Szerb & Autio (2014) - indicates the percentage among the population who started a new entrepreneurial activity (Metzger 2020) and is not connected or considerate of different type of ventures and therefore might be an unusable metric to track any policy effectiveness, same as the previous default indicator of new firm formations per year (BWVI 2014a), yet it served as a mechanism to fuel the comparison with Berlin, Germany’s startup capital, which Hamburg overtook in 2017, culminating the eternal success of the policy agenda (SKHH 2018), justifying its approach and solidifying the validity of any claims without providing any substantial proof that connects the policy to the actual reality in the region. Any attempt by the author to gather performance data on subsidy funding by the IFB, number of jobs created and sustained etc. remained unsuccessful. Discussions with IFB1 and IFB2 revealed that this data has indeed not been published and may not even be available in a satisfactory depth and quality. It was made clear that there is no intention to release any qualifying information beyond the material available on public repositories, especially since extension of policy programs and the establishment of a new investment fund (BFHH 2017a, 2017b, 2017d) shall not be jeopardised with unfavourable data. This extends the insights provided by IFB1 and IFB2, that at least some of the programs are operated with the primary objective of spending the allocated money over selecting projects that truly qualify as innovative or highly likely to create economic success or jobs.

With a Foucauldian perspective, the narrative theme of the entrepreneurial city shows how the discourse is seeded on the governmental level, at the pin of the wheel, deciding the direction of the new knowledge and phrase regime of what makes the entrepreneurial city. The Amt Medien and the mayor’s direct proxies use direct control over the relevant entities within the discourse community to repetitively articulate and embody the discourse from the centre to the periphery, creating the governmentality of the discourse (Foucault 1984, 1997). Other entities such as ministries, business development and place marketing units as well as other cluster initiatives, universities and private entities engaged in the entrepreneurial ecosystem adopt the discourse, showing the institutional arrangements within the discourse community, echoing what is said, resulting the self-perpetuation of the discourse and showing its biopower Foucault (1978, 1984) as it shapes their beliefs and behaviours. It established the power-knowledge-subject triad
and how it creates mechanisms of difference and distinction through defining what can be said, who can say what and what can or cannot be done. Along with the increasing prominence of startups in general media coverage (see section 2.1), the visible resistance of discourse is not even challenging the merits or premises of the discourse itself but rather demand more of the same at faster speeds, e.g. creation and investment funds faster, criticising delays etc. (BFHH 2016a 2017b, 2017d 2017c; Dey 2016, 2017; Meyer-Wellmann 2017b). The weight of what is said and seen reinforces the dominant discourse. All visible entities within the discourse community, including general media, accept the discourse on the entrepreneurial city, its roles, abilities, institutions, and interrelations by adopting it in their fields, transforming entities towards being more entrepreneurial or supportive of entrepreneurship. The overall trajectory certainly aligns with notions of entrepreneurialism (Woods 2011; Woods & Nelson 2013), the “everydayness” of entrepreneurship (Hjorth & Steyaert 2004) extending the realms of business and increasingly being visible in all areas of modern life (Gibb 2002), or extended urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989), the transformation of urban governance from a logic of managerialism to one of entrepreneurialism (Steyaert in Germain & Jacquemin 2017). Along the trajectory of the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative and the political career of Carsten Brosda, the theme of the entrepreneurial city is persistent, adopted and integrated in other entities (HIW 2017a, 2017b; BKM 2017, 2019). Scholz left office in 2018, the discourse structures and mechanism however, stayed the same, continuing the established discourse trajectory under new mayorship.

The Bourdieusian analysis augments the skeleton of the discourse described in terms of Foucault with the proverbial flesh to the bones. It reveals once again the field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) established by the mayor, his immediate subordinates, and a multitude of actors within the network of actors that are mutually invested as a field of peers to dominate the discourse. Through their habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) and deployment of social, cultural, and political capital (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) they create the knowledge of the entrepreneurial city in Hamburg. The words they use, the language they speak, how they talk about the entrepreneurial city establishes the rules of the game that actors commit themselves to - illusio (Bourdieu 1998b) - and the values and attributes - doxa (Bourdieu 1998b) - relevant to what makes the city entrepreneurial. The actors buy into their own narrative that they repetitively articulate - an act of misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) - not realising that their policy agenda is a construct building on the narrative of the past. It fuels the symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) that excludes anyone not accepting the discourse as is and playing by the rules established in the various programs and initiatives and constitutes the mechanism of differentiation, distinction, and domination. The exclusion can even be seen as self-exclusion more than anything else, as people not qualifying for programs offered by IFB Hamburg or not acquainted with the language, actors and entities that may provide access to the entrepreneurial city do it to themselves, making the exercise of power even unnecessary. This is best illustrated through Bourdieu’s concept of performativity, the embodiment of
discourse that is acted or lived out in spatial and socio-cultural dynamics. The mayor and other government representatives articulate the discourse through their illocutionary force, speaking the entrepreneurial city into existence, a discursive formation which people then believe and buy into while it is repetitively articulated on all stages of the discourse. The network of actors are the makers of knowledge and encrypt the spaces, their offices and institutions, their proceedings and practices and the entities within the ecosystem on which the discourse is enacted. Through their capitals they know how to behave and interact with the power/knowledge inscribed in the socio-spatial relation. They speak the language, use the appropriate phrase regime, display, and act social grace, giving deference to superiors and instruction to subordinates. Through illusio - their unconditional commitment to the game - and doxa - the values and rules of the game - they commit acts of misrecognition, believing in the game to a degree that they no longer realise its constructive nature but actually believe it is real. As they play the game, the book is already written in their head in Bourdieusian terms, eternally re-inscribing the power-knowledge-subject triad and the governmentality of discourse in terms of Foucault, legitimising, and perpetuating the differentiation, distinction, and domination. Wherever the discourse appears, whether it is in general media coverage or at political events, conferences, entities within the entrepreneurial ecosystem, the discourse is performed and acted out by the field’s elite that is behaving in a prescribed fashion. While behaving formal and like statesmen in the political arena, at senate receptions or high-profile events, actors such as Scholz or Brosda also appear on lower stages of the discourse at local universities, industry conferences or open door events at co-working offices, where they behave less formal, wear the clothes and speak the language of the entrepreneurial ecosystem as they perceive it (suit and tie vs. sneakers & hoodies), while maintaining the overall structure of the discourse, its mechanism of exclusion and domination.

At various occasions the author observed Olaf Scholz or Carsten Brosda and lower ranking officials from BWVI or IFB at events within the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Even when attending events that are low key and trying to blend in with the crowd through behaving informal or even personal, all relevant actors are easy to identify among typical or “native” inhabitants of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The representatives of the policy domain or the regional subsidy system stand out as alienated actors, that may be welcome to share news about programs, how to qualify and apply or to share projects with that may then be referenced in public political events or press material from entities with the entrepreneurship policy field. They are guests in a world that is not their own and perform or enact their role, which may differ from representation to advocacy or rendering structural support etc., and ultimately is not primarily aimed at the recipient but serves the political process and discourse on entrepreneurship policy. As such, the discourse is appropriating parts of the entrepreneurial ecosystem to legitimise the discourse itself. As subsidy programs provided by IFB Hamburg are advocated, the involved entities provide support and advice for interested parties to write applications, ensuring that some get access to funding, ultimately creating the “data of discourse” and metrification as in numbers of startups having
received funding. Through the creation of its own audience, the discourse is generating a process of evidence-based sanctification for itself. However, despite the subsidy programs being received and used within the entrepreneurial ecosystem by those who can access it, little weight is given to the voice of entrepreneurs in the discourse. Aside from anecdotal evidence of success provided by high profile entrepreneurs in the city, no systematic or even unsystematic consideration of the entrepreneurial perspective can be identified in the discourse. The discourse claims to be open for all and inclusive of anyone, yet it is operated by a closed network of actors that is impossible to penetrate without the appropriate social and political capital, that may arise from economic success as entrepreneur or through political affiliation but not from starting or being interested in entrepreneurial activity. The emphasis on narrative for international comparison, e.g. allocation of famous companies from Silicon Valley in Hamburg or startups from Hamburg participating in international programs (Hamburg@work 2012a p.17, 2013 p.2, 2018c; Meyer-Wellmann 2014; Hamburg Marketing 2016; nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a p.1; Iken 2017; Hamburg@work 2018c) as well as the entrepreneurial index as an easy to please metric in times of generally increasing self-employment (Statista, 2020c) illustrate that the self-serving nature of discourse prioritised exploitable narrative over real world impact.

This constitutes the presentation of narrative themes that the author identified in the discourse of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg in his study. The genealogical history of the policy agenda shows how existing narrative motives are appropriated under new leadership to self-legitimise position within the field, while the inherent structures, institutional arrangements and overall practices of the discourse remain more or less the same, independent from individual actors and who is occupying office. The analysis shows the discourse works and how it is operated, illustrating function over contribution to unmask the self-perpetuating and self-serving nature of the political process.

The following chapter presents a summative analysis of the discourse across all narrative themes presented so far as well as findings of the study and will then conclude the study with outlining its contributions, limitations and reflect upon potential areas for further research.
6. Conclusion: A Self-Sustaining Policy Ecosystem and its Sociotechnical Imaginaries

In the following sections, the author presents a summative analysis of the discourse across the afore described narrative themes from chapter 5 to provide a high-level abstraction of what the discourse analysis reveals about the entrepreneurship policy discourse and its self-perpetuating nature. Also, analysis and findings are contextualised through an autobiographical reflection of the author to ensure reflexivity in the study and allow the reader to understand the author's perspective and motivation.

To conclude the thesis, the author presents how the research addressed the objectives outlined in chapter 1 and the study contributes to knowledge. Then the limitations of the study are discussed and areas for potential further research are highlighted.

6.1 Summative Analysis, Findings & Autobiographical Reflections

This section provides a summative analysis and illustrative findings of the critical discourse analysis along the tangents of the presented narrative themes in section 5.2. It concludes the presentation of data and incremental analysis with a meta-analysis, synthesizing the overall findings of the study and revealing the inner workings of the discourse in entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg.

Considering the described network of actors (see section 5.1) and the narrative themes of Hamburg as a growing city with its tangents of talents, environmentalism and internationalisation (see section 5.2.1), Hamburg as an innovative city (see section 5.2.2), Hamburg as a media city (see section 5.2.3) and finally Hamburg as an entrepreneurial city (see section 5.2.4), the author critically interrogated the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg under the mayorship of Olaf Scholz from 2011-2018 and its genealogical genesis that dates back at least a decade before he entered into office. Using the analytical framework by combining theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu (see chapter 4) the author conducted a policy analysis in form of a critical discourse analysis (see chapter 3) through the method of an in-depth document analysis, augmented with an ethnography through the method of covert observations to solidify the analysis and increase the depth of critical insight. The overall study, coined as an entrepreneurial ethnography by the author, addressed the aim to uncover how entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg reflects a policy paradox that fosters symbolic rather than practical “real world” economic growth while perpetuating a self-sustaining discourse and capitals of sociotechnical imaginaries and the policy ecosystem itself.

Although the preceding sections in chapter 5 provided sectional analysis, the following section presents a summative analysis of the discourse, which provides a core contribution to the thesis. In this, the summative analysis is considerate of the narrative themes presented in chapter
5 and establishes the findings of how the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg works. Subsequently, the author will provide autobiographical reflections to contextualise the analysis and findings with his own perspective, or habitus in terms of Bourdieu to show how reflexivity was integrated into the research process.

6.1.1 The Domination of Entrepreneurship Policy Discourse

The discourse of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg can be seen as an aggregate manifestation of various themes within the overall public policy discourse in Hamburg that was seemingly spawned in the period of Olaf Scholz’ mayorship from 2011-2018, while in reality dating back to at least the initial articulation of the Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city from 2002 (SKHH 2002) or even the city’s vision of “Enterprise Hamburg” from 1983 that was intended to appeal to entrepreneurial residents to create economic growth (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2017). Therefore, the discourse on entrepreneurship policy is rather defined through roles and positions within the discourse, institutions, institutional arrangements, and practices than with individual contributors to policy agenda. Consequently, even though Olaf Scholz is disproportionately represented in the data presented in chapter 5 due to his mayorship in the period under investigation, this just reflects the relevance of the position within the discourse community. The overall notion of entrepreneurship policy may have become a dominant policy trajectory under his governance, however, the discourse trajectory was established long before. As such it can be seen as a representation of the entrepreneurialism phenomenon (Woods 2011; Woods & Nelson 2013, Formica 2020a, 2020b), associating entrepreneurial attributes to all context of social life and urban entrepreneurialism in particular, as in the transformation of urban governance (Harvey 1989) from a logic of managerialism to one of entrepreneurialism (Steyaert in Germain & Jacquemin 2017) and being more innovative and entrepreneurial (Harvey 1989; Steyaert & Beyes 2009). As such, urban entrepreneurialism is closely linked to new narratives of urban policy, centring around ideas of the entrepreneurial city or the sociotechnical imaginary of the creative city (Landry 2008) or creative class (Florida 2002).

Under this backlight, the entrepreneurship policy established in the period under investigation and the corresponding entrepreneurship policy discourse must be seen as an already established paradigm and persistent trajectory under new ownership and labelling, largely reiterating over pre-existing discourse. Even though Olaf Scholz took office in 2011 with a new government formed by the SPD (and later in coalition with the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (green party) for his second term from 2015 onwards) that replaced a period of more than 10 years of government led by Ole von Beust from the CDU (and later in coalition with the Grüne Alternative Liste GAL), the new government did not fundamentally change any policy orientation or even the direction of discourse but rather reappropriated existing programs, procedures, arrangements and mechanisms to self-legitimise their position on the back of exploitable narrative of tradition, success or at least establishment. As such, the mayor inhabits the discourse, like wearing a suit,
embodying the manifestation and symbolic repression of the power-knowledge-subject triad of discourse (Foucault 1977).

The entrepreneurship policy discourse mainly revolves around the narratives of Hamburg as an innovative city and Hamburg as a media city that establishes the foundation for the theme of Hamburg as the entrepreneurial city. As presented in the genealogical genesis in chapter 5, the mayor reappropriated the emphasis on innovation and technology set forth by the InnovationsAllianz in 2010 just shortly before he took office in 2011 to self-legitimize his imprint on the regional innovation strategy published in 2014. The strategic principles set forth by the InnovationsAllianz argue for the restructuring of the regional subsidy system and already propose the InnoRampUp program to foster innovation and technology-driven entrepreneurship. Under new mayors'hip the regional real estate development bank (WK Hamburg) was transformed into an investment and subsidy bank (IFB) that unified all subsidy mechanisms under its umbrella, including the InnoRampUp program and its later derivatives. Even though not originated under Scholz’ mayors'hip and already discussed under previous governments, the IFB Hamburg and the dedicated startup support mechanisms in the regional subsidy systems are claimed as major achievements under Scholz’ mayors'hip (SKHH 2018). Similarly, the media/IT industry cluster initiative Hamburg@work, dating back to 1997 as one of the first cluster initiatives in Germany, was reappropriated under Scholz’ mayors'hip within the Amt Medien - media department - at the Senate Office to gain direct control over the industry cluster initiative catering to the trending digital media and startup economy. Various programs existing for many years, e.g. the Gamecity initiative, as well as the startup vocabulary of startups, entrepreneurial ecosystems and the entrepreneurial index was adopted from Hamburg@work and established as the new phrase regime that governs the policy approach towards innovation and entrepreneurship in Hamburg and integrated throughout all entities within the political domain that are even remotely connected to entrepreneurship, such as ministries, place marketing and business development entities, public private partnership, university programs, private accelerator programs, etc. Increasing comparison with Silicon Valley - common inspiration in many policy agendas (Welter et al. 2017) - or other non-applicable role models seem deeply interwoven with fictional expectations, foreclosing uncertainty of the moment as already resolved (Riles 2010) and shape social processes and affect actors’ decisions, practices, and relations (Mische 2009) as illustrated in chapter 5.

However, the overall policy trajectory was not new but can clearly be traced back to the Leitbild of Hamburg as a growing city from 2002 (SKHH 2002) and notions of smart growth as in economic growth, job creation and sustainable development (BFHH 2005) - another sociotechnical imaginary on its own in terms of Jasanoff et al. (2015) - and its later derivatives of Hamburg as a city for talents (BFHH 2007) with its notions of Hamburg as an international city and already largely emphasizing innovation and entrepreneurial ambitions (BFHH 2009a) and later accentuation of creative industries (BFHH 2009b), renewable energies and Hamburg as a green city (BFHH 2010). As such, the discourse changed colours and players, but its structure
and institutional arrangements and mechanisms stay the same over time, even across decades, and just replicate itself, revealing the self-perpetuating nature of the political process. In connection to sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff, Kim, & Sperling 2007, Jasanoff 2015) and fictional expectations (Becker 2013a), it exemplifies how policy agenda or any discourse sharing decision on policies, measures or programs is not based relational calculation of outcomes, but rather associated to the social structures, institution, networks, and their cultural framing (Beckert 2013b), revealing sociotechnical imaginaries and fictional expectations as purely social constructions.

Through a Foucauldian analysis the narrative theme presented in this study establishes clearly how the discourse is embodied and seeded by key players within the network of actors that Foucault would call subjects (Foucault 1997), above all the mayor Olaf Scholz and his direct proxy Carsten Brosda. At the proverbial pin of the wheel - the Senate Office and highest level of the regional government - the discourse is articulated and repetitively articulated throughout the discourse community - almost as a cheerleading group - from the centre to the periphery. The control from the Senate Office and the Amt Medien - media department - and later the Ministry of Culture and Media (BKM) as well as the Ministry of Economics, Transport and Innovation (BWVI) create the governmentality of the discourse in terms of Foucault (1984, 1997), revealing the discourse’s biopower (Foucault 1978, 1984). In Foucauldian terms, the discourse shapes behaviour, and actors as they adopt the created knowledge of the discourse. Quite explicitly, they do it to themselves - as in technologies of the self (Foucault 1985) - and believe in the inherent narrative and system. It exemplifies the power-knowledge-subject (Foucault 1977) triad and reveals the institutional arrangements within the discourse that ultimately create mechanisms of difference and distinction as well as self-regulating subjection (Foucault 1985, 1997) and thus domination. Any resistance to the dominant discourse (Foucault 1980) is created from the discourse itself but then silenced and does not appear on the official stages of the discourse or is reappropriated within the discourse to reaffirm its legitimacy. As exploration of specific tangents of critique revealed (e.g. the Gamecity narrative), the media is boxed in while the network of actors can move beyond boundaries of policy or market silos to affect the discourse dynamics.

The closed network of appointed officials and their representatives are the makers of knowledge and anyone talking about the innovative city, the media city or the entrepreneurial city accepts the discourse, its roles, arrangements, practices and most importantly what constitutes as something that can be said or done. Subsequently, all base narratives established in the discourse trajectory are also accepted, making the entrepreneurship policy discourse one of Hamburg as a growing, green, international, and innovative media city for entrepreneurial talents, if not even an innovation capital in Europe, the proclaimed goal of the overall policy agenda. To this effect, the discourse establishes its own processes of legitimation by appropriating entities or actors within the ecosystem. By providing support mechanisms to ensure that some entities or individuals successfully access funding programs, e.g. as part of the Gamecity initiative or the various subsidy
programs offered for startups at IFB Hamburg, the “data of discourse” is created as means of metrification. While certainly benefiting those that participate in such programs, the discourse is creating its own audience and as such an evidence-based sanctification or legitimization that ultimately benefits the discourse elite above all. The described mechanisms reveal the inner workings of the discourse and its actors - or subjects as Foucault (1997) would call them - and their function that is more expansive than their individual contribution to the discourse itself. As evidenced through the change in mayorship while maintaining both the discourse trajectory as well as overall policy orientation, the mayor may get kicked out of office, but the clothes stay the same. The office maintains the same structures and mechanisms in the discourse, serving to reappropriate existing knowledge to self-legitimise the position and function in the field, no matter who sits in office. The Foucauldian analysis reveals the structure of the discourse, how it looks and works, what its architecture or skeleton is.

With a Bourdieusian perspective the described skeleton of the policy discourse under investigation can be augmented with the proverbial flesh to the bones, showing how the discourse is embodied and enacted in social practice and beyond textual representations. In Bourdieu’s terms, the mayor and his proxies establish the field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and can be seen as the discourse elite within the network of actors - which Bourdieu (1984b, 2000; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) calls agents as he attributes them with having agency over Foucault’s notion of them being mere agentless subjects - and the entities and outlets they represent. These actors are mutually invested in a field of peers and embody the discourse through their habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) and display of cultural, social, and political capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) to dominate the discourse. Through adoption of a shared phrase regime, the language they use and how they talk about innovation, growth, sustainability, innovation, media, or entrepreneurship establishes the knowledge of the city. Through their appropriation of language, rationale, and narrative themes, they create the illusio of the discourse (Bourdieu 1998b), the rules of the game of how the discourse is operated, how one can participate and what can be said and done, what the values and beliefs are - the doxa (Bourdieu 1998b) - what images of the future shape the discourse orientation. The power of the discourse is so dominant that the actors appropriate themselves in the process - an act misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) - and accept the discourse as real, not realising that it is a construct of narrative motives, practices built on sociotechnical imaginaries of the creative city (Landry 2008) or the creative class (Florida 2002), role models from Silicon Valley or New York and the illusion of entrepreneurship as a generally good thing. Through their seal of office, they ultimately encrypt the spaces within the city, their office, ministries, events, platforms, or any stage on which the discourse is performed with the knowledge, making them inaccessible for anyone not buying into the discourse and equipped with the appropriate capitals and habitus to participate. Through the embodiment of the knowledge, the discourse is creating mechanisms of differentiation, distinction, and domination, that even works as self-exclusion as the ultimate
exercise of power. Anyone not able to participate in the discourse self-excludes from the discourse - doing it to themselves - making the exercise of power even unnecessary. The study reveals the performativity of discourse in terms of Bourdieu as the mayor speaks the discourse into existence through the illocutionary force of his words and the network of actors believes it and acts it out on all stages of the discourse within the ecosystem of the city. Ultimately, the inherent logic of the discourse dictates that the function of discourse outshines any practical applicability. To maintain the discourse and its inherent power relations, the discourse is acted out as self-perpetuating and self-serving above all, serving the field of peers foremost and above all as Foucault argued and mentioned above. While claiming to provide means for all to participate in Hamburg as a growing, green, international, and innovative media city for entrepreneurial talents, anyone not fitting the “designed” knowledge of what constituted growing, green, international, innovative, or entrepreneurial may in fact not participate and not benefit from the discourse and connected policy agenda. As such, the discourse is designed by those in power - the political elite - for those in power, essentially by male, middle class culture and taste, higher education, position and privilege, suits and ties, being completely ignorant of not just tangents of entrepreneurship policy research that contradicts their policy orientation, e.g. persistent myths among policy makers indicated by Brown et al. (2017), ill-advised focus on technology driven entrepreneurship as a source for economic growth (Ács & Mueller 2008; G. Mason, Bishop & Robinson 2009; Henrekson & Johansson 2010; Moreno & Coad 2015), misconception of research & development subsidies (Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen 2007) or young firms as a source for job creation (Ács, Parsons & Tracy 2008) etc., but also of any perspective not fitting within the prescribed fashion inside the discourse, e.g. non-technology driven entrepreneurship, everyday entrepreneurs and the relevance of survival ventures and lifestyle entrepreneurship (Morris et al. 2016), non-knowledge based or non-educated entrepreneurship, not to mentioned any tangents of fundamental critique of affirmative proclamation of entrepreneurship as the solution of choice and wealth creation as the number one objective of all political action. Notwithstanding potential for fundamental discussion of any of these counter narrative tangents, the Bourdieusian perspective clearly illustrates how the discourse is operated, maintaining structure and process and feeding self-interest of the discourse elite to secure and advance position and privilege - as in serving self-interest of ministers, their ideologies and policy interest above formal structure (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum 2009; Perry et al. 2010) - and operating independent from any real world applicability. For the functionality of the discourse, how it works and how it is operated, any merit or practical effect is not required, what is required is that the discourse is performed and self-replicated.

The author’s study critically interrogated the inner workings of the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg and revealed its self-perpetuating nature. With his analytical coupling of the perspectives provided by Foucault and Bourdieu, the author showed how the discourse works, how it is operated and how it serves the needs of the discourse elite despite
claiming to work in the interest of others. Even though actors may genuinely believe in the
discourse - their misrecognition in terms of Bourdieu (1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) - they
ultimately create mechanisms of differentiation and distinction and through the self-serving
nature of the discourse commit an act of domination. The analysis developed by the author
unmasks the discourse and its illusive notions of prosperity through technology-driven innovation
and entrepreneurship for all society as a self-serving system to legitimise the political process and
advance position and privilege, replicating itself independent from any individual contribution
through its inherent institutional arrangements and practices.

The next section will conclude the summative analysis and findings of the study with an
autobiographical reflection to contextualise the author’s perspective and habitus in terms of
Bourdieu. In an attempt to remain reflexive in the research process, the author constantly reflected
his perspective, position, and habitus-field-capital in terms of Bourdieu as he navigated the field
of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg. As such, the autobiographical reflection may serve to
further qualify and situate the study for the reader.

6.1.2 Autobiographical Reflections
To distinguish the author’s role as a researcher from his role as a professional within the
entrepreneurial ecosystem, it is important to point out his motivation for the research and his
underlying perspective. Over the course of 10+ years as a media industry professional the author
had various opportunities to experience elements of the startup economy. Both in capacities as an
employee and as a freelance consultant he was involved in the evaluation of business ideas for
potential seed funding or established startups for investment. He participated in M&A (merger &
acquisition) projects (both on national and international levels) for later stage private equity deals
and was charged with integrating acquired companies within corporate structures. During these
projects the author was charged with evaluating business models as well as technical feasibility
for any signs of terminal risks to the investment. Among others, the author was involved in
technology stack and code reviews on a very operational level, as well as in strategic evaluations
of product roadmaps, monetisation strategies and growth dynamics to make investment
recommendations. He also served as a mentor to aspiring entrepreneurs and participants of
accelerator programs, sharing insights to support new business endeavours. Apart from the
shareholder perspective, the author was also involved in entrepreneurial activity himself as a co-
founder of a technology firm and as a deployed manager in a portfolio startup among others. In
these capacities he had to manage day to day business, develop long term monetisation strategies
and business models, while at the same time pitch to potential investors to raise money. Lastly,
the author also acted as an “intrapreneur” within a large corporation and built up a digital business
from 5 to 100+ employees over the course of 18 months.

All of these experiences in the startup economy left the author sceptical of common belief
systems, assumptions, goals and rationale within the entrepreneurial ecosystems he encountered,
both in Germany and abroad. He is not denying the relevance of high-growth startups as drivers of change and innovation, in fact he is certain of it, but he is convinced that 1. most proclaimed startups do not qualify as firms with high-growth potential or even moderate growth potential; 2. many private investors he encountered may not have fully understood the mechanics of the venture capital industry and therefore made wrong or at least ill-advised investment decisions; and 3. public initiatives to foster entrepreneurship the author was made aware of were somewhat generic at best and if focussed, wrongly focussed and therefore not just ineffective but actually harmful to the economy (at least in the respect that they are not aligned with the public agenda to create new jobs and economic growth). More critically, he felt that serious side effects and consequences of disruptive transformations caused through technology-driven or at least technology-mediated innovation are discussed on abstract levels and international platforms but remain agentless and silenced in dominant regional policy discourse and media coverage, for example surrounding job displacement, privacy, taxation, or general business ethics. These convictions were gained and substantiated in previous research done by the author in both Australia (Recke & Bliemel 2017, 2018) and Germany (Recke 2016, 2020a) and led to the research presented in this thesis to further the understanding of the underlying mechanics and power structures within the entrepreneurial ecosystems and more specifically the public policy discourse towards entrepreneurship.

The focus on public policy is of the highest relevance to the author, as it shapes belief systems on a societal level with a very long-term perspective. The potential impact on society is considered to be huge, especially if it is based on sociotechnical imaginaries that are disconnected from reality and prove to be false motivators. The predominant overly enthusiastic view on entrepreneurship as the answer of choice in neo-liberal capitalism leaves negative side-effects agentless, excluding critical voices from the discourse or reappropriating any resistance as natural rejection of inevitable change that just must be overcome. Even if social and ethical issues are more and more present in public discourse about technology driven innovation the entrepreneurial aspect remains more or less untainted. Even more considerate approaches regarding social inclusion or natural environment and ecology (quadruple or quintuple helix) like social entrepreneurship are still not fundamentally questioning the notions of entrepreneurialism and wealth creation as the primary objective above all.

As a researcher the author was determined to gain deep insights into the inner workings and power structures of the discourse about public policy towards entrepreneurship in Hamburg. The goal was to understand the inherent belief system and uncover any disconnect from reality on deeper procedural and social levels to unmask the discourse as a self-perpetuating and self-serving system. The author is aware that any knowledge derived from his research is just a small part of the whole picture that is largely specific to the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Hamburg and also dependent on the circumstances under which any data is obtained and of course informed by the authors own perspective on the topic, even if a neutral position was taken as much as possible.
In an attempt to ensure reflexivity in the research process, the author constantly balanced his own perspective and position against literature, data sources and critical reflection with academic peers and supervisors. Yet, the investigation is certainly influenced through the author’s perspective and even more so through his habitus as well as social and cultural capital in terms of Bourdieu. Consequently, there is no truth to be claimed or factual reality to be described, rather the author is aware that he created a “history of the present” in terms of Foucault, showing the institutional arrangements and relations, how the discourse created power and knowledge with his epistemically contingent perspective. As certain parts of the ecosystem were inaccessible to the author, potential insight might be missing from the results as well. Subsequently, any findings do not constitute any kind of objective truth, nor can they be generalized. Still, the author can genuinely show how the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg works and constitutes practice under the conditions outlined in this document.

The gained knowledge was used to generate an interpretative understanding of narratives and their function within the regional entrepreneurial policy discourse and might serve to formulate indicators for the effectiveness of public policy agendas towards high-growth entrepreneurship in Hamburg. The author’s analysis might be suitable to discover (vanity) imaginaries as well as explain the use of (vanity) metrics that policy makers and potentially other stakeholders are engineering their efforts to nurture high-growth entrepreneurship against. Most critically however, the author revealed the contamination of the political process as a self-serving system to maintain and advance power while claiming to work in the interest of everyone.

6.2 Contributions, Limitations & Further Research

The author conducted his study with the premise to avoid rehearsing old grounds. Therefore, while replicative studies investigating policy effectiveness would have also been possible to gain insights specific to entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg, the author is convinced to provide deeper insights and valuable contribution to knowledge with the presented investigation of the underlying dynamics in the entrepreneurship policy formation process in the city of Hamburg, namely the entrepreneurship policy discourse, as it goes beyond effectiveness, policy metrics and implementation failure but accentuates the motivational side of policy creation as a socially constructed process. As such, the thesis aims to critically interrogate how entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg reflects a policy paradox that fosters symbolic rather than practical “real world” economic growth while perpetuating a self-sustaining discourse and capitals of sociotechnical imaginaries and the policy ecosystem itself.

In chapter 1 the author outlined the objectives of the study that were addressed along the presented structure of the thesis. Before elaborating on the study’s contribution to knowledge, the author wants to highlight, how the objectives were addressed throughout the thesis. These are:
1. Discuss foundational literature on entrepreneurship and its practice;
2. Outline primary western entrepreneurship policy agendas and institutional arrangements relevant to their formation;
3. Contextualise regional innovation theory and imaginaries with entrepreneurship policy;
4. Articulate the research perspective underpinning the study and the coupling of theories by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu as an analytical framework;
5. Map the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem in Hamburg (Germany);
6. Methodologically situate the study through an empirical investigation of institutional structures, strategic processes, practices and primary stakeholders of Hamburg’s entrepreneurship policy;
7. Develop and critically interrogate findings of the study through the analytical framework drawing upon theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu.

Objectives 1 – 3 are addressed in the in-depth literature review in chapter 2 that covered entrepreneurship, its theoretical origin and connection to innovation, entrepreneurial practice, the role of the entrepreneur, new firm formation and entrepreneurialism as a phenomenon (section 2.1) as well as the professionalisation of entrepreneurship in policy and education and the gap between policy research and practice (section 2.2). Additionally, regional innovation theories, such as industry clusters, the triple helix approach and entrepreneurial ecosystems (section 2.3) and concepts of fictional expectations and sociotechnical imaginaries (section 2.4) are reviewed and contextualised for their relevance to entrepreneurship policy formulation and the discourse under investigation.

Objective 4 is addressed in chapters 3 and 4 by illustrating the theoretical perspective informing the study and presenting ontological and epistemological assumptions, the research strategy and methodological approach, research methods as well as research execution. The author presents his approach of combining a critical discourse analysis with a complementary component of ethnographic observations to interrogate how entrepreneurship policy is shaped in Hamburg (chapter 3). The approach is embedded in the author’s analytical framework presented in chapter 4, introducing the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, and arguing for an analytical coupling to establish the analytical framework for the empirical investigation of the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg.

Objectives 5-7 are addressed in chapter 5, which presents the empirical investigation, the collected data and analysis. The city of Hamburg is contextualised, and the current state of its entrepreneurship policy agenda is presented (section 5.1.1) on the backdrop of foundational literature discussed in chapter 2. Then, entities and stakeholders in the entrepreneurship policy terrain are presented (section 5.1.2) to map the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem, its network of actors and the core field of power in the discourse under investigation (section 5.1.3). The
institutional structures and their interrelations are presented and geographically allocated and classified using the conceptual backdrop of innovation theories discussed in chapter 2. Along themes of local discursivity, the entrepreneurship policy discourse, its processes, practices, and phrase regimes are presented through narrative themes commonly adopted by stakeholders and entities that articulate aspirations and goals (section 5.2). These themes evolved over time and are presented in the form of a history to establish the trajectory of the discourse and develop and discuss findings through the author’s analytical framework, drawing upon Foucault and Bourdieu, presented in chapter 4. The themes are presented along 4 main trajectories, Hamburg as a Growing City (section 5.2.1), Hamburg as an Innovative City (section 5.2.2), Hamburg as a Media City (section 5.2.3) and Hamburg as an Entrepreneurial City (section 5.2.4) to provide ground for the genealogical investigation of the discourse formation over time.

Finally, this chapter concludes the thesis with a summative Analysis, Findings & Autobiographical Reflections and establishes how the study contributed to both academia and practice with relevant and novel insights from a perspective of implications as well as methodology.

The presented research makes several contributions relevant to both academia and practice. However, before moving on to discuss these, the overall analysis and critical contribution of the study reveals the self-sustaining nature of the entrepreneurship policy discourse with the primary objective to sustain the entrepreneurship policy ecosystem and to secure or advance key actor’s position and privilege. As such the policy community is unmasked as self-serving above all, leaving critical problems, challenges, and issues unanswered and agentless. The study thus contributes to the field of entrepreneurship policy research and policy analysis while also providing valuable contributions for research methodologists with its unique methodological approach as well as for social studies with its unusual analytical framework through the conceptual connection of theories developed by both Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. In the following sections, the author summarises the contributions of the thesis as well as its limitations and elaborates on areas for further research.

6.2.1 Unmasking the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Political Processes
First, the (dis)connect between regional entrepreneurship policy and academic research (see section 2.2.) was analysed in greater detail to provide deeper insights into public policy forming processes in Hamburg. As highlighted by scholars, implemented policies often do not reflect one academic position or the other and are often criticised for not being effective (C. Mason & Brown 2014, Arshed & Carter & Mason 2014, 2016), calling into question government interventions that are perceived as mistargeted by entrepreneurs (Massa & Testa 2008). The author has already reflected upon the misaligned policy in Hamburg (Recke 2021) and aims to dig below the surface to explain the evident disconnect with this study. As the presented analysis revealed, academia or any representative from university could not be identified as being a relevant contributor to the
discourse apart from serving as a narrative of success or excellence in academia, that is commonly connected to innovation and research-based entrepreneurship, despite evidence from Autio, Kronlund & Kovalainen indicating that such a policy orientation may not yield promising perspectives (2007). With this qualitative analysis, (vanity) imaginaries for policy articulation and (vanity) metrics for evaluation of public policy programs were contextualised in a way that may serve valuable for the formation of future policy agendas. The origin of the disconnection was traced back to power relations at play in the entrepreneurship policy discourse, that are vital to the creation of public policy agendas. The inherent dynamics, belief systems and imaginaries shape stakeholders’ views of the future and therefore their take on innovation as well as concrete definition of policy programs to foster entrepreneurship despite any data to substantiate their assumptions. The research shows that although sociotechnical imaginaries are common and essential to create a coherent vision of the world to come, there are imaginaries at play in the discourse under investigation that are over-enthusiastic and too simplistic to follow to steer the complex interrelations in economic dynamics and might not match the factual reality in the region. Rather they serve as narrative motives to feed discourse and its trajectory as tangible narratives of a better world to come, without any merit in the present but serving within in “policy windows” (Rutter, Mashall & Sims 2012) that align various interests and apparently not include academic input in case of this study. Also, the previously diagnosed reliance on non-targeted research and persistent romantic views of entrepreneurship and innovation (Massa & Testa 2008, Perry et al. 2010) were certainly evident in the authors analysis. The entrepreneurship policy discourse was unmasked through the presented critical discourse analysis by exposing the discourse’s inherent structures, practices, institutions, interrelations, and power dynamics that establish the knowledge, biopower (Foucault 1978, 1984) and self-regulating subjection (Foucault 1985, 1997) inside the entrepreneurship policy community and the governmentality of discourse in terms of Foucault (1984, 1997). The discourse is operated by a closed network of actors that repetitively articulate and embody the constitutional statements presented along the tangents of narrative themes and establish the discourse and policy trajectory. Actors operate the field and establish a field of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) through their habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) and display of cultural, social and political capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), buying into the inherent belief system, rules and values of the discourse - illusio and doxa in terms of Bourdieu (1998b) - in acts of misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and ultimately create mechanisms of differentiation, distinction and domination in terms of Bourdieu, resulting in a self-perpetuating and self-serving discourse that benefits the network of actors before anyone else.

The authors findings are in line with other scholars’ findings about policy making, even though rationally designed to achieve specific goals, being impacted by non-rational dimensions or organisational behaviours, such as self-interest of ministers, their ideologies and policy interests (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum 2009, Perry et al. 2010). The author revealed the underlying
dynamics of this process within the entrepreneurship policy domain, the self-perpetuating nature of the discourse. Even though the study does not investigate how the sphere of academia may be intentionally or unintentionally complicit in the disconnect as pointed out in section 2.1.3, the cultural divide is also substantiated by inherent absence of academia from the discourse under investigation. This phenomenon goes to the extent that very little, if any, critique of the dominant discourse is permitted. The discourse is so dominant that there is little or even no alternative, as was evidenced through the naturally generated resistance to the discourse (Foucault 1980) either being ignored or reappropriated inside the discourse. While being targeted at entrepreneurship spawning from higher education or through networks, e.g. from policy mediated subsidy systems, the discourse is ignorant of anyone not playing by the rules of game, thus excluding them from participating. This can be even described as a mechanism of self-exclusion. The everyday entrepreneur, making up the majority of the regional or even national economy as 99% of all businesses in the EU are SMEs (Masurel 2019a), is neither participating nor benefiting from any entrepreneurship policy tangent. As such, true resistance can only exist outside the discourse, making it invisible to the inner workings and embodiment of the dominant discourse, that creates mechanisms of differentiation, distinction and exclusion, or rather self-exclusion of those resisting it. Participants or contributors to the discourse must be able to navigate the field and habitus and deploy the appropriate capitals in terms of Bourdieu, making it impossible for anyone else to access the discourse. Ultimately, this dynamic unmasks the self-perpetuating and self-serving nature of the political process for which there is no solution.

The analysis reveals the very nature of the discourse that has to exclude “an other” as a means of differentiation and distinction and so has to dominate “an other”. To “solve” the inevitable inequality within the discourse is to expose the discourse for what it is. The discourse claims to be open to all, work in the interest of society and welfare, economic development, and a brighter future for all, while in reality it is self-serving above all as well as disconnected and insulated from reality. The discourse is self-sustaining, even beyond individuals in office (e.g. mayors or ministers) that may change over time, while the discourse dynamics, institutional arrangements and power relations remain the same. So, claiming to work for “everyone” or the “citizens” is naturally flawed as without domination over the “other” the discourse mechanisms of differentiation and distinction make no sense. Any attempt to influence, change or create new dominance in the discourse would result in a similar structure under different labelling as any new knowledge would be reappropriated within the discourse, creating new mechanisms of differentiation, distinction and domination that would operate under similar principles.

The revealed dynamics have similarities to critical issues of ideological racism, sexism or other forms of discrimination. The author thus calls for institutional reflexivity, providing knowledge and understanding of how the discourse works and how it is operated as a contribution towards better comprehension of entrepreneurship policy formation processes. The inherent problems cannot be solved or eradicated, just navigated. The political process is always
contaminated in terms of its culture or habitus in the words of Bourdieu and everyone is actively involved in trans-generational reproduction of who is the “other”.

The study is of high relevance for academics, policy practitioners as well as interested citizen. To an academic audience the analysis of the discourse dynamics may serve to inform more in-depth understanding of the messy policy formation processes, an area of high relevance and seemingly few existing insights (Arshed, Carter & Mason 2015; Lundstrom & Stevenson 2005). For policy practitioners it could be of interest to realise that academic insight is not considered and that divergent perspectives on articulated policy agenda exists. Even more so, the study might prove valuable for more in-depth debate of motivation, goals and intended outcomes in the political arena. Lastly, interested citizen benefit from understanding the underlying mechanics that drive the policy formation. By unmasking the discourse power dynamics, the policy agenda advertised as working for the coming good and “for them” is revealed as self-serving as its differentiates, distinguishes and dominates.

6.2.2 The Approach of an Entrepreneurial Ethnography

Second, the study was conducted with a unique and previously unattempted methodological approach, coined entrepreneurial ethnography by the author. The critical discourse analysis and its primary method of document analysis was augmented with an ethnography component of covert observations to solidify the analysis and develop deeper and more profound insights into the discourse dynamics and its embodied reality in the field of entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg. Even though covert observations come with specific methodological and ethical challenges, they provide a powerful mechanism to penetrate the defensive layers of discourse communities and social networks of stakeholders. While ethical implications must be considered carefully, the author emphasises the focus on function over contribution. As for the critical discourse analysis the identification of actors in terms of their function within the field under investigation is more critical than individual contribution to particular discursive statements or discursive formations, participants of the observation can easily be anonymised to protect personal data and any implications for the participants’s privacy or dignity that might arise from the delicate nature of the study at hand. Consequently, the covert observations can be conducted in full awareness of the ethical implications and in line with ethical code of conduct.

Due to his position as a professional within the entrepreneurial ecosystem and as a former executive in the media/IT industry sector within the city, the author had unique access to “center stages” and more critically “backstages” of the field in terms of Goffmann (1956). Building on his existing network in industry, university and government as well as through experience within public participation, or the social helix in the quadruple helix approach (Carayannis & Campbell 2009, 2010) - and through his habitus-field-capital in terms of Bourdieu, the author was able to penetrate and navigate the field as well as blend in to a certain degree. Over the extensive period of field research, the author was able to build relationships with various actors in the discourse
community and has gained access to no longer publicly available or even private information to augment the critical discourse analysis. The approach considerably extended the level of insights that could have been gathered from just evaluating the available documents in public archives and repositories and conducting open observations, e.g. in terms of scripted interviews or questionnaires while fully disclosing the aim of the study. Due to the critical investigation of the discourse dynamics, the author’s approach allowed observations in unscrutinised scenarios and revealed areas of the discourse that are not accessible without the required social capital.

The field of entrepreneurship policy formation has not been investigated with this approach prior to this study, transposing elements of ethnographic studies to an entrepreneurial setting within the unique setting of the city of Hamburg. The approach also provides an interesting perspective for more collaborative and cross-cultural studies. As there are similar themes in other studies, e.g. studies exploring entrepreneurial ecosystems with comparable setups, comparative analysis may be allowed due to the depth of insight gained in this study. For example, the author conducted studies of entrepreneurial ecosystem and public policy towards entrepreneurship in Sydney (Recke & Bliemel 2017, 2018) prior to this study that even though very different in orientation revealed similar symptoms that were now investigated in Hamburg.

The entrepreneurial ethnography is a novel and innovative approach and a considerable challenge in the research design of the study. The creative inventiveness can be seen in the context of entrepreneurialism, making the ethnography entrepreneurial in nature. It extends the analysis towards a genealogical perspective to create a “history of the present” in terms of Foucault (1977, 1980) that unmasks the discourse trajectory. Along the epistemic development (Foucault 1970) of narrative themes that aligned all actors in the discourse community under its directive, it revealed the governmentality of discourse (Foucault 1984, 1997) through its biopower Foucault (1978, 1984) and self-regulating subjection (Foucault 1985, 1997). From the Foucauldian abstraction of discourse, it then traces the discourse to its embodied reality in the field of entrepreneurship policy, revealing how actors enact the discourse in their habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) and through deployment of their social, political, and cultural capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) to encrypt the stages of the discourse with knowledge and enable its performativity. As an innovative and previously unattempted approach in this context, the study illustrated how the discourse and its networks of actors are operated and insulated against resistance through its mechanisms of differentiation, distinction, and domination, which can prove to be insightful for research methodologists.

Even though time consuming and extensive in scope without any guarantee of successfully gaining valuable insights, the interdisciplinary methodology employed by the author constitutes a contribution to academia that may inspire other academics to investigate social phenomena, especially within closed networks, of which many exist in both physical and virtual worlds beyond domains of policy and entrepreneurship.
6.2.3 An Analytical Framework to Investigate Socially Constructed Ecosystems

Third, the study is building on the works of social theorists Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu and combines their approach to establish the analytical framework for the study. The analytical coupling is unusual and comes with specific methodological and theoretical challenges. Yet, it allowed the author to augment the abstract critical discourse analysis of the discourse skeleton provided by Michel Foucault with the proverbial meat on the bones through Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to embodiment of discourse and constitutes a contribution as an analytical framework. Foucault provides his concepts of power, knowledge and subjectivity (Foucault 1977, 1997) to establish how discourse creates knowledge that represents power over subjects that then shapes their behaviour according to institutional arrangements and practices within the discourse - the biopower of discourse (Foucault 1978, 1984) - through technologies of the self (Foucault 1985) that ultimately constitute the discourse’s governmentality (Foucault 1984, 1997) through mechanism of difference and distinction. The Foucauldian lens allows the discourse to be described on an abstract level. It establishes the foundation for the analytical framework that is then augmented to gain more in-depth insight and understanding from embodied practices in the reality of the actual environment of the field under investigation.

To this effect, Bourdieu provides his concepts of field (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), habitus (Bourdieu 1977a) and capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) that show how discourse is embodied and acted out. The agents within the discourse enact the discourse as they buy into the doxa (Bourdieu 1998b) - the inherent rules of the game, its values, rules, and procedures - with their illusio (Bourdieu 1998b), their commitment to the inherent logic and capitals within the field. This is an act of misrecognition (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), letting them believe the discourse is real, not realising that it is socially constructed. It thus enables acts of symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) that ultimately leads to exclusion as part of the natural order of things. Through these concepts provided by Bourdieu, it can be shown how the performativity of discourse thus results in mechanisms of differentiation, distinction and so domination.

The Foucauldian analysis allows the author to show what is said and seen of the power-knowledge-subject triad and its abstraction. Bourdieu allows the author to animate the discourse by showing its embodied performativity in live and dynamic contexts, unmasking embodied realities of everyday practice.

The approach can provide valuable insights for research methodologists as it can be applied also to other areas within the realms of socially constructed ecosystems, such as cityscapes or nationscapes. Discourses are also ever changing and moving to different spheres that could also be explored based on this methodological approach. For example, entrepreneurial ecosystems are more and more moving towards digital spheres or virtual ecosystems. In such scenarios also the discourse on entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship policy will likely work differently. The
methodological approach and the analytical framework developed by the author to critically interrogate policy discourse would allow to explore whether the uncovered discourse dynamics and inherent sociotechnical imaginaries become even more powerful within digitally interconnected ecosystems that transcend regional and national boundaries and interact globally, or eventually become more democratized and sparsely redistributed into micro discourses.

6.2.4 Limitations & Further Research

The study at hand focuses on the entrepreneurship policy discourse in Hamburg and as such is highly specific to the regional environment and contexts, such as period of investigation, individual stakeholders within the network of actors (e.g. the period of Olaf Scholz as mayor of Hamburg from 2011-2018) as well as the unique access and perspective of the author himself. As the qualitative study deals with socially constructed knowledge, it provides a perspective that is contingent to circumstance and cannot be used for generalisation. The discourse under investigation is centred in the city state of Hamburg and as such is not just a regional discourse, but also highly condensed in reach. Consequently, the closed networks of actors shaping the discourse as revealed in the study might not exist or operate differently in other regions. Even if it might be safe to assume that in other city states within Germany, discourse dynamics might be similar, certainly other dynamics are to be expected in less centralised and more spacious states. As the scope of the discourse is regional, it might also not translate well to a federal, national or even international discourse that might reveal other aspects of the discourse that are not apparent in Hamburg. Beyond that, the study is limited by the authors access and habitus-field-capital. Even though the author spent considerable time investigating the discourse community and immersed in the field during the extensive covert observations, it is safe to assume that some areas of the discourse and thus some levels of the network of actors were impenetrable for the author as an external actor. This in consequence means, that there could be aspects to the discourse that have not been discovered and revealed, leaving more discourse dynamics to be discovered. Also, the interpretation and analysis are contingent to the authors habitus and unique perspective. Despite the attempt to remain reflexive in the research process and providing autobiographical reflections for readers to situate the authors perspective in this study, the analysis can never be objective and is fact biased by the author’s individual view on the world. Beyond these limitations, the study is certainly of interest to academics and practitioners alike as a source of insight that provided a solid foundation for further research.

To make the analysis more accessible to wider audience in academic debate, the author also contributes through translating the German policy discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg to English speaking audiences. Most artefacts under investigation are documents written in German, speeches delivered in German etc., yielding a considerable challenge for consideration in international debate about entrepreneurship policy. All relevant statements presented in this thesis have been translated to English by the author while providing also access
to the German text elements in the appendix. Consequently, the otherwise exclusively German discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg is made accessible and explorable for international audiences. This not just enhances the potential reception of the study at hand but provides perspectives for more international and comparative studies that may also provide perspectives for generalisation of findings.

Some general discursive formations may serve as a baseline for further research that may allow some degree of generalisation of understanding, considering some principles on which the knowledge was obtained. As the general mechanisms of discourse as established by scholars Foucault and Bourdieu transcend beyond the regional boundaries of the city of Hamburg, it is safe to assume that also in other regions of the world similar discourses and power dynamics govern the entrepreneurship policy formation. As such, conducting similar studies in other regions could provide additional insights and might allow perspectives for generalisation along the tangents established in this thesis, for example over-simplification of fictional expectations or use of sociotechnical imaginaries, misguided emphasis on technology-driven entrepreneurship and startups linked to tangible narratives of the past, from other regions or anecdotal evidence etc. The author’s initial analysis of the public policy agenda towards entrepreneurship in Sydney (Australia) indicates very similar conditions, assumptions, and policy orientations (Recke & Bliemel 2017, 2018). Therefore, a similar investigation of the regional discourse on entrepreneurship policy and the network of actors in Sydney could reveal similar or complementary insights. This could be seen as an opportunity for intercultural or comparative studies that address local or regional specificity in cityscapes, metropolitan or rural regions.

To ensure a more rigorously reflexive perspective on the regional entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg (or any other region for that matter) might also be achieved by conducting similar analysis on the same body of documents by other scholar, therefore exploring wether different researchers background and perspective would reveal similar or divergent interpretation. Alternatively, the discourse could also be explored through alternative analytical frameworks that might reveal additional insights beyond the theories of Foucault and Bourdieu.

Another tangent would be to explore policy formation on higher levels of policy, e.g. national or even international levels, for example in Germany or the European Union. As existing academic evidence suggests that widely different perception and understanding of entrepreneurship phenomena exist among policy makers, entrepreneurship researchers and entrepreneurs (Massa & Testa 2008) on macro-levels but changes its focus in the process of finalising for delivery on micro-levels (Arshed, Carter & Mason 2016), an in-depth analysis of the policy formation process on macro-levels might reveal new insights to trace the disconnection to a point of occurrence. This tangent of further research would also provide opportunities for intercultural or comparative studies that address national and inter-continental differences, as the composition of entrepreneurial ecosystems is vastly different not just across regions but also nations. To this effect, also the consideration of the discourse language may serve critical.
the authors contribution of translating the German discourse on entrepreneurship policy in Hamburg for English speaking audiences, also other regional policy discourses may benefit from being translated into English for more comparative studies across regions, language and culture.

Then, in the few cases in which policy seems more aligned to academic findings, e.g. Finish public investment and policy measures which are recognised as leading in the domain of high-growth entrepreneurship policy (C. Mason & Brown 2013), a critical investigation of the policy discourse could provide insights into whether the policy agenda is formed under similar discursive structures or whether additional factors come into play that were not apparent in the study at hand.

Lastly, beyond regional and international perspectives on entrepreneurship policy discourse and investigation of different regional, national or international discourses along tangents of policy effectiveness, also more transversal studies could reveal additional insights. For example, the discourse community could be explored more in-depth along ethnic, or feminist perspective or be more considerate of marginalised groups. Especially in light of persistent changes in business practices due to the COVID-19 pandemics in 2020 and 2021, the entrepreneurship policy formation could also be explored along virtual/cyber-spatial discourses and performativities that may reveal critical insights for the immediate to mid-term future. As the notion of place becomes increasingly less relevant in times of global connectivity, other dynamics may be discovered that may govern entrepreneurship policy discourse in more digitally transcendent ecosystems.

In any case, all these directions would serve to further qualify the findings from the study and could contribute towards generalisable indicators to qualify and characterise public policy in contingency of the policy discourse.

However, the Bourdieusian analytical lens would suggest that by claiming any generalisable contribution, the author would postulate new knowledge or power and commit a classic act of differentiation, distinction, and domination within his field of academia, creating an exact manifestation of what he exposed and criticised.
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Glossary

It is understandable that a glossary may be helpful for readers unfamiliar with the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Therefore, the following glossary is provided from key bodies of text by authors Danaher, Schirato & Webb (2000) and Webb, Schirato & Danaher (2002). The glossary and included terminology are not intended to be conclusive or complete, but to provide information about the key terminology used throughout the thesis. A far more comprehensive elaboration on the entailed concepts is provided by the authors in their works Understanding Foucault (Danaher, Schirato & Webb 2000) and Understanding Bourdieu (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002).

Foucauldian Terminology

archaeology is the term used by Foucault to refer to the process of working through the historical archives of various societies to bring to light the discursive formations and events that have produced the fields of knowledge and discursive formations of different historical periods.

biopolitics and biopower refer to the technologies, knowledges, discourses, politics and practices used to bring about the production and management of a state’s human resources. Biopower analyses, regulates, controls, explains and defines the human subject, its body and behaviour.

discipline refers first to the notion of punishment or coercion, and second to the notion of sets of skills and knowledges which must be mastered in order to achieve success in particular fields. Foucault connects these two meanings through his concept of ‘power-knowledge’.

discourse generally refers to a type of language associated with an institution, and includes the ideas and statements which express an institution’s values. In Foucault’s writings, it is used to describe individual acts of language, or ‘language in action’ - the ideas and statements that allow us to make sense of and ‘see’ things.

dividing practices refers to the ways in which social groups are separated from one another on the basis of judgements made about their actions and attitudes. For example, the mad are divided from the sane, the sick from the healthy, the criminal from the legal.

epistemes are periods of history organised around, and explicable in terms of, specific world-views and discourses. They are characterised by institutions, disciplines, knowledges, rules and activities consistent with those world-views. The rise and fall of epistemes doesn’t correspond to any notion of natural continuity, development or progress, but is random and contingent.
ethics, in Foucault’s definition, refers to how people behave in relation to the ‘moral’ norms - the sets of rules, prohibitions and codes of a society.

games of truth refers to the sets of rules within particular institutions by which the truth is produced.

genealogy is a process of analysing and uncovering the historical relationship between truth, knowledge and power. Foucault suggests, following Nietzsche, that knowledge and truth are produced by struggles both between and within institutions, fields and disciplines and then presented as if they are eternal and universal.

governing and government, for Foucault, can be understood in terms of both a ‘body politics’ - the ways in which we conduct ourselves, the relationships that we have with our body and other bodies in society - and, in a more conventional sense, the way in which a state rules over its people.

governmentality is the term Foucault uses to describe the change in technologies of, and attitudes towards, governing which developed in Europe in the eighteenth century. This involved a greater emphasis on the state’s ability to manage its resources (including its population) economically and efficiently, and a concomitant increase in state intervention in the lives of its citizens. There have been two major consequences of this change. The first is that citizens are both ‘regulated’ by the state and its institutions and discourses, and educated to monitor and regulate their own behaviour. The second, which derives from what Foucault calls the ‘liberal attitude’, is the emergence of an understanding, on the part of citizens, of the need to ‘negotiate’ those forces of ‘subject regulation’ through a process of ‘self-governing’.

knowledge, for Foucault, is made up of perspectives, ideas, narratives, commentaries, rules, categories, laws, terms, explanations and definitions produced and valorised by disciplines, fields and institutions through the application of scientific principles. Different and new knowledge emerges from the struggle between the different areas within a culture.

liberalism is an attitude and practice that monitors and works to limit the control, intrusion or intervention of the state in the social, economic and cultural activities of its citizens.

micro-power explains how discourses ‘write’ the body, or shape the ways in which bodies are understood and function.
modernity as used in disciplines like philosophy, historiography and sociology generally refers to that period of (western) history which dates from the Enlightenment, and which is characterised by scientific rationality, the development of commerce and capitalism, the rise of education, surveillance, urbanism and atheism.

normative judgements are used to assess and monitor the actions and attitudes of people according to the notion of a norm or average. Such judgements work throughout various institutions such as prisons, schools and hospitals, as well as throughout the social body as a whole, to divide the ‘normal’ from the ‘abnormal’.

the ‘order of things’ refers to a combination of the institutions, knowledges, discourses and practices which organise an episteme, and which make some things and activities possible and explicable, and other things unthinkable. The reason for, or the logic of, such ‘order’ provides the foundation for social practices and systems of social organisation, without necessarily being visible itself.

power for Foucault is not a thing that is held and used by individuals or groups. Rather, it is both a complex flow and a set of relations between different groups and areas of society which changes with circumstances and time. The other point Foucault makes about power is that it is not solely negative (working to repress or control people): it is also highly productive. Power produces resistance to itself; it produces what we are and what we can do; and it produces how we see ourselves and the world.

power-knowledge is Foucault’s concept that knowledge is something that makes us its subjects, because we make sense of ourselves by referring back to various bodies of knowledge.

social contract theory refers to the notion that people freely choose to submit to the dictates and laws of the state in exchange for its protection.

subjectivity is the term derived from psychoanalytic theory to describe and explain identity, or the self. It replaces the commonsense notion that our identity is the product of our conscious, self-governing self and, instead, presents individual identity as the product of discourses, ideologies and institutional practices.

technologies, for Foucault, refers to two main functions or mechanisms: first, the ways in which societies pacify, dominate and regulate subjects; and second, ‘technologies of the self’, which allow individuals to shape their own bodies and thoughts.
will to power, which Foucault takes from Nietzsche, refers to the notion that meanings, ideas, rules, discourses, knowledge, and ‘truths’ do not emerge naturally, but are produced in order to support, advantage or valorise a particular social group.

**Bourdieuian Terminology**

**agency:** The idea that individuals are equipped with the ability to understand and control their own actions, regardless of the circumstances of their lives: usually termed ‘intentionality’ and ‘individuality’. We exercise agency, for example, when we indicate our intention to vote one way or another, or make choices about what to eat from a restaurant menu. For Bourdieu, the possibilities of agency must be understood and contextualised in terms of their relation to the objective structures of a culture.

**bodily hexis:** The physical attitudes and dispositions which emerge in individuals as a result of the relationships between particular fields and individuals’ habitus. The bodily hexis of someone from the artistic field, for example, might be expressed through flamboyant gestures and unconventional dress sense.

**bureaucrats/bureaucracy:** For Bourdieu, bureaucrats make up a ‘state nobility’ who act as intermediaries between the community and the government, implementing the government’s policies, and providing the public with a voice in government.

**construction:** The notion that objects of research exist for researchers only within the framework of their hypothesis. For Bourdieu, the fundamental scientific act is the construction of the object of research.

**cultural capital:** A form of value associated with culturally authorised tastes, consumption patterns, attributes, skills and awards. Within the field of education, for example, an academic degree constitutes cultural capital.

**cultural field:** Bourdieu’s metaphor for representing sites of cultural practice. A cultural field can be defined as a series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, designations and appointments which constitutes an objective hierarchy, and which produce and authorise certain discourses and activities. But a field is also constituted by, or out of, the conflict which is involved when groups or individuals attempt to determine what constitutes capital within that field and how that capital is to be distributed.
cultural literacy: A strategic engagement with the field based upon self-reflexivity, an understanding of the rules, regulations and values of the field, and an ability to negotiate conditions and contexts moment by moment.

discourse: The forms of language associated with, and expressing the values of, particular cultural fields. A legal discourse, for example, expresses the values and beliefs of the field of law.

distinction: A kind of habitus, or set of acquired tastes, that is associated with the upper classes, but which has become more generally naturalised as good and noble. A taste for fine wine, classical music and great works of art are examples of markers of distinction.

doxa: A set of core values and discourses which a field articulates as its fundamental principles and which tend to be viewed as inherently true and necessary. For Bourdieu, the ‘doxic attitude’ means bodily and unconscious submission to conditions that are in fact quite arbitrary and contingent.

empiricism: The study of social phenomena and sense experience, based on systems of measurement rather than on argument alone. For Bourdieu, empiricism is only scientific if its theoretical principles are clearly understood and well thought out, that is, reflexive.

epistemology: A concept related to theories about knowledge. Bourdieu calls on sociologists to practise ‘epistemological vigilance’, reflecting on their own social contexts and conditions, ways of thinking and prejudices that colour their view of the world.

field of power: Bourdieu’s metaphor for the ways in which cultural fields actually conduct themselves. ‘Power’ operates as a meta-field or macro-concept to describe the way in which individuals and institutions in dominant fields (such as government, the law and business) relate to one another and the whole social field. The field of power operates as a configuration of capital (economic, cultural and symbolic) that shapes relations and practices within these fields.

habitus: A concept that expresses, on the one hand, the way in which individuals ‘become themselves’ - develop attitudes and dispositions - and, on the other hand, the ways in which those individuals engage in practices. An artistic habitus, for example, disposes the individual artist to certain activities and perspectives that express the culturally and historically constituted values of the artistic field.

heterodoxy: The set of beliefs and values that challenge the status quo and received wisdom - or common sense - within a particular field. For example, Bourdieu refers to artists as hetero-doXical because of the freedom they claim from social norms (see also ‘orthodoxy’).
illusio: The fact of being caught up in and by the game, of believing that the game is worth playing and recognising its stakes. A politician, for example, will demonstrate illusio by believing that the political field constitutes the ‘only game in town’.

misrecognition: The form of forgetting that social agents are caught up in and produced by. When we feel comfortable within our roles within the social world, they seem to us like second nature and we forget how we have actually been produced as particular kinds of people.

orthodoxy: Those sets of beliefs and values that constitute the received wisdom and the status quo within a field. The orthodoxy reflects the ‘official history’ of the field: that version of events preserved in official records and documents, authoritative publications and practices (see also ‘heterodoxy’).

practical sense: An ability to understand and negotiate positions within cultural fields, comparable to a sportsperson’s ‘feel’ for the game.

radical and hyperbolic doubt: The consistent disposition to doubt and question the received wisdom, values and logic that a field presents as its common sense, along with the claims that fields make on behalf of themselves. Bourdieu writes that we ‘can never doubt too much’.

reflexivity: Bourdieu asks researchers to adopt a reflexive attitude towards our practices, reflecting upon how forces such as social and cultural background, our position within particular fields and intellectual bias shape the way we view the world.

reproduction: The tendencies of fields such as education to reproduce existing social inequalities rather than challenging or transforming the status quo.

symbolic capital: A form of capital or value that is not recognised as such. Prestige and a glowing reputation, for example, operate as symbolic capital because they mean nothing in themselves, but depend on people believing that someone possesses these qualities.

symbolic violence: The violence which is exercised upon individuals in a symbolic, rather than a physical way. It may take the form of people being denied resources, treated as inferior or being limited in terms of realistic aspirations. Gender relations, for example, have tended to be constituted out of symbolic violence which has denied women the rights and opportunities available to men.
Appendixes

Appendix A: Sectional Data for 5.1 Network of Actors: Hierarchy and Closed Circles

This section contains quotes from documents considered in the document analysis of the study. As most documents are in German, the author translated the selected segments into English and references them to this appendix. In the rare case that an analysed document is available in English, the version is used in the main body of the study. In addition to the original version of texts quoted in the main body of the document, this section also contains additional segments of analysed documents that support the presented analysis. The sequence of data in this section is defined through the order of appearance in the main body of the document.

Excerpts from Scholz’ initial policy agenda:


“Ganz zentral ist dabei auch die Schaffung einer Investitionsbank, bei der wir sämtliche staatliche Fördermaßnahmen von der Wirtschaftsförderung über den Wohnungsbau bis zu Umwelt- und Klimaschutz bündeln werden. Wir werden dazu die Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt umbauen.” (Scholz 2011a)

“Wir werden uns außerdem um den wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt kümmern. Schon heute sind wir beispielsweise in der Klimaforschung oder in der physikalischen Grundlagenforschung exzellent. Wir werden mit der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft verhandeln, diese Erfolge mit einem eigenen Institut am DESY zu unterstützen. Wir sollten außerdem dafür sorgen, dass sich um unsere Spitzenforschungseinrichtungen jeweils ein Innovationscampus entwickelt, in denen aus guten Ideen auch gute Produkte und Geschäftsideen und Arbeitsplätze werden.” (Scholz 2011a)

Aggregating responsibility for media policy at Senate Office:

“Deshalb habe ich die Zuständigkeit für die Medienpolitik auch direkt zu mir in die Senatskanzlei geholt. Vor Ihnen steht sozusagen der Senator für Medien. Ich habe erstklassige Leute zu mir ins Rathaus geholt, die sich in Verwaltung, Journalismus, Medienwirtschaft und Politik gleichermaßen gut auskennen und Ansprechpartner für Sie sein sollen. (Scholz 2011g)

“Um die städtischen Strukturen dafür zu verbessern, habe ich die Medienpolitik – und damit auch die Fragen IT und Neue Medien – in die Senatskanzlei geholt. Ich bin sozusagen auch ihr Senator für Medien.” (Scholz 2011b)

Appendix B: Sectional Data for 5.2.1 Hamburg as a Growing City

This section contains quotes from documents considered in the document analysis of the study. As most documents are in German, the author translated the selected segments into English and references them to this appendix. In the rare case that an analysed document is available in English, the version is used in the main body of the study. In addition to the original version of texts quoted in the main body of the document, this section also contains additional segments of analysed documents that support the presented analysis. The sequence of data in this section is defined through the order of appearance in the main body of the document.

Hamburg as an international city, growth & sustainable development:


“Zentrale Zielsetzungen sind hierbei die weitere Steigerung der Einwohnerzahl, die Förderung des Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungswachstums […] sowie die Steigerung der internationalen Attraktivität und Bekanntheit Hamburgs.” (SKHH 2002, p.4)


Nachhaltigkeit wirkt auch als Innovationsmotor, mit dem neue Marktpotentiale, insbesondere im globalen Wettbewerb und auch für die klein- und mittelständischen Unternehmen, erschlossen werden können.” (SKHH 2002, p.16)


Talents, Environmentalism and Internationalisation:

“Vielmehr dreht sich der Wettbewerb immer stärker um Menschen mit Ideen, mit Gründergeist und mit dem Mut, innovative Wege zu gehen.” (BFHH 2007 p.2)

Hamburg will sich zukünftig stärker als herausragender Ort der Innovation national und international positionieren und die Stadt als Spitzenstandort für Technologie und Innovation profilieren.” (BFHH 2007 p.11)

„Hamburg soll international Maßstäbe setzen als eine wachsende Metropole der Talente, der Nachhaltigkeit und der Verantwortungsbereitschaft.” (BFHH 2009c, p.1)

„Vergleichbar mit technischen Innovationen werden kreative Schöpfungen und Produkte zu einem entscheidenden Inputfaktor für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung von Standorten.” (BFHH 2009b p.1)

„Rahmenbedingungen ändern sich fortlaufend. […] Auch deshalb ist es wichtig, dass Hamburg sich ergänzend neue Entwicklungsbereiche wie etwa die Kreativwirtschaft, den Bereich regenerativer Energien oder die Gesundheitswirtschaft noch stärker erschließen muss. Dazu kommt, dass unkonditioniertem Wachstum auch natürliche Grenzen durch knapper werdende endliche Ressourcen gesetzt sind, und dass rein quantitatives Wachstum oft mit nicht unerheblichen Folgen für die Umwelt und die Gesellschaft verbunden ist.” (BFHH 2010 p.1)
Hamburg stellt die Grundsätze der Nachhaltigkeit und Verantwortungsbereitschaft in den Mittelpunkt seines Handelns, über die Stadtgrenzen hinaus und mit Blick in die Zukunft. Hamburg strebt eine Vorbildfunktion in der Entwicklung zukunftsfähiger Lösungen als Antwort auf aktuelle Herausforderungen an, für die Menschen in der Stadt, für die Region und in seinem Wirkungskreis in Deutschland, Europa und der Welt. (BFHH 2009c, p.1)


„Wir werden Hamburg als Umwelthauptstadt fest etablieren. Das ist für uns nicht bloß ein Titel für das Marketing, sondern ein Auftrag.“ (Scholz 2011a)

„Europäische Umwelthauptstadt 2011 – dieses Gütesiegel der Europäischen Union ist ein Grund stolz zu sein.“ (Scholz 2011b)


„Damit hat die Stadt als „Modellregion Elektromobilität“ Flagge gezeigt. Das Elbufer scheint ein günstiger Ort zu sein, nicht nur um hereinkommende Schiffe zu beobachten, sondern auch um Lösungen für einen umweltfreundlichen Weitertransport der Fahrgäste an Land zu zeigen.“ (Scholz 2011e)

„Als „Modellregion Elektromobilität“ hat unsere Stadt mit Unterstützung der Bundesregierung in den Jahren 2009 bis 2011 ein ausgeprägtes Know-how und die größte E-Flotte in Deutschland aufbauen können. Auf unseren Straßen sind mit 350 PKW mehr als ein Viertel der Elektrofahrzeuge aller acht deutschen Modellregionen unterwegs.“ (Scholz 2012f)

„Als Windkraft-Hauptstadt Deutschlands werden wir gerade weiter aufgewertet durch die Entscheidung der Samsung Heavy Industries, dass sie ihre europäische Forschungs- und Entwicklungszentrale für die Windindustrie in Hamburg eröffnen wollen.“ (Scholz 2012j)


“Richard Florida hat in seiner Studie „The Rise of the Creative Class“ sogar uns Politiker zu dieser so genannten creative class gezählt.“ (Scholz 2013f)

“Da wir Politiker ja laut Richard Florida auch zu den Kreativen gehören, geht es mir nicht anders. Wandel ist nötig – nicht als Selbstzweck, sondern um Sicherheit zu erhalten. Wenn sich die Spielregeln verändern, dann muss sich auch unser Spiel anpassen.” (Scholz 2013q)

Appendix C: Sectional Data for 5.2.2 Hamburg as an Innovative City

This section contains quotes from documents considered in the document analysis of the study. As most documents are in German, the author translated the selected segments into English and references them to this appendix. In the rare case that an analysed document is available in English, the version is used in the main body of the study. In addition to the original version of texts quoted in the main body of the document, this section also contains additional segments of analysed documents that support the presented analysis. The sequence of data in this section is defined through the order of appearance in the main body of the document.


An Innovation Capital in Europe:


“Kernaussagen und Zielsetzungen: a) Positionierung Hamburgs als europäische Innovationsmetropole [...]” (BWVI 2017 p.9)

“Wir wollen Hamburg zu einer Innovationshauptstadt in Europa machen. Das wird gelingen, wenn wir in einzelnen wirtschaftlichen Clustern eine enge Zusammenarbeit von Unternehmen, Wissenschaft und öffentlicher Hand organisieren.” (Scholz 2011a)

“Unser Ziel ist es, Hamburg zu einer Stadt zu entwickeln, die Vorbild sein kann für andere europäische Städte. Hamburg versteht sich als weltoffen, dynamisch und als lernende Stadt – als „Labor der Moderne“.” (Scholz 2011c)

“Hamburg mit seiner Metropolregion Innovationshauptstadt für Europa 2020 zu entwickeln. Mit dem „InnovationCampus for Green Technologies“ werden wir einen weiteren Schritt in diese Richtung tun.” (Scholz 2012a)

Bekanntheitsgrades im Hinblick auf Innovationsqualität und -kompetenz – insbesondere das durchaus messbare Ziel, im europäischen Vergleich eine Spitzenposition bei Einkommen und Beschäftigung Einzunehmen." (Scholz 2013)


"Die Innovations- und Technologiestrategie für Hamburg ist ausgerichtet auf die Stärkung forschungsintensiver Industrien und wissensintensiver Dienstleistungen.” (BWVI 2010a p.4)


"Die Innovationskraft unserer Unternehmen entscheidet über die Wachstumschancen von heute und morgen. Durch die zielgerichtete Zusammenarbeit von Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft, Politik und Verwaltung wollen wir Hamburg zu einer Innovationshauptstadt für Europa machen. Themen sind Förderung von Forschungs- und Kooperationsflächen für Hochschulen, Unternehmen und innovative Existenzgründer (Technologieparks, Innovations- und Forschungscampus mit Hochschulanbindung); Weiterentwicklung der anwendungsorientierten Forschungseinrichtungen und Ausbau der gemeinsamen Einrichtungen der beruflichen und akademischen Aus- und Weiterbildung; Optimierung der bestehenden Hamburger Förderstruktur; Förderung von technologieorientierten Existenzgründungen durch aufeinander aufbauende Finanzierungsinstrumente; Entwicklung eines neuen Hamburger Innovationsportals, das alle innovationsrelevanten Informationen transparent abbildet; Aktivitäten in Brüssel, damit die EU ihre Förderprogramme unter Vereinfachung der Verfahren stärker auf die Förderung von Innovation und Forschung konzentriert; Innovationskontaktsstelle zwischen Unternehmen und Hochschulen.” (SKHH 2011a pp.5-6)

"Mit Blick auf die Intensivierung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft sind insbesondere die Weiterentwicklung der anwendungsorientierten Forschungseinrichtungen sowie die nachhaltige Stärkung der Cluster und Netzwerke beabsichtigt.” (BWVI 2013 p.10)

“Daher werden zur Umsetzung dieser Zielsetzungen die folgenden Investitionsprioritäten ausgewählt: IP 1a: Ausbau der Forschungs- und Innovationsinfrastruktur (FuI) und der Kapazitäten für die Entwicklung von FuI-Spitzenleistungen; Förderung von Kompetenzzentren, insbesondere solchen von europäischem Interesse. IP 1b: Förderung von Investitionen der Unternehmen in


"Aber wir unterstützen auch gezielt Innovationen und die Entwicklung von Technologien in Hamburg. Mit dem Zentrum für Angewandte Luftfahrtforschung zum Beispiel, in dem unter anderem sehr fortschrittlich zu Produktionsverfahren geforscht wird, die man im alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch als 3D-Druck kennt, oder den entstehenden Forschungs- und Innovationsparks (F&I Par), dem Masterplan Industrie 4.0, der Investitions- und Förderbank, unserer Clusterpolitik und Initiativen wie nextMedia.Hamburg, die die Medien- und Digitalszene begleiten. All das sind Beispiele für Innovationsförderung." (Scholz 2016i)

Hamburg’s Cluster Policy:


"Im Rahmen ihrer Politik der „Metropole Hamburg – Wachsende Stadt“ setzt die Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg gezielt auf die Förderung von sogenannten Clustern, d. h. auf Netzwerke aus Unternehmen verwandter Branchen, Forschungseinrichtungen, Verbänden sowie der öffentlichen Verwaltung, die ein günstiges Umfeld für Innovation und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit schaffen." (BFHH 2007 p.3)

"Wirtschaftsförderung und Clusterpolitik werden daher durch eine Innovations- und Technologiestrategie sowie die gezielte Förderung von Kompetenzzentren, kreativem Know-how und clusterübergreifenden Netzwerken gemeinsam mit Hochschulen, Bildungsinstitute und Forschungseinrichtungen sowie Unternehmen zu einem umfassenden Innovationsansatz ergänzt." (BFHH 2010 p.3)

"Durch die Stärkung von Vernetzungen und Clustern wird der Know-how-Transfer innerhalb einzelner Branchen aber auch zwischen den Akteuren unterschiedlicher Branchen angeregt und die Kooperationsintensität zwischen Akteuren der Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft zusätzlich gesteigert." (BWVI 2013 p.24)

“Hamburg fördert seit vielen Jahren mit aktiver Clusterpolitik Innovation, Wachstum und Beschäftigung in zukunftsfähigen Wirtschaftsbereichen." (BWVI 2014c p.3)

“Solche Cluster sind die Voraussetzung dafür, dass gute Ideen auch gute Rahmen- und Förderbedingungen finden und so zu einem wirtschaftlichen Erfolg werden können. Dazu gehört auch, dass wir den Betrieben ausreichend Flächen und Gewerberaum zur Verfügung stellen. Wer Ansiedlungen und Neugründungen und Expansion will, der muss auch den Platz dafür schaffen.” (Scholz 2011a)


“Logistik, Luftfahrt, Erneuerbare Energien, namentlich die Windkraft, Medien, aber auch klassische Industrien gewährleisten eine verlässliche weitere realwirtschaftliche Entwicklung.” (Scholz 2012)

“Die Clusterstrategie, wie sie besonders an der TuTech gebündelt wird, trägt wesentlich dazu bei, dass Hamburg bereits jetzt als Innovationsstandort unschlagbar ist.” (Scholz 2013t)


“Für den Bereich Medien und IT wurde 1997 die Clusterinitiative Hamburg@work als Public-Private-Partnerschaft der Stadt Hamburg, der Hamburgischen Wirtschaftsförderung und Hamburg@work e. V. ins Leben gerufen. Die Schwerpunkte und das Leistungssortiment des Clusters haben sich entsprechend der Dynamik der Branche in den Folgejahren gewandelt. Beides bewegte sich aber stets im Sektor von Information, Service and Support, Networking und Events sowie Aktionslinien und Fokusgruppen.” (HK 2014 p.19)

“Um besondere Zukunftsfelder zu erschließen, werden die Clustermanagements gefordert sein, innovative Akteure zu relevanten technologischen bzw. wissensintensiven Themen (siehe vorher benannte Bereiche) zusammenzubringen, um neue Wertschöpfungspotenziale innerhalb der Cluster und in enger Vernetzung über die Clustergrenzen hinaus zu erschließen.” (BWVI 2014a p.104)
"Der Senat wird die Clusterpolitik fortführen und stärker auf die drei Leitlinien der Wirtschaftspolitik – Wissensbasis, Digitalisierung, Internationalisierung – ausrichten, die Chancen der ökologischen Modernisierung nutzen und auch auf sogenannte Cross-Cluster-Maßnahmen setzen, mit denen Synergieeffekte zwischen den Clustern realisiert werden können. Er wird dabei auch die Ansiedlungsbemühungen in den Clusterbereichen verstärken." (SKHH 2015b)


Research & Innovation:

"Für die Zukunft des Innovationsstandortes Hamburg ist neben einer hohen Forschungs- und Entwicklungsintensität in zukunftsweisenden Bereichen ein effizienter Wissens- und Technologietransfer unabdingbar.” (BFHH 2007 p.12)

"Kern einer modernen Metropolenpolitik ist die Stärkung von Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung. Denn Bildung hält unsere Stadt zusammen, indem sie für eine Entfaltung der Lebenschancen aller sorgt und somit die notwendigen Voraussetzungen einer Wissensgesellschaft gestaltet.” (BFHH 2010 p.2)

"Innovationsförderung ist die Gesamtheit der monetären und nicht-monetären Anreize und Unterstützungen für Innovationen, Technologietransfer, Lernen und Qualifizierung sowie wissens- und technologiebasierte Unternehmensgründungen.” (BWVI 2010a p.5)

"Durch eine Reihe von Maßnahmen sind die Arbeitsbedingungen für die Wissenschaft in Hamburg zu verbessern - etwa durch gezielte Förderung von Forschungsprojekten, Nachwuchsforderung, Doktorandenausbildung, Spitzenforschungsförderung sowie Verbesserung der Kooperation zwischen Wissenschaft und in Hamburg ansässiger Wirtschaft.” (SKHH 2011a pp.5-6)

"Wir brauchen exzellente Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen, die keine sozialen Barrieren haben. Ohne Wissenschaft, Lehre und Forschung werden wir die Zukunft nicht gewinnen. […] Wir werden uns außerdem um den wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt kümmern. Schon heute sind wir beispielsweise in der Klimaforschung oder in der physikalischen Grundlagenforschung exzellent. Wir werden mit der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft verhandeln, diese Erfolge mit einem eigenen Institut am DESY zu unterstützen. Wir sollten außerdem dafür sorgen, dass sich um unsere Spitzenforschungseinrichtungen jeweils ein Innovationscampus entwickelt, in denen aus guten Ideen auch gute Produkte und Geschäftsstrategien und Arbeitsplätze werden.” (Scholz 2011a)
(Scholz 2012u)


“Wir wollen sukzessive ein Netz von F&I-Parks etablieren und planen Innovationsdarlehen einzuführen. Inzwischen konnte der Senat die Voraussetzungen dafür schaffen, dass sich drei Fraunhofer-Vorhaben in Hamburg etablieren.” (Scholz 2015t)

“Es ist geplant, den Auf- und Ausbau von anwendungsorientierten Forschungs- und Innovationsinfrastrukturen, die im Themenbereich der Hamburger Zukunftsfeldern und Cluster tätig sind, einschließlich der Ausgaben zur Ausstattung der geförderten Einrichtungen, zu unterstützen. Denkbar ist beispielsweise die Etablierung eines Fraunhofer-Institutes, welches im Themenbereich eines der Hamburger Zukunftsfelder beziehungsweise in einem Hamburger Cluster forscht, aber auch die Bereitstellung von Infrastrukturen, welche die Umsetzung und Verwertung von innovativem Wissen erleichtern.” (BWVI 2013 p.22)

“Angestrebt ist die Errichtung eines Inkubators am DESY, in dem ausgründer- und StartUp-gründer aus dem DESY, der Universität Hamburg und anderen wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen ein Umfeld erhalten, das die unmittelbare Nähe zu den Technologien des DESY gewährleistet und Unterstützung im Service-/Dienstleistungsbereich (kaufmännische und Rechtsberatung, Vermarktung, Sitzungsräume, Catering) bietet.” (BWVI 2014a p.79)

“Durch eine Reihe von Maßnahmen sind die Arbeitsbedingungen für die Wissenschaft in Hamburg zu verbessern - etwa durch gezielte Förderung von Forschungsprojekten, Nachwuchsförderung, Doktorandenausbildung, Spitzenforschungsförderung sowie Verbesserung der Kooperation zwischen Wissenschaft und in Hamburg ansässiger Wirtschaft.” (SKHH 2011a pp.5-6)

“Langfristiges Wachstum und eine nachhaltige Steigerung der Produktivität lassen sich nur durch ein hohes Niveau von Investitionen in Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) realisieren. Im wirtschaftlichen Strukturwandel müssen am hochentwickelten Wirtschaftsstandort Hamburg insbesondere durch Innovationen neue, intelligente und qualitativ hochwertige Produkte, Verfahren und Systemlösungen entwickelt werden.” (BFHH 2012b p.50)

“Herausragende anwendungsorientierte Forschungseinrichtungen und Innovationsinfrastrukturen erhöhen die Attraktivität des Innovationsstandortes und regen die hier betriebenen Entwicklungstätigkeiten an. Hamburg erhöht seine Anziehungskraft auf FuE-Fachkräfte und auf innovationsorientierte Unternehmen und Gründer.” (BWVI 2013 p.21)

“Seitens des Senats arbeiten wir intensiv daran, neue Innovationsparks zu schaffen, in denen der Transfer wissenschaftlichen Wissens in neue Produkte und Dienstleistungen gelingt.” (Scholz 2016g)

“In Hamburg entsteht derzeit ein Netz von Forschungs & Innovations Parks (F&I), initiiert vom Hamburger Senat und auch von privaten Unternehmen. Sie bieten, ausgehend von einem wissenschaftlichen Anker, Gewerbeflächen für innovationsorientierte Unternehmen, Forschungseinrichtungen und Existenzgründer.” (HIW 2017a)

“Die zukünftige Wirtschaftskraft und der Wohlstand Hamburgs werden nur dann gesichert bleiben, wenn neben der konsequenten Weiterentwicklung traditioneller Stärken die Stadt zu einem attraktiven Innovationsraum wird, in dem exellente Hochschulen, angewandte Spitzenforschung und innovationsfreudige etablierte und junge Unternehmen mit hoch qualifizierten Fachkräften mehr und besser als bisher zusammenarbeiten.” (BFHH 2018c p.3)

The InnovationsAllianz:


„Vor einigen Jahren haben Hamburger Unternehmen, Hochschulen, Verbände und Senat gemeinsam die InnovationsAllianz Hamburg ins Leben gerufen. Die Allianz vernetzt diese Partner in verschiedenen Zukunftsfeldern [...].“ (Scholz 2012j)

„Seit Ende 2008 liegt die Federführung für den Bereich Innovationspolitik bei der InnovationsAllianz Hamburg. Die Allianz hat sich das Ziel gesetzt, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft nachhaltig zu verbessern. Alle relevanten Personen und Institutionen in Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft sind dabei gefragt.“ (Scholz 2013e)

„In Hamburg können sich Investoren und Investorinnen darauf verlassen, dass ihre Anliegen aktiv unterstützt werden. Günstige Rahmenbedingungen schaffen wir vor allem mit zwei Instrumenten: unserer langjährigen Clusterpolitik und einer breit aufgestellten InnovationsAllianz.“ (Scholz 2011l)


„In Hamburg sehen wir unser innovatives Potenzial besonders in der räumlichen Nähe der innovativen Akteure. In der InnovationsAllianz haben Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und der Hamburger Senat gemeinsam die regionale Innovationsstrategie für die Hansestadt erarbeitet.“ (Frank Horch (Senator for Economy, Transport and Innovation) in BWVI 2016 p.3)

„Die Innovationspolitik des Senats stützt sich auf die gemeinsam mit Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft entwickelte und betriebene InnovationsAllianz Hamburg. Die moderne Innovationspolitik Hamburgs wird in der Allianz gemeinsam mit den Innovationsakteuren entwickelt, ausgerichtet und umgesetzt.“ (BWVI 2018b)


„Die InnovationsAllianz Hamburg hat unter Mitwirken von mehr als 160 Akteuren aus Wissenschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik, Institutionen und Verbänden zentrale Weichenstellungen zur Entwicklung konkreter Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Innovationstätigkeit und

Hamburg as a Digital City:

“Um im internationalen Wettbewerb der Wirtschaftsregionen und Metropolen bestehen zu können, seien Investitionen für die Umsetzung des technologischen Fortschritts erforderlich, die sich langfristig auszahlen. Der Senat werde daher in Kürze seine Strategie zur Digitalen Stadt beschließen; darin sei ein Leitprojekt mit dem Namen Digitale City Science Lab enthalten, das die HafenCity Universität in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) entwickelt habe.“ (BFHH 2015 p.1)

"Smart City, Digital Stadt - meine Damen und Herren, man kann es nennen wie man will. Die Bandbreite unserer Vorhaben aber muss reichen von der Digitalen Verwaltung über intelligente Verkehrssysteme und die Hafenorganisation - Stichwort "smartPORT", aber digitale Geodaten sowie Bildungs- und Kulturangebote bis hin zur Infrastruktur der gesamten Energieversorgung - Stichwort "SmartEnergy". (Scholz 2015c)

"Eine Strategie Digitale Stadt umfasst mehr als die bisherige E-Government- und IT-Strategie, die sich auf die Effizienzsteigerung der Verwaltung und die Schnittstelle zu bestimmten Gruppen von Verwaltungskunden konzentriert hat. Da sich Wertschöpfungsprozesse in der Wirtschaft ebenso digitalisieren wie der Alltag der Bürgerinnen und Bürger, ist die Stadt gefordert, diese Entwicklung zu gestalten und zu Steigerung von Lebensqualität und Wirtschaftskraft zu nutzen.“ (SKHH 2015a p.1)

“In Hamburg hat der Senat jetzt eine Strategie zur Digitalen Stadt beschlossen. Das meldet die Behörde für Wissenschaft und Forschung der Freien und Hansestadt. Hintergrund für den Beschluss ist die zunehmende Digitalisierung Hamburgs. Immer mehr Verwaltungsangebote werden digital zur Verfügung gestellt, zusätzlich entwickeln Hamburger Unternehmen und Initiativen neue digitale Angebote in allen Bereichen. Um diese Prozesse zu bündeln und geeignete Strukturen für eine optimale Entwicklung zu schaffen, möchte der Senat mit seiner Strategie Digitale Stadt künftig in allen Initiativen und Projekten mit seiner Beteiligung den Aspekt der Digitalisierung verstärkt berücksichtigen. Eine Leitstelle Digitale Stadt soll den Prozess begleitend koordinieren.“ (K21 media AG 2015)

"Die Digitalisierung der großen Stadt ist eine Querschnittsaufgabe. Deshalb haben wir in der Senatskanzlei eine Leitstelle für die digitale Stadt eingerichtet, welche den Überblick über die vielfältigen Projekte behält und Koordinierungsauflagen übernimmt. Während die Verantwortung für die einzelnen Projekte der Digitalisierung bei den Fachbehörden bleibt, soll die Leitstelle die übergreifenden Themen vorantreiben.“ (Scholz 2016a)

"Um das Ziel des Senats 'Ausbau Hamburgs zu einer digitalen Stadt' zu erreichen, braucht es eine strategische Steuerung und verstärkte Koordination aller beteiligten Bereiche. Der CDO wird dazu kooperativ mit allen Behörden und an der Digitalisierung beteiligten Stellen zusammenarbeiten und in alle mit der Digitalisierung der Stadt zusammenhängende Themen eingebunden, um die Digitalisierungsstrategie der Stadt effektiv, effizient und zum Wohle der Bürger Hamburgs umzusetzen.“ (Dr. Christoph Krupp (Head of the Senate Office) in Meyer-Wellmann 2017a)

Appendix D: Sectional Data for 5.2.3 Hamburg as a Media City

This section contains quotes from documents considered in the document analysis of the study. As most documents are in German, the author translated the selected segments into English and references them to this appendix. In the rare case that an analysed document is available in English, the version is used in the main body of the study. In addition to the original version of texts quoted in the main body of the document, this section also contains additional segments of
analysed documents that support the presented analysis. The sequence of data in this section is defined through the order of appearance in the main body of the document.

“Eine Analyse der Stärken und Schwächen des IT-Standorts Hamburg durch die Unternehmensberatung KPMG aus dem Jahr 2002 unterstreicht, dass Hamburg gute Chancen hat, seine Position als Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie-Standort zu verbessern und zu den Konkurrenzstandorten aufzuschließen. [...] Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die im Bereich der Neuen Medien erfolgreiche Initiative "Hamburg newmedia@work" - wegen der Nähe des NewMedia-Sektors zur IT-Branche und der bestehenden Netzwerke - damit beauftragt worden, den Fokus ihrer Aktivitäten konsequent auf die Unternehmen der IT-Branche auszuweiten. Dies soll u.a. durch den neuen Namen hamburg@work verdeutlicht werden.” (SKHH 2002, p.35)


“Darüber hinaus ist Hamburg natürlich mit seinen vielen Verlagen und Agenturen eine Medienhauptstadt” (Prof. Dr. Karin von Welck, Senator for culture) in BKM 2006 p.6)

“Hamburg hat eine führende Medien- und IT-Standorte Deutschlands und verfügt über die besten Voraussetzungen, um diese Position weiter auszubauen. Hamburg@work unterstützt und fördert diesen Prozess.” (Hamburg@work 2008b p.6)

“Doch mit rund 110.000 Mitarbeitern in über 21.600 Unternehmen ist die Hansestadt als wichtiger Standort für Medien- und Informationstechnologie gut aufgestellt und bietet der gesamten Medien-, IT- und Telekommunikationstechbranche (MITT) in Hamburg auch weiterhin optimale Rahmenbedingungen.” (Prof. Dr. Karin von Welck, Senator for Culture in Hamburg@work 2009a p.2)

“Hamburg behauptet damit trotz Krise seine Position als einer der wichtigsten Medien- und IT-Standorte Europas.” (Hamburg@work 2009a p.4)


“Technologische Innovationen und das Zusammenwachsen bislang getrennter Bereiche der Medien- und IT-Wirtschaft verleihen der Branche zunehmend nicht genannte Dynamik. Das Internet als Innovationsträger eröffnet zahlreichen neuen Dienstleistungen und Geschäftsideen eine Plattform. Unsere Stadt ist längst nicht nur für die klassischen Medien eine Hochburg, sondern auch für die neuen digitalen Medien.” (Prof. Dr. Karin von Welck, Senator for Culture in BKM 2010a p.1)

“Seit im 17. Jahrhundert die ersten Drucker und Postmeister auf die Idee kamen, die in einer Hafenstadt eben auch einlaufenden Informationen zu drucken, zu vervielfältigen und zu verkaufen, hat Hamburg jede Medienentwicklung mitgemacht, ja mitgeprägt – und zwar von den gelehrten Zeitungen der Aufklärung bis hin zu Social-Network-Games.” (Scholz 2011h)

hamburg@work, die Hamburger Initiative für Medien, IT- und Telekommunikation. Auch hier gibt es keinen Grund zum Zurücklehnen, denn es gibt Wettbewerb, es gibt Konkurrenz. Die Medienpolitik will die Standortvorteile Hamburgs akzentuieren, gemeinsam mit der Branche weiterentwickeln und politisch verstärken. Wie wollen Hamburg als die Medienstadt Deutschlands festigen” (Scholz 2011f)

“anders als die meisten anderen Medienstandorte ist Hamburg nicht auf einen Bereich der Medien konzentriert. Nirgendwo sonst in Deutschland ist die Medienwirtschaft auf hohem Niveau so breit aufgestellt wie hier bei uns – mit leistungsstarken Unternehmen über alle Zweige des Medien- und Kreativschaffens hinweg.” (Scholz 2012q)

“Das alles macht Ihre tatgräflige Arbeit als Medienschauffende aus und wir freuen uns, dass die Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg vielen erfolgreichen Medienbetrieben und Medienmachern ein gutes Zuhause bieten kann. Das fängt an bei den großen und kleinen Verlagshäusern, zieht sich über Radio und Fernsehen, Musik und Film bis hin zu Werbung und PR, zu IT und Software, Games und Social Media. Über 100.000 Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer haben in Hamburg mittelbar oder unmittelbar mit der Produktion oder der Verbreitung von Medien zu tun.” (Scholz 2012h)

“Hamburg macht da keine Ausnahme und ist deshalb seit Jahrhunderten eine Medienstadt und seit Gründung der Bundesrepublik auch die führende im Land. Große Namen sind damit verbunden. Hier wirkten unter anderem Rudolf Augstein und Gert Bucerius, Axel Springer, Henri Nannen und Marion Dönhoff. Sie haben Maßstäbe gesetzt und definieren mit ihrer Arbeit bis heute, was wir unter gutem Journalismus verstehen.” (Scholz 2013h)

“Hamburg ist die Medienmetropole Deutschlands. Und wir werden das bleiben.” (Scholz 2011g)


“Besonders dynamisch ist die Veränderung durch die Digitalisierung auch in der Medienwirtschaft. In Verlagen, Medien, Musik-, Film- und Gamesindustrie gehen Kreativität, wirtschaftlicher Erfolg und Technik Hand in Hand. Die Stadt hat diese Chancen gut genutzt: Mehr als 25.000 Unternehmen und über 100.000 Beschäftigte machen Hamburg zum führenden IT und Medienstandort.” (Scholz 2016b)

“Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die im Bereich der Neuen Medien erfolgreiche Initiative Hamburg newmedia@work” - wegen der Nähe des NewMedia-Sektors zur IT-Branche und der bestehenden Netzwerke - damit beauftragt worden, den Fokus ihrer Aktivitäten konsequent auf die Unternehmen der IT-Branche auszuweiten. Dies soll u.a. durch den neuen Namen hamburg@work verdeutlicht werden.” (SKHH 2002, p.35)

“Hamburg hat die besten Voraussetzungen, seine führende Position unter Deutschlands Medien- und IT-Standorten weiter auszubauen. Hamburg@work unterstützt und fördert diesen Prozess.” (Hamburg@work 2008a p.3)

“Als Public-Private-Partnership ist Hamburg@work seit 1998 aktiv, um Hamburg als Standort der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien zu fördern, neue Themen zu identifizieren und Entwicklungen anzustoßen. Hierzu bietet die Hamburger Initiative für Medien, IT und Telekommunikation ihren 2.500 Mitgliedern aus über 650 Unternehmen ein breites Leistungsportfolio in den Bereichen Information, Service & Support, Networking, Kongresse & Awards sowie Fachgruppen & Projektteams. Getragen von der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg und Hamburger Unternehmen, die sich im privaten Trägerverein Hamburg@work e.V. zusammengeschlossen haben, bringt das Netzwerk die Akteure aus Medien und IT mit denen anderer Branchen zusammen und bietet Unternehmen, Institutionen und der breiten Öffentlichkeit eine zentrale Anlaufstelle zu allen Fragen rund um die Digitale Wirtschaft in Hamburg.” (Hamburg@work 2009a p.3)

“Mit der Aktionslinie gamecity hat die Initiative die erste systematische Förderung der Computerspieleindustrie in Deutschland umgesetzt. In der eCommerceCity werden die zahlreichen Belange der E-Commerce-Branche der Hansestadt adressiert und innovative Ideen in diesem Cluster unterstützt. Die media:city wiederum vereinigt unter ihrem Dach alle Maßnahmen, die zur Förderung der Medienlandschaft auf den Weg gebracht werden. Dabei gilt das ganz besondere Augenmerk den neuen digitalen
Medien. Mit dem Fokus auf newTV, New Storytelling und Crossmedia-Projekte hat die Initiative Plattformen wie den newTV-Kongress, den Neptun Award oder das scoopcamp ins Leben gerufen, um den Austausch über die neuesten Innovationen und Trends zu forcieren. “(Hamburg@work 2010a p.3)“Hamburg konnte durch den Auf- und Ausbau der Initiative Hamburg@work als leistungsstarkes Netzwerk mit bundesweitem Vorbildcharakter die Entwicklung des Teilmarkts Software und Games aktiv fördern und das Umfeld der Unternehmen signifikant verbessern. Die Initiative agiert seit 1997. Sie wird getragen von der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg sowie Hamburger Unternehmen, die sich im Hamburg@work e.V. zusammengeschlossen haben. Mit seinen mehr als 2.500 Mitgliedern aus über 650 Unternehmen der Digitalen Wirtschaft ist Hamburg@work das bundesweit größte Netzwerk der Branche. Bemerkenswert ist auch, dass die beteiligten Unternehmen und Einzelmitglieder die Aktivitäten von Hamburg@work zu annähernd 50 % mitfinanzieren. Zur Unterstützung der Unternehmen verfügt die Initiative über ein breites Leistungssortiment in den Bereichen Information, Service & Support, Networking & Events sowie Focus Group. Besondere inhaltliche Schwerpunkte werden durch die Aktionslinien eCommerceCity, gamecity und – ganz neu – Next Media gesetzt.” (BFHH 2012a p.21)


Amt Medien:


„In Deutschland und Europa gehen viele Uhren noch anders, aber die Medienstadt Hamburg können solche Entwicklungen und Debatten nicht kalt lassen. Es ist unserer Stadt gelungen, sich zu einem europaweit anerkannten Standort einer vielgestaltigen Kommunikationsindustrie zu entwickeln. Alle Medienzweige sind mit wirtschaftlich starken Anbietern in Hamburg vertreten, das ist unser Alleinstellungsmerkmal. Wett über 100.000 Medienbeschäftigende sind in mehr als 21.000 Unternehmen hier tätig. Deren Rahmenbedingungen weiter zu verbessern, ist seit Beginn ein Schwerpunkt des von mir geführten Senators.“ (Scholz 2012e)

„Deswegen habe ich zu Beginn meiner Amtszeit die Zuständigkeit unter anderem für den Bereich IT in das neue „Amt Medien“ in der Senatskanzlei geholt. Das soll deutlich machen, dass dies ein für Hamburg und seine Wirtschaft sehr relevanter Bereich ist.“ (Scholz 2011j)

„Vor einem Jahr habe ich Ihnen versprochen, dass ich nicht nur Ihr Erster Bürgermeister, sondern auch Ihr Senator für Medien sein werde“ (Scholz 2012b)

„Aus diesem Grund haben wir 2011 das Amt Medien in der Senatskanzlei eingerichtet und die Zuständigkeit für Medien beim Ersten Bürgermeister angestiegen. Ich spreche daher heute zu Ihnen in erster Linie als zuständiger Senator für Medien.” (Scholz 2014h)
"Die Bedeutung des Themas Medien für Hamburg können Sie vielleicht auch daran ablesen, dass ich hier nicht nur als Erster Bürgermeister, sondern auch als zuständiger Fachsenator für Medien vor Ihnen stehe. Direkt nach meinem Amtsantritt habe ich beschlossen, in der Senatskanzlei ein Amt Medien einzurichten, dass sich darum kümmern soll, dass Medienunternehmen hier in der Stadt gute Bedingungen vorfinden und sich entsprechend entwickeln können." (Scholz 2014c)

"Es gibt viele weitere, um die wir uns tagtäglich kümmern müssen, damit Hamburg Medienmetropole bleibt. Deshalb habe ich die Zuständigkeit für die Medienpolitik auch direkt zu mir in die Senatskanzlei geholt. Vor Ihnen steht sozusagen der Senator für Medien. Ich habe erstklassige Leute zu mir ins Rathaus geholt, die sich in Verwaltung, Journalismus, Medienwirtschaft und Politik gleichermaßen gut auskennen und Ansprechpartner für Sie sein sollen." (Scholz 2011g)

"Hier in Hamburg werden Medien- und Netzpolitik seitens der Exekutive bereits in der Senatskanzlei im selben Amt betreut. Das zwingt dazu, die Differenzen zwischen Content und Technology nicht leidenschaftlich auszutragen, sondern gleich von vornherein zu balancieren. Von diesem Modell kann man auch im Großen lernen." (Scholz 2013j)

"Wir haben eine Kreativgesellschaft gegründet, die sich insbesondere um junge, kreative Gründerinnen und Gründer kümmert. Wir haben das Amt Medien in der Senatskanzlei geschaffen, das die Rahmenbedingungen des Medienstandorts verbessern soll und auch das ADC-Festival begleitet. […] Und wir starten mit nextMedia.Hamburg eine neue Initiative, die dabei helfen soll, erfolgreiche digitale Geschäftsmodelle zu entwickeln." (Scholz 2014e)

nextMedia.Hamburg:

"Wir sind europaweit führend in dem Bereich Online Browser Games, wir sind Deutschlands eCommerce Hauptstadt und der Inkubator für Next Media, also die neue Generation der Medien, seien es Print, Digital oder Bewegtbild." (Scholz 2012a)

"Zudem sei die 2012 entwickelte Aktionslinie Next Media gar nicht ausgeschrieben worden, obwohl sie alles in allem ein Gesamtvolumen von mehr als 200.000 Euro erreiche und daher hätte ausgeschrieben werden müssen. Zudem steuere die Senatskanzlei, die ihre Zuwendungen über die Hamburgische Wirtschaftsförderung (HWF) kanalisieren, die Projekte letztlich selbst – und an der HWF vorbei." (Meyer-Wellmann 2013)

"nextMedia.Hamburg ist die konsequente Weiterentwicklung des 1997 gegründeten Public-Private-Partnerships Hamburg@work, das auf 16 Jahre erfolgreiche Netzwerkarbeit in der Medien- und IT-Wirtschaft der Stadt zurück blickt” (SKHH 2014)

"Gerade für einen inhaltestarken und kreativen Medienstandort wie Hamburg sehe ich hier erhebliche Entwicklungs- und Wachstums perspektiven. Deshalb haben wir in diesem Jahr die Medienstandortinitiative nextMedia.Hamburg gestartet." (Scholz 2014g)

"Das ist auch der Grund, warum wir das alte Netzwerk Hamburg@work weiter entwickelt haben zur Initiative nextMedia.Hamburg. Gemeinsam mit dem Verein Hamburg@work – ja, der heißt weiter so, damit die Akteure nicht dauernd verwechselt werden, – wollen wir seitens des Senats und der Wirtschaftsförderung künftig all denen Angebote machen, die mit Inhalte-Geschäftsmodellen im Digitalen unterwegs sind." (Scholz 2014h)

hätten sich nun entschieden, die Initiative nextMedia.Hamburg ins Leben zu rufen, um den Transformationsprozess der Medien- und Digitalwirtschaft noch intensiver zu begleiten, hieß es in einer Mitteilung. “(Geisler 2014)

“Mit einer neuen Standortinitiative für die Medien- und Digitalwirtschaft wolle der Senat „die Vernetzung zwischen großen Inhaltehäusern, dem digitalen Mittelstand und Start-ups weiter erhöhen“ (Carsten Brosda in Meyer-Wellmann 2014)

“Hamburg will an der Schnittstelle von Content und Technologie die Rahmenbedingungen für die Entwicklung digitaler Geschäftsmodelle verbessern, Kooperationen anstoßen und vor allem die Vernetzung zwischen großen Inhaltehäusern, dem digitalen Mittelstand und Startups weiter verdichten.” (BWVI 2014a p.112)

“Mit Ausstrahlung der Standortinitiative nextMedia.Hamburg durch Bürgermeister Olaf Scholz im Februar 2014 wurde eine Neuordnung der Clusterpolitik für die hiesigen Medien- und IT-Unternehmen vorgenommen. Hamburg@work wird seitdem nicht mehr als städtische Marke verwendet. Der Hamburg@work e. V. bleibt bestehen und ist privater Partner der neuen Initiative nextMedia.Hamburg […] Zentraler Schwerpunkt der neuen Standortinitiative ist die aktive Förderung von digitalen Transformationsprozessen, unter anderem durch Schaffung einer Anlaufstelle für die Hamburger Startup-Szene und Monitoring erfolgverwerter digitaler Geschäftsmodelle.” (HK 2014 p.19)

“Hamburg hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren aktiv als Content-City positioniert und übernimmt in den deutschlandweiten Debatten um Medienregulierung, Urheberrecht und Datenschutz eine führende Rolle. “(HK 2015 p.39)

“Erstens wurde vor einigen Jahren beim IT-Gipfel zum Thema „Content & Technology, Geschäftsmodelle und Wertschöpfungskonstellationen“ gearbeitet. Zweitens haben wir die Initiative nextMedia.Hamburg, die sich um veränderte Rahmenbedingungen unter Digitalisierungsdruck kümmert. ” (Carsten Brosda in ECCE 2017 p.21)


“Aktuell entsteht ein neues digitales Ökosystem, das sich von der klassischen Medienlandschaft durch völlig neue Nutzungsformen, Anwendungen, Inhalteformate und Märkte unterscheidet. In diesem Kontext will nextMedia.Hamburg die Rolle eines Enablers einnehmen, der die Potenziale des digitalen Transformationsprozesses der Medienwirtschaft für die Sicherung und den Ausbau der Spitzenposition Hamburgs als Medienstandort vor allem mit Blick auf die Entwicklung neuer Geschäftsmodelle aktiviert.” (BWVI 2014a p.112)

“In keiner anderen Medienstadt sind so viele Medienwirtschaftszweige so relevant und so profitabel vertreten. Als Stadt der Inhalte, als Contentcity, ist Hamburg daher prädestiniert, die Chancen des digitalen Wandels und der Medienkonvergenz zu ergreifen. Kreativität und Kaufmannsgeist sind die Grundlage innovativer Geschäftsmodelle quer durch alle Mediengattungen.” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2014a p.4)


“Als Content City gestaltet Hamburg die Veränderungen in der Medien- und Digitalszene unmittelbar mit. Schon immer entstanden hier Innovationen und neue Geschäftsmodelle.” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a p.6)

neuer Geschäftsmodelle, um Hamburgs Spitzenposition als Medienstandort zu sichern und auszubauen.” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2017c)

“next-Media.Hamburg will an der Schnittstelle von Content und Technologie die Rahmenbedingungen für die Entwicklung digitaler Geschäftsmodelle verbessern, Kooperationen anstoßen und vor allem die Vernetzung zwischen großen Inhaltehäusern, dem digitalen Mittelstand und Startups weiter verdichten.” (BWVI 2016 p.9)

“Die besten Tage der Medien und der Medienstadt Hamburg liegen noch vor uns. Niemals standen uns mehr Informationen zur Verfügung, und noch nie gab es mehr Möglichkeiten, Medieninhalte gleichermaßen gehalt- wie lustvoll zu gestalten. Spannende Zeiten also für Medienmacher, die die Herausforderung annehmen. Gerade auch hier in der Medienstadt Hamburg, in der wir alle Voraussetzungen und alle Kompetenzen besitzen, neue Medienangebote und Geschäftsmodelle zu entwickeln.” (Carsten Brosda (Senator for Culture and Media) in BKM 2017 p.3)

“Wir haben das unternehmerische Know-How, das im Medienbereich dringend immer wieder neu eingefordert und benötigt wird, und wir müssen über die Frage, wie kündige Geschäftsmodelle aussehen sollen, immer wieder vielfältige Diskussionen führen. Das wird an der HMS maßgeblich in der Medienökonomie und im Medienmanagement vermittelt.” (Brosda 2018a)


“Solche Fragen nach künftigen Perspektiven an der Schnittstelle zwischen Inhalten und Technologie bilden auch den Kern unserer neuen Medienstandortinitiative nextMedia.Hamburg. Wir wollen hier ein Ökosystem schaffen, in dem etablierte Unternehmen zusammen mit Start Ups die Medienangebote der Zukunft ebenso erkunden wie die Möglichkeiten, mit ihnen gutes Geld zu verdienen.” (Scholz 2014o)


“Deshalb haben wir das Thema Content & Technology 2014 auf die Agenda auch des IT-Gipfels der Bundesregierung gesetzt. Und wir haben die Initiative nextMedia.Hamburg gestartet, die bei der digitalen Transformation der Medien- und Kreativbranche helfen soll. Unsere Chance ist es, rund um die etablierten und erfolgreichen Unternehmen und Marken eine lebhafte digitale StartUp-Szene wachsen zu lassen. Aus diesem Zusammenspiel entstehen die Innovationen, die wir brauchen, um die Zukunft der Medien zu gewinnen.” (Scholz 2015u)

“The city’s Senate is another key stakeholder in the framework of Hamburg’s digitalisation process, as it is the leader of the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative, as mentioned in the section below. Alongside the public sector, local businesses have also played a crucial role. Start-ups, big companies and associations (e.g. Cisco, Betahaus, Hamburg@work, Deutsche Telekom) have all been involved in the city’s digitalisation process. In addition to the stakeholders mentioned above, digital giants based in Hamburg (e.g. Facebook and Google) are deeply involved in the city’s digitalisation process.” (European Commission 2016b p.4)

“The nextMedia.Hamburg initiative sees itself as a driving force for innovative technologies and their use. As part of its role, the initiative is committed to expanding and supporting the regional network of media and digital industries. [...] Launched in early 2014, nextMedia.Hamburg is further strengthening the innovation culture in Hamburg and improving the framework conditions for start-up businesses in the Hamburg Metropolitan Region. To this end, the nextMedia.StartHub is the first port of call for businesses from the digital economy and serves as a central point of contact for the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative. By connecting the start-up scene with established stakeholders from the regional media sector, the StartHub aims to actively support the digitalisation process for the content industry, thereby strengthening Hamburg’s prime position as an innovative media location over the long term.” (European Commission 2017 p.5)


Gamecity Hamburg:


“Ein spezielles Programm zur Förderung von Prototypen, ein professionell gemanagtes Netzwerk mit rd. 1.700 Vertretern der Games-Branche, die damit verbundenen Kooperationsmöglichkeiten, Plattformen zur Interaktion mit der Medien- und IT-Wirtschaft sowie die Qualität und Quantität der branchenspezifischen Supportleistungen machen Hamburg zum Games-Standort Nr. 1 in Deutschland.” (BFHH 2009b p.3)

“Für die Wirtschaftsbehörde ist die ”Game-City“ Bestandteil des Konzepts der ”Wachsenden Stadt“, da die Branche Umsatz und Arbeitsplätze stetig steigert. Im Sommer hatte Hamburg zudem als erstes Bundesland ein spezielles Förderprogramm für die Entwicklung von Computerspielen gestartet.” (Späth 2006)

“Hamburg ist eine der Hochburgen von Unternehmen, die Computerspiele entwickeln. In der Hansestadt gibt es nach Angaben der Organisation Gamecity Hamburg 50 solcher Firmen. Mehr als 20 stehen in direkter Konkurrenz zu Intenium im Bereich der Casual Games, wie beispielsweise 49Games, Bigpoint, King.com oder northworks. ” (Laufer 2008)

“Und die Hamburger IT-Branche wächst weiter. Allein die Spieleanbieter wie Bigpoint oder InnoGames dürften in diesem Jahr noch einmal 500 neue Arbeitsplätze schaffen.” (Wassink 2012)


“Denn zwischen Alster und Elbe sind nicht nur etablierte Medien zuhause, sondern zusätzlich schaffen unzählige kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen in noch jungen Branchen weitere zukunftsfähige Arbeitsplätze. So sind im Bereich Games derzeit 1.700 Mitarbeiter in 190 Unternehmen festangestellt – noch in diesem Jahr sollen rund 175 weitere Arbeitsplätze in 18 Firmen dazu kommen.” (Prof. Dr. Karin von Welck (Senator for Culture) in Hamburg@work 2009a)

“Im Oktober 2003 erkannte die Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg als erstes Bundesland die Potenziale der Games-Branche und rief die Aktionslinie Gamecity Hamburg ins Leben. Seither hat sich die Zahl der Unternehmen und Arbeitsplätze in der Hamburger digitalen Spieleunterhaltung mehr als verdoppelt.” (Hamburg@work 2010a p.12)


“Die Software-/Games-Industrie hat zwischen 2003 und 2008 kräftig an Erwerbstätigen hinzugewonnen (29,3 %) und ist inzwischen der beschäftigungstärkste Teilmarkt […] Mit rund 150 Unternehmen und circa 3 000 Beschäftigten in der Games-Branche ist Hamburg zudem einer der führenden deutschen Standorte im Spielszektor.” (Hamburger Kreativ Gesellschaft 2012 p.74)

“Die Games-Branche ist qualifizierter Nachwuchs ein wichtiger Standortfaktor, zumal das jährliche Wachstum zwischen 15 und 20 Prozent liegt und aktuell in Hamburger Games-Unternehmen rund 300 freie Stellen zu besetzen sind” (Hamburg@work 2010a p.12)

“Auch im Bereich der Browser-Games-Industrie ist Hamburg unbestrittener Marktführer in Deutschland mit zuletzt fast 4 000 Beschäftigten in Festanstellung. Die überregionale Bedeutung Hamburger Unternehmen dieser Branche gibt einen Hinweis darauf, dass die Stadt in diesem Segment im Zuge der zunehmenden Konvergenz der Medien- und IT-Branche nicht zuletzt vom traditionell starken hiesigen Medienstandort profitieren kann.” (HK 2014 p.7)


"In der Games-Branche arbeiten deshalb heute weit über 4000 Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter für Hamburger Unternehmen und produzieren weltweit erfolgreiche Online-Browser-Games. " (Schoolz 2012n)

"Ihr Wissen und Können bildet die Grundlage der weiteren guten Entwicklung nicht nur Ihres Unternehmens, sondern auch der Gamesstadt Hamburg", so Olaf Scholz. Denn erfolgreiche Unternehmen würden auch andere Firmen anziehen. Die Ansiedlung könne zudem mitheilf, die Perspektiven der östlichen Innenstadquartiere zu entwickeln.“ (Opresnik 2014)

"An einem Standort, an dem so viele relevante Medienangebote aus allen Bereichen auf engstem Raum beieinander sind, lohnt der Austausch über erfolgreiche Strategien. Nehmen Sie nur die Games Branche, die es geschafft hat, neue Geschäftsmodelle zu entwickeln, deren Monetarisierung ausschließlich online funktioniert. Eine Grundlage dazu war neben dem Aufbau eigener Communities auch die kluge Kombination von kostenfreien Basisangeboten und kostenpflichtigen Zusatzmöglichkeiten. Vielleicht lässt sich aus solchen Modellen ja auch etwas lernen." (Scholz 2015i)

"Hamburg hat sich auf dem Gebiet der Unterhaltungssoftware einen Namen als "Gamecity" gemacht" (Scholz 2015x)

"Wir sind europaweit führend in dem Bereich Online Browser Games" (Scholz 2012a)


"Bigpoint entlässt 120 Mitarbeiter. Der Spielehersteller Bigpoint entlässt 120 Mitarbeiter. Gründer Heiko Hubertz zieht die Konsequenzen und gibt sein Amt als CEO ab. “ (Hofmann 2012)


Appendix E: Sectional Data for 5.2.4 Hamburg as an Entrepreneurial City

This section contains quotes from documents considered in the document analysis of the study. As most documents are in German, the author translated the selected segments into English and references them to this appendix. In the rare case that an analysed document is available in English, the version is used in the main body of the study. In addition to the original version of texts quoted in the main body of the document, this section also contains additional segments of analysed documents that support the presented analysis. The sequence of data in this section is defined through the order of appearance in the main body of the document.

“Die Spitzenstellung Hamburgs im Bereich der Existenzgründungen, die eine wesentliche Wachstumschance mit Blick auf den Arbeitsmarkt und die Entwicklung zukunftsträchtiger Unternehmen bieten, sollte verstärkt genutzt werden, um das Wachstumspotential auszuschöpfen.” (SKHH 2002, p.47)

“Die Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg konzentriert sich in ihrer Innovationspolitik außer auf die Förderung von Gründungen technologieorientierter Unternehmen auf die Stärkung der Innovationsfähigkeit von kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen, da der Mittelstand als besonders flexibel gilt und auf Grund seiner hohen Spezialisierung als Zulieferer und Anwender neuer Technologien eine tragende Rolle im Innovationsprozess der gesamten Wirtschaft einnimmt.” (BFHH 2007 p.3)


“Die Hamburger Behörde für Kultur, Sport und Medien bietet jungen newTV-Unternehmen ein bundesweit einmaliges Förderprogramm. Unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen sind Zuschüsse von bis zu 100.000 Euro möglich. […] Die Hamburger Behörde für Kultur, Sport und Medien bietet jungen newTV-Unternehmen ein bundesweit einmaliges Förderprogramm. Unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen sind Zuschüsse von bis zu 100.000 Euro möglich.” (Hamburg@work 2009a p.12)
“Innovationsförderung ist die Gesamtheit der monetären und nicht-monetären Anreize und Unterstützungen für Innovationen, Technologietransfer, Lernen und Qualifizierung sowie wissens- und technologiebasierte Unternehmensgründungen.” (BWVI 2010a p.5)


“Hamburg unterstützt newTV-Startups. Die zunehmende Digitalisierung der Medien und Übertragungswege schafft für immer mehr innovative Unternehmen beste technische Voraussetzungen, neue Bewegtbildinhalte zu entwickeln und zu betreiben. Da sich dieser Markt jedoch in der Frühphase der Entwicklung befindet und sich private Investoren bislang noch stark zurückhalten, stehen insbesondere kleinere Unternehmen häufig vor erheblichen finanziellen Startbarrieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund bietet die Hamburger Behörde für Kultur, Sport und Medien ab sofort allen Unternehmen, die bereits in Hamburg ansässig sind oder ihren Sitz in die Hansestadt verlegen, in der Frühphase neuer newTV-Angebote eine finanzielle Unterstützung an. Der Förderbeitrag beläuft sich dabei auf bis zu 100.000 Euro pro Vorhaben als bedingt rückzahlbare Zuwendung. Der Förderanteil beträgt bis zu 50 Prozent.” (Hamburg@work 2008b p.8)

“Die Gamecity Hamburg unterstützt vor allem junge Firmen und hat in diesem Rahmen bereits zwei bundesweit einmalige Projekte ins Leben gerufen. Neben der Prototypenförderung stellt die Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg kleinen und mittelständischen Entwicklern günstige Büroflächen im Gamecity Port bereit, die zu flexiblen Vertragsbedingungen gemietet werden können. Natürlich bietet die Gamecity Hamburg auch klassische Startup-Beratungen und zahlreiche Qualifizierungsmaßnahmen an, wie etwa die regelmäßig stattfindenden Ringvorlesungen” (Hamburg@work 2009a p.16)

“Für Startup-Unternehmen bieten wir mit dem Webfuture Award einen Preis zur Förderung der E-Commerce- und Web 2.0-Szene an, um nur ein Beispiel zu nennen.” (Hamburg@work 2009a p.8)

“Bereits zum dritten Mal wurden 2009 innovative Startup-Ideen aus dem Online-Bereich made in Hamburg mit dem Webfuture Award prämiert. Das Ziel des E-Commerce-Wettbewerbs ist die Förderung des Innovationspotenzials und der Startup-Szene in der Metropolregion.” (Hamburg@work 2010a p.8)


“Doch Hamburg hat ein gutes Existenzgründungsklima. Wer sich in Hamburg selbstständig machen will, für die oder den gibt es viele Beratungs- und Seminarangebote. Diese richten sich nach dem Bedarf der Gründungsinteressierten.” (Scholz 2011m)


“Firmen und ‘start-ups’ werden in aller Regel nicht in Büros am Schreibtisch gegründet, sondern vielmehr auf dem Weihnachtsmarkt oder abends beim Bier oder Heurigen. Es geht darum, ein Klima der Kreativität und des unternehmerischen Mutes zu schaffen. Wo, wenn nicht in der Stadt, können diese beiden Tugenden blühen? Die Gründer brauchen die Stadt als Milieu, um weltweit aktiv sein zu können. Auch durch Bildung und Forschung werden neue Blickwinkel ermöglicht. Es entstehen neue Denkrichtungen, Ideen und Innovationen, die Fortschritt ermöglichen.” (Scholz 2012m)
Wir wollen ein umfassendes digitales Ökosystem fördern, das allen offensteht, die mit kreativen Inhalten Geld verdienen. Wir wollen die digitale Transformation bestehender erfolgreicher Inhalte- Geschäftsmodelle genauso unterstützen wie die Entwicklung neuer Ideen, wie Inhalte digital produziert und vertrieben werden können (Carsten Brosda in Geisler 2014).

Gemeinsam mit der Investitions- und Förderbank wird der Senat wirksame Finanzierungsangebote für StartUps entwickeln.“ (SKHH 2015b)


Im IFB Beratungszentrum Wirtschaft beraten Förderlotsen und Förderlotsinnen, Existenzgründerinnen und Existenzgründer, Unternehmerinnen und Unternehmer sowie Freiberuflerinnen und Freiberufler in Hamburg zu allen Förderthemen in den Bereichen Wirtschaft, Umwelt und Innovation. Darüber hinaus wird der Senat zur Unterstützung wissensbasiierter Gründungen eine Plattform einrichten, welche die Angebote für wissensbasierte Gründungswillige aufbereitet, bündelt und zur Verfügung stellt.” (BFHH 2017d p.1)


Ziel ist es explizit, vielversprechende und profitable Unternehmen zu finanzieren, um so Hamburgs Position im Wettbewerb um innovative Unternehmen und als Gründungs- und Startup-Metropole zu stärken.” (BFHH 2017d p.2)

Unternehmensgründungen in der Spielart der „Startups“ bzw. guten Rahmenbedingungen für deren Entwicklung („Startup-Ökosystem“) werden außerdem im internationalen Standortwettbewerb vor dem Hintergrund der fortschreitenden Digitalisierung eine zunehmende Bedeutung für die positive Entwicklung von Innovationsystemen und die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit auch bereits existierender Unternehmen zugeschrieben.” (BFHH 2018a p.1)

Promotion of Entrepreneurship and the Regional Subsidy System:


"Hamburg ist nicht nur Medien- und Handelsstadt, sondern auch Gründerstadt. Um die ständig weiter wachsende Innovationskultur und Start-up Szene in der Hansestadt zu stärken, setzt die Standortinitiative für die Medien- und Digitalwirtschaft nextMedia.Hamburg sich seit Anfang 2014 dafür ein, die Rahmenbedingungen für Startups in Hamburg zu verbessern“ (Games Career 2016)


"The nextMedia.StartHub is the first port of call for businesses from the digital economy and serves as a central point of contact of the nextMedia.Hamburg initiative. By connecting the start-up scene with established stakeholders from the regional media sector, the StartHub aims to actively accompany the process of digitisation in the content industry, thereby strengthening Hamburg’s prime position as an innovative media location in the long term.” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016c p.2)
"HWF Hamburgische Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung mbH zur One Stop Agency für Investitionen ausgehakt. Sie wird künftig unter der Dachmarke "Hamburg Invest" firmieren und die gesamte Vermarktung städtischer Gewerbe- und Industrieflächen sowie die Entwicklung, Vermarktung und den Betrieb von Hamburgs F & I Parks übernehmen. Darüber hinaus werden wir bei Hamburg Invest eine zentrale Anlaufstelle für wissensbasierte Startups einrichten. [...] Darüber hinaus sind wir die zentrale Anlaufstelle für Wissens- und technologieorientierte Start-ups und vermitteln in das Startup-Ökosystem der Stadt Hamburg.  " (HIW 2017a)


"Es wird eine neue Förderbank geben, die solche Fördermaßnahmen in Zukunft zielgenauer und unbürokratischer abwickeln soll.” (Scholz 2011f)

"Ganz zentral ist dabei auch die Schaffung einer Investitionsbank, bei der wir sämtliche staatliche Fördermaßnahmen von der Wirtschaftsförderung über den Wohnungsbau bis zu Umwelt- und Klimaschutz bündeln werden. Wir werden dazu die Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt umbauen."  (Scholz 2011a)


"Maßnahme 2.3: Verbesserung der Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten insbesondere junger innovativer Unternehmen. Es ist beabsichtigt, im Rahmen des Operationellen Programms insbesondere junge, innovative Unternehmen, die die Entwicklung von neuen und vielversprechenden Produkten und/oder Dienstleistungen verfolgen, unter Einsatz eines Finanzierungsinstruments zu stärken. Mit dem Instrument soll primär in der Frühphase die Finanzierung verbessert werden, die ein großes Hemmnis für die Entwicklung junger, innovativer Unternehmen darstellt. [...] Förderempfänger der Maßnahme 2.3 kann ein Finanzinstrument sein, wobei die Übernahme offener Beteiligungen bzw. Vergabe von Nachrangdarlehen in den Fokus stehen kann. Zielgruppe der Maßnahme sind insbesondere junge innovative Unternehmen."  (BWVI 2013 pp.25-26)

"Was wir brauchen, ist ein klares, zielorientiertes Fördersystem, das die Finanzierung von aussichtsreichen Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprojekten mit hoher Beratungskompetenz verbindet. Darüber hinaus benötigen wir ein leistungsfähiges Netz innovationsfördernder Infrastruktur. Deshalb hat der Senat im Dezember die Weiterentwicklung der Hamburgischen Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt zur Hamburgischen Investitions- und Förderbank, kurz IFB, beschlossen. Damit wird die öffentliche Förderung auch von Innovationen erheblich verbessert und das gesamte Förderspektrum in einer Hand zusammengefasst.” (Scholz 2013e)

“Wir wollen und werden seitens des Senats in den kommenden Monaten und Jahren weiter daran arbeiten, die Infrastruktur für Gründerinnen und Gründer weiter zu verbessern und sie enger mit den etablierten Unternehmen zusammenbringen.” (Scholz 2014h)

“Wir haben, als nur ein Beispiel, das Förderprogramm „InnoRampUp“ eingeführt, das die Existenzgründungen und Unternehmen fördert, die auf neuen Ideen basieren. Wir wollen sukzessive ein Netz von F&I-Parks etablieren und planen Innovationsdarlehen einzuführen. Inzwiensch konnte der Senat die Voraussetzungen dafür schaffen, dass sich drei Fraunhofer-Vorhaben in Hamburg etablieren. Hamburg soll zu einer Innovationshauptstadt in Europa werden.” (Scholz 2015u)

“Hamburg hat mit der Investitions- und Förderbank (IFB) eine wichtige Institution zur Förderung von Unternehmensfinanzierung und Existenzgründung. Der Senat wird zusammen mit der IFB in Hamburg die Rahmenbedingungen für mehr Ansiedlungen und mehr Unternehmen setzen.” (SKHH 2015b)


"Aus Sicht des Senats spielt das Gründungsgeschehen eine überaus wichtige Rolle für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Hamburgs.” (BFHH 2017d p.1)

“Gesetzliche Drucksache 21/2770 soll mit dem Hamburger Innovations-Wachstumsfonds, die Angebotsstücke bei den Finanzierungsinstrumenten im Bereich Wachstumsfinanzierung für innovative Unternehmen geschlossen, damit einhergehende Nachteile im Standortwettbewerb abgebaut, sowie die gut funktionierenden Förderprogramme der IFB systematisch ergänzt werden.” (BFHH 2017b p.5)


“Die unter ihrem Dach fungierende Innovationsagenteur bietet ein breites Spektrum an Fördermaßnahmen, um Unternehmen bei der Entwicklung und Umsetzung innovativer Produkte, Verfahren und Dienstleistungen zu unterstützen. Beispielhaft wären zu nennen: InnoRampUp: Überdurchschnittlich innovative, kleine Unternehmen, die noch nicht lange am Markt sind, werden mit bis zu 150.000
Euro bezuschusst; Innovationsstarter Fonds: stellt Beteiligungskapital für innovative Geschäftsideen kleiner junger Unternehmen, maximal 1 Million Euro, zur Verfügung; Programm für Innovation (PROFI): bezuschusst FuE-Projekte bestehender Unternehmen, die neue oder wesentlich verbesserte Produkte, Verfahren und Dienstleistungen zum Ziel haben; “(BFHH 2016a p.1)


"Für den „Hamburger Innovations-Wachstumsfonds“ sollten folgende Eckpunkte gelten: - Das Fondsvolumen beträgt bis zu 100 Millionen Euro in Form von Eigenkapital, Bürgschaften oder Darlehensmitteln für innovative Unternehmen, die mit neuen Produkten, Verfahren beziehungsweise Dienstleistungen im Anschluss an die Start-up-Phase in die Wachstumsphase eintreten.” (BFHH 2016a p.2)

The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem:

"Dazu gehört dann auch, dass wir uns intensiver als bisher um die Start-Up-Szene in der Stadt kümmern. Was da rund um das neue Betahaus, um die Initiative Hamburg StartUps und viele weitere neue Akteure passiert, ist spannend und verdient unsere Unterstützung. Welche Kraft hier liegt, hat vor ein paar Wochen, die Hamburger Firma Protonet gezeigt, die einen Weltrekord im Crowdfunding aufgestellt hat und binnen 5 Tagen, 13 Stunden und 31 Minuten genau 1.826 Investoren überzeugt hat, insgesamt 3 Millionen Euro zu investieren.” (Scholz 2014)

"Es ist spannend, was zwischen großen etablierten Unternehmen und der jungen StartUp-Szene passiert, wie sich der Hafen zum SmartPort entwickelt und welche neuen digitalen Ideen rund um die etablierten Verlagshäuser entstehen. Dieses Zusammenspiel von Kreativität und Kaufmannsgeist macht Hamburg aus. In Hamburg geht es nicht darum, sich ohne funktionierendes Geschäftsmodell von Finanzierungsrunde zu Finanzierungsrunde zu hangeln. Hier geht es um funktionierende Geschäftsmodelle. Die StartUp-Szene in Hamburg ist lebendig und vielfältig. Hier ist vielleicht etwas weniger Hype, dafür aber umso mehr erfolgreiches Business.” (Scholz 2014a)


"Auch Stephan Uhrenbacher, Gründer des Bewertungsportals Qype (heute: Yelp) und der Ferienwohnungs-Plattform 9flats, verweist darauf, dass die Kreativbranche in der Hansestadt deutlich mehr Geld verdient als im Rest der Republik [...]. Dazu zählen der weltweit erfolgreiche Internetseitenanbieter Jimdo, Firmen wie Goodgames, Bigpoint oder Qype, Online-Partnervermittler wie Parship oder ElitePartner, und letztlich müsse man auch den Versandhändler Otto dazuzählen – nach Amazon immerhin der zweitgrößte E-Commerce-Händler der Welt...” (Meyer-Wellmann 2014)

"The fact that Hamburg is a leading location of digital industry is not only confirmed by the presence of important digital companies such as Xing, Google, Twitter, Facebook, Yelp, and Hootsuite, but also by numerous industry-related events”, states Dr. Carsten Brosda, Media Representative for the Senate of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg. “Until mid-November alone, more than ten important industry events will be taking place in Hamburg, which will reflect the bandwidth and the potentials of Hamburg’s digital
Economy. One of these events will be NEXT. We are glad the digital conference is returning to Hamburg this year!” (Hamburg Marketing 2015b)


"Hamburg hat sich in den letzten Jahren zu einem der größten deutschen Start-up-Zentren entwickelt. Um den Wirtschaftsstandort Hamburg und die Start-up-Szene weiter zu stärken und international auszubauen, braucht es allerdings auch Know-how von außen und eine internationale Vernetzung [...]. Das Silicon Valley ist wohl das bekannteste und auch erfolgreichste Innovations- und Start-up-Zentrum der Welt. Die hier heimishen Tech-Riesen wie Apple, Facebook, Google, Hewlett-Packard und Intel profitieren durch die gegenseitige Vernetzung, durch die Nähe zur renommierten Stanford University sowie weiteren renommierten Hochschulen und Forschungseinrichtungen.” (BFHH 2017a p.1)

"Hamburg hat in den letzten Jahren mit betahaus, SocialMediaWeek Hamburg oder HamburgStartups wichtige Kristallisationspunkte unterstützt. Der Senat will alle relevanten Stakeholder in Hamburg zusammenbringen und ein StartUp Ökosystem aufbauen.” (SPD 2015 p.24)

"Aktuell entsteht ein neues digitales Ökosystem, das sich von der klassischen Medienlandschaft durch völlig neue Nutzungsformen, Anwendungen, Inhalteformate und Märkte unterscheidet.” (BWVI 2016 p.8)

"Hamburg ist ein Hotspot der deutschen Gründerszene. Die starke und diversifizierte Wirtschaftsstruktur sowie ein lebendiges Start-up-Ökosystem bilden eine gute Basis, um Ideen erfolgreich umzusetzen.” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a p.1)


"Hamburg ist ein Hotspot der deutschen Gründerszene. Die starke und diversifizierte Wirtschaftsstruktur sowie ein lebendiges Start-up-Ökosystem bilden eine gute Basis, um Ideen erfolgreich umzusetzen. Das Resultat ist eine wachsende und gut vernetzte Start-up-Szene.” (HIW 2017b p.5)

"Das Start-up-Ökosystem hat sich in Hamburg in den letzten Jahren sehr positiv entwickelt.” (BFHH 2018c p.22)

"In Hamburg treffen starke Hightech Cluster auf ein deutschlandweit einmaliges dichtes Netzwerk an Unternehmen aus der Medien-, Kultur- und Kreativwirtschaft. Entstanden sind hier in den vergangenen Jahren bekannte Firmen, wie Xing und mytaxi. Ebenso das größte deutsche Finanz-Start-up Kreditech kommt aus Hamburg.” (BWVI 2018a p.5)

"Es ist nur folgerichtig, dass sich eine aktive Digital- und Startup-Szene in unmittelbarer Nähe zu einem der modernsten Häfen der Welt und zu den bekannten Medienhäusern ansiedelt. In Hamburg treffen neue Ideen auf fruchtbaren Boden. Das Netzwerk an potenziellen Partnern, Dienstleistern und Kunden ist groß. Dieser kreative Nährboden gepaart mit einer gut ausgebauten öffentlichen Förderstruktur macht Hamburg zu einem idealen Ort für Gründer.” (Scholz 2016b)

"Dort haben wir Anfang 2017 mit dem schon erwähnten Innovation Campus Green Technologies das neue Gründerzentrum der Technischen Universität Hamburg eröffnet. Der Innovationssampus soll Ausgangspunkt für wissensbasierte Startups und Existenzgründungen aus allen Hamburger Hochschulen heraus werden. Die inhaltlichen Schwerpunkte liegen bei Green Technologies, Life Sciences und Digitalisierung.” (Scholz 2017f)

Ich freue mich außerdem sehr, dass hier in Hamburg zurzeit die dpa gemeinsam mit etlichen namhaften Medienpartnern die Arbeit an einem Next Media Accelerator aufnimmt, um Teams zu fördern, die neue mediale Geschäftsmodelle entwickeln und zur Marktreife bringen wollen. Das ist es, was wir brauchen. “ (Scholz 2015r)


“Gemeinsam schaffen Unternehmen und Stadt ein attraktives und dynamisches Umfeld für die Branche. Der mit Unterstützung der Stadt und einem Zusammenschluss vieler wichtiger Medienunternehmen gegründete Next Media Accelerator fördert mediennahe Startups mit einem sechsmonatigen Intensivprogramm.” (Scholz 2016h)

“Ein Beispiel sind Accelerator-Programme, die wir hier in Hamburg mit dem Next-Media-Accelerator und dem Next-Commerce-Accelerator ausprobiert haben. Das sind zwei elementar wichtige Bereiche in Hamburg. Unsere Kreativitätsgesellschaft hält sich darum, dass das kreativwirtschaftliche Innovationswissen einerseits und mit den großen Unternehmen andererseits vernetzt wird” (Brosda 2018c)


The Metrification of Entrepreneurship:

“Intelligentes Wachstum bedeutet, Wissen und Innovation als Vektoren unseres künftigen Wachstums zu stärken. Bedingungen hierfür sind eine erhöhte Qualität unseres Bildungssystems, die Steigerung unserer Forschungsleistungen, die Förderung von Innovation und
Wissenstransfer innerhalb der Union, die Ausschöpfung des Potenzials der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien und die Gewährleistung, dass innovative Ideen in neue Produkte und Dienste umgesetzt werden können, durch die Wachstum und hochwertige Arbeitsplätze entstehen und die dazu beitragen die europäischen und weltweiten gesellschaftlichen Probleme zu lösen. Mitbestimmend für den Erfolg ist hierbei Unternehmergeist, die Verfügbarkeit der finanziellen Mittel und die Konzentration auf unsere Bedürfnisse und Marktchancen. “(European Commission 2010 p.14)

“Die Mitgliedstaaten wiederum sind aufgefordert, die nationalen (und regionalen) FuE und Innovationssysteme im Sinne der Förderung von Exzellenz und intelligenter Spezialisierung zu reformieren, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Hochschulen, Forschung und Unternehmen zu stärken, die Programmplanung gemeinsam vorzunehmen, die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Bereichen zu stützen, in denen ein EU-Mehrwert erzielt werden kann und die nationalen Förderverfahren entsprechend anzupassen sowie die Verbreitung der Technologie auf dem Gebiet der Union zu gewährleisten [...].” (European Commission 2010 p.15)

“The concept of smart specialisation is also consistent with and supports the main reform goals of the proposals for the EU Cohesion Policy 2014-2020, published in October 2011: delivering the Europe 2020 objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; reinforcing policy performance and focus on results; maximising the impact of EU funding through thematic concentration. Indeed, smart specialisation has a strategic and central function within the new Cohesion Policy being a key vehicle for ensuring Cohesion Policy’s contribution to the Europe 2020 jobs and growth agenda.” (European Commission 2012 p.9)

“Die Spitzenstellung Hamburgs im Bereich der Existenzgründungen, die eine wesentliche Wachstumschance mit Blick auf den Arbeitsmarkt und die Entwicklung zukunftsträchtiger Unternehmen bieten, sollte verstärkt genutzt werden, um das Wachstumspotential auszuschöpfen.” (SKHH 2002, p.47)

“Nur wachsende Städte sind auch in der Lage wirtschaftliches Wachstum zu generieren, was wiederum Voraussetzung für die Schaffung und den Erhalt von Arbeitsplätzen ist.” (BFHH 2005 p.2)


“Die Fähigkeit zur Innovation ist der zentrale Erfolgsfaktor der heutigen, zunehmend wissensbasierten Gesellschaften Europas, um den Chancen und Herausforderungen der Globalisierung wirksam begegnen zu können. Technischer Fortschritt ist empirischen Studien zufolge für etwa ein Drittel des Wirtschaftswachstums verantwortlich. Innovationen ermöglichen qualitativ hochwertige Arbeitsplätze mit angemessener produktivitätsorientierter Entlohnung und leisten damit einen erheblichen Beitrag zur einträglichen Teilhabe am Erwerbsleben.” (BWVI 2010a p.3)

“Mit seinen rund 90.000 Unternehmen gehört Hamburg zu den stärksten Wirtschaftsstandorten Europas. Es ist erklärtes Ziel des Senats, diese Position zu festigen und auszubauen. Er sieht eine vorrangige Aufgabe seiner Wirtschaftspolitik darin, die Rahmenbedingungen für unternehmerische Aktivitäten insgesamt zu verbessern und insbesondere kleine und mittlere Unternehmen (KMU) sowie Existenzgründer zu unterstützen.” (BFHH 2012b p.1)
"Wir übernehmen Verantwortung für Wachstum und Wohlstand und Arbeitsplätze in Hamburg – und zwar in allen wirtschaftlichen Bereichen." (Scholz 2011a)

(Scholz 2011f)

"Wir wollen nachhaltiges Wirtschaftswachstum und hochwertige Arbeitsplätze in dieser Stadt erhalten und neue generieren. Wir wollen durch die ständige Verbesserung von Produkten, Verfahren und Prozessen, Wettbewerbsvorsprünge insbesondere im internationalen Wettbewerb realisieren. Wir wollen, dass unsere Stadt auch in Zukunft ihren im nationalen und internationalen Vergleich überdurchschnittlichen Lebensstandard sichert." (Scholz 2014a)

"Innovationen schaffen Arbeitsplätze, bringen neue Heilmethoden, machen die Mobilität bequemer und irgendwann so leise, dass man sich beim Überqueren einer großen Straße wieder angenehm unterhalten kann. Innovationen machen es möglich, dass Industrie und Gewerbe in der Stadt sein können, ohne die Nachbarn zu stören, dass Häuser warm sind, ohne dabei viel Energie zu verbrauchen, und dass Hamburg grün bleibt, auch wenn die Bebauung dichter wird." (Scholz 2017f)


"Die Fähigkeit, Innovationen hervorzubringen, ist eine notwendige Voraussetzung für nachhaltigen ökonomischen Erfolg. Im globalen Wettbewerb können Unternehmen am hochentwickelten Standort Hamburg mit seinem vergleichsweise hohen Einkommensniveau ihre Wettbewerbsposition nur durch ständige Produkt- und Prozessinnovationen behaupten. Diese sind eine wesentliche Voraussetzung dafür, dass nachhaltiges Wirtschaftswachstum und hochwertige Arbeitsplätze entstehen können" (BWVI 2014a p.66)

"Förderung innovativer Startups. Aus Sicht des Senats spielt das Gründungsgeschehen eine wichtige Rolle für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Hamburgs. Neugründungen bringen Innovationen hervor, schaffen Arbeitsplätze und sind eine Triebfeder der Wirtschaft und des strukturellen Wandels. Es sind hauptsächlich erfolgreiche und dynamische Gründer/innen, die die Arbeitsplätze von morgen schaffen. " (BFHH 2018c p.20)

"Das Vorhaben lässt einen absehbaren Beitrag zur Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen und zur Steigerung der wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit in der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg erwarten. Das Vorhaben geht mit positiven Effekten für den Standort einher (mittelbare Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen/Ansiedlung weiterer Unternehmen, Netzwerkeffekte, Wissens-/Technologietransfer, Kooperationseffekte, etc.)." (IFB 2014 p.5)

"IFH II verfolgt dabei nachstehend genannte Ziele: Förderung von jungen innovativen Unternehmen aller Branchen in Hamburg; Erschließen von Innovationspotentialen; Schaffen von Unternehmen und Arbeitsplätzen; Verbesserung Gründungsklima; Schließen von Angebotslücken bezüglich Eigenkapital für junge innovative Unternehmen; Realisieren von Rückflüssen. " (IFB 2016 p.3)


"Damit sollen neuartige und innovative Gründungen gefördert werden, die sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass deren innovative Produkte und Dienstleistungen sich signifikant vom Wettbewerb abheben und besondere Risiken bei der weiteren Konzeption und
Markteinführung aufgrund der Neuartigkeit bestehen. Mit dem Förderprogramm werden folgende Ziele verfolgt: Verbesserung des Gründungsklimas in Hamburg; Förderung neuer wettbewerbsfähiger und zukunftssicherer Arbeits- und Ausbildungsplätze in Hamburg; Erhöhung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und der Innovationskraft des Standorts Hamburg; Stärkung der Hamburger Zukunftsfelder; Steigerung der Attraktivität des Startup-Standorts Hamburg” (IFB 2018 p.3)

”Basierend auf den Antragsunterlagen erwarten die von PROFI und InnoRampUp geförderten Unternehmen im dritten Jahr nach Projektende aus der Verwertung der Projektergebnisse pro Projekt durchschnittlich einen jährlichen Umsatz von 5 Mio. Euro sowie die Sicherung und Schaffung von durchschnittlich 17 Arbeitsplätzen.” (BFHH 2018c p.23)


”Dank zahlreicher Förder- und Entwicklungsmassnahmen hat sich die Elbmetropole zu einem führenden Standort der digitalen Wirtschaft entwickelt: Alleine die Anzahl der Multimedia-Dienstleister hat sich seit 1997 in der Hansestadt verzehnfacht. Über 350 Neuausiedlungen gehen in den letzten einhalb Jahrzehnten auf das Konto der Initiative, die es sich gemeinsam mit der Stadt zum Ziel gesetzt hat, Hamburg auch in Zukunft als führende Medien- und IT-Metropole in Europa zu positionieren” (Hamburg@work 2012b p1)


”Sehr hohe Gründungsdynamik im Bereich wissensintensiver Dienstleistungen, Hamburg gehört zu den Top-Standorten in Deutschland.” (BWVI 2014a p.64)


”Hamburg’s status as a federal city-state has been crucial to its digitalisation, along with its constant, direct links with its political system, while its economic structure is more prosperous than other German cities. As stated in the KfW Start-Up Monitor 2015, the proportion of new entrepreneurs involved in freelance activities is disproportionately high in Hamburg (46% in 2014) compared with the German average and second only to Berlin (51% in 2014), and this is connected to the fact that they are attractive centres for the media and IT sectors.” (European Commission 2016b p.4)

”Ein aktives Start-up-Geschehen mit einer hohen Gründungsintensität und im Branchenvergleich überdurchschnittlichen Quoten von Unternehmen, die sich mittelfristig am Markt behaupten können, sowie eine hohe Grundzufriedenheit mit den Rahmenbedingungen komplettieren das Bild eines dynamischen IT-Standorts Hamburg.” (HK 2016b p.7)

”Die Anzahl der Patentanmeldungen je 100.000 Einwohner in Hamburg betrug 2018 insgesamt 43 und liegt somit deutlich oberhalb des Mittels in Deutschland von 36 Anmeldungen” (BWVI 2018a p.3)
“[...] viele der geförderten Startups regelmäßig zu den Gewinnern von Gründerpreisen zählen (wie z.B. dem Webfuture Award und dem Startups@Reeperbahn Award), auf dem Hamburg Innovation Summit (HHIS), dem europaweit ausgetragenen EIT-ICT-Wettbewerb und dem weltweit bedeutenden South by Southwest (SXSW) Accelerator ausgezeichnet oder als „Ausgezeichneter Ort im Land der Ideen“ prämiert werden.” (BFHH 2018c p.24)


“Hamburgs kreative Unternehmen setzen im Schnitt doppelt so viel um wie ihre Berliner Pendants.” (Hamburg Kreativ Gesellschaft 2012 p.18)

“Laut KfW-Gründungsmonitor 2015 liegt die Gründungsquote in Hamburg bei rund 2,36 Prozent und damit nur knapp hinter Berlin (2,60 Prozent).” (HK 2015 p.13)

“Unter denen sind natürlich viele kleine und junge Unternehmen der IT-Branche und gerade für die ist Hamburg ein guter Standort. Das Gründungs-Barometer der Handelskammer weist aus, dass von knapp 21.000 Neugründungen im vorigen Jahr rund zehn Prozent zum Informations- und Kommunikationsbereich zu rechnen waren.” (Scholz 2011j)

“Hamburg ist immer ein großer Medienstandort gewesen, in allen Zweigen der Medien sind heute etwa 100.000 Arbeitnehmer beschäftigt. Mit den sozialen Netzwerken (Xing, Google, Facebook in Hamburg) oder Games sind neue Medienarbeitsplätze entstanden” (Scholz 2012m)

“Dazu müssen wir das Rad nicht neu erfinden, sondern können auf viele gute Initiativen und Beratungsangebote gerade auch der Kammer zurückgreifen. Aber wir werden Projekte wie Inkubatoren und Acceleratoren anregen, dabei helfen, neue Finanzierungsinstrumente zu entwickeln und zeigen, dass die zweithöchste Gründungsintensität Deutschlands kein Zufall ist.” (Scholz 2014h)

“In Hamburg haben wir dafür alle Voraussetzungen: Bei uns arbeiten 3,8 Prozent aller sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigten in Informatik-, Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie-Berufen. Damit sind wir nach Aussage des BITKOM im Ländervergleich mit deutlichem Abstand die Nummer eins.” (Scholz 2016h)


“Die jungen Gründer mit guten Ideen leben längst unter uns. Nicht umsonst stehen wir seit Jahren in allen Gründerstatistiken weit vorne.” (Scholz 2013a)

“Bei der Entwicklung neuer, vor allem digitaler Technologien spielen Start-Ups in Hamburg eine immer wichtigere Rolle. Mit 25 Gründungen pro 1000 Erwerbstätige hat sich die Gründungsquote verglichen mit dem Vorjahr wieder leicht positiv entwickelt und Hamburg liegt laut KfW-Gründungsmonitor damit im Bundesländer-Ranking weiterhin weit voran.” (Scholz 2016i)


"Between 2014 and 2016, Hamburg had the most new businesses founded in Germany, overtaking Berlin. Per ten thousand working people, there were on average 253 new businesses started annually (compared to Berlin's figure of 238)” (Raisher et al. 2018 p12)


International Comparison:

"Der Senat hat in Vorbereitung der Talentstrategie das Projekt „Talentstadt Hamburg“ initiiert, in dem u.a. untersucht wurde, inwieweit die Beobachtungen aus den USA auf Hamburg übertragbar sind, welche Talent- und Metropolstrategien andere europäische Spitzenmetropolen anwenden, welche Rolle die erfolgreiche Hamburger Clusterpolitik für eine Talentstrategie spielt, wie groß der zukünftige Talentedarf in der Metropolregion Hamburg ist und welche Anforderungen relevante Talengruppen an ihren Lebensmittelpunkt stellen. Aus diesen Analysen wurden anschließend Empfehlungen für eine Hamburger Talentstrategie abgeleitet.” (BFHH 2007 p.7)

"Zusammen mit vier Mitgliedsunternehmen und über 30 weiteren Ausstellern aus der Hansestadt ist Hamburg@work auf der größten Kreativmesse in den USA mit einer eigenen Präsenz vertreten.” (Hamburg@work 2012a p.17)


"Diese weltgrößte globale Konferenz rund um Facebook, Twitter, Xing, Youtube und Co. findet zeitgleich auch in Bangalore, Barcelona, Kopenhagen, Lagos, Mailand, New York und Tokio statt. In keiner der anderen Teilnehmerstädte aber wurden so viele Veranstaltungen angemeldet wie in Hamburg, wo es verteilt über die Stadt mehr als 200 Vorträge und Diskussionsrunden geben wird. Etwa 100 davon sollen im Internet übertragen werden.” (Meyer-Wellmann 2014)

"Und nicht ohne Grund haben sich mit Google, Facebook, Twitter, Hootsuite und Yelp führende Internetgiganten bei der Auswahl ihres Hauptsitzes in Deutschland für Hamburg entschieden. ” (nextMedia.Hamburg 2016a p.1)


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„Wissenschaft, Wirtschaft und die Stadtgesellschaft bekommen ein Labor, um dort Lösungen für die Zukunft zu entwickeln.“ Ein Silicon Valley mit Elbblick.” (Iken 2017)

“CityScienceLab der HafenCity Universität in Hamburg, eine Kooperation mit dem MIT Media Lab, das eine führende Position in der Exploration und Anwendung partizipativer Entscheidungsprozesse mittels datengestützter Visualisierungen und Simulationen im Kontext der digitalen Stadt / Smart Cities einnimmt.” (Hamburg@work 2018c)

“Gerade bei der Ansiedlung von US-Firmen aus dem IT-Bereich sind wir im Moment sehr erfolgreich.” (Dr. Rolf Strittmatter (Managing Director HWF Hamburgische Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung and Hamburg Marketing) in HWF 2015 p.2)

“Für Michael Zilmer ist klar: „Warum Boston und das Silicon Valley so stark sind? Das liegt auch an den dortigen Hochschulen.“ Der Games-Master ist eine Hamburger Antwort darauf. „Nach anfänglichen Vorurteilen werden hier mittlerweile sowohl das künstlerische wie das Innovationsniveau erkannt. Wir haben einen hohen Grad an Ausgründungen wie zum Beispiel Daedalic oder Xyrality“, erzählt Professor Gunther Rehfeld, Gründer des Studiengangs an der HAW.” (BKM 2017 p.46)

“Das erste Cluster, das sich in Hamburg entwickelt hat, ist Hamburg@work (1997). Über 23.000 internationale Medien-, IT- und Telekommunikationsunternehmen sitzen in Hamburg (Google, Dropbox, facebook, Snapchat, twitter und twitch, mytaxi, Kreditech, statista). Hamburg ist „gamecity“, weil hier die großen Spieleentwickler sitzen.” (BWVI 2018a p.3)


“Mit dem Energie-Campus soll ein „Silicon Valley“ der Erneuerbaren Energien in Hamburg entstehen, das Innovationen und Ansiedlungen der Branche fördert.” (HK 2018 p.18)

“Nach gewonnenen Kreativpreisen in der Werbewirtschaft gehört Hamburg in den letzten Jahren zusammen mit New York, London und Sao Paulo auch weltweit zu den erfolgreichsten Kreativmetropolen.” (Scholz 2012l)

“Dem großen Vorbild des South by South West Festivals in Austin folgend, schickt sich das Reeperbahnfestival damit an, zum führenden europäischen Festival der Kreativwirtschaft zu werden!” (Scholz 2013s)

“es derzeit faszinierend zu sehen, dass sich in vielen Metropolen Europas urbane Entwicklung auf Räume östlich der City konzentriert. East London und die Entwicklung um den Silicon Roundabout oder das East End sind da nur prominente Beispiele. Auch in Hamburg ist das nicht anders. Nach der HafenCity und dem Sprung über die Elbe richten wir den Blick stromaufwärts nach Osten.” (Scholz 2014i)

“Zunächst aber freue ich mich mit Ihnen auf den Ausblick, den uns Joi Ito, der Direktor des Media Lab am MIT in den USA nun geben wird. Mit dem MIT Media Lab wollen wir in den kommenden Jahren gemeinsam die digitalen Umbrüche moderner Städte erforschen.” (Scholz 2015l)

“es gehört vermutlich zu den urbanen Mythen, dass die Container-Kräne in den Häfen eine wichtige Inspirationsquelle für George Lucas, den Produzenten von „Star Wars“, waren. Die Einwohner der San Francisco Bay Area haben diese Geschichte erzählt. Ihnen drängte sich die Ähnlichkeit zwischen den großen grauen Kränen in Oakland und den elefantengleich gehenden Fahrzeugen aus dem Film „Das Imperium schlägt zurück“ auf. Vermutlich hält sich die Geschichte auch deshalb so gut, weil die Bewegung der Kräne immer wieder an die geistige Verwandtschaft zwischen Logistik und Zukunft erinnert. Wenn Sie in Hamburg sind, können Sie das bei einem Sonntagsspaziergang überprüfen. Denn in Hamburg liegt der Hafen mitten in der Stadt.” (Scholz 2016k)

“In den USA wird gemessen am Bruttoinlandsprodukt jährlich rund sieben Mal mehr Venture Capital investiert. Der deutsche Markt hat ein erhebliches Nachholpotenzial. Mit der DTCP geht damit von Hamburg ein neuer dynamischer Impuls aus. Mit Ihrem Know-how, Ihrer Erfahrung, Ihrem Netzwerk und dem sechstgrößten Telekommunikationsunternehmen der Welt im Rücken unterstützen Sie
das Wachstum von innovativen Unternehmen ganz erheblich. Viele Gründungen aus Hamburg sind zu erfolgreichen, international agierenden Unternehmen geworden, beispielsweise InnoGames, Kreditech, myTaxi oder Xing – die Reihe ist natürlich viel länger, und wir sind sehr zuversichtlich, dass sie immer weiter anwachsen wird. Gründungen in Hamburg zeichnen sich durch eine klare wirtschaftliche Perspektive aus.“ (Scholz 2016i)


"Die zuversichtliche und zupackende Reaktion auf die Veränderungen unserer Tage ist etwas, das insbesondere in den USA – in Anlehnung an JFK – als „moonshot thinking“ beschrieben und oft mit einem gehörigen Schuss Pathos verbunden wird. Gemeint ist eine Haltung, die sagt: „Versucht nicht, Bestehendes fünf Prozent besser zu machen, sondern macht es 100 Prozent anders. Strebt nach dem Sprung, sucht die Disruption.“ Wie damals beim Projekt Mondlandung. Wer so denkt, der umarmt andererseits den Wandel und schafft die neuen Möglichkeiten, die nicht nur aus dem Silicon Valley zu uns gelangen und die wir gerne auch hier bei uns ermöglichen wollen.“ (Scholz 2013j)

"In den USA kann man im Straßenbild sehen, wie technologischer Fortschritt durch Vorpreschen in den Regionen entsteht. Kalifornien zum Beispiel hat immer wieder Fortschritte der Pkw-Antriebstechnologie bewirkt. Hamburg ist einer der größten Buskäufer in Deutschland. Deshalb ist unsere Stadt als Entwicklungslabor für emissionsfreie Busse so wichtig, denn damit die Pläne aufgehen, muss die Industrie jetzt investieren. Das tut sie, wenn sie weiß, dass sie Partner findet, die die Fahrzeuge dann auch kaufen.“ - (Scholz 2014r)

"Wir müssen uns vielmehr um die digitale Transformation kümmern. Deshalb lohnt aus meiner Sicht auch der Blick nach New York mehr als der ins Silicon Valley. Wir sollten uns bemühen, noch genauer zu verstehen, wie es dort an der Ostküste gelungen ist, die großen Medien- und Entertainmenthäuser digital zu erneuern und gleichzeitig viel Neues wachsen zu lassen.“ (Scholz 2014h)

"Sie repräsentieren übrigens vier der Medienhäuser, die bei nextMedia.Hamburg mit dabei sind. Man muss kein Apologet der California Ideology sein, um die gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Chancen zu sehen, die darin liegen, dass immer mehr Geräte miteinander vernetzt sind und uns dabei helfen, Prozesse intelligenter zu steuern und besser informiert zu entscheiden. Auch für Medienmacher liegen hier große Möglichkeiten: Nie waren die Reichweiten höher, nie die Optionen der Darstellung größer.“ (Scholz 2014g)

"Schon als es mit der Digitalisierung im Westen der USA, im Silicon Valley, so richtig losging, da war viel die Rede von der so genannten „California Ideology“. Gemeint war damit die Überzeugung, dass die neuen digitalen Möglichkeiten in der Lage seien, unsere Gesellschaften unbegrenzt freier und partizipativer zu machen, besser und gerechter. Der frühe Leitsatz von Google „Don’t be evil“ fällt in diese Zeit und fußt auf diesen Überzeugungen. Ich will hier nicht einer naive Technikgläubigkeit das Wort reden, aber es könnte nicht schaden, wenn wir uns von diesem Optimismus ein wenig abwenden würden. Denn die grundsätzliche Überzeugung, dass es möglich ist, mit technischen Innovationen unser Leben zu verbessern, teile ich ausdrücklich. Der Fortschritt nicht nur der Industrie-, sondern auch der digitalen Gesellschaft ist eng verknüpft mit der technologischen Entwicklung und unserer gesellschaftlichen Fähigkeit, uns diese nutzbar zu machen.“ (Scholz 2015n)


"Wir können stolz darauf sein, dass auch in London, an der Ostküste oder im Silicon Valley gesehen wird, dass man in Hamburg ein gutes Geschäft machen kann.“ (Scholz 2012n)

Appendix F: Ethics Approval

02/08/2018

Dear Moritz Philip Recke,

Your application 5079: The effects of social imaginaries on the development of entrepreneurship policies towards high-growth entrepreneurship in Hamburg, Germany, submission 3843, has been approved by the Business and Enterprise SEC. You may now proceed with your study. If you wish to make any significant changes to the study you must seek the committee's approval before actioning them.

Good luck with your research.

Dr A Kourtoulis